The expression ‘tenant’ includes ‘a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour’. It thus includes, by express provision, a quondam tenant whose nexus with the property is continuance in possession. The fact that a decree or any other process extinguishes the tenancy under the general law of real property does not terminate the status of a tenant under the Act having regard to the carefully drawn inclusive clause. Even here, we may mention by way of contrast that Subudhi’s case (supra) related to a statute where the definition in Section 2(5) of that Act expressly included “any person against whom a suit for ejectment is pending in a court of competent jurisdiction” and more pertinent to the point specially excluded “a person against whom a decree or order for eviction has been made by such a court.
AIR 1980 SC 271 : (1980) 1 SCR 804 : (1980) 2 SCC 410 (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) D. G. Gouse and Co. (Agents) Pvt. Ltd. Appellant Versus State of Kerala and […]
KEYWORDS:-PAROLE AIR 1979 SC 1595 : (1980) 1 SCR 1 : (1979) 3 SCC 645 (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Dharambir and another Appellant Versus State of U.P. Respondent (Before : V. R. […]
KEYWORD:-PAROLE- HARD LABOUR- OUTDATED LEGISLATION AIR 1980 SC 1579 : (1980) 2 SCR 557 : (1980) 3 SCC 488 : (1980) CriLJ SC 1099 (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Sunil Batra Appellant Versus […]
Whether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
In case of the partition suit, all the parties are to be treated as plaintiffs. Even if any preliminary decree would have been passed by this court in this suit based on the said affidavit dated 15th October, 1985 under Order 20 Rule 18 read with sections 151 to 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, court has ample power to pass more than one preliminary decree or to modify the preliminary decree prior to passing of the final decree having regard to change of supervening circumstances.
M.V. ELISABETH AND OTHERS Vs. HARWAN INVESTMENT AND TRADING PVT. LTD., HANOEKAR HOUSE, SWATONTAPETH, VASCO-DE-GAMA, GOA
(1993) AIR(SCW) 177 : (1993) AIR(SC) 1014 : (1992) 2 JT 65 : (1992) 1 SCALE 490 : (1993) Sup2 SCC 433 : (1992) 1 SCR 1003 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION […]
NINTH SCHEDULE (Article 31B) 1. The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XXX of 1950). 2. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bombay Act LXVII of 1948). 3. The […]
[FIRST SCHEDULE] [Articles 1 and 4] THE STATES Name Territories 1. Andhra Pradesh [The territories specified in sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Andhra State Act, 1953, sub-section (1) of section […]
A mutt in Hindu Law is a judicial person capable of holding and vindicating legal rights, through the medium of human agency: SC
The property belonging to a math is in fact attached to the office of the mahant, and passed by inheritance to no one who does not fill the office. The head of […]
We may recall the well-known observations of Menon C. J., in Aldo Maria Patroni and Another Vs. E.C. Kesavan and Others, regarding the unique position of the head of an educational institution […]
If a party in Trial or appeal or revision dies and right to sue survives the L.Rs must be substituted otherwise suit shall be abated-SC
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ( Before : D. A. Desai, J; Baharul Islam, J ) BIBI RAHMANI KHATOON AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. HARKOO GOPE AND OTHERS — Respondent
Whereas suit was filed for recognition of right of easement and later on amendment sought in the plaint for introducing essential ingredients of easement – The amendment, if allowed at the appellate […]
School violence has been a persistent problem in the United States. For example, on January 29, 1979, a 16-year-old opened fire on Grover Cleveland Elementary School in San Diego, CA. She killed two adults […]
What is a substantial question of law would certainly depend upon facts and circumstances of every case and if a question of law had been settled by the highest court of the country that question however important and difficult it may have been regarded in the past and however large may be its effect on any of the parties, would not be regarded as substantial question of law. In Raghunath Prasad v. Deputy Commissioner of Partabgarh  54 LA. 126 the Judicial Committee observed that a question of law to be considered a “substantial question of law” need not be one of general importance and it could be a substantial question “as between the parties”.
JT 2011 (13) SC 319 : (2011) 13 SCALE 75 (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Shiv Shankar Singh Versus State of Bihar and Another (Before : B.S. Chauhan and T.S. Thakur, JJ.) Criminal […]
SCHEDULED BANKS UNDER RBI ACT Ajodhia Bank, Fyzabad, Allahabad Bank. American Express Banking Corp. American Express International Banking Corporation. Andhra Bank, Masulipatam. Bank of America, National Association. Bank of Baroda Bank of […]
According to Section 433(A) that a prisoner who has been sentenced to death and whose death sentence has been commuted into one of imprisonment for life and persons who have been sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law should undergo actual imprisonment of 14 years in Jail. We are referring to Section 433(A) in this judgment only for a limited purpose of showing that after the introduction of this section, the life convicts falling within the purview of Section 433(A) has to undergo the mandatory minimum 14 years of actual imprisonment. It may be mentioned at this juncture that no one has got a vested right to claim premature release on the ground that he has suffered the minimum actual imprisonment as prescribed under Section 433(A) because a sentence of ‘imprisonment for life’ is incarceration until death, that is, for the remaining period of convicted prison’s actual life
We are of the view that aforesaid directions are not consistent with the law laid down by the larger Bench in Mathew (supra). In Mathew (supra), the direction for consulting the opinion of another doctor before proceeding with criminal investigation was confined only in cases of criminal complaint and not in respect of cases before the Consumer Forum. The reason why the larger Bench in Mathew (supra) did not equate the two is obvious in view of the jurisprudential and conceptual difference between cases of negligence in civil and criminal matter. This has been elaborately discussed in Mathew (supra). This distinction has been accepted in the judgment of this Court in Malay Kumar Ganguly (supra) (See paras 133 and 180 at pages 274 and 284 of the report).
The apex court’s five-judge Constitution bench was unanimous in striking down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code dealing with the offence of adultery, holding it as manifestly arbitrary, archaic and violative of the rights to equality and equal opportunity to women