Refer: Madras City Wine Merchants’ Assiciation v. State of Tamil Nadu [ (1994) 5 Supreme Court Cases 509
We will briefly deal with the doctrine of legitimate expectation. It is not necessary to refer to large number of cases excepting the following few:
On this doctrine Clive Lewis in ‘Judicial Remedies in Public Law at page 97 states thus :
Decisions affecting legitimate expectation –
In the public law field, individuals may not have strictly enforceable rights but they may have legitimate expectations. Such expectations may stem either from a promise or a representation made by a public body, or from a proviso practice of a public body, The promise of a hearing before a decision is taken may give rise to a legitimate expectation that a hearing will be given. A past practice of consulting before a decision is taken may give rise to an expectation of consultation before any future decision is taken. A promise to confer, or past practice of conferring a substantive benefit, may give rise to an expectation that the individual will be given a hearing before a decision is taken not to confer the benefit. The actual enjoyment of a benefit may create a legitimate expectation that the benefit will not be removed without the individual being given a hearing. On occasions, individuals seek to enforce the promise of expectation itself, by claiming that the substantive benefit be conferred. Decisions affecting such legitimate expectations are subject to judicial review.”
In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1984] 3 All ER 935 at pages 943-44 it is stated thus :
“But even where a person claiming some benefit or privilege has no legal right to it, as a matter of private law, he may have a legitimate expectation of receiving the benefit or privilege, and, if so, the courts will protect his expectation by judicial review as a matter of public law. This subject has been fully explained by Lord Diplock in O’Reilly v. Mackman, [1982] 3 All ER 1124 = (1983) 2 AC 237 and I need not repeat what he has so recently said. Legitimate, or reasonable, expectation may arise either from an express promise given on behalf of a public authority or from the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue. Examples of the former type of expectation are Re Liverpool Taxi Owners’ Association [1972] 2 All ER 589, (1972) 2 QB 299 and A-G of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu, [1983] 2 All ER 346 = (1983) 2 AC 629. (I agree with Lord Diplock’s view, ex-pressed in the speech in this appeal, that ‘legitimate’ is to be preferred to ‘reasonable’ in this context, I was responsible for using the word ‘reasonable’ for the reason explained in Ng Yuen Shiu, but it was intended only to be exegetical of ‘legitimate.’) An example of the latter in R v. Hull Prison Board of Visitors, ex p. St. Germain, [1979] 1 All ER 701, [1979] QB 425, approved by this House in O’Reilly v. Mackman, [1982| 3 All ER 1124 at 1126 = [1983] 2 AC 237 at 274.”
Halsbury’s Laws of England
In Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol. 1(1) Fourth Edition Para 81 at pages 151-52 it is stated thus :
“81 Legitimate expectations. A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment.
O’Reilly v. Mackman, [1983] 2 AC 237 at 275, HL; A-G of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu, [1983], 2 AC 629, [1983] 2 All ER 346, PC; Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] AC 374, [1984] 3 All ER 935, H.L. The expectation must plainly be a reasonable one: A-G of Hong Kong v, Ng Yuen Shiu supra. It seems that a person’s own conduct may deprive any expectations he may have of the necessary quality of legitimacy : Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority, [1980] 2 All ER 368, [1980] 1 WLR 582, CA.
