No court passes any Interim order which would be contrary to or inconsistent with another interim order which has been passed by a court of competent jurisdiction

CALCUTTA HIGH COURT

DIVISION BENCH

( Before : Satyabrata Sinha, J; Basudeva Panigrahi, J )

MAHANANDA BANERJEE — Appellant

Vs.

HASIM ABDUL HALIM, WEST BENGAL LEGISTATIVE ASSEMBLY, CONTEMNER — Respondent

Contempt Application C.R. No. 2031 of 1996 with F.MA. No. 197 of 1990

Decided on : 20-05-1997

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Section 12, Section 2

West Bengal Legislative Assembly Secretariat Rules, 1953 – Rule 7(1)
West Bengal Services Rules – Rule 55(4)

JUDGMENT

S.B. Sinha, J.—The contempt application arises out of a judgment of a Division Bench comprising of G.N. Roy, J. (As His Lordship then was) and S.K. Hazari, J. passed in F.M.A. No. 197 of 1990.

2. The said appeal was directed against the judgment dated 4th April, 1984 passed by a learned single Judge of this court in C.R. No. 6164(W) of 1981 dismissing the writ application of the petitioner.

3. The fact of the matter is not much in dispute.

4. The appellant was Assistant Secretary in the Secretariat of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly. According to him, he was superseded in violation of the conditions of service, as a result whereof he was deprived of successive promotion to a higher post. The petitioner questioned a notification whereby the Hon’ble Speaker of the Legislative Assembly was given the exclusive power to select any one from amongst his personal assistants or stenographers or Upper Division or Lower Division Assistant to act as his Private Secretary.

5. The learned trial Judge dismissed the writ application. The appeal court also held that there is no illegality in the amendments effected on the Recruitment Rules of the Assembly Secretariat laying down essential qualification for the post of Deputy Secretary.

6. The petitioner appearing in person before the appeal court very fairly stated that he is not interested in demotion or cancellation of appointments made in the post of Deputy Secretary and upward though made illegally superseding him but a proper proforma fixation and his appointment to promotional post should be made. The appeal court held that the amendments effected in Recruitment Rules of the Assembly Secretariat cannot be held to be illegal and invalid. It, therefor, can not be held that the appellant was Improperly by passed by such appointments to the post of Deputy Secretary and other superior post for which any direction for proforma fixation of seniority, scales of pay etc. and for appointment to promotional post by creating a supernumerary post, if necessary, need be made. The appellant had contended that he has also been deprived of the proper scale of pay, increments etc. in his post of Assistant Secretary which he was thence holding.

7. It was observed:–

“There is no manner of doubt that the appellant is entitled to all the benefit in the post of Assistant Secretary including Increments etc. It appears to us that the appellant is a very senior employee in the Assembly Secretariat and has rendered long useful service in the secretariat. It is only desirable that no injustice is noted out to him in the post of Assistant Secretary since held by him. We reasonably expect that the Hon’ble Speaker of the Assembly will review the case of the appellant, if necessary, by giving him a personal hearing and try to redress the grievances of the appellant as far as practicable because we are confident that if proper attention of the Hon’ble Speaker is drawn to any Secretariat or unmerited hardship is suffered by such officer, the Hon’ble Speaker will explore ways and means to give appropriate relief to such officer of his Secretariat. This appeal is accordingly disposed of. There will be no order as to costs”.

8. A review application was filed before S.K. Hazari, J. as in the meantime G.N. Roy, J. was elevated. When the effect of the judgment was explained, the petitioner submitted that he may be allowed to withdraw the said application for the present as he expected that the hearing before the Hon’ble Speaker will be made at an early date. Mr. Kundu, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents therein submitted that the Hon’ble Speaker is also ready and willing to dispose of the matter at an early date in terms of the order passed by the Division Bench and his client had the least intention to harass the petitioner in any manner whatsoever. In that view of the matter the prayer of the petitioner was allowed and the review application was directed to be withdrawn.

9. The alleged contemnor thereafter was given an opportunity of hearing whereafter by reason of an order dated 4.3.1992 passed by the alleged contemnor it was held:-

“Sri Banerjee contended that, unlike his colleagues, he was promoted directly to the post of Assistant Secretary from that of Section Officer without being routed through the post of Registrar and as a result his pay in the post of Assistant Secretary was fixed at a stage lowern than those of his juniors who were first promoted to the Post of Registrar and then to the Post of Assistant Secretary and thus he was made to suffer financial loss.

