Non- infringement of copyright or Copyright free materials in India

Section 52 , Copyright Act, 1957
52. Certain acts not to be infringement of copyright.—

(1) The following acts shall not constitute an infringement of copyright, namely:—

(a) a fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work 1[not being a computer programme] for the purposes of—
(i) Private use including research;]

(ii) criticism or review, whether of that work or of any other work;
(aa) the making of copies or adaptation of a computer programme by the lawful possessor of a copy of such computer programme from such copy—
(i) in order to utilise the computer programme for the purpose for which it was supplied; or
(ii) to make back-up copies purely as a temporary protection against loss, destruction or damage in order only to utilise the computer programme for the purpose for which it was supplied;
(ab) the doing of any act necessary to obtain information essential for operating inter-operability of an independently created computer programme with other programmes by a lawful possessor of a computer programme provided that such information is not otherwise readily available;
(ac) the observation, study or test of functioning of the computer programme in order to determine the ideas and principles which underline any elements of the programme while performing such acts necessary for the functions for which the computer programme was supplied;
(ad) the making of copies or adaption of the computer programme from a personally legally obtained copy for non-commercial personal use;
(b) a fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work for the purpose of reporting current events—

(i) in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical; or
(ii) by 4[broadcast] or in a cinematograph film or by means of photographs. broadcast or in a cinematograph film or by means of photographs.”
[Explanation.—The publication of a compilation of addresses or speeches delivered in public is not a fair dealing of such work within the meaning of this clause;]
(c) the reproduction of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work for the purpose of a judicial proceeding or for the purpose of a report of a judicial proceeding;
(d) the reproduction or publication of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work in any work prepared by the Secretariat of a Legislature or, where the Legislature consists of two Houses, by the Secretariat of either House of the Legislature, exclusively for the use of the members of that Legislature;
(e) the reproduction of any literary, dramatic or musical work in a certified copy made or supplied in accordance with any law for the time being in force;
(f) the reading or recitation in public of any reasonable extract from a published literary or dramatic work;
(g) the publication in a collection, mainly composed of non-copyright matter, bona fide intended for the use of educational institutions, and so described in the title and in any advertisement issued by or on behalf of the publisher, of short passages from published literary or dramatic works, not themselves published for the use of educational institutions, in which copyright subsists: Provided that not more than two such passages from works by the same author are published by the same publisher during any period of five years.
Explanation.—In the case of a work of joint authorship, references in this clause to passage from works shall include references to passages from works by any one or more of the authors of those passages or by any one or more of those authors in collaboration with any other person;
(h) the reproduction of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work—
(i) by a teacher or a pupil in the course of instruction; or

(ii) as part of the questions to be answered in an examination; or
(iii) in answers, to such questions;
(i) the performance, in the course of the activities of an educational institution, of a literary, dramatic or musical work by the staff and student of the institution, or of a cinematograph film or a 6[sound recording], if the audience is limited to such staff and students, the parents and guardians of the students and persons directly connected with the activities of the institution or the communication to such an audience of a cinematograph film or sound recording];
(j) the making of sound recordings in respect of any literary, dramatic or musical work, if—
(i) sound recordings of that work have been made by or with the licence or consent of the owner of the right in the work;
(ii) the person making the sound recordings has given a notice of his intention to make the sound recordings, has provided copies of all covers or labels with which the sound recordings are to be sold, and has paid in the prescribed manner to the owner of rights in the work royalties in respect of all such sound recordings to be made by him, at the rate fixed by the Copyright Board in this behalf:
Provided that—
(i) no alterations shall be made which have not been made previously by or with the consent of the owner of rights, or which are not reasonably necessary for the adaptation of the work for the purpose of making the sound recordings;
(ii) the sound recordings shall not be issued in any form of packaging or with any label which is likely to mislead or confuse the public as to their identity;
(iii) no such sound recording shall be made until the expiration of two calendar years after the end of the year in which the first recording of the work was made; and
(iv) the person making such sound recordings shall allow the owner of rights or his duly authorised agent or representative to inspect all records and books of account relating to such sound recording:
Provided further that if on a complaint brought before the Copyright Board to the effect that the owner of rights has not been paid in full for any sound recordings purporting to be made in pursuance of this clause, the Copyright Board is, prima facie satisfied that the complaint is genuine, it may pass an order ex parte directing the person making the sound recording to cease from making further copies and, after holding such inquiry as it considers necessary, make such further order as it may deem fit, including an order for payment of royalty;
(k) the causing of a recording to be heard in public by utilising it,—

(i) in an enclosed room or hall meant for the common use of residents in any residential premises (not being a hotel or similar commercial establishment) as part of the amenities provided exclusively or mainly for residents therein; or
(ii) as part of the activities of a club or similar organisation which is not established or conducted for profit;
(l) the performance of a literary, dramatic or musical work by an amateur club or society, if the performance is given to a non-paying audience, or for the benefit of a religious institution;
(m) the reproduction in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical of an article on current economic, political, social or religious topics, unless the author of such article has expressly reserved to himself the right of such reproduction;
(n) the publication in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical of a report of a lecture delivered in public;
(o) the making of not more than three copies of a book (including a pamphlet, sheet of music, map, chart or plan) by or under the direction of the person in charge of a public library for the use of the library if such book is not available for sale in India;
(p) the reproduction, for the purpose of research or private study, or with a view to publication, of an unpublished literary, dramatic or musical works kept in a library, museum or other institution to which the public has access:
Provided that where the identity of the author of any such work or, in the case of a work of joint authorship, of any of the authors is known to the library, museum or other institution, as the case may be, the provisions of this clause shall apply only if such reproduction is made at a time more than sixty years from the date of the death of the author or, in the case of a work of joint authorship, from the death of the author whose identity is known or, if the identity of more authors than one is known from the death of such of those authors who died last;
(q) the reproduction or publication of—

(i) any matter which has been published in any Official Gazette except an Act of a Legislature;
(ii) any Act of a Legislature subject to the condition that such Act is reproduced or published together with any commentary thereon or any other original matter;
(iii) the report of any committee, commission, council, board or other like body appointed by the Legislature, unless the reproduction or publication of such report is prohibited by the Government;
(iv) any judgment or order of a court, Tribunal or other judicial authority, unless the reproduction or publication of such judgment or order is prohibited by the court, the Tribunal or other judicial authority, as the case may be;
(r) the production or publication of a translation in any Indian language of an Act of a Legislature and of any rules or orders made thereunder—

(i) if no translation of such Act or rules or orders in that language has previously been produced or published by the Government; or
(ii) where a translation of such Act or rules or orders in that language has been produced or published by the Government, if the translation is not available for sale to the public: Provided that such translation contains a statement at a prominent place to the effect that the translation has not been authorised or accepted as authentic by the Government;
(s) the making or publishing of a painting, drawing, engraving or photograph of a work of architecture or the display of a work of architecture;]
(t) the making or publishing of a painting, drawing, engraving or photograph of a sculpture, or other artistic work falling under sub-clause (iii) of clause (c) of section 2, if such work is permanently situate in a public place or any premises to which the public has access;
(u) the inclusion in a cinematograph film of—

(i) any artistic work permanently situate in a public place or any premises to which the public has access; or
(ii) any other artistic work, if such inclusion is only by way of background or is otherwise incidental to the principal matters represented in the film;
(v) the use by the author of an artistic work, where the author of such work is not the owner of the copyright therein, of any would, cast, sketch, plan, model or study made by him for the purpose of the work: Provided that he does not thereby repeat or imitate the main design of the work;
(x) the reconstruction of a building or structure in accordance with the architectural drawings or plans by reference to which the building or structure was originally constructed: Provided that the original construction was made with the consent or licence of the owner of the copyright in such drawings and plans;
(y) in relation to a literary, dramatic or musical work recorded or reproduced in any cinematograph film, the exhibition of such film after the expiration of the term of copyright therein: Provided that the provisions of sub-clause (ii) of clause (a), sub-clause
(i) of clause (b) and clauses (d), (f), (g), (m) and (p) shall not apply as respects any act unless that act is accompanied by an acknowledgement—

(i) identifying the work by its title or other description; and
(ii) unless the work is anonymous or the author of the work has previously agreed or required that no acknowledgement of his name should be made, also identifying the author; 12[(z) the making of an ephemeral recording, by a broadcasting organisation using its own facilities for its own broadcast by a broadcasting organisation of a work which it has the right to broadcast; and the retention of such recording for achival purposes on the ground of its exceptional documentary character;
(za) the performance of a literary, dramatic or musical work or the communication to the public of such work or of a sound recording in the course of any bona fide religious ceremony or an official ceremony held by the Central Government or the State Government or any local authority.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this clause, religious ceremony including a marriage procession and other social festivities associated with a marriage.]
(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply to the doing of any act in relation to the translation of a literary, dramatic or musical work or the adaptation of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work as they apply in relation to the work itself.

Supreme Court of India Judgment Index-1991

1991 Supreme Court of India Judgment Index 
January 1991
  • SHER SINGH V. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS [1991] – 1 (8 January 1991)
  • GRIH KALYAN KENDRA WORKERS’ UNION V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 2 (9 January 1991)
  • SUBHASH KUMAR V. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS [1991] – 3 (9 January 1991)
  • SHIVA GLASS WORKS CO. LTD. V. ASSITANT COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE & ORS [1991] – 4 (11 January 1991)
  • STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR V. KAUSHAL KISHORE SHUKLA [1991] – 5 (11 January 1991)
  • BALAKRISHNA PILLAI, CHIEF INSPECTOR OF DRUGSINTELLIGENCE V. MATHA MEDICLAS & ORS [1991] – 6 (15 January 1991)
  • RAJU KAKARA SHETTY V. RAMESH PRATAPRAO SHIROLE & ANR [1991] – 7 (15 January 1991)
  • BABU LAL V. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS [1991] – 8 (16 January 1991)
  • PADMABEN SHAMALBHAI PATEL V. STATE OF GUJARAT [1991] – 9 (18 January 1991)
  • DHONDU UNDRU CHUDHARY V. GANPAT LAL SHANKAR LAL AGARWAL [1991] – 10 (18 January 1991)
  • M.L. JAIN V. UNION OF INDIA [1991] – 11 (22 January 1991)
  • K.M. ABDULLA KUNHI AND B.L. ABDUL KHADER V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS, STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS [1991] – 12 (23 January 1991)
  • COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, WEST BENGAL V. WESMAN ENGG. CO. (P.) LTD. [1991] – 13 (24 January 1991)
  • NIADAR & ORS ETC V. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR [1991] – 14 (25 January 1991)
  • ASSISTANT COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, GUNTUR V. RAMDEV TOBACCO COMPANY [1991] – 15 (25 January 1991)
  • UNION OF INDIA & ORS V. EX-CONSTABLE AMRIK SINGH [1991] – 16 (29 January 1991)
  • STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS V. KRISHNARAO SHINDE & ORS [1991] – 17 (29 January 1991)
  • INDIAN EX-SERVICES LEAGUE & ORS V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 18 (29 January 1991)
  • ANIRUDHA RAMAKRISHNA KARLEKAR V. SMT. JANKIBAI R. BEDEKAR [1991] – 19 (29 January 1991)
  • NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU V. KRISHAN LAL & ORS [1991] – 20 (29 January 1991)
February 1991
  • MAHARANI KUSUMKUMARI & ANR V. SMT. KUSUMKUMARI JADEJA & ANR [1991] – 21 (1 February 1991)
  • PREM CHAND SOMCHAND SHAH & ANR V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR [1991] – 22 (5 February 1991)
  • SHANKAR PANDURANG JADHAV & ORS V. VICE-ADMIRAL, FLAG OFFICER, COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF & ORS [1991] – 23 (5 February 1991)
  • JAI PRAKASH V. STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) [1991] – 24 (5 February 1991)
  • BAYER (INDIA) LTD. & ORS V. STATE OF

