MANGALACHARAN
1. I worship Śiva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity; by whom the earth and the rest were produced, in him only has this all a maker.
2. Daily I follow my Guru Sarvajña-Vishṇu, who knows all the Ágamas, the son of Śárṅgapáṇi, who has gone to the further shore of the seas of all the systems, and has contented the hearts of all mankind by the proper meaning of the term Soul.
3. The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable Mádhava mighty in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of the milk-ocean of the fortunate Sáyaṇa.
4. Having thoroughly searched the Śástras of former teachers, very hard to be crossed, the fortunate Sáyaṇa-Mádhava[5] the lord has expounded them for the delight of the good. Let the virtuous listen with a mind from which all envy has been far banished; who finds not delight in a garland strung of various flowers?
THE ÁRHATA SYSTEM
The Gymnosophists (Jainas), rejecting these opinions of the Muktakachchhas, and maintaining continued existence to a certain extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything. (They say): If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will be useless. But surely this can never be imagined as possible—that one should act and another reap the consequences! Therefore as this conviction, “I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap its consequences,” establishes undoubtedly the existence of a continuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the subsequent period, the discriminating Jaina Arhats reject as untenable the doctrine of momentary existence, i.e., an existence which lasts only an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part.
But the opponent may maintain, “The unbroken stream (of momentary sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it? In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument, ‘whatever is, is momentary, &c.,’ it follows that in each parallel line of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the agent and the subsequent one reaps the fruit. Nor may you object that, ‘if this were true, effects might extend beyond all bounds’—i.e., A might act, and B receive the punishment—because there is an essentially controlling relation in the very nature of cause and effect. Thus we see that when mango seeds, after being steeped in sweet juices, are planted in prepared soil, there is a definite certainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the stalk, the stem, the branches, the peduncle, &c., and so on by an unbroken series to the fruit itself; or again, when cotton seeds have been sprinkled with lac juice, there will be a similar certainty of finding, through the same series of shoot, &c., an ultimate redness in the cotton. As it has been said—
“‘In whatever series of successive states the original impression of the action was produced,
“‘There verily accrues the result, just like the redness produced in cotton.
“‘When lac juice, &c., are poured on the flower of the citron, & c.,
“‘A certain capacity is produced in it,—do you not see it?'”
But all this is only a drowning man’s catching at a straw, for it is overthrown by the following dilemma:—
In the example of the “cloud,” &c. supra, p. , was your favourite “momentariness” proved by this very proof or by some other? It could not be the former, because your alleged momentariness is not always directly visible in the cloud, and consequently, as your example is not an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to the ground. Nor can it be the latter—because you might always prove your doctrine of momentariness by this new proof (if you had it), and consequently your argument regarding all existence “whatever is, is momentary,” &c. would become needless. If you take as your definition of “existence” “that which produces an effect,” this will not hold, as it would include even the bite of a snake imagined in the rope, since this undoubtedly produces the effect of fear. Hence it has been said that the definition of an existence is “that which possesses an origin, an end, and an intermediate duration.”
As for what was said in p. that “the momentariness of objects is proved by the fact that the contrary assumption leads to contradictory attributes of capacity and want of capacity existing contemporaneously,” that also is wrong—for the alleged contradiction is not proved, as the holders of the Syád-váda doctrine vide infra willingly admit the indeterminateness of the action of causes. As for what was said of the example of the cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given, and we do not accept even in that instance a separate destruction at each moment. And again, your supposed continued series cannot be demonstrated without some subject to give it coherence, as has been said, “In individual things which are of the same class or successively produced or in mutual contact, there may be a continued series; and this series is held to be one throughout all”.
Nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite relation between causes and effects. For even on your own admission it would follow that something experienced by the teacher’s mind might be remembered by that of the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter might experience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired; and thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing done passed away without result, and that the fruit of the thing not done was enjoyed. This has been said by the author of the Siddhasenávákya—
“The loss of the thing done,—the enjoyment of the fruit of a thing not done,—the dissolution of all existence,—and the abolition of memory,—bold indeed is the Buddhist antagonist, when, in the teeth of these four objections, he seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary destruction!”
Moreover, (on your supposition of momentary existence), as at the time of the perception (the second moment) the object (of the first moment) does not exist, and similarly at the time of the object’s existence the perception does not exist, there can be no such things as a perceiver and a thing perceived, and consequently the whole course of the world would come to an end. Nor may you suppose that the object and the perception are simultaneous, because this would imply that, like the two horns of an animal, they did not stand in the relation of cause and effect as this relation necessarily involves succession, and consequently the Álambana, or the object’s data supra, p. , would be abolished as one of the four concurrent causes (pratyaya).