It is a fact that Sri Banerjee was promoted to the post of Assistant Secretary directly from the post of Section Officer. The Secretary, West Bengal Legislative Assembly is hereby directed to examine whether Juniors to Sri Banerjee in the post of Section Officer now working as Assistant Secretary are getting more pay than Sri Banerjee In the post of Assistant Secretary and if it is found that juniors are getting more pay, then Sri Banerjee’s pay scale should be refixed in terms of Rules 55(4), W.B.S.R. Part-I and Sri Banerjee should also be paid the additional amount that may be admissible to him in consequence of such refixation of pay. The Secretary, West Bengal Legislative Assembly is further directed to carry out and Implement this order within 7 days from the date of this order. No other benefit is legally admissible to him. Review application preferred by Sri Banerjee is disposed of accordingly”.

10. From a bare perusal of the aforementioned order, It would appear that the Secretary of Legislative Assembly was delegated with the power to consider as to whether the juniors to the petitioner to the post of Section Officer were getting more pay than the petitioner in the post of Assistant Secretary and if it is found that the Juniors are getting more pay, the petitioner’s pay scale should be refixed in terms of Rule 55(4) of the WBSR, Part-I.

11. However, on facts, the petitioner’s grievance was found to have no justification.

12. The contempt rule had been Issued by this court pursuant whereto one Md. Nesar Khan affirmed an affidavit on behalf of the alleged contemnor. An objection to the said affidavit was taken by the petitioner whereafter the alleged contemnor himself has affirmed an affidavit.

13. The petitioner, who has appeared in person and argued his case very ably, inter alia, submitted that fixation of pay in terms of rule 55 (4) of the West Bengal Service Rule, Part-I was not the only matter which fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Speaker. Accordingly to the petitioner, the alleged contemnor was required to find out if the petitioner was entitled to get any higher scale of pay In the post of Assistant Secretary as ft stands admitted that Illegality of appointments of the candidates in different posts in Assembly Secretariat and the claim of seniority of the petitioner were the main grievance of the petitioner. It has been pointed out that as the Division Bench had directed that there should not be any injustice to the petitioner in the post of Assistant Secretary which obviously included proper placement and other benefit of service in the said appointment. It has been pointed out that the words ‘Injustice’ and ‘unmerited hardship’ had been used in many places which clearly show the Intention of the Division Bench. It has further been pointed out that In terms of the order dated 9th January, 1991 (in the review application) it has been clarified that all grievances of the petitioner in the matter of service was to be considered.

14. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General submitted that keeping in view the order passed by the Appeal Court as also the fact that the Review Application was permitted to be withdrawn, the alleged contemnor cannot be said to have committed any contempt of this court. Our attention was drawn to ajudgment dated 23.2.94 passed by S.K. Sen, J. in Civil order No. 18624(W) of 1992 wherein the learned Judge, Inter alia, observed:-

“It appears that the petitioner moved several applications from time to time and also went on appeal before the Division Bench more than once. Pursuant to the order passed by the Division Bench dated 27th August, 1990 the Speaker, West Bengal Legislative Assembly has passed an order. The said order is being challenged in the Instant writ application”.

15. It was further held:-

“The Secretary, West Bengal Legislative Assembly thereafter pursuant to my direction has considered and examined the case of the petitioner and refixed the pay scale of the petitioner and granted the benefit accordingly. In my view there is no infirmity in the order of the learned Speaker, West Bengal Legislative Assembly. In the event the petitioner is aggrieved by the refixation made by the Secretary, West Bengal Legislative Assembly, it will be open to the petitioner to take appropriate steps in accordance with law.

It is stated that the Service Book of the petitioner has been sent to the Finance Department pursuant to my direction dated 2.4.93 directing reconstruction and the same has been done accordingly.

The writ application is thus disposed of without any order as to costs.”

