KEYWORDS : BAIL- POCSO -CANCELLATION OF BAIL
The legal proposition that under the POCSO Act only the Special Court has been singularly vested with all the powers to try an offence under the Act and to entertain and consider application for bail filed by the accused and to deal with any incidental matter thereto including the power of detention and remand of the accused.
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Unknown vs Dhananjoy Singh @ Motu & Anr
on 8 April, 2015
Author: Shib Sadhan Sadhu
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction Appellate Side Present: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Shib Sadhan Sadhu, J.
C.R.R. No.2562 of 2014 Ramrahit Singh … Petitioner Versus Dhananjoy Singh @ Motu & Anr.
For the Petitioner : Mr.Animesh Mookherjee
For the State : Mr.Ayan Bhattacharya
For the O.P. No.1 : Mr.Subhasish Dasgupta
Mr. Kunal Ganguly
Mr.Anirban Roy Chowdhury
Heard on : March 18, 2015
Judgment on : April 08, 2015
Shib Sadhan Sadhu, J.
1. By preferring the present application under Section 401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C. for brevity) the petitioner has prayed that the order dated 15.07.2014 passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Burdwan in Criminal Misc. Case No.4027 of 2013, thereby dismissing the revision and affirming the order dated 29.07.2013 passed by the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Asansol in G.R. Case No.1366 of 2013 in respect of granting of bail of the O.P. No.1 be quashed and set aside.
2. The factual matrix which gave rise to the present application is as follows:
An offence was registered being No.40/13 dated 01.06.2013 under the provisions of Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as POCSO Act for brevity) and Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code against Dhananjoy Singh @ Motu (O.P.No.1 herein).
3. As per the F.I.R. lodged on 01.06.2013 the petitioner on 20.05.2013 went to his native place in Bihar keeping his two minor sons and the minor daughter aged about 13 years 4 months 16 days (victim girl) in his house. Taking advantage of his absence his neighbour’s son Dhananjoy Singh @ Motu trespassed into his house in the night and committed rape upon his minor daughter on 21.05.2013, 24.05.2013 and 28.05.2013 under threat to kill her and her minor brothers. In the night on 28.05.2013 around 12.30 hours the complainant returned home and saw the accused Dhananjoy Singh @ Motu fled away from his house. His daughter (victim girl) narrated the incident to the petitioner and his wife.
4. Investigation was conducted and charge sheet being No.52 of 2013 was submitted against the accused Dhananjoy Singh @ Motu under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and under Section 506 of the IPC on 24.07.2013.
5. On 29.07.2013 the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Asansol granted bail to the accused on the ground that charge sheet has been submitted and the accused is in custody for 58 days. Being aggrieved by such order the petitioner made an application on 27.11.2013 before the Learned Sessions Judge, Burdwan under Section 439 (2) of the Cr.P.C. praying for cancellation of bail granted to the accused. That application was registered as Misc. Case No.4027 of 2013 and was transferred to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Burdwan which was designated to try the offences under the POCSO Act, for disposal. The accused (O.P.No.1) opposed the said application.
After hearing rival submissions, Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Burdwan dismissed the said application by order dated 15.07.2014 and thereby confirmed the impugned order therein passed by the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Asansol on 29.07.2013. Hence, the petitioner has questioned the correctness and legality of both the said orders in the present Revisional Application.
6. Mr. Animesh Mukherjee, Learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the victim was a 13 years plus old daughter of the petitioner and she was subjected to forcible rape by the accused in this case. He further submitted that as per the definition of “child” under the POCSO Act, a child means any person below the age of 18 years. Thus the victim girl was definitely a child on the date of occurrence. He submitted yet further that as per provision of POCSO Act only the designated Special Court is empowered to try the offences under the said Act and so the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Asansol has no jurisdiction to entertain and consider the application for bail moved by the accused in this case. Therefore, the impugned order passed by him granting bail to the accused is illegal and without jurisdiction. But the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Burdwan completely ignored such fact and without application of judicial mind and in a very casual manner passed the impugned order dated 15.07.2014 affirming the said order dated 19.07.2013 inter-alia holding that there is no provision that the Learned Magistrate has got no authority or power to grant bail, if the accused is produced before him. Therefore, according to the Learned Counsel, both the impugned orders are unjustified, illegal and perverse and are liable to be quashed.