If you say that “the object may still be perceived, inasmuch as it will impress its form on the perception, even though the one may have existed in a different moment from the other,” this too will not hold. For if you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception has a certain form impressed upon it, you are met by the impossibility of explaining how a momentary perception can possess the power of impressing a form; and if you say that it has no form impressed upon it, you are equally met by the fact that, if we are to avoid incongruity, there must be some definite condition to determine the perception and knowledge in each several case. Thus by perception the abstract consciousness, which before existed uninfluenced by the external object, becomes modified under the form of a jar, &c., with a definite reference to each man’s personality i.e., I see the jar, and it is not merely the passive recipient of a reflection like a mirror. Moreover, if the perception only reproduced the form of the object, there would be an end of using such words as “far,” “near,” &c., of the objects. Nor can you accept this conclusion, “as exactly in accordance with your own views,” because, in spite of all our logic, the stubborn fact remains that we do use such phrases as “the mountain is nearer” or “further,” “long” or “large.” Nor may you say that “it is the object (which supplies the form) that really possesses these qualities of being ‘further,’ &c., and they are applied by a fashion of speech to the perception though not really belonging to it”—because we do not find that this is the case in a mirror i.e., it does not become a far reflection because it represents a far object. And again, as the perception produced by an object follows it in assuming the form of blue, so too, if the object be insentient, it ought equally to assume its form and so become itself insentient. And thus, according to the proverb, “wishing to grow, you have destroyed your root,” and your cause has fallen into hopeless difficulties.
If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that “the perception does not follow the object in being insentient,” then there would be no perception that the object is insentient, and so it is a case of the proverb, “While he looks for one thing which he has lost, another drops.” “But what harm will it be if there is no perception of a thing’s being insentient?” We reply, that if its being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form is perceived, the two may be quite distinct and as different from each other as a jar and cloth, or it may be a case of “indeterminateness” so that the two may be only occasionally found together, as smoke with fire. And again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the blue form, how could there then be conformity between them so that both the blue and the insentience should together constitute the character of the thing? We might just as well maintain that, on perceiving a post, the unperceived universe entered into it as also constituting its character.
All this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full length by the Jaina authors, Pratápachandra and others, in the Prameyakamalamártaṇḍa, &c., and is here omitted for fear of swelling the book too much.
Therefore those who wish for the summum bonum of man must not accept the doctrine of Buddha, but rather honour only the Árhata doctrine. The Arhat’s nature has been thus described by Arhachchandra-súri, in his Áptaniśchayálaṅkára.
“The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient one, who has overcome all faults, desire, &c.,—adored by the three worlds, the declarer of things as they are.”
But may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul can enter the path of proof, since none of the five affirmative proofs can be found to apply, as has been declared by Tautátita Bhaṭṭa Kumárila?
. “No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in this world by ourselves or others; nor is there any part of him seen which might help us as a sign to infer his existence.
. “Nor is there any injunction (vidhi) of scripture which reveals an eternal omniscient one, nor can the meaning of the explanatory passages (arthaváda) be applied here.
. “His existence is not declared by those passages which refer to quite other topics; and it cannot be contained in any emphatic repetitions (anuváda), as it had never been mentioned elsewhere before.
. “An omniscient being who had a beginning can never be the subject of the eternal Veda; and how can he be established by a made and spurious Veda?
. “Do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on his own word? How can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal support?
. “If you say, ‘The saying is true because it was uttered by one omniscient, and this proves the Arhat’s existence;’ how can either point be established without some previously established foundation?
. “But they who accept a supposed omniscient on the baseless word of a parviscient know nothing of the meaning of a real omniscient’s words.
. “And again, if we now could see anything like an omniscient being, we might have a chance of recognising him by the well-known fourth proof, comparison (upamána).
. “And the teaching of Buddha as well as that of Jina, which embraces virtue, vice, &c., would not be established as authoritative, if there were not in him the attribute of omniscience, and so on.”