    MAHARASIFTRA

     & ORS [1991] – 25 (6 February 1991)
  • SMT. SURESHTA DEVI V. OM PRAKASH [1991] – 26 (7 February 1991)
  • STATE OF KERALA & ANR V. KANAN DEVAN HILLS PRODUCE CO. LTD. [1991] – 27 (7 February 1991)
  • ANAYATULLAH & ORS V. COMMISSIONER OF MUSLIM WAKF OF JAMMU [1991] – 28 (7 February 1991)
  • SMT. VIOLET ISSAC & ORS V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 29 (8 February 1991)
  • B. VISWANATHIAH AND COMPANY & ORS V. STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS [1991] – 30 (11 February 1991)
  • CHEMICALS AND FIBRES OF INDIA LTD. V. UNION OF INDIA [1991] – 31 (11 February 1991)
  • DIRECTOR, LIFT IRRIGATION CORPORATION LTD. & ORS V. PRAVAT KIRAN MOHANTY & ORS [1991] – 32 (12 February 1991)
  • RATTAN CHAND HIRA CHAND V. ASKAR NAWAZ JUNG & ORS [1991] – 33 (12 February 1991)
  • G. CLARIDGE AND COMPANY LIMITED V. COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE [1991] – 34 (12 February 1991)
  • EMC STEEL LIMITED, CALCUTTA V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR [1991] – 35 (13 February 1991)
  • S. SURJIT SINGH KALRA V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR [1991] – 36 (13 February 1991)
  • DES RAJ BHATNAGAR & ANR V. UNION OF INDIA [1991] – 37 (13 February 1991)
  • MUKERIAN PAPERS LTD- V. STATE OF PUNJAB [1991] – 38 (13 February 1991)
  • JASWANT SINGH NERWAL V. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS [1991] – 39 (14 February 1991)
  • GOKAK PATEL VOLKART LTD. V. DUNDAYYA GURUSHIDDAIAH HIREMATH & ORS [1991] – 40 (14 February 1991)
  • NARAIN DAS JAIN (SINCE DECEASED) BY L.RS. V. AGRA NAGAR MAHAPALIKA [1991] – 41 (14 February 1991)
  • GUIP SINGH & ANR V. AMAR SINGH & ANR [1991] – 42 (14 February 1991)
  • NEW

    BANK,OF

     INDIA V. N.P. SEHGAL & ANR [1991] – 43 (15 February 1991)
  • MATHURA REFINERY MAZDOOR SANGH V. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. [1991] – 44 (15 February 1991)
  • DARYAO SINGH V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [1991] – 45 (15 February 1991)
  • SMT. P. LEELAVATHAMMA V. CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, ANDHRA PRADESH, HYDERABAD [1991] – 46 (15 February 1991)
  • SPENCES HOTEL PVT. LTD. & ANR V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS [1991] – 47 (15 February 1991)
  • SMT.GRACY V. STATE OF KERALA & ANR [1991] – 48 (15 February 1991)
  • OM PRAKASH PURI ANR V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS [1991] – 49 (16 February 1991)
  • K. VENKATA SESHIAH V. KANDURU RAMASUBBAMMA [1991] – 50 (19 February 1991)
  • RAJRATHA NARANBHAI MILLS. CO. LTD. V. SALES TAX OFFICER, PETLAD [1991] – 51 (19 February 1991)
  • STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS V. DEBDAS KUMAR & ORS [1991] – 52 (19 February 1991)
  • MAHARASHTRA STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION V. JAYCEE DRUGS AND PHARMACEUTICALS PVT. LTD. & ORS [1991] – 53 (19 February 1991)
  • HARBANS SINGH V. GURAN DITTA SINGH [1991] – 54 (20 February 1991)
  • PURAN SINGH SAHNI V. SMT. SUNDARI BHAGWANDAS KRIPALANI & ORS [1991] – 55 (20 February 1991)
  • AJEET SINGH SINGHVI V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS [1991] – 56 (20 February 1991)
  • BHAVANI TEA AND PRODUCE CO. LTD. V. STATE OF KERALA & ORS [1991] – 57 (20 February 1991)
  • LAKHAN SAO V. DHARAMU CHAUDHARY [1991] – 58 (20 February 1991)
  • RAM KUMAR & ORS V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 59 (21 February 1991)
  • A.L.A. FIRM V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, MADRAS [1991] – 60 (21 February 1991)
  • CAPTAIN SUBASH KUMAR V. PRINCIPAL OFFICER, MERCANTILE MARINE DEPARTMENT, MADRAS [1991] – 61 (22 February 1991)
  • RAM SARAN & ANR ECT. V. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS [1991] – 62 (22 February 1991)
  • MOHAN LAL SHAMLAL SONI V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR [1991] – 63 (22 February 1991)
  • MITHLESH KUMARI & ANR V. FATEH BAHADUR SINGH & ANR [1991] – 64 (22 February 1991)
  • NAIN SINGH & ANR V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH [1991] – 65 (22 February 1991)
  • PUNDALIK V. DISTRICT DEPUTY REGISTRAR, CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES, CHANDRAPU [1991] -66 (22 February 1991)
  • BIHAR STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION V. STATE TRANSPORT TRIBUNAL & ORS [1991] – 67 (22 February 1991)
  • K. MURUGAN V. FENCING ASSN. OF INDIA, JABALPUR & ORS [1991] – 68 (22 February 1991)
March 1991
  • MANOHAR JOSHI V. DAMODAR TATYABA DADASAHEB RUPWATE & ORS [1991] – 69 (11 March 1991)
  • MAHARASHTRA STATE BOA OF SECONDARY ANDHIGHER SECONDARY ED V. K.S. GANDHI & ORS [1991] – 70 (12 March 1991)
  • PRAKASH WAREHOUSING CO. V. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY& ANR [1991] – 71 (13 March 1991)
  • TOOLSIDASS

