Section 14 of the Limitation Act and the time spent in prosecuting remedy before a wrong forum.
The question whether Section 14 of the limitation Act can be relied upon for excluding the time spent in prosecuting remedy before a wrong forum was considered by a two Judge Bench in State of Goa v. Western Builders (supra) in the context of the provisions contained in Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Bench referred to the provisions of the two Acts and observed:
There is no provision in the whole of the Act which prohibits discretion of the court. Under Section 14 of the limitation Act if the party has been bona fidely prosecuting his remedy before the court which has no jurisdiction whether the period spent in that proceedings shall be excluded or not. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has taken us to the provisions of the Act of 1996: like Section 5, Section 8(1), Section 9, Section 11, sub- sections (4), (6), (9) and Sub-section (3) of Section 14, Section 27, Sections 34, 36, 37, 39(2) and (4), Section 41, Sub-section (2), Sections 42 and 43 and tried to emphasise with reference to the aforesaid sections that wherever the legislature wanted to give power to the court that has been incorporated in the provisions, therefore, no further power should lie in the hands of the court so as to enable to exclude the period spent in prosecuting the remedy before other forum. It is true but at the same time there is no prohibition incorporated in the statute for curtailing the power of the court under Section 14 of the limitation Act. Much depends upon the words used in the statute and not general principles applicable. By virtue of Section 43 of the Act of 1996, the limitation Act applies to the proceedings under the Act of 1996 and the provisions of the limitation Act can only stand excluded to the extent wherever different period has been prescribed under the Act, 1996. Since there is no prohibition provided under Section 34, there is no reason why Section 14 of the limitation Act (sic not) be read in the Act of 1996, which will advance the cause of justice. If the statute is silent and there is no specific prohibition then the statute should be interpreted which advances the cause of justice.
The same issue was again considered by the three-Judge Bench in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department (supra) to which reference has been made hereinabove. After holding that Section 5 of the limitation Act cannot be invoked for condonation of delay, Panchal, J (speaking for himself and Balakrishnan, C.J.) observed:
Section 14 of the limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. On analysis of the said section, it becomes evident that the following conditions must be satisfied before Section 14 can be pressed into service:
(1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party;
(2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith;
(3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature;
(4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue and;
(5) Both the proceedings are in a court.
The policy of the section is to afford protection to a litigant against the bar of limitation when he institutes a proceeding which by reason of some technical defect cannot be decided on merits and is dismissed. While considering the provisions of Section 14 of the limitation Act, proper approach will have to be adopted and the provisions will have to be interpreted so as to advance the cause of justice rather than abort the proceedings. It will be well to bear in mind that an element of mistake is inherent in the invocation of Section 14. In fact, the section is intended to provide relief against the bar of limitation in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum. On reading Section 14 of the Act it becomes clear that the legislature has enacted the said section to exempt a certain period covered by a bona fide litigious activity. Upon the words used in the section, it is not possible to sustain the interpretation that the principle underlying the said section, namely, that the bar of limitation should not affect a person honestly doing his best to get his case tried on merits but failing because the court is unable to give him such a trial, would not be applicable to an application filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The principle is clearly applicable not only to a case in which a litigant brings his application in the court, that is, a court having no jurisdiction to entertain it but also where he brings the suit or the application in the wrong court in consequence of bona fide mistake or (sic of) law or defect of procedure. Having regard to the intention of the legislature this Court is of the firm opinion that the equity underlying Section 14 should be applied to its fullest extent and time taken diligently pursuing a remedy, in a wrong court, should be excluded.
At this stage it would be relevant to ascertain whether there is any express provision in the Act of 1996, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the limitation Act. On review of the provisions of the Act of 1996 this Court finds that there is no provision in the said Act which excludes the applicability of the provisions of Section 14 of the limitation Act to an application submitted under Section 34 of the said Act. On the contrary, this Court finds that Section 43 makes the provisions of the limitation Act, 1963 applicable to arbitration proceedings. The proceedings under Section 34 are for the purpose of challenging the award whereas the proceeding referred to under Section 43 are the original proceedings which can be equated with a suit in a court. Hence, Section 43 incorporating the limitation Act will apply to the proceedings in the arbitration as it applies to the proceedings of a suit in the court. Sub-section (4) of Section 43, inter alia, provides that where the court orders that an arbitral award be set aside, the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of the court shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the limitation Act, 1963, for the commencement of the proceedings with respect to the dispute so submitted. If the period between the commencement of the arbitration proceedings till the award is set aside by the court, has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation provided for any proceedings with respect to the dispute, there is no good reason as to why it should not be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the limitation Act would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, more particularly where no provision is to be found in the Act of 1996, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the limitation Act, to an application made under Section 34 of the Act. It is to be noticed that the powers under Section 34 of the Act can be exercised by the court only if the aggrieved party makes an application. The jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, cannot be exercised suo motu. The total period of four months within which an application, for setting aside an arbitral award, has to be made is not unusually long. Section 34 of the Act of 1996 would be unduly oppressive, if it is held that the provisions of Section 14 of the limitation Act are not applicable to it, because cases are no doubt conceivable where an aggrieved party, despite exercise of due diligence and good faith, is unable to make an application within a period of four months. From the scheme and language of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the intention of the legislature to exclude the applicability of Section 14 of the limitation Act is not manifest. It is well to remember that Section 14 of the limitation Act does not provide for a fresh period of limitation but only provides for the exclusion of a certain period. Having regard to the legislative intent, it will have to be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside an arbitral award.
In his concurring judgment, Raveendran, J. referred to the judgment in State of Goa v. Western Builders (supra) and observed:
On the other hand, Section 14 contained in Part III of the limitation Act does not relate to extension of the period of limitation, but relates to exclusion of certain period while computing the period of limitation. Neither Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the AC Act nor any other provision of the AC Act exclude the applicability of Section 14 of the limitation Act to applications under Section 34(1) of the AC Act. Nor will the proviso to Section 34(3) exclude the application of Section 14, as Section 14 is not a provision for extension of period of limitation, but for the exclusion of certain period while computing the period of limitation. Having regard to Section 29(2) of the limitation Act, Section 14 of that Act will be applicable to an application under Section 34 of the AC Act. Even when there is cause to apply Section 14, the limitation period continues to be three months and not more, but in computing the limitation period of three months for the application under Section 34 of the AC Act, the time during which the applicant was prosecuting such application before the wrong court is excluded, provided the proceeding in the wrong court was prosecuted bona fide, with due diligence. Western Builders therefore lays down the correct legal position.
The same view was reiterated in Coal India Limited v. Ujjal Transport Agency.