We reply as follows:—As for the supposed contradiction of an Arhat’s existence, derived from the failure of the five affirmative proofs,—this is untenable, because there are proofs, as inference, &c., which do establish his existence. Thus any soul will become omniscient when, (its natural capacity for grasping all objects remaining the same), the hindrances to such knowledge are done away. Whatever thing has a natural capacity for knowing any object, will, when its hindrances to such knowledge are done away, actually know it, just as the sense of vision cognises form, directly the hindrances of darkness, &c., are removed. Now there is such a soul, which has its hindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasping all things remaining unchanged; therefore there is an omniscient being. Nor is the assertion unestablished that the soul has a natural capacity for grasping all things; for otherwise the Mímáṃsist could not maintain that a knowledge of all possible cases can be produced by the authoritative injunction of a text,—nor could there otherwise be the knowledge of universal propositions, such as that in our favourite argument, “All things are indeterminate from the very fact of their existence” and, of course, a follower of the Nyáya will grant that universal propositions can be known, though he will dispute the truth of this particular one. Now it is clear that the teachers of the Púrva Mímáṃsá accept the thesis that the soul has a natural capacity for grasping all things; since they allow that a knowledge embracing all things can be produced by the discussion of injunctions and prohibitions, as is said by Śabara in his commentary on the Sútras, i. , , “A precept makes known the past, the present, the future, the minute, the obstructed, the distant, &c.” Nor can you say that “it is impossible to destroy the obstructions which hinder the soul’s knowing all things,” because we Jainas are convinced that there are certain special means to destroy these obstructions, viz., the three “gems”, right intuition, &c. By this charm also, all inferior assaults of argument can be put to flight.
But the Naiyáyika may interpose, “You talk of the pure intelligence, which, after all hindrances are done away, sees all objects, having sense-perception at its height; but this is irrelevant, because there can be no hindrance to the omniscient, as from all eternity he has been always liberated.” We reply that there is no proof of your eternally liberated being. There cannot be an omniscient who is eternally “liberated,” from the very fact of his being “liberated,” like other liberated persons,—since the use of the term “liberated” necessarily implies the having been previously bound; and if the latter is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of the ether. “But is not this being’s existence definitely proved by his being the maker of that eternal series of effects, the earth, &c.? according to the well-known argument, ‘the earth, &c., must have had a maker, because they have the nature of effects, as a jar.'” This argument, however, will not hold, because you cannot prove that they have the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from the fact of their being composed of parts, because this supposition falls upon the horns of a dilemma. Does this “being composed of parts” mean (i.) the being in contact with the parts; or (ii.) “the being in intimate relation to the parts; or (iii.) the being produced from parts;” or (iv.) the being a substance in intimate relation; or (v.) the being the object of an idea involving the notion of parts?
Not the first, because it would apply too widely, as it would include ether since this, though not itself composed of parts, is in contact with the parts of other things; nor the second, because it would similarly include genus, &c. as this resides in a substance by intimate relation, and yet itself is not composed of parts; nor the third, because this involves a term (“produced”) just as much disputed as the one directly in question; nor the fourth, because its neck is caught in the pillory of the following alternative:—Do you mean by your phrase used above that it is to be a substance, and to have something else in intimate relation to itself,—or do you mean that it must have intimate relation to something else, in order to be valid for your argument? If you say the former, it will equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and has its qualities resident in it by intimate relation; if you say the latter, your new position involves as much dispute as the original point, since you would have to prove the existence of intimate relation in the parts, or the so-called “intimate causes,” which you mean by “something else.” We use these terms in compliance with your terminology; but, of course, from our point of view, we do not allow such a thing as “intimate relation,” as there is no proof of its existence.
Nor can the fifth alternative be allowed, because this would reach too far, as it would include soul, &c., since soul can be the object of an idea involving the notion of parts, and yet it is acknowledged to be not an effect. Nor can you maintain that the soul may still be indiscerptible in itself, but by reason of its connection with something possessing parts may itself become metaphorically the object of an idea involving the notion of parts, because there is a mutual contradiction in the idea of that which has no parts and that which is all-pervading, just as the atom which is indiscerptible but not all-pervading.
And, moreover, is there only one maker? Or, again, is he independent?
In the former case your position will apply too far, as it will extend erroneously to palaces, &c., where we see for ourselves the work of many different men, as carpenters, &c., and in the second case if all the world were produced by this one maker, all other agents would be superfluous. As it has been said in the Vítarágastuti, or “Praise of Jina”—
. “There is one eternal maker for the world, all-pervading, independent, and true; they have none of these inextricable delusions, whose teacher art thou.”
And again—
. “There is here no maker acting by his own free will, else his influence would extend to the making of a mat. What would be the use of yourself or all the artisans, if Íśwara fabricates the three worlds?”
Therefore it is right to hold, as we do, that omniscience is produced when the hindrances are removed by the three means before alluded to.
Nor need the objection be made that “right intuition,” &c., are impossible, as there is no other teacher to go to,—because this universal knowledge can be produced by the inspired works of former omniscient Jinas. Nor is our doctrine liable to the imputation of such faults as Anyonyáśrayatá, &c., because we accept an eternal succession of revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers, like the endless series of seed springing from shoot and shoot from seed. So much for this preliminary discussion.