    JEWRAJ

     V. ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS & ORS [1991] – 72 (13 March 1991)
  • R. MCDILL AND COMPANY PVT. LTD. V. GOURI SHANKAR SAA & ORS [1991] – 73 (13 March 1991)
  • K.NAGAMALLESHWARA RAO & ORS V. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [1991] – 74 (14 March 1991)
  • M.C.MEHTA V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 75 (14 March 1991)
  • BHUPPENDRA SINGH & ORS V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH [1991] – 76 (14 March 1991)
  • EX. CAPT. K. BALASUBRAMANIAN V. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR [1991] – 77 (14 March 1991)
  • LAXMI SHANKAR PANDEY V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 78 (19 March 1991)
  • K.VIMAL V. K.VEERASWAMY [1991] – 79 (20 March 1991)
  • MOHIT LAL DAS V. REBA RANI SAHA [1991] – 80 (22 March 1991)
  • GAEN SILK WEAVING FACTORY, SURAT V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,GUJARAT, AHMEDABAD [1991] – 81 (22 March 1991)
  • N.K. JAIN & ORS V. C.K.SHAH & ORS [1991] – 82 (26 March 1991)
April 1991
  • STATE OF BIHAR V. P.P. SHARMA, IAS & ANR [1991] – 83 (2 April 1991)
  • SRI RABINARAYAN MOHAPATRA V. STATE OF ORISSA & ORS [1991] – 84 (2 April 1991)
  • D.T.C . WORKERS’ UNION & ORS V. DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION [1991] – 85 (2 April 1991)
  • HEDULED CASTE AND WEAKER SECTION WELFARE ASSOCIATION V. STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS [1991] – 86 (2 April 1991)
  • NARENDRA PRATAP NARAIN SINGH & ANR V. STATE OF U.P [1991] – 87 (3 April 1991)
  • BURN STANDA COMPANY LIMITED V. MCDERMOTT INTERNATIONAL INC. & ANR [1991] – 88 (3 April 1991)
  • MAHESH CHANDER & ANR V. STATE OF DELHI [1991] – 89 (3 April 1991)
  • MAGUNI CHARAN PRADHAN V. STATE OF ORISSA [1991] – 90 (4 April 1991)
  • SOUTH EASTERN COALFIELDS LIMITED V. CENTURY TEXTILES AND INDUSTRY LTD. & ORS [1991] – 91 (4 April 1991)
  • ORISSA CEMENT LTD & ORS V. STATE OF ORISSA & ORS [1991] – 92 (4 April 1991)
  • S.L. CHOPRA & ORS V. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS [1991] – 93 (5 April 1991)
  • A.N.SEHGAL & ORS V. RAJE RAM SHEORAN & ORS [1991] – 94 (5 April 1991)
  • MOTILAL CHHADAMI LAL JAIN V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX , DELHI [1991] – 95 (8 April 1991)
  • STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS V. ST. JOSEPH TEACHERS TRAINING INSTITUTE & ANR [1991] -96 (8 April 1991)
  • ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LIMITED, KYMORE V. COMMISSIONER OF SALES-TAX [1991] – 97 (9 April 1991)
  • MALKIAT SINGH & ORS V. STATE OF PUNJAB [1991] – 98 (10 April 1991)
  • U.P.STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION & ANR V. MOHD. ISMAIL & ORS [1991] – 99 (11 April 1991)
  • JAHARLAL DAS V. STATE OF ORISSA [1991] – 100 (12 April 1991)
  • AJYURVIDYA PRASARAK MANDAL & ANR V. MRS.GEETA BHASKAR PENDSE & ORS [1991] – 101 (12 April 1991)
  • STATE OF PUNJAB V. BABU SINGH [1991] – 102 (16 April 1991)
  • GENERAL SECRETARY ROURKELA SRAMIK SANGH V. ROURKELA MAZDOOR SABHA & ORS [1991] – 103 (16 April 1991)
  • AMIRTHAM KUDUMBAH V. SARNAM KUMDUMBAN [1991] – 104 (16 April 1991)
  • N.PARTHASARATHY V. CONTROLLER OF CAPITAL ISSUES & ANR [1991] – 105 (16 April 1991)
  • MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, RAIPUR V. ASHOK KUMAR MISRA [1991] – 106 (16 April 1991)
  • EAST INDIA CORPORATION LTD. V. SHREE MEENAKSHI MILLS LTD. [1991] – 107 (16 April 1991)
  • STATE OF BIHAR & ORS V. AKHOURI SACHINDRA NATH & ORS [1991] – 108 (19 April 1991)
  • UNION OF INDIA & ORS V. E.G. NAMBUDIRI [1991] – 109 (23 April 1991)
  • O.P. GARG & ORS V. STATE OF U.P. & ORS [1991] – 110 (23 April 1991)
  • NANDGANJ SIHORI SUGAR CO. LTD., RAE BARELI & ANR V. BADRI NATH DIXIT & ORS [1991] -111 (24 April 1991)
  • DAYA SINGH V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 112 (24 April 1991)
  • DISTRICT EXHIBITORS ASSOCIATION MUZAFFARNAGAR& ORS V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 113 (25 April 1991)
  • VATTICHERUKURU VILLAGE PANCHAYAT & ORS V. NORI VEKATRAMA DEEKSHITHULU & ORS [1991] – 114 (26 April 1991)
  • MAHARAJA TOURIST SERVICE ETC V. STATE OF GUJARAT [1991] – 115 (26 April 1991)
  • MST. SURAYYA BEGUM, V. MOHD. USMAN & ORS [1991] – 116 (26 April 1991)
  • STATE OF TAMILNADU V. STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS [1991] – 117 (26 April 1991)
  • DR. ARUN KUMAR AGRAWAL & ORS ETC V. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS [1991] – 118 (26 April 1991)
  • G. NARAYANASWAMY REDDY & ANR V. GOVT. OF KARNATAKA & ANR [1991] – 119 (29 April 1991)
  • NAGARAJ SHIVARAO KARJAGI V. SYNDICATE BANK HEAD OFFICE MANIPAL & ANR [1991] – 120 (30 April 1991)
  • SHANKARSAN DASH V. UNION OF INDIA [1991] – 121 (30 April 1991)
May 1991
  • KALAWATIBAI V. SOIRYABAI & ORS [1991] – 122 (1 May 1991)
  • DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. DELHI CLOTH MILLS LTD. & ORS [1991] – 123 (1 May 1991)
  • HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD. V. ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ELECTRICITY BOAS & ORS [1991] – 124 (2 May 1991)
  • GENERAL MANAGER, E.I.D. PARRY (INDIA) LTD. V. PRESIDING OFFICER & ORS [1991] – 125 (2 May 1991)
  • ANDHRA STEEL CORPORATION LTD. V. ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ELECTRICITY BOA & ORS [1991] – 126 (2 May 1991)
  • STATE OF MAHARASHTRA V. ANAND CHINTAMAN DIGHE [1991] – 127 (2 May 1991)
  • DR MAHABAL RAM V. INDIAN COUNCIL OF AGRICULTURE RESEARCH [1991] – 128 (3 May 1991)
  • AJUDH RAJ & ORS V. MOTI [1991] – 129 (3 May 1991)
  • UNION OF INDIA & ORS V. TEJRAM PARASHRAMJI BOMBHATE & ORS [1991] – 130 (3 May 1991)
  • EX. NAIK SAAR SINGH V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 131 (3 May 1991)
  • OM PRAKASH GOEL V. HIMACHAL PRADESH TOURISM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. [1991] – 132 (6 May 1991)
  • PODDAR STEEL CORPORATION V. GANESH ENGINEERING WORKS & ORS [1991] – 133 (6 May 1991)
  • CHANDMAL V. FIRM RAM CHANDRA AND VISHWANATH [1991] – 134 (7 May 1991)
  • BOLLAVARAM PEDDA NARSI REDDY & ORS V. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [1991] – 135 (7 May 1991)
  • SEVAKA PERUMAL, V. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [1991] – 136 (7 May 1991)
  • SUB-COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 137 (8 May 1991)
  • PRATIBHA CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. & ANR V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS [1991] – 138 (9 May 1991)
  • MUNINDRA KUMAR & ORS V. RAJIV GOVIL & ORS [1991] – 139 (10 May 1991)
  • TRIBHOVANDAS HARIBHAI TAMBOLI V. GUJARAT REVENUE TRIBUNAL & ORS [1991] – 140 (10 May 1991)
  • STATE OF PUNJAB V. IQBAL SINGH & ORS [1991] – 141 (10 May 1991)
  • F.A. SAPA V. SINGORA & ORS [1991] – 142 (10 May 1991)
July 1991
  • GAGAN BIHARI SAMAL & ANR V. STATE OF ORISSA [1991] – 143 (9 July 1991)
  • B.P. SINGH & ORS V. DIRECTOR GENERAL, ONANCE FACTORY & ORS [1991] – 144 (9 July 1991)
  • Y. NARASIMHA RAO & ORS V. Y. VENKATA LAKSHMI & ANR [1991] – 145 (9 July 1991)
  • ASHOK KUMAR ALIAS GOLU V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 146 (10 July 1991)
  • COMMISSIONER OF GIFT TAX, ERNAKULAM V. ABDUL KARIM MOHD [1991] – 147 (10 July 1991)
  • DIRECTOR GENERAL GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF INDIA& ORS V. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF INDIA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION [1991] – 148 (11 July 1991)
  • RAM SEWAK PRASAD V. STATE OF U.P. & ORS [1991] – 149 (11 July 1991)
  • BADAL RAM LAXMI NARAIN V. C.I.T. LUCKNOW [1991] – 150 (12 July 1991)
  • SAGAR MAHAVIDYALAYA, SAGAR V. PANDIT SADASHIV RAO HARSHE & ORS [1991] – 151 (12 July 1991)
  • GULABBAI V. NALIN NARSI VOHRA & ORS [1991] – 152 (15 July 1991)
  • ASSOCIATED ENGINEERING CO. V. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR [1991] – 153 (15 July 1991)
  • KHUJJI @ SURENDRA TIWARI V. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [1991] – 154 (16 July 1991)
  • GURMEJ SINGH & ORS V. STATE OF PUNJAB [1991] – 155 (16 July 1991)
  • BURN STANDA COMPANY LTD. & ANR V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 156 (16 July 1991)
  • HARENDRA NARAIN SINGH V. STATE OF BIHAR [1991] – 157 (17 July 1991)
  • SHIVAJI DAYANU PATIL & ANR V. SMT. VATHALA UTTAM MORE [1991] – 158 (17 July 1991)
  • RAJENDRA AND TWO OTHERS V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [1991] – 159 (18 July 1991)
  • STATE OF U.P. & ANR V. M/S. SYNTHETICS AND CHEMICALS LTD. & ANR [1991] – 160 (18 July 1991)
  • BANGALORE MEDICAL TRUST V. B.S. MUDDAPPA & ORS [1991] – 161 (19 July 1991)
  • S.S. DHANOA V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 162 (24 July 1991)
  • MR. LOUIS DE RAEDT & ORS V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 163 (24 July 1991)
  • K. VEERASWAMI V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 164 (25 July 1991)
  • ANIL KUMAR SONI V. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, PUNJAB FINANCIAL CORPORATION & ANR [1991] – 165 (25 July 1991)
  • REGIONAL DIRECTOR, EMPLOYEE’S STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION V. HIGH LAND COFFEE WORKS OF P.F.X. SALDANHA AND SONS ANDANR [1991] – 166 (26 July 1991)
  • TEXMACO LTD. V. COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CALCUTTA [1991] – 167 (31 July 1991)
  • M.B. SANGHI, ADVOCATE V. HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA & ORS [1991] – 168 (31 July 1991)
August 1991
  • MANGALORE CHEMICALS & FERTILISERS LIMITED V. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES & ORS [1991] – 169 (2 August 1991)
  • MAHENDER SINGH V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR [1991] – 170 (2 August 1991)
  • BANWASI SEVA ASHRAM V. STATE OF U.P [1991] – 171 (6 August 1991)
  • PATEL ROADWAYS LIMITED, BOMBAY V. PRASAD TRADING COMPANY [1991] – 172 (6 August 1991)
  • VIJAYA LAXMI SUGAR MILLS LTD. V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, KANPUR [1991] – 173 (6 August 1991)
  • STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR V. A. MOHAMMED YOUSEF & ORS [1991] – 174 (6 August 1991)
  • UNION OF INDIA & ANR V. MAJ. GEN. DAYANAND KHURANA [1991] – 175 (6 August 1991)
  • GENERAL ELECTRIC TECHNICAL SERVICEOMPANY INC. V. PUNJ SONS (P) LTD. & ANR [1991] – 176 (7 August 1991)
  • ATTAR SINGH GURMUKH SINGH V. INCOME TAX OFFICER, LUDHIANA [1991] – 177 (7 August 1991)
  • DR. KU. NILOFAR INSAF V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS [1991] – 178 (8 August 1991)
  • D.H. BROTHERS PVT. LTD. V. COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, U.P. LUCKNOW [1991] – 179 (8 August 1991)
  • KRISHAN KUMAR V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS [1991] – 180 (9 August 1991)
  • DOONGAJI AND CO. V. STATE OF M.P. & ORS [1991] – 181 (9 August 1991)
  • DOONGAJI AND CO. V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS [1991] – 182 (9 August 1991)
  • SPL. TEHSILDAR LAND ACQN. VISHAKAPATNAM V. SMT. A. MANGALA GOWRI [1991] – 183 (9 August 1991)
  • A. VISWANATHA PILLAI & ORS V. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR FOR LAND ACQUISITION NO. IV & ORS [1991] – 184 (9 August 1991)
  • RESERVE BANK OF INDIA V. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA STAFF OFFICERSASSOCIATION & ORS [1991] – 185 (9 August 1991)
  • AMIR SHAD KHAN AZIZ AHMEDKHAN @ AZIZMOHD. KHAN V. L. HMINGLIANA & ORS [1991] -186 (9 August 1991)
  • GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR V. P. RAVINDER & ORS [1991] – 187 (13 August 1991)
  • SMT. SARAN KUMAR GAUR & ORS V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS [1991] – 188 (13 August 1991)
  • KOYAPPATHODI M. AYISHA UMMA V. STATE OF KERALA [1991] – 189 (13 August 1991)
  • BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 190 (13 August 1991)
  • ALL INDIA GLASS MANUFACTURERS’ FEDERATION, NEW DELHI V. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, BOMBAY [1991] – 191 (13 August 1991)
  • STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH V. DR. M.V. RAMANA REDDY & ORS [1991] – 192 (14 August 1991)
  • DR. V.P. CHATURVEDI & ORS V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 193 (14 August 1991)
  • DELHI COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DELHI-I, NEW DELHI [1991] – 194 (14 August 1991)
