the Constitution Bench in Ram Sewak Yadav Vs. Hussain Kamil Kidwai and Others, , an Election Tribunal has undoubtedly the power to direct discovery and inspection of documents within the narrow limits of Order XI of Code of Civil Procedure. Inspection of documents under Rule 15 of Order XI of CPC may be ordered of documents which are referred to in the pleladings or particulars as disclosed in the affidavit of documents of the other party, and under Rule 18(2) of other documents in the possession or power of the other party. The Returning Officer is not a party to an election Petition and an order for production of the ballot papers cannot be made under Order XI of Code of Civil Procedure. But the Election Tribunal is not on that account without authority in respect of the ballot papers. In a proper case where the interest of justice demand it, the Tribunal may call upon the Returning Officer to produce the ballot papers and may permit inspection by the parties before it of the ballot paper which power is clearly implicit in Sections 100(1)(d)(iii), 101, 102 and Rule 93 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. This power to order inspection of the ballot papers which is apart from Order XI CPC may be exercised, subject to the statutory restriction about the secrecy of the ballot paper prescribed by Sections 94 and 128(1). However, the Constitution Bench has cautioned, by the mere production of the sealed boxes of ballot papers before the Election Tribunal pursuant to its order the ballot papers do not become part of the record and they are not liable to be inspected unless the Tribunal is satisfied that such inspection is in the circumstances of the case necessary in the interest of justice.
It is true that a recount is not be ordered merely for the asking or merely because the Court is inclined to hold a recount. In order to protect the secrecy of ballots the Court would permit a recount only upon a clear case in that regard having been made out. To permit or not to permit a recount is a question involving jurisdiction of the Court. Once a recount has been allowed the Court cannot shut its eyes on the result of recount on the ground that the result of recount as found is at variance with the pleadings. Once the Court has permitted recount within the well-settled parameters of exercising jurisdiction in this regard, it is the result of the recount which has to be given effect to.
So also, once the Court exercises its jurisdiction to enter into the question of improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote, or the reception of any vote which is void by reference to the election result of the returned candidate u/s 100(1)(d)(iii), as also as to the result of the election of any other candidate by reference to Section 97 of the Act consistently with its (sic.) cannot refuse to give effect to the result of its findings as to the validity or invalidity of the votes for the purpose of finding out true result of recount though the actual finding as to validity or otherwise of the votes by reference to number may be at variance with the pleadings. In short, the pleadings and proof in the matter of recount have relevance for the purpose of determining the question of jurisdiction to permit or not to permit recount. Once the jurisdiction to order recount is found to have been rightly exercised, thereafter, it is the truth as revealed by the result of recounting that has to be given effect to.
The apex Court summarised the law thus:
We have already stated that rigorous rule propounded by the Constitution Bench in Jabar Singh’s case has met with critcism in some of the subsequent decisions of this Court though by Benches of lesser coram and an attempt at seeking reconsideration of the majority opinion in Jabar Singh’s case has so far proved to be abortive. The view of the law taken by the Constitution Bench in Jabar Singh’s case is binding on us. Analysing the majority opinion in Jabar Singh’s case and the view taken in several decisions of this Court, referred to hereinabove, we sum up the law as under:
(1) In an election Petition wherein the limited relief sought for is the declaration that the election of returned candidate is void on the ground u/s 100(1)(d)(iii) of the Act, the scope of enquiry shall remain confined to two questions : (a) finding out any votes having been improperly cast in favour of the returned candidate, and (b) any votes having been improperly refused or rejected in regard to any other candidate. In such a case an enquiry cannot be held into and the election Petition decided on the finding (a) that any votes have been improperly cast in favour of a candidate other than the returned candidate, or (b) any votes were improperly refused or rejected in regard to the returned candidate.
(2) A recrimination by the returned candidate or any other party can be filed u/s 97(1) in a case where in an election Petition an additional declaration is claimed that any candidate other than the returned candidate has been duly elected.
(3) For the purpose of enabling an enquiry that any votes have been improperly cast in favour of any candidate other than the returned candidate or any votes have been improperly refused or rejected in regard to the returned candidate the election Court shall acquire jurisdiction to do so only on the two conditions being satisfied: (i) the election Petition seeks a declaration that any candidate other than returned candidate has been duly elected over and above the declaration that the election of the returned candidate is void; and (ii) the recrimination Petition u/s 97(1) is filed.
(4) A recrimination Petition must satisfy the same requirements as that of an election Petition in the matter of pleadings, signing and verification as an election Petition is required to fulfil within the meaning of Section 83 of the Act and must be accompanied by the security or the further security referred to in Section 117 and 118 of the Act.
(5) The bar on enquiry enacted by Section 97 read with Section 100(1)(d)(iii) of the Act is attracted when the validity of the votes is to be gone into and adjudged or in other words the question of improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or reception of any vote which is void is to be gone into. The bar is not attracted to a case, where it is merely a question of correct counting of the votes without entering into adjudication as to propriety, impropriety or validity of acceptance, rejection or reception of any vote. In other words, where on a recount the election Judge finds the result of recount to be different from the one arrived at by the Returning Officer or when the election Judge finds that there was an error of counting the bar is not attracted because of the Court in a pure and simple counting carried out by it or under its directions is not adjudicating upon any issue as to improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void but is performing mechanical process of counting or recounting by placing the vote at the place where it ought to have been placed. A case of error in counting would fall within the purview of Sub-clause (iv), and not Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 100 of the Act.
Similar question was considered by the apex Court in Jibontara Ghatowar (supra), wherein the apex Court held thus:
So also, once the Court exercises its jurisdiction to enter into the question of improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote, or the reception of any vote which is void by reference to the election result of the returned candidate u/s 100(1)(d)(iii), as also as to the result of the election of any other candidate by reference to Section 97 of the Act and enters into scrutiny of the votes polled, followed by recount, consistently with its findings on the validity or invalidity of the votes, it cannot refuse to give effect to the result of its findings as to the validity or invalidity of the votes for the purpose of finding out the true result of the recount though the actual finding as to the validity or otherwise of the votes by reference to number may be at variance with the pleadings. In short, the pleadings and proof in the matter of recount have relevance for the purpose of determining the question of jurisdiction to permit or not to permit recount. Once the jurisdiction to order recount is found to have been rightly exercised, thereafter it is the truth as revealed by the result of recounting that has to be given effect to.
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