In Gujarat Urja Vikash Nigam Ltd. Versus Essar Power Ltd [AIR 2008 SC 1921 : (2008) 4 SCR 822 : (2008) 4 SCC 755 : JT 2008 (3) SC 336 : (2008) 3 SCALE 469]
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA HELD :
Today many of our educated people are largely unaware about the great intellectual achievements of our ancestors and the intellectual treasury they have bequeathed us. The Mimansa Principles of Interpretation is part of that intellectual treasury but it is distressing to note that apart from a reference to these principles in the judgment of Sir John Edge, the then Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court in Beni Prasad vs. Hardai Devi, (1892) ILR 14 All 67 (FB), and some judgments by one of us (M. Katju, J.) there has been almost no utilization of these principles even in our own country.
38. It may be mentioned that the Mimansa Rules of Interpretation were our traditional principles of interpretation laid down by Jaimini, whose Sutras were explained by Shabar, Kumarila Bhatta, Prabhakar, etc. These Mimansa Principles were regularly used by our great jurists like Vijnaneshwara (author of Mitakshara), Jimutvahana (author of Dayabhaga), Nanda Pandit, etc. whenever they found any conflict between the various Smritis or any ambiguity, incongruity, or casus omissus therein. There is no reason why we cannot use these principles on appropriate occasions. However, it is a matter of deep regret that these principles have rarely been used in our law Courts. It is nowhere mentioned in our Constitution or any other law that only Maxwell’s Principles of Interpretation can be used by the Court. We can use any system of interpretation which helps us resolve a difficulty. In certain situations Maxwell’s principles would be more appropriate, while in other situations the Mimansa principles may be more suitable.
39. The Mimansa principles of interpretation were created for resolving the practical difficulties in performing the yagyas. The rules for performing the various yagyas were given in books called the Brahmanas (all in Sanskrit) e.g. Shatapath Brahmana, Aitareya Brahmana, Taitareya Brahmana, etc. There were many ambiguities, obscurities, conflicts etc. in the Brahmana texts, and hence the Mimansa Principles of Interpretation were created for resolving these difficulties.
40. Although the Mimansa principles were created for religious purpose, they were so rational and logical that they subsequently began to be used in law, grammar, logic, philosophy, etc. i.e. they became of universal application. The books on Mimansa are all in Sanskrit, but there is a good book in English by Prof. Kishori Lal Sarkar called ‘The Mimansa Rules of Interpretation’ published in the Tagore Law Lecture Series, which may be seen by anyone who wishes to go deeper into the subject.
41. In the Mimansa system there are three ways of dealing with conflicts which have been fully discussed by Shabar Swami in his commentary on Sutra 14, Chapter III, Book III of Jaimini.
(1) Where two texts which are apparently conflicting are capable of being reconciled, then by the Principle of Harmonious Construction (which is called the Samanjasya Principle in Mimansa) they should be reconciled. The Samanjasya Principle has been laid down by Jaimini in Chapter II, Sutra 9 which states :
“The inconsistencies asserted are not actually found. The conflicts consist in difference of application. The real intention is not affected by application. Therefore, there is consistency.”
42. The Samanjasya axiom is illustrated in the Dayabhag. Jimutvahana found that there were two apparently conflicting texts of Manu and Yajnavalkya. The first stated “a son born after a division shall alone take the paternal wealth”. The second text stated “sons, with whom the father has made a partition, should give a share to the son born after the distribution”. Jimutvahana, utilizing the Samanjasya principle of Mimansa, reconciled these two texts by holding that the former applies to the case of property which is the self-acquired property of the father, and the latter applies to the property descended from the grandfather.
43. One of the illustrations of the Samanjasya principle is the maxim of lost horses and burnt chariot (Nashtashvadaghda Ratha Nyaya). This is based on the story of two men travelling in their respective chariots and one of them losing his horses and the other having his chariot burnt through the outbreak of fire in the village in which they were putting up for the night. The horses that were left were harnessed to the remaining chariot and the two men pursued their journey together. Its teaching is union for mutual advantage, which has been quoted in the 16th Vartika to Panini, and is explained by Patanjali. It is referred to in Kumarila Bhatta’s Tantra Vartika.
