Smt. Surinder Kaur Sandhu Versus Harbax Singh Sandhu and another [All SC 1984 APRIL]

The modern theory of conflict of Laws recognises and, in any event, prefers the jurisdiction of the State which has the most intimate contact with the issues arising in the case. The spouses in this case had made England their home where this boy was born to them. The father cannot deprive the English Court of its jurisdiction to decide upon his custody by removing him to India.… Read More Smt. Surinder Kaur Sandhu Versus Harbax Singh Sandhu and another [All SC 1984 APRIL]

Union of India and others Vs Dev Raj Gupta  and others [ALL SC 1990 OCTOBER]

Conversion of land in Delhi (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Union of India and others Versus Dev Raj Gupta  and others (Before: P. B. Sawant And K. Ramaswamy, JJ.) Civil Appeal No. 1996 of 1990, Decided on: 23-10-1990. Delhi Development Act, 1957—Section 7—Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976—Section 20(1). Judgment Sawant, J—This appeal raises some… Read More Union of India and others Vs Dev Raj Gupta  and others [ALL SC 1990 OCTOBER]

STATE OF HARYANA Vs. RAMA DIYA [All SC 1990 APRIL]

According to Section 433(A) that a prisoner who has been sentenced to death and whose death sentence has been commuted into one of imprisonment for life and persons who have been sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law should undergo actual imprisonment of 14 years in Jail. We are referring to Section 433(A) in this judgment only for a limited purpose of showing that after the introduction of this section, the life convicts falling within the purview of Section 433(A) has to undergo the mandatory minimum 14 years of actual imprisonment. It may be mentioned at this juncture that no one has got a vested right to claim premature release on the ground that he has suffered the minimum actual imprisonment as prescribed under Section 433(A) because a sentence of ‘imprisonment for life’ is incarceration until death, that is, for the remaining period of convicted prison’s actual life… Read More STATE OF HARYANA Vs. RAMA DIYA [All SC 1990 APRIL]

Gottumukkala Venkata Krishamraju Vs. Union of India & Ors. [ALL SC 2018 SEPTEMBER]

SEPTEMBER 07, 2018 : Ordinarily wherever the word ‘substitute’ or ‘substitution’ is used by the legislature, it has the effect of deleting the old provision and make the new provision operative. The process of substitution consists of two steps: first, the old rule is made to cease to exist and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in its place. The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all. No doubt, in certain situations, the Court having regard to the purport and object sought to be achieved by the Legislature may construe the word “substitution” as an “amendment” having a prospective effect.… Read More Gottumukkala Venkata Krishamraju Vs. Union of India & Ors. [ALL SC 2018 SEPTEMBER]

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS Vs. C.N. SAHASRANAMAN AND ORS [ALL SC 1986 APRIL]

The main question which needs determination is whether part of the scheme mentioned before introduced by the Reserve Bank of India is violative of guarantee of equality before law and of equal opportunity in public employment as enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The High Court noted that the point arose at the instance of three petitioners who were Grade II working at Nagpur branch of Reserve Bank ever since their employment which commenced somewhere between 1960 to 1965.… Read More RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS Vs. C.N. SAHASRANAMAN AND ORS [ALL SC 1986 APRIL]

Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. Vs. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice [ALL SC 2018 September]

September 6, 2018:-SECTION 377of IPC-Homosexuality-It is declared that insofar as Section 377 criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults (i.e. persons above the age of 18 years who are competent to consent) in private, is violative of Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. It is, however, clarified that such consent must be free consent,… Read More Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. Vs. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice [ALL SC 2018 September]

Suresh Kumar Koushal & Anr vs Naz Foundation & Ors [ALL SC 2013 DECEMBER]

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.10972 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.15436 of 2009) Suresh Kumar Koushal & Anr vs Naz Foundation & Ors Decided on: 11 December 2013 Bench: G.S. Singhvi, Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya JUDGMENT G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. These appeals are directed against order… Read More Suresh Kumar Koushal & Anr vs Naz Foundation & Ors [ALL SC 2013 DECEMBER]

State of West Bengal and ORS Vs  The Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and ORS [ ALL SC 2010 FEBRUARY]

It may not be out of place to mention that in so far as this Court is concerned, apart from Articles 32 and 142 which empower this Court to issue such directions, as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter, Article 144 of the Constitution also mandates all authorities, civil or judicial in the territory of India, to act in aid of the orders passed by this Court.… Read More State of West Bengal and ORS Vs  The Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and ORS [ ALL SC 2010 FEBRUARY]

Board Of Control For Cricket In vs Kochi Cricket Pvt Ltd And Etc [ALL SC

all cases where the Section 34 petition is filed after the commencement of the Amendment Act, and an application for stay having been made under Section 36 therein, will be governed by Section 34 as amended and Section 36 as substituted. But, what is to happen to Section 34 petitions that have been filed before the commencement of the Amendment Act, which were governed by Section 36 of the old Act? Would Section 36, as substituted, apply to such petitions? To answer this question, we have necessarily to decide on what is meant by “enforcement” in Section 36. On the one hand, it has been argued that “enforcement” is nothing but “execution”, and on the other hand, it has been argued that “enforcement” and “execution” are different concepts, “enforcement” being substantive and “execution” being procedural in nature.… Read More Board Of Control For Cricket In vs Kochi Cricket Pvt Ltd And Etc [ALL SC

Sarita Sharma Appellant Versus Sushil Sharma Respondent [ALL SC 2000 FEBRUARY]

It will not be proper to be guided entirely by the fact that the appellant Sarita had removed the children from U.S.A. despite the order of the Court of that country. So also, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the decree passed by the American Court though a relevant factor, cannot override the consideration of welfare of the minor children.… Read More Sarita Sharma Appellant Versus Sushil Sharma Respondent [ALL SC 2000 FEBRUARY]

How to ascertain continuing consent in a proceeding under Section 13B of Hindu Marriage Act

Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash (1991) 2 SCC 25, gives considerable guidance. 33. In Paragraph 8 of the said judgment, this Court summed up the requirement of Section 13B (1) as follows : “8. There are three other requirements in sub-section (1). They are : (i) They have… Read More How to ascertain continuing consent in a proceeding under Section 13B of Hindu Marriage Act