The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, R v. Liverpool Corpn. ex p. Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operator’s Association, [1972] 2 QB 299, [1972] 2 All ER 589, CA; A-G of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu, [1983] 2 AC 629, [1983J 2 All ER 346, PC; Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] AC 374 = [1984] 3 All ER 935, HL; R. v. Home Secretary, ex P. Oloniluyi, [1988] Times, 26 November, CA; R. v. Brent London Borough Council, ex P, Macdonagh, [1989) Times, 22 March. Al- though there is an obvious analogy between the doctrines of legitimate expectation and of estoppel, the two are distinct, and detrimental reliance upon the representation is not a necessary ingredient of a legitimate expectation; see R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Khan, [1985] All ER 40 at 48, 52, [1984] 1 WLR 1337 at 1347, 1352, CA; and see para 23 ante. In relation to Inland Revenue extra – statutory concessions and assurances, see R v. A-G, ex p ICI pic, [1986] 60 TC I; R v. HM Inspector of Taxes, Hull, ex p Bnmfteld, [1988] Times, 25 November; and R v. IRC, ex p MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd., [1989] Times, 17 July; of Re Preston, [1985] AC 835, [1984] 2 All ER 327, HL.) including an implied representation, [R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Khan, [1985] 1 All ER 40, [1984] 1 WLR 1337, CA (setting out criteria for exercise of discretion in guidance letter given to prospective adoptive parents of children requiring entry clearance led to legitimate expectation that clearance would be granted where those criteria were satisfied. See also R v, Powys County Council, ex p Howner [1988] Times, 28 May; and R v. Brent London Borough Council, ex p Macdonagh, [1989] Times 22 March. In R v. Brent London Borough Council, ex p gunning, [1986] 84 LGR 168 the court appears to have relied in part on what were in effect express or implied representations by the Secretary of State (contained in departmental circulars) that there would be consultation, although the duty to consult was being imposed upon the local authority.] or from consistent past practice.
O’Reilly v. Mackman, [1983], 2 AC 237 at 275, [1982] 2 All ER 1124 at 1126-1127, HL; Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985], AC 374, [1984] 3 All ER 935, HL; R v. Brent London Borough Council, ex p Gunning, [1986] 84 LGR 168; R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Ruddock, [1987] 2 all ER 1025, [1987] 1 WLR 1482.
It is not clear to what extant a legitimate expectation may arise other than by way of a representation or of past practice; neither factor would seem to have been present in J v. Secretary, of State for Transport, exp Greater London Council, [1986] OB 556=[1985] 3 All ER 300. See also note 8 infra. However, procedural duties imposed as a result of looking at all the surrounding circumstances will normally be treated as illustrations of the general duty to act fairly in all the circumstances (see para 84 post) rather than of a legitimate expectation; of R. v. Great Yarmouth Borough Council, ex p Botton Bros Arcades Ltd, [1988] 56 p & CR 99 at 109; and see Re Westminister City Council (1986) AC 668 at 692-693, [1986] 2 All ER 278 at 288-289, HL, per Lord Bridge of Harwich, dissenting on another point.
The existence of a legitimate expectation may have a number of different consequences: it may give locus standi to seek leave to apply for judicial review; (O’Reilly v. Mackman, [1983] 2 AC 237, 275, [1982] 3 All ER 1124-1127; HL; Council of Civil Sendee Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] AC 374 at 408, [1984] 3 AU ER 935 at 949, HL, per Lord Diplock; Re Findlay [1985] AC 318, [1984] 3 AU ER 801 at 830, HL.) It may mean that the authority ought not to act so as to defeat the expectation without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so;
R. v. Liverpool Corpn. ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association, [1972] 2 OB 299, [1972] 2 All ER 589, CA; R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department. exp Ruddock, [1987] 2 All ER 1025, [1987] 1 WLR 1482, and cf HTV Ltd v. Price Commission, [1976] ICR 170, CA. But where the/expectation arises out of an administrative authority’s existing policy, it can only be that the policy for the time being in existence will be fairly applied, and cannot be invoked to prevent a change of policy fairly carried out: Re Findlay [1985] AC 318 at 338, [1984] 3 AU ER 801 at 830, HL; R v. Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Barratt (Guildford) Ltd, [1988] Times 3 April; and see R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Ruddock supra.
Or it may mean that, if the authority proposes to defeat a person’s legitimate expectation, it must affirm him an opportunity to make representations on the matter.