16. However, from a perusal of the Judgment of the Division Bench dated 22.9.1994 in F.M.A. No. 22 of 1994 and F.M.A.T. No. 841 of 1994 it appears that two appeals were filed, one against the order dated 1st October 1991 in C.O. No. 16567[W) of 1991 passed by Monoranjan Mallick, J. and another against the order dated 23rd February, 1994 passed by S.K. Sen, J. in C.O. No. 18624(W) of 1992. Before the Division Bench the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner was that in view of pendency of a departmental proceedings, his case had not been considered for promotion from the post of Assistant Secretary to the Deputy Secretary despite the fact that even before the Division Bench comprising of G.N. Roy, and S.K. Hazarl, JJ. the court was assured that the case of the appellant was considered on each occasion for promotion of Deputy Secretary as and when its incumbent were promoted. The Division Bench considered the records and found that the said statements were untrue and in fact the case of the petitioner was not considered as a departmental proceeding had been pending. The Division Bench took into consideration the entire records which were produced before M.G. Mukherjee, J (As His Lordship then was) and Tarun Cnatterjee, J. and it was found that as the petitioner has retired, he was entitled to a notional promotion to the post of Deputy Secretary with effect from 1.10.90 when Gadadhar Banerjee was promoted as Deputy Secretary.

17. It was held:-

“We thing that the only relief that the writ petitioner /appellant is now entitled to is a notional promotion to the post of Deputy Secretary with effect from 1.10.90 when Gadadhar Banerjee was promoted as Deputy Secretary. We direct the respondents accordingly to calculate the salary and emoluments which are due to the petitioner from 1.10.90 till the date of retirement in the grade of Deputy Secretary and after deducting the emoluments drawn by him for the post of Assistant Secretary which purpose he was holding till retirement on 31-3.1991 he may be paid off the difference in salary and emoluments within a period of three months from today.

We, however, direct the respondents to grant pension and retiring benefits to the appellant calculating the same on the basis of his deemed promotion from 1.10.90 as a Deputy Secretary to the Speaker’s establishment.

We think that the writ petitioner/appellant is not entitled to any further relief except as indicated above. The pay and allowances of the writ petitioner/appellant be determined by the Speaker in accordance with law keeping in view the case of other promotees who were given similar promotion to the post of Deputy Secretary. Such determination be made by the speaker within a period of three months from today.”

18. The decision of S.K. Sen. J. was not reversed nor the point urged before the said learned Judge was questioned by the appellant.

19. In that view of the matter the said judgment attained finality and cannot be directed to be re-opened in this proceedings. The Judgment of the Division Bench in the aforementioned judgment having become final, the petitioner cannot be granted any other relief In this proceedings.

20. The petitioner in his contempt application at page 41 stated that not a single question which had been raised before the alleged contemnor at the time of personal hearing had been actually considered and found places in the order dated 4.3.92. It was further submitted that in the contempt application itself the question relating to interpretation of this court’s order should be determined.

21. In paragraph 24 of the Affidavit-in-Reply the petitioner stated:-

(a) the authorities had not allowed the petitioner any service benefit available on the basis of seniority laid down In G.O. No. 568-F dated 20.2.68 and in the W.B. Services (determination of seniority) Rules, 1981 inspite of specific observations of the Finance Department;

(b) the authorities had not allowed the petitioner any service benefit available on the basis of seniority laid down in G.O. No. 556-F dated 20.2.68 and inspite of repeated prayers did not refer the matter to the Finance Department;

(c) there had been several cases of appointments, made inspite of any provision of the recruitment rules/infringing the recruitment rules and/or well accepted norms wherein the petitioner, very much eligible under the rules/accepted norms were not considered at all. The said Incumbents appointed irregularly was subsequently promoted to higher posts to the detriment of the petitioner:

(d) the authorities did not take into consideration the alleged Infirmities in the recruitment rules prescribed did not refer them to the Finance Department in spite of repeated prayers and appointments continued to be made under them to the detriment of the petitioner;

(e) One Shri K.L. Mukherjee, admittedly junior to the petitioner was arbitrarily promoted to the post of Section Officer in 1973 in reference to the petitioner although no reason for this was adduced in the office files. This has been inspite of the fact that the post of Section Officer was definitely not a selection post within the accepted meaning of the term. Subsequently on the strength of the said appointment the said incumbent was promoted to the posts of Editor of Debates, and Register to the detriment of the petitioner. The same treatment was meted to the petitioner in respect of appointments of one Shri G. Banerjee in the post of Section Officer and Editor of Debates.