  • VANIA SILK MILLS (P) LTD. V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, AHMEDABAD [1991] – 195 (14 August 1991)
  • LAXMIKANT PANDEY V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 196 (14 August 1991)
  • STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR V. E. PARIPOORNAM & ORS [1991] – 197 (19 August 1991)
  • DATTATRAYA @ PRAKASH & ORS V. KRISHNA RAO [1991] – 198 (20 August 1991)
  • STATE OF SIKKIM V. DORJEE TSHERING BHUTIA & ORS [1991] – 199 (20 August 1991)
  • CENTRAL PROVINCES MANGANESE ORE. CO. LTD. V. I.T.O NAGPUR [1991] – 200 (20 August 1991)
  • R.S. SODHI, ADVOCATE V. STATE OF U.P [1991] – 201 (21 August 1991)
  • STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS V. V.S. NARAYANA SWAMY [1991] – 202 (21 August 1991)
  • STATE OF U.P. V. KAPIL DEO & ANR [1991] – 203 (21 August 1991)
  • LALA RAGHURAJ SWARUP V. HAWARI LAL & ORS [1991] – 204 (21 August 1991)
  • STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS V. GUEV SINGH, ASHOK KUMAR [1991] – 205 (21 August 1991)
  • ANNA TRANSPORT CORPORATION LTD., SALEM V. SAFE SERVICE LTD. & ORS [1991] – 206 (22 August 1991)
  • HARNAMA SINGH (DEAD) LRS. ON RECO & ORS V. SHRI HARBHAJAN SINGH [1991] – 207 (22 August 1991)
  • RANJIT SINGH V. UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH & ANR [1991] – 208 (23 August 1991)
  • THOTA SESHARATHAMMA & ANR V. THOTA MANIKYAMMA & ORS [1991] – 209 (23 August 1991)
  • S. RAJAGOPAL CHETTIAR V. HAMASAVENI AMMAL & ORS [1991] – 210 (23 August 1991)
  • UNION OF INDIA V. K.V. JANKIRAMAN [1991] – 211 (27 August 1991)
  • PREM JEET KUMAR V. SURENDER GANDOTRA & ORS [1991] – 212 (27 August 1991)
  • UNION OF INDIA V. DR. M.G. DIGHE & ORS [1991] – 213 (27 August 1991)
  • S.P. BISWAS & ORS V. STATE BANK OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 214 (27 August 1991)
  • THE JANATA DAL & ORS V. H.S. CHOWDHARY & ORS [1991] – 215 (27 August 1991)
  • BHAGWAN SWARUP & ANR V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [1991] – 216 (28 August 1991)
  • SONI DEVRAJBHAI BABUBHAI V. STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS [1991] – 217 (28 August 1991)
  • H.C. SUMAN & ANR V. REHABILITATION MINISTRY EMPLOYEES COOPERATIVE HOUSE BUILDING [1991] – 218 (29 August 1991)
September 1991
  • MOHINDER SINGH & ANR V. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS [1991] – 219 (3 September 1991)
  • UNION OF INDIA & ORS V. A. RADHAKRISHNAN & ORS [1991] – 220 (4 September 1991)
  • COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, GUJARAT V. CELLULOSE PRODUCTS OF INDIA LTD. [1991] -221 (4 September 1991)
  • UNION OF INDIA & ANR V. DEOKI NANDAN AGGARWAL [1991] – 222 (4 September 1991)
  • THE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, MADRAS V. M/S. M.M. RUBBER & CO. TAMIL NADU [1991] – 223 (4 September 1991)
  • VINOD GURUDAS RAIKAR V. NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ORS [1991] – 224 (6 September 1991)
  • GOA, DAMAN AND DIU HOUSING BOA V. RAMAKANT V.P. DARVOTKAR [1991] – 225 (6 September 1991)
  • INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OFINDIA & ANR V. INDER CHAND JAIN [1991] -226 (10 September 1991)
  • NETHALA POTHURAJU & ORS V. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [1991] – 227 (11 September 1991)
  • PARUSURAMAN @ VELLADURAI & ORS V. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [1991] – 228 (11 September 1991)
  • DELHI JUDICIAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION TIS HAZARI COURT, DELHI V. STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS [1991] – 229 (11 September 1991)
  • BHATINDA IMPROVEMENT TRUST V. BALWANT SINGH & ORS [1991] – 230 (11 September 1991)
  • GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR V. A. SURYANARAYANARAO & ORS [1991] – 231 (12 September 1991)
  • S. VENKITACHALAM IYER V. S. RAMA IYER [1991] – 232 (12 September 1991)
  • MAHADEO PRASAD BAIS V. INCOME-TAX OFFICER ‘A’ WA, GORAKHPUR & ANR [1991] – 233 (12 September 1991)
  • SURJA & ORS V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR [1991] – 234 (13 September 1991)
  • MADHUKAR SINHA V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 235 (13 September 1991)
  • MOHAN KUMAR SINGHANIA & ORS V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 236 (13 September 1991)
  • CHANDER MOHAN KHANNA V. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING & ORS [1991] – 237 (17 September 1991)
  • YUSUFBHAI NOORMOHMED NENDOLIYA V. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR [1991] – 238 (17 September 1991)
  • SAARA SINGH & ORS V. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS [1991] – 239 (17 September 1991)
  • YOGENDRA PRASAD V. ADDL. REGISTRAR, CO-OP. SOCIETIES, BIHAR & ORS [1991] – 240 (17 September 1991)
  • MUNSHI RAM RAM NIWAS V. COLLECTOR, FOOD AND SUPPLIES DEPARTMENT & ORS [1991] -241 (17 September 1991)
  • COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, JAIPUR V. RAJASTHAN STATE CHEMICAL WORKS DEEDWANA, RAJASTHAN [1991] – 242 (17 September 1991)
  • GHAN SHYAM DAS GUPTA & ANR V. ANANT KUMAR SINHA & ORS [1991] – 243 (17 September 1991)
  • MOHAMMAD MAHIBULLA & ANR V. SETH CHAMAN LAL & ORS [1991] – 244 (18 September 1991)
  • BHAGAWATHULLA SAMANNA & ORS V. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR AND LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER VISAKHAPATNAM [1991] – 245 (18 September 1991)
  • UNION OF INDIA V. PURNA MUNICIPAL COUNCIL & ORS [1991] – 246 (19 September 1991)
  • BYRAM PESTONJI GARIWALA V. UNION BANK OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 247 (20 September 1991)
  • INDIAN ALUMINIUM COMPANY LIMITED V. THANE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [1991] – 248 (25 September 1991)
  • GOODWILL PAINT AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRY V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR [1991] – 249 (27 September 1991)
October 1991
  • BALBIR SINGH & ANR V. STATE OF PUNJAB [1991] – 250 (1 October 1991)
  • JASWANT SINGH MATHURA SINGH & ANR V. AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS [1991] – 251 (1 October 1991)
  • UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION V. UNION OF INDIA [1991] – 252 (3 October 1991)
  • SWADESH RANJAN SINHA V. HARADEB BANERJEE [1991] – 253 (3 October 1991)
  • MATHURA PRASHAD & ANR V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [1991] – 254 (4 October 1991)
  • DR. UMA KANT & ANR V. DR. BHIKA LAL JAIN & ORS [1991] – 255 (4 October 1991)
  • R.S. RAGHUNATH V. STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR [1991] – 256 (4 October 1991)
  • ABDUL SATHAR IBRAHIM MANIK V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 257 (8 October 1991)
  • STATE OF PUNJAB V. BALWANT SINGH & ORS [1991] – 258 (9 October 1991)
  • LAXMI BAI V. DAYANU NARAYAH MOHITE [1991] – 259 (9 October 1991)
  • SURINDER SINGH SIBIA V. VIJAY KUMAR SOOD [1991] – 260 (10 October 1991)
  • MANGAL SINHJI DOLAT SINHJI V. STATE OF GUJARAT [1991] – 261 (11 October 1991)
  • ASHOK ALIAS SOMANNA GOWDA & ANR V. STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS [1991] – 262 (11 October 1991)
  • COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL OFINDIA & ORS V. MOHAN LAL MEHROTRA & ORS [1991] – 263 (11 October 1991)
  • MADHU KISHWAR & ORS V. STATE OF BIHAR [1991] – 264 (11 October 1991)
  • T .P. SRIVASTAVA V. NATIONAL TOBACCO CO. OF INDIA LTD. [1991] – 265 (11 October 1991)
  • SANGANER DAL AND FLOUR MILL V. F.C.I. & ORS [1991] – 266 (22 October 1991)
  • SRI CHAND GUPTA V. GULZAR SINGH & ANR [1991] – 267 (22 October 1991)
  • SMT. RANI DEVI V. BHOLE NATH & ORS [1991] – 268 (22 October 1991)
  • SARASWATI SUGAR MILLS V. HARYANA STATE BOA & ORS [1991] – 269 (22 October 1991)
  • G. NARAYANAPPA & ANR V. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [1991] – 270 (22 October 1991)
  • SMT. MEERA GUPTA V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS [1991] – 271 (22 October 1991)
  • CHANDRAKANT MANILAL SHAH & ANR V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY-II [1991] – 272 (24 October 1991)
  • SALEHBHAI MULLA MOHAMADALI V. STATE OF GUJARAT AN [1991] – 273 (25 October 1991)
  • DR. P.P.C. RAWANI & ORS V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 274 (29 October 1991)
  • SMT. SHASHI NAYAR V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 275 (29 October 1991)
  • SUB-COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS, [1991] – 276 (29 October 1991)
  • M .B. HIREGOUDAR V. STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS [1991] – 277 (29 October 1991)
  • NAVNIT LAL SAKAR LAL V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [1991] – 278 (29 October 1991)
  • HOSHIAR SINGH & ORS V. STATE OF PUNJAB [1991] – 279 (29 October 1991)
  • MRS. NEERA MATHUR V. LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA & ANR [1991] – 280 (31 October 1991)
  • WORKMEN REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY V. MANAGEMENT OF REPTAKOS BRETT. AND CO. LTD. & ANR [1991] – 281 (31 October 1991)
  • BHIKHA RAM V. RAM SARUP & ORS [1991] – 282 (31 October 1991)
  • NUTAKKI SESHARATANAM V. SUB-COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION VIJAYAWADA & ORS [1991] – 283 (31 October 1991)
November 1991
  • LAKSHMANASAMI GOUNDER V. C.I.T. SELVAMANI & ORS [1991] – 284 (1 November 1991)
  • CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, MADRAS V. N. SHANKARAN [1991] – 285 (1 November 1991)
  • MANSOOR ALL KHAN & ORS V. STATE OF U.P. & ORS [1991] – 286 (1 November 1991)
  • JAGHNATH V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR [1991] – 287 (1 November 1991)
  • D.C. OSWAL V. V.K. SUBBIAH & ORS [1991] – 288 (12 November 1991)
  • COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, HARYANA V. KRISHNA COPPER STEEL ROLLING MILLSJAGADHRI [1991] – 289 (12 November 1991)
  • KUMAR SUDHENDU NARAIN DEB V. MRS. RENUKA BISWAS & ORS [1991] – 290 (13 November 1991)
  • ALL INDIA JUDGES’ ASSOCIATION V. UNION OF INDIA [1991] – 291 (13 November 1991)
  • KANTILAL & ORS V. SHANTILAL & ORS [1991] – 292 (14 November 1991)
  • STATE OF ORISSA V. K. RAJESHWAR RAO [1991] – 293 (14 November 1991)
  • UJJAIN VIKAS PRADHIKARAN V. RAJ KUMAR JOHRI & ORS [1991] – 294 (14 November 1991)
  • RADHASOAMI SATSANG, SAOMI BAGH, AGRA V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [1991] – 295 (15 November 1991)
  • GURCHARAN SINGH BALDEV SINGH V. YASHWANT SINGH & ORS [1991] – 296 (15 November 1991)
  • C.E.S.C. LTD. V. SUBHASH CHANDRA BOSE & ORS [1991] – 297 (15 November 1991)
  • CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION & ANR V. MANPREET SINGH & ORS [1991] – 298 (18 November 1991)
  • A.S.KRISHNA AND CO. PVT. LTD. V. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER(DEPUTY COLLECTOR) HYDERABAD [1991] – 299 (19 November 1991)
  • EX-HAVILDAR RATAN SINGH V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 300 (19 November 1991)
  • K.M. MATHEW V. STATE OF KERALA & ANR [1991] – 301 (19 November 1991)
  • RABINDRA CHAMRIA & ORS V. REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES WEST BENGAL & ORS [1991] – 302 (19 November 1991)
  • IN THE MATTER OF CAUVERY WATER DISPUTES TRIBUNAL [1991] – 303 (22 November 1991)
  • BANK OF INDIA V. JAGJIT SINGH MEHTA [1991] – 304 (22 November 1991)
  • UNION OF INDIA & ANR V. ZORA SINGH [1991] – 305 (22 November 1991)
  • TATA ENGINEERING AND LOCOMOTIVE COMPANY LTD. & ANR V. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF THANE & ORS [1991] – 306 (22 November 1991)
  • MITHILESH GARG V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 307 (22 November 1991)
  • N. SURESH NATHAN & ANR V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 308 (22 November 1991)
  • ASHOK KUMAR SINGH & ORS V. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS [1991] – 309 (22 November 1991)
  • DENA NATH & ORS V. NATIONAL FERTILIZERS LTD. & ORS [1991] – 310 (22 November 1991)
  • M.RAJA MOHAMMED & ANR V. FOOD INSPECTOR, PALGHAT MUNICIPALITY [1991] – 311 (22 November 1991)
  • U.P. JUNIOR DOCTORS’ ACTION COMMITTEE & ORS V. DR. B. SHEETAL NANDWANI & ORS [1991] – 312 (22 November 1991)
  • M.C. MEHTA V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [1991] – 313 (22 November 1991)
  • JAGDISH SINGH V. NATTHU SINGH [1991] – 314 (25 November 1991)