The well-known triad called the three gems, right intuition, &c., are thus described in the Paramágamasára (which is devoted to the exposition of the doctrines of the Arhats)—”Right intuition, right knowledge, right conduct are the path of liberation.” This has been thus explained by Yogadeva:—
(a.) When the meaning of the predicaments, the soul, &c., has been declared by an Arhat in exact accordance with their reality, absolute faith in the teaching, i.e., the entire absence of any contrary idea, is “right intuition.” And to this effect runs the Tattvártha-sútra, “Faith in the predicaments is right ‘intuition.'” Or, as another definition gives it, “Acquiescence in the predicaments declared by a Jina is called ‘right faith;’ it is produced either by natural character or by the guru’s instruction.” “Natural character” means the soul’s own nature, independent of another’s teaching; “instruction” is the knowledge produced by the teaching of another in the form of explanation, &c.
(b.) “Right knowledge” is a knowledge of the predicaments, soul, &c., according to their real nature, undisturbed by any illusion or doubt; as it has been said—
“That knowledge, which embraces concisely or in detail the predicaments as they actually are, is called ‘right knowledge’ by the wise.”
This knowledge is fivefold as divided into mati, śruta, avadhi, manas-paryáya, and kevala; as it has been said, “Mati, śruta, avadhi, manas-paryáya, and kevala, these are knowledge.” The meaning of this is as follows:—
. Mati is that by which one cognises an object through the operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions of knowledge being abolished.
. Śruta is the clear knowledge produced by mati, all the obstructions of knowledge being abolished.
. Avadhi is the knowledge of special objects caused by the abolition of hindrances, which is effected by “right intuition,” &c.
. Manas-paryáya is the clear definite knowledge of another’s thoughts, produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of knowledge caused by the veil of envy.
. Kevala is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake of which ascetics practise various kinds of penance.
The first of these (mati) is not self-cognised, the other four are. Thus it has been said—
“True knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow, and which manifests itself as well as its object; it is both supersensuous and itself an object of cognition, as the object is determined in two ways.”
But the full account of the further minute divisions must be got from the authoritative treatise above-mentioned.
(c.) “Right conduct” is the abstaining from all actions tending to evil courses by one who possesses faith and knowledge, and who is diligent in cutting off the series of actions and their effects which constitutes mundane existence. This has been explained at length by the Arhat—
. “Right conduct is described as the entire relinquishment of blamable impulses; this has been subjected to a fivefold division, as the ‘five vows,’ ahiṃsá, súnṛita, asteya, brahmacharyá, and aparigraha.
. “The ‘vow’ of ahiṃsá is the avoidance of injuring life by any act of thoughtlessness in any movable or immovable thing.
. “A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the ‘vow’ of súnṛita. That truthful speech is not truthful, which is unkind to others and prejudicial.
. “The not taking what is not given is declared to be the ‘vow’ of asteya; the external life is a man’s property, and, when it is killed, it is killed by some one who seizes it.
. “The ‘vow’ of brahmacharyá (chastity) is eighteen-fold, viz., the abandonment of all desires, heavenly or earthly, in thought, word, and deed, and whether by one’s own action or by one’s consent, or by one’s causing another to act.
. “The ‘vow’ of aparigraha is the renouncing of all delusive interest in everything that exists not; since bewilderment of thought may arise from a delusive interest even in the unreal.
. “When carried out by the five states of mind in a fivefold order, these great ‘vows’ of the world produce the eternal abode.”
The full account of the five states of mind (bhávaná) has been given in the following passage of which we only quote one śloka—
“Let him carry out the ‘vow’ of súnṛita uninterruptedly by the abstinence from laughter, greed, fear, and anger, and by the deliberate avoidance of speech,”—and so forth.
These three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct, when united, produce liberation, but not severally; just as, in the case of an elixir, it is the knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues, and the actual application of the medicine, united, which produce the elixir’s effect, but not severally.
Here we may say concisely that the tattvas or predicaments are two, jíva and ajíva; the soul, jíva, is pure intelligence; the non-soul, ajíva, is pure non-intelligence. Padmanandin has thus said—
“The two highest predicaments are ‘soul’ and ‘non-soul;’ ‘discrimination’ is the power of discriminating these two, in one who pursues what is to be pursued, and rejects what is to be rejected. The affection, &c., of the agent are to be rejected; these are objects for the non-discriminating; the supreme light of knowledge is alone to be pursued, which is defined as upayoga.”