(2) The second situation is a conflict where it is impossible to reconcile the two conflicting texts despite all efforts. In this situation the Vikalpa principle applies, which says that whichever law is more in consonance with reason and justice should be preferred. However, conflict should not be readily assumed and every effort should be made to reconcile conflicting texts. It is only when all efforts of reconciliation fail that the Vikalpa principle is to be resorted to.
(3) There is a third situation of a conflict and this is where there are two conflicting irreconciliable texts but one overrides the other because of its greater force. This is called a Badha in the Mimansa system (similar to the doctrine of ultra vires). The great Mimansa scholar Sree Bhatta Sankara in his book ‘Mimansa Valaprakasha’ has given several illustrations of Badha as follows :
“A Shruti of a doubtful character is barred by a Shruti which is free from doubt. A Linga which is more cogent bars that which is less cogent. Similarly a Shruti bars a Smriti. A Shruti bars Achara (custom) also. An absolute Smriti without reference to any popular reason bars one that is based upon a popular reason. An approved Achara bars an unapproved Achara. An unobjectionable Achara bars an objectionable Achara. A Smriti of the character of a Vidhi bars one of the character of an Arthavada. A Smriti of a doubtful character is barred by one free from doubts. That which serves a purpose immediately bars that which is of a remote service. That which is multifarious in meaning is barred by that which has a single meaning. The application of a general text is barred by a special text. A rule of procedure is barred by a mandatory rule. A manifest sense bars a sense by context. A primary sense bars a secondary sense. That which has a single indication is preferable to what has many indications. An indication of an inherent nature bars one which is not so. That which indicates an action is to be preferred to what merely indicates a capacity. If you can fill up an ellipse by an expression which occurs in a passage, you cannot go beyond it.” (Emphasis supplied)
44. The principle of Badha is discussed by Jaimini in the tenth chapter of his work. Badha primarily means barring a thing owing to inconsistency. Jaimini uses the principle of Badha mainly with reference to cases where Angas or sub-ceremonies are to be introduced from the Prakriti Yagya (i.e. a yagya whose rules for performance are given in detail in the Brahmanas) into a Vikriti (i.e. a yagya whose rules of performance are not mentioned anywhere, or are incompletely mentioned). In such a case, though the Angas or the sub-ceremonies are to be borrowed from the Prakriti Yagya, those of the sub-ceremonies which prove themselves to be inconsistent with or out of place in the Vikriti Yagya, are to be omitted.
45. For example, in the Rajsuya Yagya, certain homas are prescribed, for the proper performance of which one must borrow details from the Darshapaurnamasi Yagya. In the Rajsuya Yagya, plain ground is directed to be selected as the Vedi for the homas, while in the case of the Darshapaurnamasi, the Vedi should be erected by digging the ground with spade etc. Such an act would be out of place in constructing the Vedi for the homas in the Rajsuya Yagya. Here, there is a Badha (bar) of the particular rule regarding the erection of the Vedi in the Darshapaurnarnasi Yagya, being extended to the Rajsuya Yagya. This is the case of Badha by reason of express text.
46. There are other instances in which the inconsistency arises incidentally. For example, in the Sadyaska there is no need of cutting the peg with which the animal is to be tied. But, in the Agni-Somiya Yagya which is the Prakriti of the Sadyaska Yagya, reciting of certain Mantras is prescribed in connection with the cutting of the peg. This recital being out of place in the former Yagya is barred in carrying the Atidesha process. Numerous other illustrations can be given. For example, in the Satra Yagya the selection of Rittik is out of place and so omitted, though this is done in the Soma Yagya of which the Satra is the Vikriti. The Krishnala Nyaya (black bean maxim) is another instance. In cases where Atidesha is to be made by implication, it is altogether barred, if there is an express text against making the implication.
47. When there is a negative ordinance prohibiting a thing, it is to prevail notwithstanding that there is an Atidesha which by implication enjoins the thing. For instance, there is a rule that all sacrifices partake of the character of Darsha and Paurnamasi Yagyas. The result is that all the rules of Darsha and Paurnamasi Yagyas are applicable to the Pasu Yagya also. But there is a text which says that the Aghara and the Ajyabhaga homas need not be made in the Pasu Yagya. Therefore, these homas need not be made in the Pasu Yagya, though in the absence of the prohibitory text they would have to be made on account of the rule which lays down that all Yagyas must partake of the character of Darsha and Paurnamasi.