The Limitation Act, 1963 [THE SCHEDULE]

 The Limitation Act 1963Image result for calendar gif

PERIODS OF LIMITATION

  [See sections 2(j) and 3]

The Statute of limitation is a disabling act and action for claiming rights flowing from various laws is barred with lapse of time as indicated in the Limitation Act. Limitation for an action in law, therefore, has to be found within the four corners of the statute.

FIRST DIVISION–SUITS
Description of suit
Period of limitation
Time from which period begins to run
PART I– SUITS RELATING TO ACCOUNTS
1
For the balance due on a mutual, open and current account, where there have been reciprocal demands between the parties.
Three years
The close of the year in which the last item admitted or proved is entered in the account; such year to be computed as in the account.
2
Against a factor for an account.
Three years
When the account is, during the continuance of the agency, demanded and refused or, where no such demand is made, when the agency terminates.
3
By a principal against his agent for movable property received by the latter and not accounted for.
Three years
When the account is, during the continuance of the agency, demanded and refused or, where no such demand is made, when the agency terminates.
4
Other suits by principals against agents for neglect or misconduct.
Three years
When the neglect or misconduct becomes known to the plaintiff.
5
For an account and a share of the profits of a dissolved partnership.
Three years
The date of the dissolution.
PART II–SUITS RELATING TO CONTRACTS
6
For a Seaman’s wages.
Three years
The end of the voyage during which the wages are earned.
7
For wages in the case of any other person.
Three years
When the wages accrue due
8
For the price of food or drink sold by the keeper of a hotel, tavern or lodging house.
Three years
When the food or drink is delivered.
9
For the price of lodging.
Three years
When the price becomes payable.
10
Against a carrier for compensation for losing or injuring goods.
Three years
When the loss or injury occurs.
11
Against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery of, or delay in delivering goods.
Three years
When the goods ought to be delivered.
12
For the hire of animals, vehicles, boats or house-hold furniture.
Three years
When the hire becomes payable.
13
For the balance of money advanced in payment of goods to be delivered.
Three years
When the goods ought to be delivered.
14
For the price of goods sold and delivered where no fixed period of credit is agreed upon.
Three years
The date of the delivery of the goods.
15
For the price of goods sold and delivered to be paid for after the expiry of a fixed period of credit.
Three years
When the period of credit expires.
16
For the price of goods sold and delivered to be paid for by a bill of exchange, no such bill being given.
Three years
When the period of the proposed bill elapses.
17
For the price of trees or growing crops sold by the plaintiff to the defendant where no fixed period of credit is agreed upon.
Three years.
The date of the sale.
18
For the price of work done by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request, where no time has been fixed for payment.
Three years
When the work is done.
19
For money payable for money lent.
Three years
When the loan is made.
20
Like suit when the lender has given a cheque for the money.
Three years
When the cheque is paid.
21
For money lent under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand.
Three years
When the loan is made.
22
For money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, including money of a customer in the hands of his banker so payable.
Three years
When the demand is made.
23
For money payable to the plaintiff for money paid for the defendant.
Three years
When the money is paid.
24
For money payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for money received by the defendant, for the plaintiff’s use.
Three years
When the money is received.
25
For money payable for interest upon money due from the defendant to the plaintiff.
Three years
When the interest becomes due.
26
For money payable to the plaintiff for money found to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff on accounts stated between them.
Three years
When the accounts are stated in writing signed by the defendant or his agent duly authorised in this behalf, unless where the debt is, by a simultaneous agreement in writing signed as aforesaid, made payable at a future time, and then when that time arrives.
27
For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified .time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.
Three years
When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.
28
On a single bond, where a day is specified for payment.
Three years
The day so specified.
29
On a single bond, where no such day is specified.
Three years
The date of executing the bond.
30
On a bond subject to a condition.
Three years
When the condition is broken.
31
On a bill of exchange or promissory note payable at a fixed time after date.
Three years
When the bill or note falls due.
32
On a bill of exchange payable at sight, or after sight, but not at a fixed time.
Three years
When the bill is presented.
33
On a bill of exchange accepted payable at a particular place.
Three years
When the bill is presented at that place.
34
On a bill of exchange or promissory note payable at a fixed time, after sight or after demand.
Three years
When the fixed time expires.
35
On a bill of exchange or promissory note payable on demand and not accompanied by any writing restraining or postponing the right to sue.
Three years
The date of the bill or note.
36
On a promissory note or bond payable by installments.
Three years
The expiration of the first term of payment as to the part then payable; and for the other parts, the expiration of the respective terms of payment.
37
On a promissory note or bond payable by installments, which provides that, if default be made in payment of one or more installments, the whole shall be due.
Three years
When the default is made, unless where the payee or obligee waives the benefit of the provision and then when fresh default is made in respect of which there is no such waiver.
38
On a promissory note given by the maker to a third person to be delivered to the payee after a certain event should happen.
Three years
The date of the delivery to the payee.
39
On a dishonoured foreign bill where protest has been made and notice given.
Three years
When the notice is given.
40
By the payee against the drawer of a bill of exchange, which has been dishonoured by non-acceptance.
Three years
The date of the refusal to accept.
41
By the acceptor of an accommodation bill against the drawer.
Three years
When the acceptor pays the amount of the bill.
42
By a surety against the principal debtor.
Three years
When the surety pays the creditor.
43
By a surety against a co-surety.
Three years
When the surety pays anything in excess of his own share.
44
(a) On a policy of insurance when the sum insured is payable after proof of the death has been given to or received by the insurers.
Three years
The date of the death of the deceased, or where the claim on the policy is denied, either partly or wholly, the date of such denial.
(b)On a policy of insurance when the sum insured is payable after proof of the loss has been given to or received by the insurers.
Three years
The date of the occurrence causing the loss, or where the claim on the policy is denied, either partly or wholly, the date of such denial.
45
By the assured to recover premia paid under a policy voidable at the election of the insurers.
Three years
When the insurers elect to avoid the policy.
46
Under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), section 36p or section 361, to compel a refund by a person to whom an executor or administrator has paid a legacy or distributed assets.
Three years
The date of the payment or distribution.
47
For money paid upon an existing consideration which afterwards fails.
Three years
The date of the failure.
48
For contribution by a party who has paid the whole or more than his share of the amount due under a joint decree, or by a sharer in a joint estate who has paid the whole or more than his share of the amount of revenue due from himself and his co-sharers.
Three years
The date of the payment in excess of the plaintiff’s own share.
49
By a co-trustee to enforce against the estate of a deceased trustee a claim for contribution.
Three years
When the right to contribution accrues.
50
By the manager of a joint estate of an undivided family for contribution, in respect of a payment made by him on account of the estate.
Three years
The date of the payment.
51
For the profits of immovable property belonging to the plaintiff which have been wrongfully received by the defendant.
Three years
When the profits are received.
52
For arrears of rent.
Three years
Where the arrears become due.
53
By a vendor of immovable property for personal payment of unpaid purchase-money.
Three years
The time fixed for completing the sale, or (where the title is accepted after the time fixed for completion) the date of the acceptance.
54
For specific performance of a contract.
Three years
The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.
55
For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.
Three years
When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) when it ceases.
PART III–SUITS RELATING TO DECLARATIONS
56
To declare the forgery of an instrument issued or registered.
Three years
When the issue or registration becomes known to the plaintiff.
57
To obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid, or never, in fact, took place.
Three years
When the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiff.
58
To obtain any other declaration.
Three years
When the right to sue first accrues.
PART IV–SUITS RELATING TO DECREES AND INSTRUMENTS
59
To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract.
Three years
When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.
60
To set aside a transfer of property made by the guardian of a ward –
(a) by the ward who has attained majority.
Three Years
When the ward attains majority.
(b) by the ward’s legal representative–
(i) When the ward dies within three years from the date of attaining majority.
Three years
When the ward attains majority.
(ii) When the ward dies before attaining
Three Years
When the ward dies.
majority.
PART V–SUITS RELATING TO IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
61
By a mortgagor —
(a) to redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged.
Thirty years
When the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues.
(b) to recover possession of immovable property mortgaged and afterwards transferred by the mortgagee for a valuable consideration.
Twelve year
When the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff.
(c) to recover surplus collections received by the mortgagee after the mortgage has been satisfied.
Three years
When the mortgagor re-enters on the mortgaged property.
62
To enforce payment of money secured by a mortgage or otherwise charged upon immovable property.
Twelve years
When the money sued for becomes due.
63
By a mortgagee–
(a) for foreclosure.
Thirty years
When the money secured by the mortgage becomes due.
(b) for possession of immovable property mortgaged.
Twelve year
When the mortgagee becomes entitled to possession.
64
For possession of immovable property based on previous possession and not on title, when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed.
Twelve year
The date of dispossession.
65
For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.
Twelve years
When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
Explanation.– For the purposes of this article —
(a) where the suit is by a remainderman, a reversioner (other than a landlord) or a devisee the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the estate of the remainderman, reversioner or devisee, as the case may be, falls into possession;
(b) where the suit is by a Hindu or Muslim entitled to the possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindu or Muslim female, the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the female dies;
(c) where the suit is by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree when the judgment-debtor was out of possession at the date of the sale, the purchaser shall be deemed to be a representative of the judgment-debtor who was out of possession.
66
For possession of immovable property when the plaintiff has become entitled to possession by reason of any forfeiture or breach of condition.
Twelve years
When the forfeiture is incurred or the condition is broken.
67
By a landlord to recover possession from a tenant.
Twelve years
When the tenancy is determined.
PART VI–SUITS RELATING TO MOVABLE PROPERTY
68
For specific movable property lost, or acquired by theft, or dishonest misappropriation or conversion.
Three years
When the person having the right to the possession of the property first learns in whose possession it is.
69
For other specific movable property.
Three years
When the property is wrongfully taken.
70
To recover movable property deposited or pawned from a depository or pawnee.
Three years
The date of refusal after demand.
71
To recover movable property deposited or pawned and afterwards bought from the depository or pawnee for a valuable consideration.
Three years
When the sale becomes known to the plaintiff.
PART VII–SUITS RELATING TO TORT
72
For compensation for doing or for omitting to do an act alleged to be in pursuance of any enactment in force for the time being in the territories to which this Act extends.
One year
When the act or omission takes place.
73
For compensation for false imprisonment
One year
When the imprisonment ends.
74
For compensation for a malicious prosecution.
One year
When the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated.
75
For compensation for libel.
One year
When the libel is published.
76
For compensation for slander.
One year
When the words are spoken or, if the words are not actionable in themselves, when the special damage complained of results.
77
For compensation for loss of service occasioned by the seduction of the plaintiff’s servant or daughter.
One year
When the loss occurs.
78
For compensation for inducing a person to break a contract with the plaintiff.
One year
The date of the breach.
79
For compensation for an illegal, irregular or excessive distress.
One year
The date of the distress.
80
For compensation for wrongful seizure of movable property under legal process.
One year
The date of the seizure.
81
By executors, administrators or representatives under the Legal Representatives’ Suits Act, 1855 (12 of 1855).
One year
The date of the death of the person wronged.
82
By executors, administrators or representatives under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (13 of 1855).
Two years
The date of the death of the person killed.
83
Under the Legal Representatives’ Suits Act, 1855 (12 of 1855) against an executor, an administrator or any other representative.
Two years
When the wrong complained of is done.
84
Against one who, having a right to use property for specific purposes, perverts it to other purposes.
Two years
When the perversion first becomes known to the person injured thereby.
85
For compensation for obstructing a way or a water course.
Three years
The date of the obstruction.
86
For compensation for diverting a watercourse.
Three years
The date of the diversion.
87
For compensation for trespass upon immovable property.
Three years
The date of the trespass.
88
For compensation for infringing copyright or any other exclusive privilege.
Three years
The date of the infringement.
89
To restrain waste.
Three years
When the waste begins.
90
For compensation for injury caused by an injunction wrongfully obtained.
Three years
When the injunction ceases.
91
For compensation, —
Three years
When the person having the right to the possession of the property first learns in whose possession it is.
(a) for wrongfully taking or detaining any specific movable property lost, or acquired by theft, or dishonest misappropriation, or conversion.
(b) for wrongfully taking or injuring or wrongfully detaining any other specific movable property.
Three years
When the property is wrongfully taken or injured, or when the detainer’s possession becomes unlawful.
PART VIII–SUITS RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUST PROPERTY
92
To recover possession of immovable property conveyed or bequeathed in trust and afterwards transferred by the trustee for a valuable consideration.
Twelve years
When the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff.
93
To recover possession of movable property conveyed or bequeathed in trust and afterwards transferred by the trustee for a valuable consideration.
Three years
When the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff.
94
To set aside a transfer of immovable property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment, made by a manager thereof, for a valuable consideration.
Twelve years
When the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff.
95
To set aside a transfer of movable property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment, made by a manager thereof, for a valuable consideration.
Three years
When the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff.
96
By the manager of a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment to recover possession of movable or immovable properly comprised in the endowment which has been transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration.
Twelve years
The date of death, resignation or removal of the transferor or the date of appointment of the plaintiff as manager of the endowment, whichever is later.
PART IX–SUITS RELATING TO MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
97
To enforce a right of pre-emption whether the right is founded on law or general usage or on special contract.
One year.
When the purchaser takes under the sale sought to be impeached, physical possession of the whole or part of the property sold, or, where the subject-matter of the sale does not admit of physical possession of the whole or part of the property, when the instrument of sale is registered.
98
By a person against whom3[an] of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or an order under section 28 of thePresidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (15 of 1882) has been made, to establish the right which he claims to the property comprised in the order.
One year
The date of the final order.
99
To set aside a sale by a civil or revenue court or a sale for arrears of Government revenue or for any demand recoverable as such arrears.
One year
When the sale is confirmed or would otherwise have become final and conclusive had no such suit been brought.
100
To alter or set aside any decision or order of a civil court in any proceeding other than a suit or any act or order of an officer of Government in his official capacity.
One year
The date of the final decision or order by the court or the date of the act or order of the officer, as the case may be.
101
Upon a judgment including a foreign judgment, or a recognisance.
Three years
The date of the judgment or recognisance.
102
For property which the plaintiff has conveyed while insane.
Three years
When the plaintiff is restored to sanity and has knowledge of the conveyance.
103
To make good out of the general estate of a deceased trustee the loss occasioned by a breach of trust.
Three years
The date of the trustee’s death or if the loss has not then resulted, the date of the loss.
104
To establish a periodically recurring right.
Three years
When the plaintiff is first refused the enjoyment of the right.
105
By a Hindu for arrears of maintenance.
Three yean
When the arrears are payable.
106
For a legacy or for a share of a residue bequeathed by a testator or for a distributive share of the property of an intestate against an executor or an administrator or some other person legally charged with the duty of distributing the estate.
Twelve years
When the legacy or share becomes payable or deliverable.
107
For possession of a hereditary office. Explanation. — A hereditary office is possessed when the properties thereof are usually received, or (if there are no properties) when the duties thereof are usually performed.
Twelve years
When the defendant takes possession of the office adversely to the plaintiff.
108
Suit during the life of a Hindu or Muslim female by a Hindu or Muslim, who if the female died at the date of instituting the suit, would be entitled to the possession of land, to have an alienation of such land made by the female declared to be void except for her life or until her re-marriage.
Twelve years
The date of the alienation.
109
By a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law to set aside his father’s alienation of ancestral property.
Twelve years
When the alienee takes possession of the property.
110
By a person excluded from a joint family property to enforce a right to share therein.
Twelve years
When the exclusion becomes known to the plaintiff.
111
By or on behalf of a any local authority for possession of any public street or road or any part thereof from which it has been dispossessed or of which it has discontinued the possession.
Thirty years
The date of the dispossession or discontinuance
112
Any suit (except a suit before the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Thirty years
When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.
PART X–SUITS FOR WHICH THERE IS NO PRESCRIBED PERIOD
113
Any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule.
Three years
When the right to sue accrues,