7. Mr. Ayan Bhattacharya, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State subscribed to the submission made by the Learned Counsel Mr. Mukherjee and added that the POCSO Act which came into force on 20.06.2012 was enacted in order to protect the children of our country from the heinous offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography and to secure such object provisions have been made in the said Act for establishment of Special Courts for trial of such offences and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Mr. Bhattacharya further submitted that after the Act came into force, any Court other than the Special Court constituted under Section 28 of the POCSO Act has been divested of the jurisdiction to entertain or deal with any application in relation to such case. Further Section 33 of the Act has laid down that a Special Court may take cognizance of any offence, without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, or upon a police report of such facts. He submitted yet further that in terms of the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (46 of 1952) the Court of a Special Judge is a Court of original Criminal Jurisdiction and in order to make it functionally oriented some powers were conferred by the Act itself. So the Special Court under the Act has to function as a Court of original criminal jurisdiction and it enjoys all the powers save and except those which have been specifically denied. The Special Court under the Act is not bound by the terminological status description of Magistrate or a Court of Sessions and the Special Judge would be a Magistrate empowered to try a case under Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. and he is empowered to exercise the powers that are conferred upon a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case. Referring to the provisions of Section 4 of the Cr.P.C., Mr. Bhattacharya further submitted that since Section 33 of the Act provides for special procedure for the manner of taking cognizance and trial of the offences under the Act those must prevail. Also in terms of Section 42-A of the Act the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provision of any other law for the time being in force and, in case of any inconsistency, the provisions of the Act shall have overriding effect on the provisions of any such law to the extent of the inconsistency. Therefore, in view of such position, the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Asansol has no jurisdiction to entertain and consider the application for bail moved by the accused prosecuted for an offence under the Act. According to him, although the Act does not prohibit the Magistrate in passing the order of first remand of an accused suspected and proceeded for an offence under the Act, on his production before him, as he is empowered to do so by the provision of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. but he has no power or jurisdiction to pass any subsequent order of remand or to entertain or consider any application for bail filed by such accused which can only be done by the Special Court. He referred to the provisions of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. on this score which reads as follows:
“The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this Section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorize the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if, he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction.” The Learned Counsel submitted further that the Learned Magistrate also took cognizance of the offence on submission of the chargesheet despite having no jurisdiction. Thus it is apparent that the entire course adopted by the Learned Magistrate is illegal being contrary to the express provisions contained in the Act. He, thus, concludingly submitted that the impugned orders are not only without jurisdiction but those also amount to gross abuse of process of Court and so this Court’s interference is warranted to set the wrong right. He relied on the decisions reported in 2014 (136) AIC 852 (Rajasthan High Court) Ramu Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others; 2013(3) RCR (Cri) 526 (Kerala High Court) V.Prasad Vs. State of Kerala; AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1255 (State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Krishnaswami Naidu & Anr.; AIR 1984 Supreme Court 718 (A.R.Antulay Vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak & Anr.); and AIR 2001 Supreme Court 3774 (Harshad S.Mehta & Others V. State of Maharashtra) in order to substantiate his submission.
8. Mr. Subhasis Dasgupta, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.No.1 countering the submissions made by his Learned Adversaries contended that there are no cogent and overwhelming circumstances to cancel the bail which was granted to the accused/O.P. No.1 earlier by the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Asansol as there is no total prohibition in the Act against grant of bail merely because a person is accused of commission of offence of serious nature. On the contrary Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. empowers the Magistrate to grant bail even in a non-bailable offence. Therefore, according to Mr. Dasgupta, the Learned Magistrate was quite empowered to grant bail to the accused by exercising his discretion. He further submitted that taking cognizance of the offence by the Learned Magistrate is a mere irregularity and it cannot make the impugned order of granting bail illegal or without jurisdiction as there was no failure of justice or no prejudice was caused. It was also contended by the Learned Counsel that there is no grievance or allegation made by the petitioner that the accused misused the liberty granted to him. Therefore, the Learned Additional Sessions Judge was justified in rejecting the prayer for cancellation of bail granted to the accused as he found no supervening circumstances and that there was no adverse report against the accused. According to the Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.No.1, once bail is granted to the O.P.No.1 by the Learned Magistrate and confirmed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, the same cannot be cancelled abruptly only on the sweet desire of the petitioner. He strenuously contended that the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Asansol has rightly passed the impugned order dated 29.07.2013 and the Revisional Court has rightly rejected the revision preferred against the said order. Accordingly he urged that the present application be dismissed. He cited the decisions reported in (2012) 2 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 481 : (2012) 4 Supreme Court Cases 516 (Rattiram and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh) and (Satyanarayan & Ors. V. State of Madhya Pradesh) and 2005 CRI.L.J. 2984 (Sanjay Narhar Malshe v. State of Maharashtra) in support of his contention.