(f) Hon’ble Speaker S.A.M. Hablbullah after assumption of office, after a very careful consideration passed orders for promotion of the petitioner to the higher post of Assistant Secretary. The said Shrl Mukherjee and Shrl Banerjee were promoted to the post of Assistant Secretary long afterwards. The prayers of the petitioner for notional promotion to the posts of Section Officer and Registrar, fixation of pay in the post of Registrar at the stage that would have been available had it on promotion from the post of Editor of Debates and notional appointment in the new Intermediate selection Grade post of Officer, which was well available under the existing norms under such circumstances could reach the table of the Speaker only after Hon’ble Mr. S.A.M. Hablbullah had relinquished his officer and or the best of the knowledge of the petitioner the file was never sent to the Finance Department (subsequently a new file was sent to the Finance Department where the aforesaid background had been suppressed resulting in nugatlon by the Finance Department. Repeated prayers to sent the file once again with the above mentioned details fell in bad cars).

(g) By two Govt. orders issued in 1977-78 and 1978-79, the scale of pay and special pay of the post of accountant was upgraded to those in the post of Section Officer with retrospective effect from 1974. Consequently an incumbent, admittedly Junior to the petitioner holding the post of accountant, got the benefit of this higher scale of pay and special pay which had been higher than of the petitioner at the material time. No action was taken In respect of the querry of the Finance Department as to If the petitioner had actually been considered at the time of appointment of the said incumbent in the post of accountant. Consequently the petitioner suffered great recurring financial loss.

(h) By careful and calculated fraud upon the Hon’ble Court the respondent had obtained an order In the appeal case FMA 197 of 1990 in the matter of requirement of a degree in law for promotion to the post of Deputy Secretary and Secretary. Their Lordships had based their decision on the rules for direct recruitment which, in its totality, had no application for promotion which had been the case of the petitioner. And in view of the said nugation the Hon’ble Court did not pass any order in respect of some other points of law. The rule regarding the requirement of a degree in law in respect of promotion to the post of Deputy Secretary had been amended as far back as 1974. Even prior to 1974, the rule was never applied. The order dated January 9, 1991 inter alia required consideration of this grievance but the grievances of the petition In this regard were not considered on the other hand the reviewing authority utilised the original decision of the Hon’ble Court of deny the entitlement which was nevertheless allowed to Juniors to him.”

22. It has further been submitted that the order dated 27th August, 1991 in respect of the post of Deputy Secretary was obtained by fraud and/or mis-representation as the rule quoted therein never came up for consideration before this court and probably the said fact was considered keeping in view the written notes submitted before the Lordships after completion of hearing and, thus, in the Interest of justice as also case laws, the said decision requires re-opening.

23. The learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the alleged contemnor, on the other hand, submitted that as the alleged contemnor has complied with the order of the court, he cannot be said to have committed comtempt of this courts. It was pointed out that in view of the judgment of S.K. Sen, J. the contempt application must be held to be barred by the principles of res Judicata.

24. It may be true that in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court of V. Sreenivasa Reddy and others Vs. Govt. of Andhara Pradesh and others, followed in V.P. Shrtuastava & Ors. v. The State of M.P. & Ors. reported in J.T. 1996(2) 374, P. Ravindran and Others Vs. Union Territory of Pondicherry and Others, , Ram Ganesh Tripathi and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, and as this aspect of the matter has recently been considered in G.A. No. 788 of 1997 with W.P. No. 119 of 1997 (Ketakt S. Adhikaiiv. The State of West Bengal & Ors.) disposed of on 24-4-97, the persons who were appointed directly would become senior to those persons who were appointed/promoted without following the rules and whose services had been regularised later on. But from the records it does not appear that the said question was ever raised. The petitioner questioned the vires Rules 7(1) of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly Secretariat Rules, 1953 (hereinafter referred to the said rules). In terms of the said rules consultation with the Public Service Commission in terms of Legislative Council (Consultation by Governor) Regulation, 1955 was not necessary. Both the learned single Judge as also the Division Bench upheld the vires of the said rules. The said question raised in this application to the effect that the petitioner was entitled to be promoted to the post of Deputy Secretary as the qualification of a Law Degree was not necessary at the relevant time had been taken into consideration by the Division Bench and has been rejected. This court while considering a contempt matter also cannot go into the question as to whether a fraud had been practised In the court of G.N. Roy, and S.K. Hazari, JJ. If the petitioner thought that some fraud has been practised; he ought to have pressed his review application. Instead he withdrew his review application.