A-G of Hong Kong v. Ng Yien Shiu, [1983] 2 AC 629 = [1983] 2 All ER 346, PC; Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] AC 374, [1984] 3 All ER 935, HL; R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Khan, [1985] 1 All ER 40, [1984] 1 WLR 1337, CA, Sometimes the expectation will itself be of consultation or the opportunity to be heard; R v. Liverpool Corpn., ex p Liverpool Taxi, Fleet Operators’ Association, [1972] 2 QB 299, [1972] 2 All ER 589, CA; A-G of Hong Kong v. Ng Yien Shiu supra; Council of Civil Service Unions, v. Minister for the Civil Service supra; and see Ltyod v. McMahon, [1987] AC 625 at 715 1 All ER 1118 at 1170-1171, HL, per Lord Templeman (legitimate expectation is just a manifestation of the duty to act fairly). But the scope of the doctrine goes beyond the right to be heard; R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Ruddock, [1987] 2 All ER 1025, [1987] 1 WLR 1482. See also R. v. Bamet London Borough Council, ex p Pardes House School Ltd, [1989] Inde-pendent, 4 May; and R v. Powys County Council, exp Homer, [1988] Times, 28 May. There is, however, a legitimate expectation of reappointment to a public body: R v. North East Thames Regional Health Authority, ex p de Groot, [1988] Times, 16 April.
Example in licensing cases
The courts also distinguish, for example in licensing cases, between original applications, applications to renew and revocations; a party who has been granted a licence may have a legitimate expectation that it will be renewed unless there is some good reason not to do so, and may therefore be entitled to greater procedural protection than a mere applicant for a grant.
Mclnnes v. Onslow Fane, [1978] 3 All ER 211 at 218, (1978) 1 WLR 1520 at 1529; Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, (1969) 2 Ch 149,’ [1968] 3 All ER 795, CA (legitimate expectation of foreign alien that residence permit will not be revoked before expiry but not of renewal); Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, (1971] 2 OB 175, [1971] 1 All ER 1148, CA (legitimate expectation that winner of trade union election would be confirmed in his post by relevant committee); R v. Bamsley Metropolitan Borough Council, ex p Hook, [1976] 3 All ER 452, [1976] 1 WLR 1052, CA. Where there has previously been no general system of control, an existing trader does not have a legitimate expectation of being granted a licence when such a system is introduced; R. v. Bristol City Council, ex p Pearce, [1985] 83 LGR 711.
There cases of this Court may now be seen.
A State of H.P. v, Kailash Chand Mahajan, [1992] Supp. 2 SCC 351 at pages 386-87 in a judgment to which one of us was a party it was stated thus:
“It might be urged by the tenure of appointment there is a right to continue; the legitimate expectation has come to be interfered with. In a matter of this kind, as to whether legitimate expectation could be pleaded is a moot point. However, we will now refer to Wade’s Administrative Law (6th edn.) wherein it is stated at pages 520-21, as under:
“Legitimate expectation : positive effect. – The classic situation in which the principles of natural justice apply is where some legal right, liberty or interest is affected, for instance where a building is demolished or an office-holder is dismissed or a trader’s licence is revoked. But good administration demands their observance in other situations also , where the citizen may legitimately expect to be treated fairly. As Lord Bridge has explained :
Re Westminister CC, (1986) AC 668 at 692, Lord Diplock made a formal statement in the Council of Civil Service Unions case (below) at 408, saying that the decision must affect some other person either –
(a) by altering rights or obligations of that person which are enforceable by or against him in private law; or (b) by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated to him more rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn.
This analysis is ‘classical but certainly not exhaustive’ : R v. Secretary of State for the Environment ex. p. Nottinghamshire CC, [1986] AC 240 at 249 (Lord Scarman). One case which does not seem to be covered is that of a first-time applicant for a licence (below, p.559).
The Courts have developed a relatively novel doctrine in public law that a duty of consultation may arise from a legitimate expectation of consultation aroused either by a promise or by an established practice of consultation”.
