What is security:-
The term ‘‘security’’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation
in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘‘security’’, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Joseph Shine vs Union of India, Supreme Court declared section 497 IPC the law against adultery by men to be unconstitutional
The apex court’s five-judge Constitution bench was unanimous in striking down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code dealing with the offence of adultery, holding it as manifestly arbitrary, archaic and violative of the rights to equality and equal opportunity to women.
The issue:- Adultery undoubtedly is a moral wrong qua the spouse and the family. The issue is whether there is a sufficient element of wrongfulness to society in general, in order to bring it within the ambit of criminal law?
The status: -Under Section 497, it is only the male-paramour who is punishable for the offence of adultery. The woman who is pari delicto with the adulterous male, is not punishable, even as an abettor. The adulterous woman is excluded solely on the basis of gender, and cannot be prosecuted for adultery. Read the JUDGMENT
Govt Stand :-Centre favours the retention of penal law on adultery, says it is a public wrong which causes mental and physical injury to the spouse, children and the family.
September 28, 2018 -The Supreme Court on Friday lifted a ban that prevented women and girls between the age of 10 and 50 from entering the famous Sabarimala temple in Kerala, holding this centuries-old Hindu religious practice illegal and unconstitutional.
Who said what:-
Dipak Misra, CJI (for himself and A.M. Khanwilkar, J: The exclusionary practice being followed at the Sabrimala temple by virtue of Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules violates the right of Hindu women to freely practise their religion and exhibit their devotion towards Lord Ayyappa. This denial denudes them of their right to worship. The right to practise religion under Article 25(1) is equally available to both men and women of all age groups professing the same religion.
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud (Concurring) : A claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship, even if it be founded in religious text, is subordinate to the constitutional values of liberty, dignity and equality. Exclusionary practices are contrary to constitutional morality;
R.F. Nariman, J. (Concurring) : the custom or usage of prohibiting women between the ages of 10 to 50 years from entering the Sabarimala temple is violative of Article 25(1), and violative of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 made under Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. Further, it is also declared that Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 is unconstitutional being violative of Article 25(1) and Article 15(1) of the Constitution of India.
INDU MALHOTRA: The Writ Petition does not deserve to be entertained for want of standing. The grievances raised are non-justiciable at the behest of the Petitioners and Intervenors involved herein.
Read the full judgment
Accordingly, this writ petition is disposed of with liberty to the concerned accused to take recourse to appropriate remedy as may be permissible in law. The interim order passed by this Court on 29th August, 2018 shall continue for a period of four weeks to enable the accused to move the concerned court. The said proceedings shall be decided on its own merits uninfluenced by any observation made in this judgment, which is limited to the reliefs claimed in the writ petition to transfer the investigation to an independent Investigating Agency and/or Court-monitored investigation. The Investigating Officer is free to proceed against the concerned accused as per law. All the accompanying applications are also disposed of in terms of this judgment”. [Read the Judgment]
September 11, 2018-TITLE APPEAL-Keeping in view the scope and ambit of the powers of the High Court while deciding the second appeal when we advert to the facts of the case, we find that the High Court committed an error in allowing the defendants’ second appeal and further erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit by answering the substantial question of law. This we say for more than one reason.
First, mere perusal of the impugned order would go to show that the High Court had admitted the second appeal by framing only one substantial question of law, namely, whether the first Appellate Court was justified in dismissing the defendants’ first appeal by taking into consideration one earlier litigation in relation to the suit land, which was not between the same parties. The High Court held that the first Appellate Court was not justified because the earlier litigation was not between the present plaintiffs and the defendants but it was between the different parties and, therefore, any decision rendered in such litigation would not operate as res judicata in the present litigation between the parties. This resulted in allowing of the appeal and dismissing the suit.
