Search results for ‘SC 1981

If property belongs to Government for acquisition of easementary right by prescription user of “30 years” is required.

It is settled principle of law that what has not been conferred in the plaint cannot be proved. Only right of easement by way of prescription has been pleaded, alleging that Plaintiff was using the land of Plot No. 164 for 20 years. It is pertinent to mention here that at the end of Section 15 of Indian Easement Act, 1882, which pertains to acquisition by prescription, it is specifically mentioned that if the property, over which a right is claimed, belongs to the Government, the word ’20 years’ shall be read as ’30 years’. As such, in respect of a Government land mere user for 20 years does not confer any easementary right by way of prescription to the Plaintiff, as he has nowhere pleaded that he used the land for 30 years or more.


According to Section 433(A) that a prisoner who has been sentenced to death and whose death sentence has been commuted into one of imprisonment for life and persons who have been sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law should undergo actual imprisonment of 14 years in Jail. We are referring to Section 433(A) in this judgment only for a limited purpose of showing that after the introduction of this section, the life convicts falling within the purview of Section 433(A) has to undergo the mandatory minimum 14 years of actual imprisonment. It may be mentioned at this juncture that no one has got a vested right to claim premature release on the ground that he has suffered the minimum actual imprisonment as prescribed under Section 433(A) because a sentence of ‘imprisonment for life’ is incarceration until death, that is, for the remaining period of convicted prison’s actual life


We are of the view that aforesaid directions are not consistent with the law laid down by the larger Bench in Mathew (supra). In Mathew (supra), the direction for consulting the opinion of another doctor before proceeding with criminal investigation was confined only in cases of criminal complaint and not in respect of cases before the Consumer Forum. The reason why the larger Bench in Mathew (supra) did not equate the two is obvious in view of the jurisprudential and conceptual difference between cases of negligence in civil and criminal matter. This has been elaborately discussed in Mathew (supra). This distinction has been accepted in the judgment of this Court in Malay Kumar Ganguly (supra) (See paras 133 and 180 at pages 274 and 284 of the report).