In a recent case, in dealing with legitimate expectation in R v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex pane Jaderow Ltd., [1991] 1 All ER 41, it has been observed at page 68:
“Question II: Legitimate expectation: It should be pointed out in this regard that, under the powers reserved to the member states by Article 5(2) of Regulation 170 of 1983, fishing activities could be made subject to the grant of licences which , by their nature, are subject to temporal limits and to various conditions. Further-more, the introduction of the quota system was only one event amongst others in the evolution of the fishing industry, which is characterised by instability and continuous changes in the situation due to a series of events such as the extensions, in 1976, of fishing areas to 200 miles from certain coasts of the Community, the necessity to adopt measures for the conservation of fishery resources, which was dealt with at the international level by the intro-duction of total allowable catches, the arguments about the distribution amongst the member states of the total allowable catches available to the Community, which were finally distributed on the basis of a reference period which ran from 1973 to 1978 but which is reconsidered every year.
In those circumstances, operators in the fishing industry were not justified in taking the view that the Community rules precluded the making of any changes to the conditions laid down by national legislation or practice for the grant of licences to fish against national quotas as the adoption of new conditions compatible with Community law.
Consequently, the answer to this question must be that com-munity law as it now does not preclude legislation or a practice of a member state whereby a new condition not previously stipulated is laid down for the grant of licences to fish against national quotas.”
Legitimate expectation cannot preclude legislation
Thus, it will be clear even legitimate expectation cannot preclude legislation,” In Food Corporation of India v. M/S. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed In-dustries, JT (1992) 6, 259 at 264 this Court observed thus :
“The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due con-sideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant’s perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweight what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this matter would satisfy the re-quirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent”
In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, JT (1993) 3 S.C. 15 at pages 50-51 this Court observed thus ;
“It has to be noticed that the concept of legitimate expectation in administrative law has sow, undoubtedly, gained sufficient importance. It is stated that “Legitimate expectation” is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the courts for the review of administrative action and this creation takes its place beside such principles as the rules of natural justice, unreasonableness, the fiduciary duty of local authorities and “in future”, perhaps, the principle of proportionality.” A passage in Administrative Law, Sixty Edition by H.W.R. Wade page 424 reads thus :
“These are revealing decisions. They show that the courts now expect government departments to honour their published state-ments or else to treat the citizen with the fullest personal con-sideration. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness here comes close to unfairness in the form of violation of natural justice, and the doctrine of legitimate expectation can operate in both contexts. It is obvious, furthermore, that this principle of substantive, as opposed to procedural, fairness may undermine some of the established rules about estoppel and misleading advice, which tend to operate unfairly. Lord Scarman has stated emphatically that unfairness in the purported exercise of a power can amount to an abuse or excess of power, and this seems likely to develop into an important general doctrine.”
Another passage at page 522 in the above book reads thus:
“It was in fact for the purpose of restricting the right to be heard that ‘legitimate expectation’ was introduced into the law. It made its first appearance in a case where alien students of ‘scientology’ were refused extension of their entry permits as an act of policy by the Home Secretary, who had announced that no discretionary benefits would be granted to this sect. The Court of Appeal held that they had no legitimate expectation of extension beyond the permitted time, and so no right to a hearing, though revocation of their permits within that time would have been contrary to legitimate expectation. Official statements of policy, therefore, may cancel legitimate expectation, just as they may create it, as seen above. In a different context where car-hire drivers had habitually offended against airport byelaws, with many convictions and unpaid fines, it was held that they had no legitimate expectation of being heard before being banned by the airport authority.
There is some ambiguity in the dicta about legitimate expectation, which may mean either expectation of a fair hearing or expectation of the licence or other benefit which is being sought. But the result is the same in either case; absence of legitimate expectation will absolve the public authority from affording a hearing.”