9. Having regard to the rival submission and contention advanced by the Learned Counsel for the parties in the light of the decisions placed, I must say at the very outset that POCSO Act, 2012 was enacted to effectively address the heinous crimes of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children and to protect them from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.This Act was introduced basing upon the Statement of Objects and Reasons which mentioned inter-alia that : “1. Article 15 of the Constitution, inter-alia, confers upon the State powers to make special provision for children. Further, Article 39, inter-alia, provides that the State shall in particular direct its policy towards securing that the tender age of children are not abused and their childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and they are given facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. (2) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children, ratified by India on 11th December, 1992, requires the State Parties to undertake all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent (a) the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity;
(b) the exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; and (c) the exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials.
(3) The data collected by the National Crime Records Bureau shows that there has been increase in cases of sexual offences against children. This is corroborated by the ‘Study on Child Abuse : India 2007’ conducted by the Ministry of Women and Child Development.
Moreover, sexual offences against children are not adequately addressed by the extant laws.
A large number of such offences are neither specifically provided for nor are they adequately penalized. The interests of the child, both as a victim as well as a witness, need to be protected. It is felt that offences against children need to be defined explicitly and countered through commensurate penalties as an effective deterrence.
(4) It is, therefore, proposed to enact a self contained comprehensive legislation inter-alia to provide for protection of children from the offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography with due regard for safeguarding the interest and well being of the child at every stage of the judicial process, incorporating child-friendly procedures for reporting, recording of evidence, investigation and trial of offences and provision for establishment of Special Courts for speedy trial of such offences.
10. In this context I think it pertinent to quote the observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gaurav Jain Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court 3021 which is as follows:
“31…………………………………………………………………………Children ‘s programme should find a prominent part in our national plans for the development of human resources, so that our children grow up to become robust citizens, physically fit, mentally alert and morally healthy, endorse with the skills and motivations needed by the society. They participate in equal measure in democratic governance of the State of useful citizens. Equal opportunities for development to all children during the period of growth should be our aim; for this we would serve our larger purpose of reducing inequality and ensuring social justice. To care for, plan out needs of the children and successful implementation is, therefore, our duty, as citizen, be an Administrator, a Magistrate or a Judge.”
11. Before entering into the arena of merits of the matter I think it would be useful to have a look on some relevant provisions of the POCSO Act which have a direct bearing upon the issue of controversy with which we are now concerned.
“Section 6. Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault._ Whoever, commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 28. Designation of Special Courts-(1) for the purposes of providing a speedy trial, the State Government shall in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, designate for each district, a Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences under the Act:
Provided that if a Court of Session is notified as a Children’s Court under the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005 (4 of 2006) or a Special Court designated for similar purposes under any other law for the time being in force, then, such Court shall be deemed to be a Special Court under this section.
Section 31. Application of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to proceedings before a Special Court.- Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (including the provisions as to bail and bonds) shall apply to the proceedings before a Special Court and for the purposes of the said provision, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions and the person conducting a prosecution before a Special Court, shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor.
Section 33. Procedure and powers of Special Court.-(1) A Special Court may take cognizance of any offence, without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, or upon a police report of such facts.
Section 42-A. Act not in derogation of any other law.-The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force and, in case of any inconsistency, the provisions of this Act shall have overriding effect on the provisions of any such law to the extent of the inconsistency.
12. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Act clearly spells out that cognizance of an offence under the Act without any order of committal or trial can be taken by the Special Court on a complaint disposing facts, which constitute such offence, or upon a police report on such facts. Such being the position, where the Special Court is empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a complaint or police report on facts constituting an offence under the Act, the Judicial Magistrate has no jurisdiction to entertain and consider the application for bail moved by any accused proceeded for an offence under the Act. The Actdoes not interdict the Magistrate in passing the order for the first remand of an accused suspected and prosecuted for an offence under the Act, the accused being produced before him since he is empowered under Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. to do so. However, he has no jurisdiction to pass any subsequent order of remand and to entertain or to consider any application of bail filed by such accused and that can only be done by the Special Court.
13. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. V. Krishnna Swami Naidu (Supra) cited by the Learned State Counsel the Hon’ble Supreme Court explaining the status, power and position of the Special Court held:
“Section 8 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act specifically empowers the Special Judge to take cognizance of the offence without the accused being committed to him. In taking cognizance of an offence without the accused being committed to him he is not a Sessions Judge for Section 193, Cr.P.C. provides that no Court of Sessions Judge shall take cognizance for any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code. Strictly he is not a Magistrate for no Magistrate can take cognizance as a Court of Session without committal. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Actbeing an Amending Act the provisions are intended to provide for a speedy trial of certain offences. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act is not intended to be a complete code relating to procedure. The provisions of the Cr.P.C. are not excluded unless they are inconsistent with the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. Thus read there could be no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the Cr.P.C. is applicable when there is no conflict with the provisions of Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. If a Special Judge who is empowered to take cognizance without committal is not empowered to exercise powers of remanding an accused person produced before him or release him on bail it will lead to an anomalous situation. A Magistrate other than a Magistrate having jurisdiction cannot keep him in custody for more than 15 days and after the expiring of the period if the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case does not include the Special Judge, it would mean that he would have no authority to extend the period of remand or to release him on bail. So also if the Special Judge is not held to be a Magistrate having jurisdiction, a charge sheet under Section 173 cannot be submitted to him. It is relevant to note that the General Clauses Act Section 32 defines a Magistrate as including every person exercising all or any of the powers of a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the time being in force. Section 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that any reference without any qualifying words, to a Magistrate, shall be construed, unless the context otherwise requires in the manner stated in the sub-sections. If the context otherwise requires the word ‘Magistrate’ may include Magistrates who are not specified in the section. Read along with the definition of the Magistrate in the General Clauses Act there can be no difficulty in construing the special Judge as a Magistrate for the purposes of Section 167.”
14. Therefore, there remains no scope for harbouring even the slightest doubt to accept the legal proposition that under the POCSO Act only the Special Court has been singularly vested with all the powers to try an offence under the Act and to entertain and consider application for bail filed by the accused and to deal with any incidental matter thereto including the power of detention and remand of the accused.
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observation while passing judgment in Criminal Appeal No.2087/2008 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.5126 of 2007 (Brijnandan Jaiswal v. Munna @ Munna Jaiswal & Anr.) : “It is now well-settled law that complainant can always question the order granting bail if the said order is not validly passed. It is not as if once a bail is granted by any Court, the only way to get it cancelled on account of its misuse. The bail order can be tested on merits also. In our opinion, therefore, the complainant can question the merits of the order granting bail. However, we find from the order that no reasons were given by the Learned Judge while granting the bail and it seems to have been granted almost mechanically without considering the pros and cons of the matter. While granting bail, particularly in serious case like murder some reasons justifying the grant are necessary.”
16. Like most things in life, there is an ever present duality in the criminal justice process. There is a never ending dialectic in legal philosophy between the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and the need of the complainant (s) or victim (s) for a fair trial, uninfluenced by powerful or nasty (or both) accused persons. Bail is a legal provision which has great potential to provide mischievous or criminal elements an opportunity to influence the course of a trial in all the wrong ways. Sometimes people are bailed out and they misuse their freedom. Bail cancellation is the most obvious post-facto way in which such abuse can be curtailed.
17. In the decision reported in 2012 Cr.L.J. 4670 (Ash Mohammad Vs. Shiv Raj Singh @ Lalla Babu & Anr.) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that concept of cancellation of bail and of nullifying order granting bail in appeal are different. It has been further held therein that the concept of setting aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse order is totally different from the cancelling an order of bail on the ground that the accused had misconducted himself or because of some supervening circumstances warranting such cancellation.
