Search results for ‘SC 1978

In absence of right to sue, the court must shoot down bogus litigation at the first hearing-SC

T. ARIVANDANDAM Vs. T.V. SATYAPAL AND ANOTHER – Rejection of Plaint – Under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clear drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it is the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X, C.P.C. An activist Judge is an answer to irresponsible lawsuits. The trial Courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Ch. XI) and must be triggered against them – SC [14-10-1977]

If property belongs to Government for acquisition of easementary right by prescription user of “30 years” is required.

It is settled principle of law that what has not been conferred in the plaint cannot be proved. Only right of easement by way of prescription has been pleaded, alleging that Plaintiff was using the land of Plot No. 164 for 20 years. It is pertinent to mention here that at the end of Section 15 of Indian Easement Act, 1882, which pertains to acquisition by prescription, it is specifically mentioned that if the property, over which a right is claimed, belongs to the Government, the word ’20 years’ shall be read as ’30 years’. As such, in respect of a Government land mere user for 20 years does not confer any easementary right by way of prescription to the Plaintiff, as he has nowhere pleaded that he used the land for 30 years or more.

Mithilesh Kumari & Anr vs Prem Behari Khare [All SC 1989 February]

A retrospective operation is, therefore, not to be given to a statute so as to impair existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure .unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. Before applying a statute retrospectively the Court has to be satisfied that the statute is in fact retrospective. The presumption against retrospective operation is strong in .cases in which the statute, if operated retrospectively, would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality of the past transactions, or impair contracts, or impose new duty or attach new disability in respect of past transactions or consideration already passed.

What is a substantial question of law- SC explained

What is a substantial question of law would certainly depend upon facts and circumstances of every case and if a question of law had been settled by the highest court of the country that question however important and difficult it may have been regarded in the past and however large may be its effect on any of the parties, would not be regarded as substantial question of law. In Raghunath Prasad v. Deputy Commissioner of Partabgarh [1927] 54 LA. 126 the Judicial Committee observed that a question of law to be considered a “substantial question of law” need not be one of general importance and it could be a substantial question “as between the parties”.

STATE OF HARYANA Vs. RAMA DIYA [All SC 1990 APRIL]

According to Section 433(A) that a prisoner who has been sentenced to death and whose death sentence has been commuted into one of imprisonment for life and persons who have been sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law should undergo actual imprisonment of 14 years in Jail. We are referring to Section 433(A) in this judgment only for a limited purpose of showing that after the introduction of this section, the life convicts falling within the purview of Section 433(A) has to undergo the mandatory minimum 14 years of actual imprisonment. It may be mentioned at this juncture that no one has got a vested right to claim premature release on the ground that he has suffered the minimum actual imprisonment as prescribed under Section 433(A) because a sentence of ‘imprisonment for life’ is incarceration until death, that is, for the remaining period of convicted prison’s actual life