Again, at pages 56-57 it is observed thus :
“………..A case of legitimate expectation would arise when a body by representation or by past practice aroused expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfill. The protection is limited to that extent and a judicial review can be within those limits. But as discussed above a person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectations, in the first instance, must satisfy that there is a foundation and thus has locus standi to make such a claim. In considering the same several factors which give rise to such legitimate expectation must be present The decision taken by the authority must be found to be arbitrary, unreasonable and not taken in public interest. If it is a question of policy, even by way of change of old policy, the courts cannot interfere with a decision. In a given case whether there are such facts and cir-cumstances giving rise to a legitimate expectation, it would primarily be a question of fact. If these tests are satisfied and if the court is satisfied that a case of legitimate expectation is made but then the next question would be whether failure to give an opportunity of hearing before the decision affecting such legitimate expectation is taken, has resulted in failure of justice and whether on that ground the decision should be quashed. If that be so then what should be the relief is again a matter which depends on several factors. ” Again at pages 57-58 it is observed thus :
“Legitimate expectations may come in various forms and owe their existence to different land of circumstances and it is not possible to give an exhaustive list in the context of vast and fast expansion of the governmental activities. They shift and change so fast that the start of our list would be absolute before we reached the middle. By and large they arise in cases of promotions which are in normal course expected, though no guaranteed by way of a statutory right, in cases of contracts, distribution of largess by the Government and in somewhat similar situations. For instance in cases of discretionary grant of licences, permits of the like, carries with it a reasonable expectation, though not a legal right to renewal or non- revocation, but to summarily disappoint that expectation may be seen as unfair without the expectant person being heard, But there again the court has to see whether it was done as a policy or in the public interest either by way of G.O., rule or by way of a legislation. If that be so, a decision denying a legitimate expectation based on such grounds docs not qualify for interference unless in a given case, the decision or action taken amounts to an abuse of power. Therefore the limitation is extremely confined and if the according of natural justice does not condition the exercise of the power, the concept of legitimate expectation can have no role to play and the court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which is empowered to take the decisions under law and the court is expected to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choice watch the legislature is presumed to have intended. Even in a case where the decision is left entirely to the discretion of the deciding authority without any such legal bounds and if the decision is taken fairly and objectively, the court will not interfere on the ground of procedural fairness to a person whose interest based on legitimate expectation might be affected. For instance if an authority who has full discretion to grant a licence and if he prefers an existing licence holder to a new applicant, the decision cannot be interfered with on the ground of legitimate expectation entertained by the new applicant applying the principles of natural justice, It can therefore be seen that legitimate expectation can at the most be one of the grounds which may give rise to judicial review but the granting of relief is very much limited. It would thus appear that there are stronger reasons as to why the legitimate expectation should not be substantively protected than the reasons as to why it should be protected. In other words such a legal obligation exists whenever the case supporting the same in terms of legal principles of dif- ferent sorts, is stronger than the case against it. As observed in Attorney General for New South Wales’ case “To strike down the exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be to set the courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism. Moreover, the notion of a legitimate expectation (falling short of a legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law.” If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power of violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles.” (Emphasis supplied) For the above it is clear that legitimate expectation may arise –
(a) if there is an express promise given by a public authority; or
(b) because of the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue ;
(c) Such an expectation must be reasonable.
However, if there is a change in policy or in public interest the position is altered by a rule or legislation, no question of legitimate expectation would arise.