18. Now let us assume for the sake of argument, of course by stretching our imagination beyond the horizon, that the Learned Magistrate had jurisdiction to grant bail to the accused. In that event too the Learned Magistrate was divested of such jurisdiction because the charge sheet was submitted on 24th July, 2013 i.e. on the 53rd day from the date of production of the accused which is very much within the statutory period. The order granting bail by the Learned Magistrate is absolutely perverse as he did not record any reason for granting bail in such serious and atrocious offence save and except that further detention of the accused would not help the investigation of the case. It is horrible to note the lack of legal conception demonstrated by the Learned Magistrate by recording such reason as only after completion of the investigation the charge sheet was submitted. Therefore, the impugned order granting bail to the accused is not only without jurisdiction but is also vitiated by illegality and perversity. The conduct of the Learned Additional Sessions Judge cannot also be appreciated either. The manner in which he approached and addressed the issue is highly condemnable as he missed the wood for the trees and totally misdirected himself in passing the impugned order dated 15.07.2014 which is equally perverse.
19. I would like to make it clear that it is not an application for cancellation of bail, as cancellation is not sought because of supervening circumstances. The present one is basically an application challenging grant of bail where the Learned Magistrate passed such order despite having no jurisdiction to entertain or consider the bail application which makes the order perverse.
20. Before concluding the discussion, I would like to add that the decision in the case of Sanjay Narhar Malshe vs. State of Maharashtra (Supra) cited by Mr. Dasgupta, Learned Counsel appearing for the O.P.No.2, was in connection with an offence punishable under Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 which is though triable by a Special Court but in that Act there is no provision empowering the Special Judge of the Special Court to take cognizance of the offence as a Court of original jurisdiction without the case being committed to it for trial. In that view of the matter it was held in that decision that there is no total prohibition against grant of bail by the Magistrate. Striking dissimilarity between the said Act and the present Act is that in the POCSO Act the Special Judge has been empowered to take cognizance of an offence under the Act without any order of committal and the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to entertain and consider the application for bail. Therefore, that decision can have no manner of application in the instant case. The other decision cited by him being (2012) 2 Supreme Court Cases (Cri)481: (2012)4 Supreme Court Cases 516 (Supra) also relates to an offence punishable under Section 3(1) (X) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and otherSections of the Indian Penal Code. In that case the Learned Special Court took cognizance directly without commitment of the case to it by the Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of Sections 209 and 193 of the Cr.P.C. That case ended into conviction of the accused persons. Appeal was preferred before the High Court and it was dismissed. Against that the appellants moved before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that mere non-compliance with Section 193 of the Cr.P.C. does not vitiate the trial and on the said ground alone the conviction cannot be set aside or there cannot be a direction for retrial. Therefore, this decision also does not have any bearing upon the instant matter. On the contrary the decisions referred to by Mr. Bhattacharya, the Learned State Counsel, are quite relevant and on the point and thus have a sound bearing upon the case in hand.
21. Consequently both the impugned orders passed by the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Asansol and by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Burdwan are set aside and the bail bond of the accused is cancelled. The accused (O.P.No.1 herein) is directed to surrender to custody forthwith failing which it shall be the duty of the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Burdwan which is designated to try the offences under the Act to take him to custody immediately. I would like to make it further clear that whatever has been stated in this judgment are only for the purpose of annulment of the order of grant of bail and its confirmation by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge and they would have no bearing whatsoever on trial.
22. The application is thus allowed.
23. The Learned Registrar General is directed to circulate a copy of this judgment to all the Learned District & Sessions Judges of West Bengal and Andaman Nicobar Islands who in their turn shall circulate it to all the Judicial Officers under their control so that they can exercise criminal jurisdiction properly.
24. Let a copy of this judgment be also sent to the Learned Director, West Bengal Judicial Academy, Bijan Bhawan, Salt Lake City, Kolkata for sensitization of the Judicial Officers attending the Academy.
25. Keeping in view the age of the case and nature and gravity of the offence, the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Burdwan (Designated Special Court) is directed to finally dispose of the G.R. Case No.1366 of 2013 as expeditiously as possible but not later than (three) 3 months from the date of communication of this order.
26. Criminal Section is directed to deliver urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment to the parties, if applied for, as early as possible.
(Shib Sadhan Sadhu, J.)