Appellate Jurisdiction is larger than mere hearing of an appeal or revision

The question with reference to Section 115 of the Civil P. C., 1908 was again considered by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in P. P. P. Chidambara Nadar v. C. P. A. Rama Nadar, ILR (1937) Mad 616 : (AIR 1937 Mad 385) (FB). Venkatasubba Rao J. following the dictum of Subramania Ayyar J. in Chap-pan v. Moidin Kutti ((1899) ILR 22 Mad 68) (FB) (Supra) held that there was no essential difference between proceedings by way of appeal and by way of revision, except in regard to the conditions for the exercise of the powers. A similar question arose in State of Madras v. Asher Textiles Ltd., ILR (1960) Mad 130 : (AIR 1960 Mad 180) and it was observed that (at p. 183 of AIR),–

“It is needless to point out that it has been an almost invariable practice of this court to take note of subsequent events, while disposing of civil revision petitions under Section 115, Civil p. C. and grant reliefs to the parties in accordance With the altered circumstances. The nature of the jurisdiction is appellate and all the powers inherent in an appellate court would be available to the court of revision, subject to the limitation that it could interfere only under those conditions prescribed by the statute. If those conditions are satisfied, its powers are as wide as the Court of first instance or the appellate court.”

16. In one sense the jurisdiction under Section 115, C. P. C. is wider than even the jurisdiction of an appellate court It follows therefore that a court of revision would have all the powers of appellate court except that the conditions of interference would have to be in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions i. e. Section 115 of the Civil P. C., 1908.

Now, it is well settled that the court is bound to give effect to a statute parsed during the pendency of an appeal. In Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, AIR 1941 FC 5 Vardachariar J. held that an appeal being in the nature of rehearing, it would be open to the court to mould its reliefs to be granted after taking in account even the facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against i. e., the powers of an ap–pellate court by virtue of Order 41, Rule 33, C. P. C. are co-extensive with those of the original Court. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision in Quilter v. Mapleson, (1882) 9 QBD 672. In this case, it was held that though a judgment of the subordinate court was correct according to law as it stood on the date thereof, the court of appeal could grant relief to the appellant according to law as it stood at the date of hearing of the appeal. There is no reason why the High Court, while exercising its revisional powers, cannot take note of a subsequent change in the law and grant relief to the parties on the basis of such law. The decision in Ahser Textiles Ltd. (AIR 1960 Mad 180) (Supra) is a clear authority on the point. I am inclined to take the same view. Recently, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 have reiterated the same view. Thus the court is bound to take notice of a change in law. Explanation, which is in the nature of a definition clause, having been amended, the rights of the parties must necessarily be governed by the amended Explanation.


Source: Rajasthan High Court
Jagdish Prasad vs Kapoor Chand And Ors. on 9 August, 1977
Equivalent citations: AIR 1978 Raj 61, 1977 WLN UC 307
Bench: A Sen