Upayoga or “the true employment of the soul’s activities” takes place when the vision of true knowledge recognises the manifestation of the soul’s innate nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of pradeśa and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces between the soul and the body, considers itself as identified with its actions and the body which they produce, knowledge should rather be defined as “the cause of its recognising that it is other than these.”
Intelligence (chaitanya) is common to all souls, and is the real nature of the soul viewed as pariṇata i.e., as it is in itself; but by the influence of upaśamakshaya and kshayopaśama it appears in the “mixed” form as possessing both, or again, by the influence of actions as they arise, it assumes the appearance of foulness, &c. As has been said by Váchakáchárya in a sútra—
“The aupaśamika, the Ksháyika, and the ‘mixed’ states are the nature of the soul, and also the audayika and the Páriṇámika.”
. The aupaśamika state of the soul arises when all the effects of past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise to affect the future, as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing nut-plant, &c.
. The Ksháyika state arises when there is the absolute abolition of actions and their effects, as in final liberation.
. The “mixed” (miśra) state combines both these, as when water is partly pure.
. The audayika state is when actions arise exerting an inherent influence on the future. The Páriṇámika state is the soul’s innate condition, as pure intelligence, &c., and disregarding its apparent states, as (), (), (), (). This nature, in one of the above-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether happy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the sútra quoted above.
This has been explained in the Svarúpa-sambodhana—
“Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical with it,—in some way both different and the same,—knowledge is its first and last; such is the soul described to be.”
If you say that, “As difference and identity are mutually exclusive, we must have one or the other in the case of the soul, and its being equally both is absurd,” we reply, that there is no evidence to support you when you characterise it as absurd. Only a valid non-perception can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd; but this is not found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the advocates of the Syád-váda) it is perfectly notorious that all things present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes.
Others lay down a different set of tattvas from the two mentioned above, jíva and ajíva; they hold that there are five astikáyas or categories,—jíva, ákáśa, dharma, adharma, and pudgala. To all these five we can apply the idea of “existence” (asti), as connected with the three divisions of time, and we can similarly apply the idea of “body” (káya), from their occupying several parts of space.
The jívas (souls) are divided into two, the “mundane” and the “released.” The “mundane” pass from birth to birth; and these are also divided into two, as those possessing an internal sense (samanaska), and those destitute of it (amanaska). The former possesses saṃjñá, i.e., the power of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving instruction; the latter are those without this power. These latter are also divided into two, as “locomotive” (trasa), or “immovable” (sthávara).
The “locomotive” are those possessing at least two senses touch and taste, as shell-fish, worms, &c., and are thus of four kinds as possessing two, three, four, or five senses; the “immovable” are earth, water, fire, air, and trees. But here a distinction must be made. The dust of the road is properly “earth,” but bricks, &c., are aggregated “bodies of earth,” and that soul by whom this body is appropriated becomes “earthen-bodied,” and that soul which will hereafter appropriate it is the “earth-soul.” The same four divisions must also be applied to the others, water, &c. Now the souls which have appropriated or will appropriate the earth, &c., as their bodies, are reckoned as “immovable;” but earth, &c., and the “bodies of earth,” &c., are not so reckoned, because they are inanimate. These other immovable things, and such as only possess the one sense of touch, are considered as “released,” since they are incapable of passing into any other state of existence.
Dharma, adharma, and ákáśa are singular categories and not generic, and they have not the attribute of “action,” but they are the causes of a substance’s change of place.
Dharma, “merit,” and adharma, “demerit,” are well known. They assist souls in progressing or remaining stationary in the universally extended sky or ether characterised by light, and also called Lokákáśa; hence the presence of the category “merit” is to be inferred from progress, that of “demerit” from stationariness. The effect of ákáśa is seen when one thing enters into the space previously occupied by another.
Pudgala, “body,” possesses touch, taste, and colour. Bodies are of two kinds, atomic and compound. Atoms cannot be enjoyed; the compounds are the binary and other combinations. Atoms are produced by the separation of these binary and other compounds, while these arise from the conjunction of atoms. Compounds sometimes arise from separation and conjunction combined; hence they are called pudgalas, because they “fill” (púr), and “dissolve” (gal). Although “time” is not properly an astikáya, because it does not occupy many separate parts of space as mentioned in the definition, still it is a dravya or tattva, as the definition will hold; “substance” (dravya) possesses “qualities and action.” Qualities reside in substance but do not themselves possess qualities, as the general qualities, knowledge, &c., of the jíva, form, &c., of the body, and the power of causing progress, stationariness, and motion into a place previously occupied, in the case respectively of “merit,” “demerit,” and ákáśa. “Action” (paryáya) has thus been defined; the actions (paryáyáḥ) of a substance are, as has been said, its existence, its production, its being what it is, its development, its course to the end, as, e.g., in the jíva, the knowledge of objects, as of a jar, &c., happiness, pain, &c.; in the pudgala, the lump of clay, the jar, &c.; in merit and demerit, the special functions of progress, &c. Thus there are six substances or tattvas i.e., the five above mentioned and “time”.