The licence under the Bar Rules of 1992 is for a period of one year. That could be renewed, as seen above only on a privilege amount, as may be fixed by the State Government, in this behalf. This is unlike the case of the retail vending licence wherein the renewal is contemplated on payment of 15 per cent more than the privilege amount at which the sale of the privilege was confirmed in the previous year”. This is as regards the second year. Likewise, 10 per cent more than the privilege amount for the third year. Therefore, the position is entirely different giving no room for any expectation. At best, it could be a hope. On this aspect we can usefully refer to Director of Public Works v. HO PO Sang, [1961] 2 All E.R. 721. at page 730 it was observed thus :
“It was submitted on behalf of the lessee that, after the director had given notice (see s.3A(2) of his intention to give a re-building certificate, some kind of a right (even though one that might be defeated) to such a certificate was then acquired by the lessee. Their Lordships cannot accept this view. After the director gave notice of his intention to issue a certificate, there could have been no giving of it until certain conditions were satisfied. The lessee was under obligation to give notices as required by s.3B(l). Had there been no appeals by tenants and sub- tenants and had the time for appeals expired, the director would then have been in a position to give a certificate. Had those been the circumstances than inas-much as the director had indicated what his intention was, doubt- less he would in fact have given his certificate. But the ordinance did not impose an obligation on the director to give a certificate in accordance with his declared intention unless and until certain conditions were satisfied. Though, in the events that happened, this point does not call for decision, it would not seem that, in any circumstances, any right to a certificate could arise at least until, after notices given, the time for appeals by tenants and sub-tenants went by without there being any appeal. In a case, however, where (as in the present case) the giving of notices under s.3B(l) resulted in appeals by way of petition to the governor, followed by a cross-petition to the governor presented by the applicant, then any decision as to the giving of a re-building certificate no longer rested with the director. In the present case, the position on Apr. 9,1957, was that the lessee did not and could not know whether he would or would not be given a re-building certificate. Had there been no repeal, the petitions and cross-petition would in due course have been taken into consideration by the Governor in Council. There-after there would have been an exercise of discretion. The governor would not have directed either that a certificate be given or be not given, and the decision to the Governor in Council would have been final. In these circumstances, their Lordships conclude that it could not properly be said that, on Apr. 9, the lessee had an accrued right to be given a re-building certificate. It follows that he had no accrued rights to vacant possession of the premises. It was said that there were accrued rights to a certificate, and, consequently, to possession, subject only to the risk that these rights were not defeated. In their Lordships’ view, such an approach is not warranted by the facts. On Apr. 9 the lessee had no right. He had no more than a hope that the Governor in Council would give a favourable decision. So the first submission fails.” (Emphasis supplied) It has already been seen that under Rule 4(a) of the Bar Rules the eligibility of such a licence is possession of a retail vending licence. The period of licence was for one year ending by 31st May, 1992. The speech of the Governor which we have extracted above was made on 4th February, 1993. The impugned G.O, had come to be passed on 3rd March, 1993. The important point to be noted here is long before the Bar licensee could apply for renewal (Rule 6 talks of 30 days before the expiry of the licence) the policy decision has been taken not to renew.
Having regard to what is stated above, it is clear that there was absolutely no promise of renewal at all.
Due consideration
It was by a Rule (subordinate legislation) in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 17-C, 17-D, 21 and 54 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 licences under Bar Rules came to be granted. Those Rules have been repealed by exercise of the same powers under Sections 17-C, 17-D, 21 and 54 of the Prohibition Act. Therefore, this is a case of legislation. The doctrine of legitimate expectation arises only in the field of administrative decisions. If the plea of legitimate expectation relates to procedural fairness there is no possibility whatever of invoking the doctrine as against the legislation. However, Mr. K. Parasaran, learned senior counsel relies on Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, [1993] 4 SCC 441. At page 703 what is stated is this :
“Due consideration of every legitimate expectation in the decision making process is a requirement of the rule of non-arbitrariness’ and, therefore, this also is a norm to be observed by the Chief Justice of India in recommending appointments to the Supreme Court. Obviously, this factor applies only to those con-sidered suitable and at least equally meritorious by the Chief Justice of India, for appointment to the Supreme Court.”
This principle of non-arbitrariness cannot apply to a change of policy by legislation. Concerning the applicability of non- arbitrariness and change of policy learned counsel has cited R. Vijaykumar v. The Commissioner of Excise, JT (1993) 6 S.C. 325. That case dealt with discrimination between licensees. Hence, the same is not applicable. As a matter of fact in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu dated 8th July, 1993 it is inter alia stated thus :
“On complaints received from the public, some time in February, 1993 itself the Government had decided not to renew the licences for bar attached to the retail vending shops. This was also announced in the Governor’s speech and made public on 4.2.1993.
That on 3.3.1993 the Government by G.O.Ms. No.44 announced that as a matter of policy the Government would not renew licences to the bar attached with the vending shop with effect from 1.6.1993.”
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