SECOND DIVISION—APPEALS

114 –Criminal
Appeal from an order of acquittal —
(a) under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898).
Ninety days
The date of the order appealed from.
(b) under sub-section (3) of section 417 of the Code.
Thirty days
The date of the grant of special leave.
115-Criminal
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898)
(a) from a sentence of death passed by a court of session or by a High Court in the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction.
Thirty days
The date of the sentence.
(b) from any other sentence or any order not being an order of acquittal —
(i) to the High Court.
Sixty days
The date of the sentence or order.
(ii) to any other court.
Thirty days
The date of the sentence or order.
116-Civil
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908),–
(a) to a High Court from any decree or order.
Ninety days
The date of the decree or order.
(b) to any other court from any decree or order.
Thirty days
The date of the decree or order.
117
From a decree or order of any High Court to the same Court.
Thirty days
The date of the decree or order.

THIRD DIVISION–APPLICATIONS

Description of application
Period of limitation
Time from which period begins to run
PART I– APPLICATIONS IN SPECIFIED CASES
118
For leave to appear and defend a suit under summary procedure.
Ten days
When the summons is served.
119
Under the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940),–
(a) for the filing in court of an award.
Thirty days
The date of service of the notice of the making of the award.
(b) for setting aside an award or getting an award remitted for reconsideration.
Thirty days
The date of service of the notice of the filing of the award.
120
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) to have the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or appellant, or of a deceased defendant or respondent, made a party.
Ninety days
The date of death of the plaintiff, appellant, defendant or respondent as the case may be.
121
Under the same Code for an order to set aside an abatement.
Sixty days
The date of abatement.
122
To restore a suit or appeal or application for review or revision dismissed for default of appearance or for want of prosecution or for failure to pay costs of service of process or to furnish security for costs.
Thirty days
The date of dismissal.
123
To set aside a decree passed ex parte or to re-hear an appeal decreed or heard ex parte.
Thirty days
The date of the decree or where the summons or notice was not duly served, when the applicant had knowledge of the decree.
Explanation. — For the purpose of this article, substituted service under rule 20 of Order V of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall not be deemed to be due service.
124
For a review of judgment by a court other than the Supreme Court.
Thirty days
The date of the decree or order.
125
To record an adjustment or satisfaction of a decree.
Thirty days
When the payment or adjustment is made.
126
For the payment of the amount of a decree by installments.
Thirty days
The date of the decree.
127
To set aside a sale in execution of a decree, including any such application by a judgment-debtor.
Sixty days
The date of the sale.
128
For possession by one dispossessed of immovable property and disputing the right of the decree-holder or purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree.
Thirty days
The date of the dispossession.
129
For possession after removing resistance or obstruction to delivery of possession of immovable property decreed or sold in execution of a decree.
Thirty days
The date of resistance or obstruction.
130
For leave to appeal as a pauper —
(a) to the High Court;
Sixty days
The date of decree appealed from.
(b) to any other court.
Thirty days-30 Days
The date of decree appealed from.
131
To any court for the exercise of its powers of revision under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898).
Ninety days
The date of the decree or order or sentence sought to be revised.
132
To the High Court for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under clause (1) of article 132, article 133 or sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of article 134 of the Constitution or under any other law for the time being in force.
Sixty days
The date of the decree, order or sentence.
133
To the Supreme Court for special leave to appeal, —
(a) in a case involving death sentence.
Sixty days
The date of the judgment, final order or sentence.
(b) in a case where leave to appeal was refused by the High Court.
Sixty days
The date of the order of refusal.
(c) in any other case.
Ninety days
The date of the judgment or order.
134
For delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree.
One year
When the sale becomes absolute.
135
For the enforcement of a decree granting a mandatory injunction.
Three years.
The date of the decree or where a date is fixed for performance, such date.
136
For the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court.
Twelve years
[When] the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place:
Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation.
PART II–OTHER APPLICATIONS
137
Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this division.

Note:- it appears to us that although the period of limitation for making an application for restoration of a suit dismissed for default under Order 9 of the Code is thirty days from the date of the order of dismissal, the application for restoration of miscellaneous case arising out of such application under Order 9, when such Misc. Case is dismissed for default, is not governed by the provisions of Art. 122 of the Limitation Act in view of the fact that expressly in terms of the said Art. 122, the miscellaneous case arising out of an application under Order 9 is not attracted and the period of limitation in such case should be governed by Art. 137

Three years
When the right to apply accrues.

 

Syndicate Bank vs Channaveerappa Beleri & Ors [SC 2006 April]

Keywords: Bank Credit-on demand-Bank Loan-period of limitation

Capture

  1. This Court itself had indicated that ‘live account’ means an account that is not settled. The use of the term ‘settled’ gives an indication that a ‘live account’ refers to an account where the balance has not been struck by an “account stated” or “account settled”.
  2. If Article 55 does not apply, then a claim against a Guarantor in such a situation may fall under the residuary Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 corresponding to Article 120 of the old Act.
  3. the period of limitation is the same (three years) both under Articles 55 and 113. Having regard to the fact that the period of limitation is 3 years both under Articles 55 and Article 113, and having regard to the binding decision in Samuel (supra).

AIR 2006 SC 1874 : (2006) 3 SCR 999 : (2006) 11 SCC 506 : JT 2006 (4) SC 579 : (2006) 4 SCALE 368

(SUPREME COURT OF INDIA)

Syndicate Bank Appellant
Versus
Channaveerappa Beleriand OTHERS Respondent

(Before : Arun Kumar And R. V. Raveendran, JJ.)

Civil Appeal No. 6894 of 1997,

Decided on : 10-04-2006.

Contract Act, 1872—Sections 126, 128, 129 and 130—Constitution of India, 1950—Articles 21, 22, 55, 113 and 120.

Counsel for the Parties:

Adarsh B. Dial, Sr. Advocate, Rajiv Nanda, Ms. Sumati Anand and Navneet Mishra, Advocates with him, for Appellant

Bhimrao Naik, Sr. Advocate, S. V. Deshpande, Mrs. Anuradha Rustogi and C. G. Solshe, Advocates, with him for Respondents.

Judgment

Raveendran, J—This appeal by special leave, is by the plaintiff-Bank against the judgment dated 6-3-1997 of the High Court of Karnataka dismissing R.F.A. No. 107 of 1993 filed by it against the judgment and decree dated 29-10-1992 of the Civil Judge, Gadag in O.S. No. 29 of 1990, dismissing its suit on the ground of limitation.

2. The appellant-Bank filed Original Suit No. 29 of 1990 against Respondents 1 to 7 herein for recovery of ` 19,77,478/60 (the liability of Respondents 2 and 3 being restricted to ` 15,75,960 and liability of Respondents 6 and 7 being restricted to 17,56,070.60) together with interest @ 18.5% per annum compounded quarterly from the date of suit till the date of realization. The plaint averments in brief are as under.

The Bank had extended credit facilities by way of overdraft, goods loans, and demand loan against Supply Bills to a company known as Gadag Forge Fits (India) Pvt. Ltd., (‘company’ for short). Respondent 1 was its Managing Director and Respondents 2 to 7 were its DirectOrs. The credit facilities were renewed and enhanced from time to time. Respondents 1 to 7 executed the following guarantee bonds in favour of the Bank, personally agreeing and undertaking to pay and satisfy the Bank on demand all sums which may be due on account of the credit facilities granted to the company subject to the limits mentioned therein:

i) Guarantee Bond dated 17-9-1983/20-8-1983/29-8-1983 executed by Respondents 1, 2 and 3, the limit of liability being ` 10.50 lakhs (a single deed executed by Respondents 1, 2 and 3 on different dates).

ii) Guarantee bond dated 4-4-1984 executed by respondents 4 and 5, the limit of liability being ` 10.50 lakhs.

iii) Guarantee bond dated 10-9-1985 executed by Respondents 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7, the limit of liability being ` 11.70 lakhs.

Thus the limit of total liability undertaken exclusive of interest was ` 22.20 lakhs in the case of Respondents 1, 4 and 5, ` 10.50 lakhs in the case of Respondents 2 and 3 and ` 11.70 lakhs in the case of Respondents 6 and 7. Their liability was joint and several with the company.