Others reckon the tattvas as seven, as has been said—
“The tattvas are jíva, ajíva, ásrava, bandha, saṃvara, nirjará, and moksha.” Jíva and ajíva have been already described. Ásrava is described as the movement of the soul called yoga, through its participation in the movement of its various bodies, audárika, &c. As a door opening into the water is called ásrava, because it causes the stream to descend through it, so this yoga is called ásrava, because by it as by a pipe actions and their consequences flow in upon the soul. Or, as a wet garment collects the dust brought to it from every side by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins, collects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions which are brought to it by yoga. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the jíva, heated by previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought by yoga. Kasháya (“sin,” “defilement”) is so called because it “hurts” (kash) the soul by leading it into evil states; it comprises anger, pride, delusion, and lust. Ásrava is twofold, as good or evil. Thus abstaining from doing injury is a good yoga of the body; speaking what is true, measured, and profitable is a good yoga of the speech.
These various subdivisions of ásrava have been described at length in several Sútras. “Ásrava is the impulse to action with body, speech, or mind, and it is good or evil as it produces merit or demerit,” &c. Others, however, explain it thus:—”Ásrava is the action of the senses which impels the soul towards external objects; the light of the soul, coming in contact with external objects by means of the senses, becomes developed as the knowledge of form, &c.”
Bandha, “bondage,” is when the soul, by the influence of “false intuition,” “non-indifference,” “carelessness,” and “sin” (kasháya), and also by the force of yoga, assumes various bodies occupying many parts of space, which enter into its own subtile body, and which are suited to the bond of its previous actions. As has been said—
“Through the influence of sin the individual soul assumes bodies suitable to its past actions, this is, ‘bondage.'”
In this quotation the word “sin” (kasháya) is used to include the other three causes of bondage as well as that properly so termed. Váchakáchárya has thus enumerated the causes of bondage: “The causes of bondage are false intuition, non-indifference, carelessness, and sin.”
(a) “False intuition” is twofold,—either innate from one’s natural character, as when one disbelieves Jaina doctrines from the influence of former evil actions, irrespectively of another’s teaching,—or derived, when learned by another’s teaching.
(b) “Non-indifference” is the non-restraint of the five senses, and the internal organ from the set of six, earth, &c.
(c) “Carelessness” (pramáda) is a want of effort to practise the five kinds of samiti, gupti, &c.
(d) “Sin” consists of anger, &c. Here we must make the distinction that the four things, false intuition, &c., cause those kinds of bondage called sthiti and anubháva; yoga or ásrava causes those kinds called prakṛiti and pradeśa.
“Bondage” is fourfold, as has been said: “Prakṛiti, sthiti, anubháva, and pradeśa are its four kinds.”
. Prakṛiti means “the natural qualities,” as bitterness or sweetness in the vimba plant or molasses. This may be subdivided into eight múla-prakṛitis.
Thus obstructions (ávaraṇa) cloud the knowledge and intuition, as a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp. This is (a) jnánávaraṇa, or (b) darśanávaraṇa. (c) An object recognised as simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and pain, as licking honey from a sword’s edge,—this is vedaníya. (d) A delusion (mohaníya) in intuition produces want of faith in the Jaina categories, like association with the wicked; delusion in conduct produces want of self-restraint, like intoxication. (e) Áyus produces the bond of body, like a snare. (f) Náman, or “the name,” produces various individual appellations, as a painter paints his different pictures. (g) Gotra produces the idea of noble and ignoble, as the potter fashions his pots. (h) Antaráya produces obstacles to liberality, &c., as the treasurer hinders the king by considerations of economy.
Thus is the prakṛiti-bandha eightfold, being denominated as the eight múla-prakṛitis, with subdivisions according to the different actions of the various subject-matter.
And thus has Umáswáti-váchakáchárya declared: “The first kind of bandha consists of obstructions of the knowledge and the intuition, vedaníya, mohaníya, áyus, náman, gotra, and antaráya;” and he has also reckoned up the respective subdivisions of each as five, nine, twenty-eight, four, two, forty, two, and fifteen. All this has been explained at full length in the Vidyánanda and other works, and here is omitted through fear of prolixity.