Second, the High Court committed another error when it failed to frame any substantial question of law on the issue of the plaintiffs’ ownership over the suit land. So long as no substantial question of law was framed, the High Court had no jurisdiction to examine the said issue in its second appellate jurisdiction. In other words, the High Court having framed only one question, which did not pertain to issue of ownership of the suit land, had no jurisdiction to examine the issue of ownership. It was not permissible in the light of Section 100 (5) of the Code, which empowers the High Court to decide the appeal only on the question framed and not beyond it.
Third, the High Court could invoke its powers under proviso to subsection (5) of Section 100 and frame one or two additional questions, as the case may be, even at the time of hearing of the second appeal. It would have enabled the High Court to examine the issue of ownership of the suit land in its correct perspective. It was, however, not done by the High Court.
Fourth, the High Court, while examining the question framed, also cursorily touched the ownership issue which, in our opinion, the High Court could not have done for want of framing of any substantial question of law on the ownership issue. That apart, the High Court also failed to see that the issue of res judicata and the issue of ownership were independent issues and the decision on one would not have 14 answered the other one. In other words, both the issues had to be examined independent of each other on their respective merits. It was, however, possible only after framing of substantial questions on both the issues as provided under Section 100(4) and (5) of the Code. This was, however, not done in this case.
September 07, 2018 – Direct Recruitment-Supreme Court discussed the following issues for decision:
SEPTEMBER 07, 2018 : Ordinarily wherever the word ‘substitute’ or ‘substitution’ is used by the legislature, it has the effect of deleting the old provision and make the new provision operative. The process of substitution consists of two steps: first, the old rule is made to cease to exist and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in its place. The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all. No doubt, in certain situations, the Court having regard to the purport and object sought to be achieved by the Legislature may construe the word “substitution” as an “amendment” having a prospective effect.
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Accordingly, the State Government considers it necessary to frame this Policy and Guidelines to provide a stable and predictable framework of rules for private investment in setting up degree colleges. The intention of the Policy is to encourage the spread of higher education in under-served mofussil areas away from Kolkata, where significant demand exists for college studies, considering the steady increase in the number of high school pass outs across the State.
Other Backward Classes” shall mean such classes of citizens as specified in Schedule I, other than Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and includes such classes as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify from time to time
Scheme for the retired employees of State Transport Undertakings (STUs) in accordance with the direction contained in the Solemn Order dated 30.6.2015 passed by HIS LORDSHIP HON’BLE JUSTICE BISWANATH SOMADDER in WP No. 11978(W) of 2015.
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In the year 2006, the Government had raised the upper age limit for entry into Govt. service from 32 to 37 years with a validity of 5 years. Now the Government again raised the limit to 40 years for entry into Govt service in Group C and D only. The minimum age is unchanged i.e.18 years. The age relaxation for the SC/ ST candidates fixed at 45 years and that for OBC/ PH candidates at 43 years.
Anglo-Indian school” means an institution, including all standards. and divisions thereof, established under the Code of Regulations for European (now Anglo-Indian) Schools in Bengal (now West Bengal), 1929 (hereinafter referred to in this Code as the existing Code) and continuing as such on the dale of coming into force of this Code, provided that such institution continues to fulfill the conditions for recognition laid down in this Code, and particularly in regulation 8.
It is thus to be seen that under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act the definition of the words “Works contract” is very wide. It is not restricted to a “Works contract” as commonly understood, i.e., a contract to do some work on behalf of somebody else. It also includes “any agreement for carrying out either for cash or for deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration, the building and construction of any moveable and immoveable property” (Emphasis supplied). The definition would, therefore, take within its ambit any type of agreement wherein construction of a building takes place either for cash or deferred payment, or valuable consideration. To be also noted that the definition does not lay down that the construction must be on behalf of an owner of the property or that the construction cannot be by the owner of the property. Thus, even if an owner of property enters into an agreement to construct for cash, deferred payment or valuable consideration a building or flats on behalf of anybody else it would be a Works contract within the meaning of the term as used under the said Act