On account of the company allegedly incurring losses and stopping its activities, operations in the accounts of the company with the Bank stopped in the middle of 1986. In view of the failure on the part of the company (principal debtor) in paying the amounts due, the Bank sent a letter dated 12-10-1987 to the company and its 7 Directors (Respondents 1 to 7) informing that the following amounts were outstanding in the accounts of the company as on 30-9-1987 and calling upon the company as principal debtor and respondents 1 to 7 as guarantors to pay the said amounts aggregating to ` 13,48,264.79 with interest @ 18.5% per annum from 1-10-87 within 15 days:-

Account No. Date of Advance Limit/Amount Balance as on

Advance 30-9-1987

Over Draft

27/85 10-9-85 2,50,000/- 3,32, 116.04

1/86 7-1-86 2,50,000/- 3,39,719.54

14/86 29-4-86 1,50,000/- 1,99, 105.35

Goods Loan

49/84 23-7-84 1,61,000/- 1,91,654.00

48/85 12-10-85 27,450/- 35,894.85

Demand Loan

against Supply

Bills

229/85 2-12-85 5,000/- 318.60

232/85 6-12-85 5,000/- 6,936.65

233/85 6-12-85 2,500/- 3,469.40

234/85 11-12-85 16,900/- 23,356.15

235/85 20-12-85 1,500/- 2,071.85

237/85 26-12-85 6, 100/- 8,366.90

2/86 1-1-86 2,900/- 3,966.95

3/86 1-1-86 5, 100/- 3,425.75

5/86 13-1-86 32,970/- 44,819.30

8/86 3-2-86 3,700/- 444.05

10/86 10-2-86 31,600/- 26,274.85

12/86 13-2-86 13,700/- 18,424.20

14/86 11-3-86 8,800/- 11,685.45

15/86 20-3-86 10,230/- 13,518.25

16/86 21-3-86 36,000/- 47,534.00

18/86 25-3-86 20,300/- 26,750.10

20/86 26-4-86 6,400/- 8,412.60

TOTAL 13,48,264.79

The company and its Directors (Respondents 1 to 7) sent a reply dated 31-10-1987 through counsel stating that the company was passing through a financial crisis and the Bank had failed to assist the company by making further advances by way of working capital. They further alleged that in view of the failure to advance further funds, the company sustained heavy loss and the company was reserving liberty to file a suit for damages for an amount which would be more than the amount claimed by the Bank. They also alleged that the bank ought to have given a moratorium on interest to rehabilitate the company. They also stated that without prejudice to their rights and contentions, they were willing to discuss the matter with the Bank, to arrive at an amicable solution. A formal notice through counsel was sent by the Bank on 17-12-1987 demanding payment which elicited a reply dated 30-12-1987 denying the demand.

The Bank initiated proceedings for winding-up against the company on account of its liability to pay its dues, on 11-10-1988 and the High Court ordered winding-up of the company on 17-3-1989. Therefore, the suit was filed by the Bank on 16-3-1990 only against the Guarantors (Respondents 1 to 7) for recovery of ` 19,77,478.60 (that is, the amount demanded in the notice dated 12-10-1987 with interest up to date of suit). The Bank restricted the claim to ` 10.50 lakhs with interest at 18.5% P.A. from 17-12-87 to the date of suit against Respondents 2 and 3 and to ` 11.70 lakhs with interest at 18.5% P.A. from 17-12-1987 to date of suit against respondents 6 and 7. The Bank contended that the respondents were jointly and severally liable to pay the amounts due by the company, as aforesaid. It was alleged that the cause of action for the suit against the guarantors (respondents 1 to 7) arose on 17-12-1987 when the demand was made and on 30-12-1987 when they denied the liability by notice. The statements of account showing the particulars of amount due as on 31-12-1989 were annexed to the plaint.

3. Respondents 4 and 7 remained ex parte. Respondents 1, 5 and 6 filed a common written statement which was adopted by 2nd respondent. Respondent No.3 filed a separate written statement. They resisted the suit inter alia on the following grounds:-

a) The suit was not maintainable only against the Guarantors and was liable to be rejected for non-joinder of the principal debtor.

b) The Bank cannot proceed against the guarantors without first exhausting of remedies against the principal debtor.

c) The guarantee bonds were executed in the years 1983, 1984 and 1985. As the suit was not filed within three years from the respective dates of the guarantee bonds, in the absence of renewals or acknowledgment by them, the suit was barred by limitation.

4. The trial court framed as many as 16 issues. We are concerned with the issue No. 4, that is: ‘Is the suit not in time?’. The Bank examined its Manager and respondents 1, 2 and 3 gave evidence on behalf of the defence. Exs. P-1 to P-35 and Exs. D1 to D5 were marked. The trial court by an exhaustive judgment answered all the issues, except the issue regarding limitation in favour of the Bank. It held that the Bank had established the correctness of the amounts claimed and the rate of interest. It, however, held that the suit was barred by time and consequently, dismissed the suit. The appeal filed by the Bank was also dismissed by the High Court. The said dismissal is challenged in this appeal by special leave. The only question that was argued and that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the decision of the courts below that the suit was barred by limitation is correct in law.

5. To appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to refer to the relevant statutory provisions, the terms of the guarantee and the decision of this Court relied on by both parties.

Section 126, 128, 129 and 130 of Contract Act, 1872 are extracted below:

“Section 126. ‘Contract of guarantee’, ‘surety’, ‘principal-debtor’ and ‘creditor’ – A ‘contract of guarantee’ is a contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person in case of his default. The person who gives the guarantee is called the ‘surety’, the person in respect of whose default the guarantee is given is called the ‘principal-debtor’, and the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the ‘creditor’. A guarantee may be either oral or written.”

“Section 128. Surety’s liability – The liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal-debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract.”

“Section 129. ‘Continuing guarantee’ – A guarantee which extends to a series of transactions is called a ‘continuing guarantee’.

“Section 130. Revocation of continuing guarantee – A continuing guarantee may at any time be revoked by the surety, as to future transactions, by notice to the creditor.”

The relevant Articles in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are extracted below : Article Description of Suit Period of Time from which

No. Limitation period beginstorun

55 For compensation for the Three years When the contract is

breach of any contract, ex- broken or (where

press or implied not herein there are successive

specially provided for. breaches)

when the breach in

respect of which the

suit is instituted oc-

curs or (where the

breach is continu- ing) when it ceases.

113 Any suit for which no period Three years When the right to

of limitation is provided else- sue accrues.

where in this Schedule.

19 For money payable for money Three years When the loan is

lent. made.

21 For money lent under an agree- Three years When the loan is

ment that it shall be payable on made.

demand.

The guarantee bonds have been executed in the standard Form of the Bank. The relevant portions from the Guarantee bond dated 10-8-1985 (the Bonds are similarly worded) are extracted below:

“In consideration of SYNDICATE BANK, hereinafter called the “Syndicate”……….. making, or continuing to make advances or otherwise giving credit or financial accommodation or affording banking facilities for as long as the Syndicate may think fit to M/s. Godrej Forge Fits (I) Pvt. Ltd., Hirakoppa village, Gadag taluk hereafter called the “Borrower”, the undersigned (1) C.M. Beleri, (2) I.M. Beleri, (3) K.M. Chhadda, (4) Mrs. Shailaja Beleri, and (5) T. Parthasarathy (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Guarantor’) hereby agrees to pay and satisfy to the Syndicate on demand all and every sum and sums of money which are now or shall at any time be owing to the Syndicate in any of its offices on any account whatsoever…………”

“PROVIDED ALWAYS that the total liability ultimately enforceable against the Guarantor under this guarantee shall not exceed the sum of ` 11,70,000/- together with interest thereon at the rate stipulated by the bank from date of demand by the Syndicate upon the Guarantor for payment.”

“NOTWITHSTANDING the Borrower’s Account or Accounts with the Syndicate may be brought to credit or the credit given to the Borrower fully exhausted or exceeded or howsoever the said financial accommodation varied or changed from time to time; notwithstanding any payments from time to time or any settlement of Account, this guarantee shall be a continuing guarantee for payment of the ultimate balance to become due to the Syndicate by the Borrower not exceeding ` 11,70,000/- as aforesaid.”

“NOTWITHSTANDING the discontinuance of this Guarantee as to one or more of the Guarantors or the death of any one of them, the Guarantee is to remain a continuing Guarantee, as to the other or others or the representatives and estates of the deceased and where there is more than one Guarantor, their liability under these presents being construed as joint and several.”

“Any Account Settled or stated by or between the Syndicate and the Borrower or admitted by him or on his behalf may be adduced by the Syndicate and shall in that case be accepted by the guarantors and each of them and their respective representatives as conclusive evidence that the balance or amount thereby appearing is due from to the Syndicate.”[Emphasis supplied]

Margaret Lalita Samuel vs. Indo Commercial Bank Ltd. (AIR 1979 SC 102) relied on both sides dealt with the question of limitation with reference to a continuing guarantee. In that case the guarantor sought to avoid liability by contending that every item of an overdraft account was an independent loan and the limitation would start from the date of each loan, and that with reference to such dates, the suit was barred by limitation. While negativing the said contention, this Court observed:

“In our view it is unnecessary for the purposes of the present case, to go into the question of the nature of an overdraft account. The present suit is in substance and truth one to enforce the guarantee bond executed by the defendant. In order to ascertain the nature of the liability of the defendant, it is necessary to refer to the precise terms of the guarantee bond rather than embark into an enquiry as to the nature of an overdraft account.

After referring to the terms of the guarantee bond, this Court held:

“The guarantee is seen to be a continuing guarantee and the undertaking by the defendant is to pay any amount that may be due by the company at the foot of the general balance of its account or any other account whatever. In the case of such a continuing guarantee, so long as the account is a live account in the sense that it is not settled and there is no refusal on the part of the guarantor to carry out the obligation, we do not see how the period of limitation could be said to have commenced running.Limitation would only run from the date of breach under Art. 115 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908. When the Bombay High Court considered the matter in the first instance and held that the suit was not barred by limitation. J.C. Shah, J. speaking for the Court said:

On the plain words of the letters of guarantee it is clear that the defendant undertook to pay any amount which may be due by the Company at the foot of the general balance of its account or any other account whatever……… We are not concerned in this case with the period of limitation for the amount repayable by the Company to the bank. We are concerned with the period of limitation for enforcing the liability of the defendant under the surety bond. We hold that the suit to enforce the liability is governed by Art. 115 and the cause of action arises when the contract of continuing guarantee is broken, and in the present case we are of the view that so long as the account remained live account, and there was no refusal on the part of defendant to carry out her obligation, the period of limitation did not commence to run.

After expressing agreement with the above view expressed by Shah, J., this Court also agreed with the view expressed by the Privy Council in Wright vs. New Zealand Farmers Co-operative Association of Canterbury Ltd. (1939 AC 439), and the Court of Appeal in Bradford Old Bank Ltd. vs. Sutcliffe (1918 (2) KB 833) that limitation against a guarantor under a continuing guarantee (which specified that the liability of the guarantor is to pay on demand) would not run from the date of each advance, but only run from the time when the balance (payment of which is guaranteed) was constituted and a demand was made for payment thereof. This Court also referred to a passage from Paget’s Law of Banking, with approval, though not extracted. The said passage from Paget reads thus:

“In Bradford Old Bank Ltd. vs. Sutcliffe (1918) 2 KB 833, it was pointed out that the contract of the surety was a collateral, not a direct, one and that in such case demand was necessary to complete a cause of action and set the statute running. Moreover, bank guarantees invariably specify that the liability of the surety is to pay on demand, and in this connection the words are not devoid of meaning or effect, even with reference to this statute, as is the case with a promissory note payable on demand, but make the demand a condition precedent to suing the surety, so that the statute does not begin to run till such demand has been made and not complied with”.

Bradford (supra), in turn, relied on Hartland vs. Juke (1863) 1 H and C 667, wherein in the context of a continuing guarantee, it was contended that the period of limitation would begin to run as soon as the principal debtor becomes indebted to the Bank. The contention was negatived by stating:

“It was contended before us that the statute began to run from the 31st of December, 1855, by reason of the debt of Pound 179:1:11 then due to the bank; but no balance was then struck, and certainly no claim was made by the bank upon the defendant’s testator (the Guarantor) in respect of that debt; and we think the mere existence of the debt, unaccompanied by any claim from the bank, would not have the effect of making the statute run from that date.”

