there is a custom of pre-emption co-extensive with Mahomedan Law
Even when there is justification for criticism, the language should be dignified and restrained. But in this case se we do not see any justification at all for such remarks.
KEYWORDS:- Basic structure of the Constitution- DATE:-27-02-1967 There is no restriction in the Constitution itself which prevents this Court from reviewing its earlier decisions AIR 1967 SC 1643 : (1967) 2 SCR […]
Whether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
In case of the partition suit, all the parties are to be treated as plaintiffs. Even if any preliminary decree would have been passed by this court in this suit based on the said affidavit dated 15th October, 1985 under Order 20 Rule 18 read with sections 151 to 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, court has ample power to pass more than one preliminary decree or to modify the preliminary decree prior to passing of the final decree having regard to change of supervening circumstances.
M.V. ELISABETH AND OTHERS Vs. HARWAN INVESTMENT AND TRADING PVT. LTD., HANOEKAR HOUSE, SWATONTAPETH, VASCO-DE-GAMA, GOA
(1993) AIR(SCW) 177 : (1993) AIR(SC) 1014 : (1992) 2 JT 65 : (1992) 1 SCALE 490 : (1993) Sup2 SCC 433 : (1992) 1 SCR 1003 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION […]
NINTH SCHEDULE (Article 31B) 1. The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XXX of 1950). 2. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bombay Act LXVII of 1948). 3. The […]
Escort means attendant/helper/guide These services should not be confused with: Aya Nurse Female Security Guard Maidservant Brothel Escort service is actually covered prostitution. In the nineties, it was called ” Call girl […]
How can there be a rule of law society if members, bulk of whom are poor and unable to decode law to obey it? SC
The rule of law is the cornerstone of democracy and how can there be a rule of law society if the members, the bulk of whom are too poor to buy legal […]
Whereas suit was filed for recognition of right of easement and later on amendment sought in the plaint for introducing essential ingredients of easement – The amendment, if allowed at the appellate […]
According to Section 433(A) that a prisoner who has been sentenced to death and whose death sentence has been commuted into one of imprisonment for life and persons who have been sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law should undergo actual imprisonment of 14 years in Jail. We are referring to Section 433(A) in this judgment only for a limited purpose of showing that after the introduction of this section, the life convicts falling within the purview of Section 433(A) has to undergo the mandatory minimum 14 years of actual imprisonment. It may be mentioned at this juncture that no one has got a vested right to claim premature release on the ground that he has suffered the minimum actual imprisonment as prescribed under Section 433(A) because a sentence of ‘imprisonment for life’ is incarceration until death, that is, for the remaining period of convicted prison’s actual life
We are of the view that aforesaid directions are not consistent with the law laid down by the larger Bench in Mathew (supra). In Mathew (supra), the direction for consulting the opinion of another doctor before proceeding with criminal investigation was confined only in cases of criminal complaint and not in respect of cases before the Consumer Forum. The reason why the larger Bench in Mathew (supra) did not equate the two is obvious in view of the jurisprudential and conceptual difference between cases of negligence in civil and criminal matter. This has been elaborately discussed in Mathew (supra). This distinction has been accepted in the judgment of this Court in Malay Kumar Ganguly (supra) (See paras 133 and 180 at pages 274 and 284 of the report).
The apex court’s five-judge Constitution bench was unanimous in striking down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code dealing with the offence of adultery, holding it as manifestly arbitrary, archaic and violative of the rights to equality and equal opportunity to women
September 11, 2018-TITLE APPEAL-Keeping in view the scope and ambit of the powers of the High Court while deciding the second appeal when we advert to the facts of the case, we find that the High Court committed an error in allowing the defendants’ second appeal and further erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit by answering the substantial question of law. This we say for more than one reason.
First, mere perusal of the impugned order would go to show that the High Court had admitted the second appeal by framing only one substantial question of law, namely, whether the first Appellate Court was justified in dismissing the defendants’ first appeal by taking into consideration one earlier litigation in relation to the suit land, which was not between the same parties. The High Court held that the first Appellate Court was not justified because the earlier litigation was not between the present plaintiffs and the defendants but it was between the different parties and, therefore, any decision rendered in such litigation would not operate as res judicata in the present litigation between the parties. This resulted in allowing of the appeal and dismissing the suit.