48. One of the Mimansa principles is the Gunapradhan Axiom, and since we are utilizing it in this judgment (apart from the badha and samanjasya principles) we may describe it in some detail.
49. ‘Guna’ means subordinate or accessory, while ‘Pradhan’ means principal. The Gunapradhan Axiom states :
“If a word or sentence purporting to express a subordinate idea clashes with the principal idea, the former must be adjusted to the latter or must be disregarded altogether.”
This principle is also expressed by the popular maxim known as matsya nyaya i.e. ‘the bigger fish eats the smaller fish’.
According to Jaimini, acts are of two kind, principal and subordinate (see Jaimini 2 : 1 : 6).
In Sutra 3 : 3 : 9 Jaimini states :
Kumarila Bhatta, in his Tantravartika (See Ganganath Jha’s English Translation Vol.3, page 1141) explains this Sutra as follows :
“When the Primary and the Accessory belong to two different Vedas, the Vedic characteristic of the Accessory is determined by the Primary, as the Accessory is subservient to the purpose of the primary.”
It is necessary to explain this Sutra in some detail. The peculiar quality of the Rigveda and Samaveda is that the mantras belonging to them are read aloud, whereas the mantras in the Yajurveda are read in a low voice. Now the difficulty arose about certain ceremonies, e.g. Agnyadhana, which belong to the Yajurveda but in which verses of the Samveda are to be recited. Are these Samaveda verses to be recited in a low voice or loud voice ? The answer, as given in the above Sutra, is that they are to be recited in low voice, for although they are Samavedi verses, yet since they are being recited in a Yajurveda ceremony their attribute must be altered to make it in accordance with the Yajurveda.
Commenting on Jaimini 3 : 3 : 9 Kumarila Bhatta says :
“The Siddhanta (principle) laid down by this Sutra is that in a case where there is one qualification pertaining to the Accessory by itself and another pertaining to it through the Primary, the former qualification is always to be taken as set aside by the latter. This is because the proper fulfillment of the Primary is the business of the Accessory also as the latter operates solely for the sake of the former. Consequently if, in consideration of its own qualification it were to deprive the Primary of its natural accomplishment then there would be a disruption of that action (the Primary) for the sake of which it was meant to operate. Though in such a case the proper fulfillment of the Primary with all its accompaniments would mean the deprival of the Accessory of its own natural accompaniment, yet, as the fact of the Accessory being equipped with all its accompaniments is not so very necessary (as that of the primary), there would be nothing incongruous in the said deprival”. See Ganganath Jha’s English translation of the Tantravartika, Vol.3 page 1141.
50. In our opinion the gunapradhan axiom applies to this case. Section 174 is the pradhan whereas Section 175 is the guna (or subordinate). If we read Section 175 in isolation then of course we would have to agree to Mr. Nariman’s submission that Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies. But we cannot read Section 175 in isolation, we have to read it along with Section 174, and reading them together, we have to adjust Section 175 (the guna or subordinate) to make it in accordance with Section 174 (the pradhan or principal). For doing so we will have to add the following words at the end of Section 175 “except where there is a conflict, express or implied, between a provision in this Act and any other law, in which case the former will prevail”.
51. No doubt ordinarily the literal rule of interpretation should be followed, and hence the Court should neither add nor delete words in a statute. However, in exceptional cases this can be done where not doing so would deprive certain existing words in a statute of all meaning, or some part of the statute may become absurd.
52. In the chapter on ‘Exceptional Construction’ in his book on ‘Interpretation of Statutes’ Maxwell writes :
“Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, by altering their collocation, by rejecting them altogether, or by interpolating other words, under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the legislature could not possibly have intended what the words signify, and that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true intention.”
53. Thus, in S.S. Kalra vs. Union of India (1991) 2 SCC 87, this Court has observed that sometimes courts can supply words which have been accidentally omitted.
54. In G.P. Singh’s ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ Ninth Edition, 2004 at pages 71-74 several decisions of this Court and foreign Courts have been referred to where the Court has added words to a statute (though cautioning that normally this should not be done).
Categories: Statutory Interpretation