. Sthiti. As the milk of the goat, cow, buffalo, &c., have continued unswerving from their sweet nature for so long a period, so the first three múla-prakṛitis, jnánávaraṇa, &c., and the last, antaráya, have not swerved from their respective natures even through the period described in the words, “sthiti lasts beyonds crores of crores of periods of time measured by thirty ságaropamas.” This continuance is sthiti.
. Anubháva. As in the milk of goats, cows, buffaloes, &c., there exists, by its rich or poor nature, a special capacity for producing its several effects, so in the different material bodies produced by our actions there exists a special capacity (anubháva) for producing their respective effects.
. Pradeśa. The bandha called pradeśa is the entrance into the different parts of the soul by the masses, made up of an endless number of parts, of the various bodies which are developed by the consequences of actions.
Saṃvara is the stopping of ásrava—that by which the influence of past actions (karman) is stopped from entering into the soul. It is divided into gupti, samiti, &c. Gupti is the withdrawal of the soul from that “impulse” (yoga) which causes mundane existence,—it is threefold, as relating to body, speech, or mind. Samiti is the acting so as to avoid injury to all living beings. This is divided into five kinds, as íryá, bháshá, &c., as has been explained by Hemachandra.
. “In a public highway, kissed by the sun’s rays, to walk circumspectly so as to avoid injuring living beings, this the good call íryá.
. “Let him practise a measured utterance in his intercourse with all people; this is called bháshá-samiti, dear to the restrainers of speech.
. “The food which the sage takes, ever free from the forty-two faults which may accrue to alms, is called the eshaṇá-samiti.
. “Carefully looking at it and carefully seating himself upon it, let him take a seat, &c., set it down, and meditate,—this is called the ádána-samiti.
. “That the good man should carefully perform his bodily evacuations in a spot free from all living creatures,—this is the utsarga-samiti. Hence samvara has been etymologically analysed as that which closes (sam + vṛiṇoti) the door of the stream of ásrava, as has been said by the learned, ‘Ásrava is the cause of mundane existence, saṃvara is the cause of liberation; this is the Árhat doctrine in a handful; all else is only the amplification of this.'”
Nirjará is the causing the fruit of past actions to decay by self-mortification, &c.; it destroys by the body the merit and demerit of all the previously performed actions, and the resulting happiness and misery; “self-mortification” means the plucking out of the hair, &c. This nirjará is twofold, “temporary” (yathákála) and ancillary (aupakramaṇika). It is “temporary” as when a desire is dormant in consequence of the action having produced its fruit, and at that particular time, from this completion of the object aimed at, nirjará arises, being caused by the consumption of the desire, &c. But when, by the force of asceticism, the sage turns all actions into means for attaining his end (liberation), this is the nirjará of actions. Thus it has been said: “From the decaying of the actions which are the seeds of mundane existence, nirjará arises, which is twofold, sakámá and akámá. That called sakámá belongs to ascetics, the akámá to other embodied spirits.”
Moksha. Since at the moment of its attainment there is an entire absence of all future actions, as all the causes of bondage (false perception, &c.) are stopped, and since all past actions are abolished in the presence of the causes of nirjará, there arises the absolute release from all actions,—this is moksha; as it has been said: “Moksha is the absolute release from all actions by the decay (nirjará) of the causes of bondage and of existence.”
Then the soul rises upward to the end of the world. As a potter’s wheel, whirled by the stick and hands, moves on even after these have stopped, until the impulse is exhausted, so the previous repeated contemplations of the embodied soul for the attainment of moksha exert their influence even after they have ceased, and bear the soul onward to the end of the world; or, as the gourd, encased with clay, sinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed from its encumbrance, so the soul, delivered from works, rises upward by its isolation, from the bursting of its bonds like the elastic seed of the castor-oil plant, or by its own native tendency like the flame.
“Bondage” is the condition of being unseparated, with a mutual interpenetration of parts between the soul and the body; saṅga is merely mutual contact. This has been declared as follows:—
“Liberation is unhindered, from the continuance of former impulses, from the absence of saṅga, from the cutting of all bonds, and from the natural development of the soul’s own powers of motion, like the potter’s wheel, the gourd with its clay removed, the seed of the castor-oil plant, or the flame of fire.”
Hence they recite a śloka:—
“However often they go away, the planets return, the sun, moon, and the rest;
“But never to this day have returned any who have gone to Álokákáśa.”
Others hold moksha to be the abiding in the highest regions, the soul being absorbed in bliss, with its knowledge unhindered and itself untainted by any pain or impression thereof.