25. There cannot, however, be any doubt that the petitioner questioned the order passed by the alleged contemnor before S.K. Sen, J as is evident from the order dated 23.02.1992. The learned Judge considered the findings of the learned Speaker and found no infirmity therein which according to the learned Judge was passed as per the direction of the Division Bench dated 27.8.90. The Division Bench presided over by M.G. Mukherjee, J might have held that the petitioner was entitled to be promoted to the post of Deputy Secretary but there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that this court cannot go beyond the orders passed in the aforementioned writ application and re-open the entire matter. The Jurisdiction of this court in a contempt matter is very limited. Civil contempt has been defined in section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act to mean :-

” ” In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-

(b) ‘Civil Contempt’ means wilful disobedience to any Judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach or an undertaking given to a court”.

26. Thus, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that this court can take necessary action only when there is a wilful disobedience of the court’s order.

In Niaz Mohammad and others, etc. etc. Vs. State of Haryana and others, . it was held :-

“The court while considering the issue as to whether the alleged contemner should be punished for not having complied with carried out the direction of the court, has to take into consideration all facts and circumstances of a particular case. That is why the framers of the Act while defining civil contempt, have said that it must be wilful disobedience to any Judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court Before a contemner is punished for non-compliance of the direction of a court, the court must not only be satisfied about the disobedience of any Judgment, decree, direction or writ but should also be satisfied that such disobedience was wilful and intentional”.

27. In Manish Gupta and others Vs. Gurudas Roy, , it has been held :-

“We do not propose to go into the question of interpretation of Rule 55(4) of the Rules. But, at the same time, we cannot say that there is no merit In the submission of Shrl Sanghi that in view of the proviso to Rule 55(4) the respondent cannot claim the fixation of his basic pay on the same level as the basic pay drawn by Hrlshlkesh Roy. In our view that appellants could reasonable proceed on the basis that in view of the proviso contained in Rule 55(4) of the Rules the pay of the respondent cannot be fixed at the same level as that the Hrishikesh Roy, and, therefore, in fixing the basic pay of the respondent it cannot be said that the appellants had wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the directions given by the appellate bench in its order dated September 20, 1989. On that view of the matter the learned Judges of the High Court were, in our opinion, not justified in holding the appellants guilty of contempt of court for not complying with the directions of the Appellate Bench regarding fixation of basic pay of the respondent If the respondent feels that the re fixation of his pay has not been made in accordance with the relevant rules, he may, if so advised, prusue the remedy available to him in law for enforcing his rights.”

28. In V. Kanakarajan Vs. General Manager, South Eastern Railway and others, , the apex court also upheld a division bench Judgment of this court wherein a Division Bench refused to give any remedy in a contempt proceedings wherein in compliance of the order passed by the said court the petitioners case for promotion was considered saying that the remedy of the petitioner was to file a separate writ against the order passed by the concerned authority.

29. In J. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar and others, it has been held :-

“The question is whether seniority list is open to review in the contempt proceedings to find out whether it is in conformity with the directions issued by the earlier Benches. It is seen that once there is an order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions issued by the court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions. But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But that cannot be considered to be the wilful violation of the order. After re-exercising the judicial review in contempt proceedings a fresh direction by the learned single Judge cannot be given to redraw the seniority list. In other words, the learned Judge was exercising the Jurisdiction to consider the matter on merits In the contempt proceedings. It would not be permissible u/s 12 of the Act”.

30. It is now well settled that the High Court while exercising its contempt Jurisdiction cannot decide a question as to whether a fraud was practised upon the Division Bench or not. It is also not within the province of this court to consider as the whether the petitioner questioned only a part of the order of the alleged contemner. This court is bound by the statement made In the judgments. If any wrong statement of fact has been made in the Judgment, in view of the settled position in law, the only remedy of the contemner would have been to file a review application but the statement of fact made in ajudgment cannot be questioned In a co-lateral proceedings far less in a contempt proceeding.

31. There cannot be any doubt that in a given case where bona fide mistake has been committed by the alleged contemner, the matter can be remitted to him for a fresh decision but as noticed hereinbefore in the instant case the petitioner has already questioned the said decision by filing a separate writ application and, thus, if any order is passed at this juncture by this court in exercise of its contempt jurisdiction, the same will offend the principles of comity of decision.

32. In Smith Stainstreet Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Probir Kumar Sengupta, reported in ILR 1995(2) Cal 389, this Bench held :-

“Thus, conflicting orders had been passed. It is now well-known that no court passes any Interim order which would be contrary to or inconsis- tent with another interim order which has been passed by a court of competent jurisdiction.

