In Union of India v. Popular Construction Company , Supreme Court considered the question whether Section 5 of the limitation Act can be invoked for condonation of delay in filing an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The two-Judge Bench referred to earlier decisions in Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel, AIR 1964 SC 1099, Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 133, Mangu Ram v. MCD, (1976) 1 SCC 392, Patel Naranbhai Marghabhai v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai, (1992) 4 SCC 264 and held:

As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are ‘but not thereafter’ used in the proviso to Sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase ‘but not thereafter’ wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.

Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award ‘in accordance with’ Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, Sub-section (3) would not be an application ‘in accordance with’ that Sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that:

36. Enforcement.-Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired ….the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court.

This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to ‘proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow’ (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the court’s powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the limitation Act.

In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Ors. (supra), a three-Judge Bench again considered Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. J.M. Panchal, J., speaking for himself and Balakrishnan, C.J., referred to the relevant provisions and observed:

….When any special statute prescribes certain period of limitation as well as provision for extension up to specified time-limit, on sufficient cause being shown, then the period of limitation prescribed under the special law shall prevail and to that extent the provisions of the limitation Act shall stand excluded. As the intention of the legislature in enacting sub- section (3) of Section 34 of the Act is that the application for setting aside the award should be made within three months and the period can be further extended on sufficient cause being shown by another period of 30 days but not thereafter, this Court is of the opinion that the provisions of Section 5 of the limitation Act would not be applicable because the applicability of Section 5 of the limitation Act stands excluded because of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the limitation Act.