Search results for ‘SC 1973

Rosy Jacob Versus Jacob A. Chakramakkal [ALL SC 1973 APRIL]

There is no dichotomy between the fitness of the father to be entrusted with the custody of his minor children and considerations of their welfare.

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In case of inordinate delay in lodging FIR, Court may reject the case if delay is not satisfactorily explained-SC

CRIMINAL – Sections 365 and 352 of the Indian Penal Code – Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely – SUPREME COURT OF INDIA [ March 29, 2019 ]

Mithilesh Kumari & Anr vs Prem Behari Khare [All SC 1989 February]

A retrospective operation is, therefore, not to be given to a statute so as to impair existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure .unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. Before applying a statute retrospectively the Court has to be satisfied that the statute is in fact retrospective. The presumption against retrospective operation is strong in .cases in which the statute, if operated retrospectively, would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality of the past transactions, or impair contracts, or impose new duty or attach new disability in respect of past transactions or consideration already passed.

STATE OF HARYANA Vs. RAMA DIYA [All SC 1990 APRIL]

According to Section 433(A) that a prisoner who has been sentenced to death and whose death sentence has been commuted into one of imprisonment for life and persons who have been sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law should undergo actual imprisonment of 14 years in Jail. We are referring to Section 433(A) in this judgment only for a limited purpose of showing that after the introduction of this section, the life convicts falling within the purview of Section 433(A) has to undergo the mandatory minimum 14 years of actual imprisonment. It may be mentioned at this juncture that no one has got a vested right to claim premature release on the ground that he has suffered the minimum actual imprisonment as prescribed under Section 433(A) because a sentence of ‘imprisonment for life’ is incarceration until death, that is, for the remaining period of convicted prison’s actual life