Second, the High Court committed another error when it failed to frame any substantial question of law on the issue of the plaintiffs’ ownership over the suit land. So long as no substantial question of law was framed, the High Court had no jurisdiction to examine the said issue in its second appellate jurisdiction. In other words, the High Court having framed only one question, which did not pertain to issue of ownership of the suit land, had no jurisdiction to examine the issue of ownership. It was not permissible in the light of Section 100 (5) of the Code, which empowers the High Court to decide the appeal only on the question framed and not beyond it.
Third, the High Court could invoke its powers under proviso to subsection (5) of Section 100 and frame one or two additional questions, as the case may be, even at the time of hearing of the second appeal. It would have enabled the High Court to examine the issue of ownership of the suit land in its correct perspective. It was, however, not done by the High Court.
Fourth, the High Court, while examining the question framed, also cursorily touched the ownership issue which, in our opinion, the High Court could not have done for want of framing of any substantial question of law on the ownership issue. That apart, the High Court also failed to see that the issue of res judicata and the issue of ownership were independent issues and the decision on one would not have 14 answered the other one. In other words, both the issues had to be examined independent of each other on their respective merits. It was, however, possible only after framing of substantial questions on both the issues as provided under Section 100(4) and (5) of the Code. This was, however, not done in this case.
The main question which needs determination is whether part of the scheme mentioned before introduced by the Reserve Bank of India is violative of guarantee of equality before law and of equal opportunity in public employment as enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The High Court noted that the point arose at the instance of three petitioners who were Grade II working at Nagpur branch of Reserve Bank ever since their employment which commenced somewhere between 1960 to 1965.
Bharat Ratna and Padma awards are not “titles” within Article 18 of the Constitution of India. These awards can be given to the citizens for exceptional and distinguished services rendered in art, literature, science and other fields. These awards are national in character and only those who have achieved distinction at national level can be considered for these awards. The question to be considered, however, is whether the purpose of instituting these awards is being achieved and these are being conferred on the deserving persons. The history and experience shows that, in the beginning, these awards were given to a limited number of persons but in the recent years there have been floodgates of awards for the persons who are well known, lesser known and even unknown. The Padma awards have been conferred on businessmen and industrialists who have multiplied their own wealth and have hardly helped the growth of national interest. Persons with little or no contribution in any field can be seen masquerading as Padma awardees. The existing procedure for selection of candidates is wholly vague and is open to abuse at the whims and fancies of the persons in authority. Conferment of Padma awards without any firm guidelines and fool-proof method of selection is bound to breed nepotism, favoritism, patronage and even corruption.
Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. Vs. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice [ALL SC 2018 September]
September 6, 2018:-SECTION 377of IPC-Homosexuality-It is declared that insofar as Section 377 criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults (i.e. persons above the age of 18 years who are competent to consent) in […]
The sine qua non of the offence of rape is penetration, and not ejaculation. Ejaculation without penetration constitutes an attempt to commit rape and not actual rape. Definition of “rape” as contained in Section 375, IPC refers to “SEXual intercourse” and the Explanation appended to the Section provides that penetration is sufficient to constitute the SEXual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. Intercourse means SEXual connection. In the instant case that connection has been clearly established. Courts below were perfectly justified in their view.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.10972 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.15436 of 2009) Suresh Kumar Koushal & Anr vs Naz Foundation & Ors Decided on: […]
Mattapalli Chelamayya (dead) by his legal reps and anr Vs Mattapalli Venkataratnam (dead) by his legal reps and anr [SC 1972 JANUARY]
The partition of the immovable properties had been effected in about the middle of 1952 and the parties were since then in possession of the lands etc. which had been allotted to their share. The recital in the award is no more than a reference to an existing fact and does not purport to create or declare, by virtue of the award itself, right title or interest in immovable property.