Search results for ‘SC 1983

Sardar Sambhaji Angre vs H.H. Jyitiraditya M. Scindia And Ors [BHC] – 18/6/2019

In case of the partition suit, all the parties are to be treated as plaintiffs. Even if any preliminary decree would have been passed by this court in this suit based on the said affidavit dated 15th October, 1985 under Order 20 Rule 18 read with sections 151 to 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, court has ample power to pass more than one preliminary decree or to modify the preliminary decree prior to passing of the final decree having regard to change of supervening  circumstances.

No Government servant or a servant of public body can have any political ideology or philosophy in the discharge of his duties: RHC

No Government servant can claim to remain at particular place on a particular post and the Courts will not interfere with the order of transfer unless it can appear to it that the transfer power has been abused or that the transfer has been made for a collateral purpose with oblique motive and colourable exercise of power-RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT (JAIPUR BENCH)

A person aggrieved by the order of a Tribunal can challenge the findings by a writ petition before High Court: SC on Assam Citizenship Case

MAY 17, 2019.-Abdul Kuddus Vs. Union of India and Others – where the issue and question of nationality has already been determined under the 1964 Order, an appeal would not be maintainable under paragraph 8 of the Schedule to the 2003 Rules. The determination would be final and binding on the Registering Authority under the Schedule and the Local Registrar. Paragraph 8 does not envisage and provide for a second round of litigation before the same authority i.e. the Foreigners Tribunal constituted under the 1964 Order on and after preparation of the final list. Provisions of paragraph 8 of the Schedule to the 2003 Rules will apply when there has not been an earlier adjudication and decision by the Foreigners Tribunal.

Death of plaintiff shall not abate suit if decreed in a defamation suit, legal heirs shall be substituted- SC

MELEPURATH SANKUNNI EZHUTHASSAN  Vs. THEKITTIL GEOPALANKUTTY NAIR  – The position, however, is different where a suit for defamation has resulted in a decree in favour of the plaintiff because in such a case the cause of action has merged in the decree and the decretal debt forms part of his estate and the appeal from the decree by the defendant becomes a question of benefit or detriment to the estate of the plaintiff-respondent which his legal representatives is entitled to uphold and defend and is, therefore, entitled to be substituted in place of the deceased respondent-plaintiff. [ Supreme Court- 29-11-1985]

What is a substantial question of law- SC explained

What is a substantial question of law would certainly depend upon facts and circumstances of every case and if a question of law had been settled by the highest court of the country that question however important and difficult it may have been regarded in the past and however large may be its effect on any of the parties, would not be regarded as substantial question of law. In Raghunath Prasad v. Deputy Commissioner of Partabgarh [1927] 54 LA. 126 the Judicial Committee observed that a question of law to be considered a “substantial question of law” need not be one of general importance and it could be a substantial question “as between the parties”.

STATE OF HARYANA Vs. RAMA DIYA [All SC 1990 APRIL]

According to Section 433(A) that a prisoner who has been sentenced to death and whose death sentence has been commuted into one of imprisonment for life and persons who have been sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law should undergo actual imprisonment of 14 years in Jail. We are referring to Section 433(A) in this judgment only for a limited purpose of showing that after the introduction of this section, the life convicts falling within the purview of Section 433(A) has to undergo the mandatory minimum 14 years of actual imprisonment. It may be mentioned at this juncture that no one has got a vested right to claim premature release on the ground that he has suffered the minimum actual imprisonment as prescribed under Section 433(A) because a sentence of ‘imprisonment for life’ is incarceration until death, that is, for the remaining period of convicted prison’s actual life