6. The trial court held that the accounts of the company with the Bank became dormant and inoperative from 1986 and, therefore, they ceased to be ‘live accounts’. It held that a ‘live account’ was one which was currently being operated at the relevant time by the borrower / customer. The trial court further held that in view of such cessation of operation of the accounts, it should be deemed that the company and consequently the guarantors had refused to discharge their obligations; that once there was such refusal by stopping operation of the accounts, the limitation would start to run immediately; that time which begins to run, cannot be stopped; and that the mere fact that the demand was made by the bank much later, that is in the year 1987, will not postpone the commencement of running of the period of limitation. The trial court refused to accept the contention that the limitation will start to run only when a notice was issued by the creditor-Bank, demanding payment of the amount from the guarantors and a refusal thereof by the guarantors. The trial court was of the view that if Bank’s contention was to be accepted, then it would mean that the Bank, by postponing issue of a notice making a demand, can postpone the commencement of the running of limitation. The trial court purported to test the validity of the Bank’s contention, by reference to a hypothetical situation, where the Bank, by not making a demand for, say 20 or 30 years, or postponing the demand indefinitely, could postpone the commencement of limitation indefinitely, and held that such a situation was impermissible. It, therefore, held that the period of limitation commenced to run from the middle of 1986 when the operation of the accounts was stopped, and the suit filed in 1990 beyond 3 years from the stoppage of operation of accounts was barred by time.

7.The High Court affirmed the said finding. It held that the words ‘on demand’ had a specific connotation in legal parlance; and that when an amount is payable on demand, it means ‘always payable’ and a ‘demand’ is not a condition precedent for the amount to be paid. The High Court held that when the guarantee stated that the guarantors were liable to pay on demand by the Bank, it meant that the amount was payable from the moment of execution of the guarantee and, consequently, no actual demand is necessary to make the amount due under the guarantees. It was held that the money became payable under the guarantee bond as soon as the guarantee was executed. The High Court also held that when the accounts became dormant in the middle of 1986 by non-operation and non-payment, it should be deemed that there was a refusal to pay the amount under the guarantees and, therefore, the suit filed on 16-3-1990 was barred by limitation, being beyond 3 years. The High Court held that the decision in Samuel (supra) will not apply to the Bank’s suit, as this Court had stated that the limitation will not run only if the account was a ‘live account’ and there was no refusal on the part of the guarantor to carry out the obligations. It held that the word ‘live’ meant that account should be operating and when an account became dormant and inoperative, it was not a live account. The High Court also distinguished the decision in Samuel on facts.

8. The appellant-Bank contended that the guarantees executed by the respondents were continuing guarantees; that the guarantors had agreed to pay the amount/s on demand by the Bank; that such a demand was made by the Bank on the guarantors on 12-10-1987 and 17-12-1987; and that the guarantors’ refusal to pay the amount demanded is contained in their reply-letters dated 31-10-1987 and 30-12-1987; and that, therefore, the suit filed on 16-3-1990, within three years from 31-10-1987 was in time. Reliance is placed on Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the decision of the Supreme Court in Samuel (supra).

9. A guarantor’s liability depends upon the terms of his contract. A ‘continuing guarantee’ is different from an ordinary guarantee. There is also a difference between a guarantee which stipulates that the guarantor is liable to pay only on a demand by the creditor, and a guarantee which does not contain such a condition. Further, depending on the terms of guarantee, the liability of a guarantor may be limited to a particular sum, instead of the liability being to the same extent as that of the principal debtor. The liability to pay may arise, on the principal debtor and guarantor, at the same time or at different points of time. A claim may be even time- barred against the principal debtor, but still enforceable against the guarantor. The parties may agree that the liability of a guarantor shall arise at a later point of time than that of the principal debtor. We have referred to these aspects only to underline the fact that the extent of liability under a guarantee as also the question as to when the liability of a guarantor will arise, would depend purely on the terms of the contract.

10. Samuel (supra), no doubt, dealt with a continuing guarantee. But the continuing guarantee considered by it, did not provide that the guarantor shall make payment on demand by the Bank. The continuing guarantee considered by it merely recited that the surety guaranteed to the Bank, the repayment of all money which shall at any time be due to the Bank from the borrower on the general balance of their accounts with the Bank, and that the guarantee shall be a continuing guarantee to an extent of ` 10 lakhs. Interpreting the said continuing guarantee, this Court held that so long as the account is a live account in the sense that it is not settled and there is no refusal on the part of the guarantor to carry out the obligation, the period of limitation could not be said to have commenced running.

11. But in the case on hand, the guarantee deeds specifically state that the guarantors agree to pay and satisfy the bank on demand and interest will be payable by the guarantors only from the date of demand. In a case where the guarantee is payable on demand, as held in the case of Bradford (supra) and Hartland (supra), the limitation begins to run when the demand is made and the guarantor commits breach by not complying with the demand.

12. We will examine the meaning of the words ‘on demand’. As noticed above, the High Court was of the view that the words ‘on demand’ in law have a special meaning and when an agreement states that an amount is payable on demand, it implies that it is always payable, that is payable forthwith and a demand is not a condition precedent for the amount to become payable. The meaning attached to the expression ‘on demand’ as ‘always payable’ or ‘payable forthwith without demand’ is not one of universal application. The said meaning applies only in certain circumstances. The said meaning is normally applied to promissory notes or bills of exchange payable on demand. We may refer to Articles 21 and 22 in this behalf. Article 21 provides that for money lent under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, the period of limitation (3 years) begins to run when the loan is made. On the other hand, the very same words ‘payable on demand’ have a different meaning in Article 22 which provides that for money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, the period of limitation (3 years) will begin to run when the demand is made. Thus, the words ‘payable on demand’ have been given different meaning when applied with reference to ‘money lent’ and ‘money deposited’. In the context of Article 21, the meaning and effect of those words is ‘always payable’ or payable from the moment when the loan is made, whereas in the context of Article 22, the meaning is ‘payable when actually a demand for payment is made’.

13. What then is the meaning of the said words used in the guarantee bonds in question? The guarantee bond states that the guarantors agree to pay and satisfy the Bank ‘on demand’. It specifically provides that the liability to pay interest would arise upon the guarantor only from the date of demand by the Bank for payment. It also provides that the guarantee shall be a continuing guarantee for payment of the ultimate balance to become due to the Bank by the borrower. The terms of guarantee, thus, make it clear that the liability to pay would arise on the guarantors only when a demand is made. Article 55 provides that the time will begin to run when the contract is ‘broken’. Even if Article 113 is to be applied, the time begins to run only when the right to sue accrues. In this case, the contract was broken and the right to sue accrued only when a demand for payment was made by the Bank and it was refused by the guarantors. When a demand is made requiring payment within a stipulated period, say 15 days, the breach occurs or right to sue accrues, if payment is not made or is refused within 15 days. If while making the demand for payment, no period is stipulated within which the payment should be made, the breach occurs or right to use accrues, when the demand is served on the guarantor.

14. We have to, however, enter a caveat here. When the demand is made by the creditor on the guarantor, under a guarantee which requires a demand as a condition precedent for the liability of the guarantor, such demand should be for payment of a sum which is legally due and recoverable from the principal debtor. If the debt had already become time-barred against the principal debtor, the question of creditor demanding payment thereafter, for the first time, against the guarantor would not arise. When the demand is made against the guarantor, if the claim is a live claim (that is, a claim which is not barred) against the principal debtor, limitation in respect of the guarantor will run from the date of such demand and refusal/non compliance. Where guarantor becomes liable in pursuance of a demand validly made in time the creditor can sue the guarantor within three years, even if the claim against the principal debtor gets subsequently time-barred. To clarify the above, the following illustration may be useful:

“Let us say that a creditor makes some advances to a borrower between 10-4-1991 and 1-6-1991 and the repayment thereof is guaranteed by the guarantor undertaking to pay on demand by the creditor, under a continuing guarantee dated 1-4-1991. Let us further say a demand is made by the creditor against the guarantor for payment on 1-3-1993. Though the limitation against the principal debtor may expire on 1-6-1994, as the demand was made on 1-3-1993 when the claim was ‘live’ against the principal debtor, the limitation as against the guarantor would be 3 years from 1-3-1993. On the other hand, if the creditor does not make a demand at all against the guarantor till 1-6-1994 when the claims against the principal debtor get time-barred, any demand against the guarantor made thereafter say on 15-9-1994 would not be valid or enforceable.

Be that as it may.

15. The respondents have tried to contend that when the operations ceased and the accounts became dormant, the very cessation of operation of accounts should be treated as a refusal to pay by the principal debtor, as also by the guarantors and, therefore the limitation would begin to run, not when there is a refusal to meet the demand, but when the accounts became dormant. By no logical process, we can hold that ceasing of operation of accounts by the borrower for some reason, would amount to a demand by the Bank on the guarantor to pay the amount due in the account or refusal by the principal debtor and guarantor to pay the amount due in the accounts.

16. In view of the above, we hold that the time began to run not when the operations ceased in the accounts in miD/- 986, but on the expiry of 15 days from 12-10-1987 when the demand was made by the Bank and there was refusal to pay by the guarantors.The suit filed within three years therefrom is, therefore, in time.

17.In the view we have taken, it is not necessary to consider the meaning of the words ‘live account’ used and referred to in Samuel (supra). Suffice it to say that the interpretation by the courts below placed on the words ‘live account’, that they refer to an account which is operational and not dormant, may not be sound. This Court itself had indicated that ‘live account’ means an account that is not settled. The use of the term ‘settled’ gives an indication that a ‘live account’ refers to an account where the balance has not been struck by an “account stated” or “account settled”. We may in this behalf, refer to the following observations in Bishun Chand vs. Girdhari Lal and Anr. (AIR 1934 PC 147) :

“The essence of an account stated is not the character of the items on one side or the other but the fact that there are cross items of account and that the parties mutually agree the several amounts of each and, by treating the items so agreed on the one side as discharging the items on the other side pro tanto, go on to agree that the balance only is payable. Such a transaction is in truth bilateral, and creates a new debt and a new cause of action.”

“There can be account stated although the balance of indebtedness is not throughout in favour of one side. It is irrelevant whether the debt in favour of the final creditor is created at the outset by one large payment or consists of several sums of principal and several sums of interest. Nor is it material whether the only payments made on the other side were simply payments in reduction of such indebtedness or were payments made in respect of other dealings. In any event items must be ascertained and agreed on each side before the balance can be struck and settled.”

18.Some arguments were addressed about the Article of limitation that would apply in respect of a suit against the guarantors. Samuel (supra) held that in the case of refusal of a guarantor to pay the amount the matter would be governed by Article 115 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, which corresponds to Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963. One of the submissions made before us was that the term ‘compensation for breach of contract’ in Article 55 indicates to a claim for unliquidated damages and not to a claim for payment of sum certain (as to what is the difference between a claim for unliquidated damages and a claim for a sum certain or a sum presently due, reference can advantageously be made to the classic statement of law by Chagla, CJ. in Iron And Hardware (India) Ltd. vs. Firm Shamlal And Bros AIR 1954 Bom. 423). If Article 55 does not apply, then a claim against a Guarantor in such a situation may fall under the residuary Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 corresponding to Article 120 of the old Act. The controversy about the appropriate Article applicable, when the claim is found to be not exactly for ‘compensation’ but ascertained sum due has been referred to as long back as 1916 in Tricomdas Cooverji Bhoja vs. Gopinath Jin Thakur (AIR 1916 PC 183). Under the old Limitation Act (Act of 1908), the periods prescribed were different under Articles 115 and 116. The periods prescribed were also different under Articles 115 and 120. But under the 1963 Act, the period of limitation is the same (three years) both under Articles 55 and 113. Having regard to the fact that the period of limitation is 3 years both under Articles 55 and Article 113, and having regard to the binding decision in Samuel (supra), we do not propose to examine the controversy as to whether the appropriate Article is 55 or 113. Suffice it to note that even if the Article applicable is Article 113, the Bank’s suit is in time.

19. In view of our finding that the suit is not barred by time, we allow this appeal and, consequently set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and that of the trial court. Consequently, the suit is decreed, as prayed for, with costs.