33. In Law of Injunctions by Lewis & Spelling, the law has been stated in the following terms :

Conflict and Loss of Jurisdiction.

Where a court having general Jurisdiction and having acquired Jurisdiction of the subject-matter has Issued an Injunction, a court of concurrent Jurisdiction will usually refuse to interfere by issuance of a second Injunction. There is no established rule of exclusion which would deprive a court of jurisdiction to issue an injunction because of the issuance of an injunction between the same parties appertaining to the same subject matter but there is what may properly be termed a Judicial comity on the subject. And even where it is a case of one court having refused to grant an injunction, while such refusal does not exclude another coordinate court of Judge from jurisdiction, yet the granting of the injunction by a second Judge may lead to complications and retaliatory action. The Jurisdiction to afford the relief is not lost by the fact that during the pendency of the suit the act which it was sought to enjoin, has been done. In such case the court may require restoration by the defendant of the status existing at the time Jurisdiction was acquired, even through no preliminary injunction or restraining order had been Issued. And speaking generally, it may be said that though a parly filing a bill for an Injunction may fail to procure a preliminary injunction, yet any act after the court has acquired Jurisdiction will be subject to the power of the court to compel restoration of the former condition or to enforce some other proper relief. On the same principle the jurisdiction once acquired is not ousted by the fact that pending the suit the right to a permanent injunction is lost by something, transpiring beyond control of the court and parties to the litigation.

Keeping in view of the fact that a court has to maintain a judicial comity, In our opinion, the order impugned in this appeal cannot be sustained.”

34. In any event, even if it is accepted that the petitioner merely questioned a part of the order whereby he was not promoted to the post of the Deputy Secretary, the application filed by the petitioner will be barred under the principles of resjudlcata Inasmuch as in the said writ application he could have and ought to have challenged the entire order passed by the alleged contemnor. It may be as was pointed out by Mr. Banerjee who appeared in person and argued his case verlably that he would suffer a great pecuniary loss but unfortunately he is to be blamed therefore Inasmuch as before the Division Bench he confined his case only to the benefits to which he was entitled to as an Assistant Secretary and furthermore, he also withdrew the review application.

35. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs.

36. Application dismissed.


Cases Referred

V. Kanakarajan Vs. General Manager, South Eastern Railway and others, AIR 1996 SC 2758 : (1996) CriLJ 3997 : (1996) 7 JT 517 : (1996) 5 SCALE 822 : (1996) 10 SCC 102
Niaz Mohammad and others, etc. etc. Vs. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1995 SC 308 : (1994) 6 JT 260 : (1994) 4 SCALE 292 : (1994) 6 SCC 332 : (1994) 3 SCR 720 Supp : (1995) 1 UJ 124
J. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar and others, AIR 1997 SC 113 : (1996) 9 JT 608 : (1996) 7 SCALE 351 : (1996) 6 SCC 291 : (1996) 6 SCR 110 Supp : (1996) AIRSCW 4272 : (1997) 6 Supreme 133
V. Sreenivasa Reddy and others Vs. Govt. of Andhara Pradesh and others, AIR 1995 SC 586 : (1994) 6 JT 461 : (1994) 4 SCALE 469 : (1995) 1 SCC 572 Supp : (1994) 4 SCR 233 Supp : (1995) 1 SLJ 99
Ram Ganesh Tripathi and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, (1997) 7 AD 260 : AIR 1997 SC 1446 : (1997) 87 CompCas 792 : (1997) 75 FLR 554 : (1997) 8 JT 205 : (1996) 9 SCALE 381 : (1997) 1 SCC 621 : (1997) SCC(L&S) 186 : (1996) 10 SCR 250 Supp : (1997) 1 UJ 558 : (1997) AIRSCW 126 : (1997) 4 Supreme 293
Manish Gupta and others Vs. Gurudas Roy, AIR 1995 SC 1359 : (1995) LabIC 1611 : (1995) 1 SCALE 664 : (1995) 3 SCC 559 : (1995) 1 UJ 500
P. Ravindran and Others Vs. Union Territory of Pondicherry and Others, (1996) 9 AD 91 : (1996) 7 SCALE 728 : (1997) 1 SCC 350 : (1997) SCC(L&S) 731 : (1996) 7 SCR 158 Supp

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Mahananda Banerjee, for the Appellant; Mr. Naranarayan Gooptu and Mr. Suman Ghosh, for the Respondent