Others hold nine tattwas, adding “merit” and “demerit” to the foregoing seven,—these two being the causes of pleasure and pain. This has been declared in the Siddhánta, “Jíva, ajíva, puṇya, pápa, ásrava, saṃvara, nirjaraṇa, bandha, and moksha, are the nine tattwas.” As our object is only a summary, we desist here.
Here the Jainas everywhere introduce their favourite logic called the sapta-bhaṅgí-naya, or the system of the seven paralogisms, “may be, it is,” “may be, it is not,” “may be, it is and it is not,” “may be, it is not predicable,” “may be, it is, and yet not predicable,” “may be, it is not, and not predicable,” “may be, it is and it is not, and not predicable.” All this Anantavírya has thus laid down:—
. “When you wish to establish a thing, the proper course is to say ‘may be, it is;’ when you wish to deny it, ‘may be, it is not.’
. “When you desire to establish each in turn, let your procedure likewise embrace both; when you wish to establish both at once, let it be declared ‘indescribable’ from the impossibility to describe it.
. “The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to establish the first as well as its indescribableness; when the second as well as its indescribableness, the occasion for the sixth process arises.
. “The seventh is required when all three characters are to be employed simultaneously.”
Syát, “may be,” is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a part of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness; as it has been said—
“This particle syát is in the form of a verb, but, from its being connected with the sense, it denotes indeterminateness in sentences, and has a qualifying effect on the implied meaning.”
If, again, the word syát denoted determinateness, then it would be needless in the phrase, “may be, it is;” but since it really denotes indeterminateness, “may be, it is,” means “it is somehow;” syát, “may be,” conveys the meaning of “somehow,” kathaṃchit; and so it is not really useless. As one has said—
“The doctrine of the syád-váda arises from our everywhere rejecting the idea of the absolute; it depends on the sapta-bhaṅgí-naya, and it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to be accepted.”
If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always, everywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or place would ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided. But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it. Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this: “Is being or non-being the real nature of the thing?” The real nature of the thing cannot be being, for then you could not properly use the phrase, “It is a pot” (ghaṭósti), as the two words “is” and “pot” would be tautological; nor ought you to say, “It is not a pot,” as the words thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same argument is to be used in other questions. As it has been declared—
“It must not be said ‘It is a pot,’ since the word ‘pot’ implies ‘is;’
“Nor may you say ‘it is not a pot,’ for existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive,” &c.
The whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of our opponents severally hold the doctrine of existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is inexplicable (anirvachaníyatá); three other classes hold one or other of the three first theories combined with the fourth. Now, when they meet us with the scornful questions, “Does the thing exist?” &c., we have an answer always possible, “It exists in a certain way,” &c., and our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues to the holder of the Syád-váda, which ascertains the entire meaning of all things. Thus said the teacher in the Syádváda-mañjarí—
“A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the omniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of scientific investigation. When our reasonings based on one point proceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealed Syád-váda, which ascertains the entire meaning of all things.”
“All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions and counter-propositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which with no partiality equally favours all sects.”
The Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by Jinadatta-súri—
“The hindrances belonging to vigour, enjoyment, sensual pleasure, giving and receiving,—sleep, fear, ignorance, aversion, laughter, liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of indifference, desire, sorrow, deceit, these are the eighteen ‘faults’ (dosha) according to our system. The divine Jina is our Guru, who declares the true knowledge of the tattwas. The path of emancipation consists of knowledge, intuition, and conduct. There are two means of proof (pramáṇa) in the Syád-váda doctrine,—sense-perception and inference. All consists of the eternal and the non-eternal; there are nine or seven tattwas. The jíva, the ajíva, merit and demerit, ásrava, saṃvara, bandha, nirjará, mukti,—we will now explain each. Jíva is defined as intelligence; ajíva is all other than it; merit means bodies which arise from good actions, demerit the opposite; ásrava is the bondage of actions, nirjará is the unloosing thereof; moksha arises from the destruction of the eight forms of karman or “action”. But by some teachers “merit” is included in saṃvara, and “demerit” in ásrava.
“Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things and is hidden from the world, and whose eight actions are abolished, absolute liberation is declared by Jina. The Śwetámbaras are the destroyers of all defilement, they live by alms, they pluck out their hair, they practise patience, they avoid all association, and are called the Jaina Sádhus. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they carry peacocks’ tails in their hands, they drink from their hands, and they eat upright in the giver’s house,—these are the second class of the Jaina Ṛishis.
“A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she enters not Mukti,—so say the Digambaras; but there is a great division on this point between them and the Śwetámbaras.”
SOURCE: THE SARVA-DARŚANA-SAṄGRAHA BY
MÁDHAVA ÁCHÁRYA
