Search results for ‘SC 1986

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS Vs. C.N. SAHASRANAMAN AND ORS [ALL SC 1986 APRIL]

The main question which needs determination is whether part of the scheme mentioned before introduced by the Reserve Bank of India is violative of guarantee of equality before law and of equal opportunity in public employment as enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The High Court noted that the point arose at the instance of three petitioners who were Grade II working at Nagpur branch of Reserve Bank ever since their employment which commenced somewhere between 1960 to 1965.

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Publishing scurrilous and defamatory articles in newspaper is not the job of a journalist [BHC]

SHRI DNYANDEVRAO TATYRAV WAGHMODE Vs. ALLABAKSHA GULAB NADAF AND OTHERS – The role of the journalist is far more noble. The media is called the fourth estate. But this type of misuse of the fourth estate is really deplorable. Once upon a time, journalists like Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak used this media for awakening the conscience of the people during the British Raj and for social, political and other worthy causes. Right to information is a fundamental right of the people, but this type of yellow journalism has to be condemned and those who resort to this type of cheap publicity and those who use their newspaper for blowing their own trumpet or for condemning and defaming others should be condemned themselves by the people. Using temperate, restrained and sophisticated language, which is at the same time effective and reaches and touches the soul of those who read it, is the key of success in the field of journalism. There are very few, who are endowed with these qualities. Newspapers like ‘Janhit’ and ‘Agman’ may be small newspapers. They are being circulated in a small town. They should aim at providing necessary and correct information and news-items to the people, to make them literate and more informative, so that they become aware as to what is going on around them.

Death of plaintiff shall not abate suit if decreed in a defamation suit, legal heirs shall be substituted- SC

MELEPURATH SANKUNNI EZHUTHASSAN  Vs. THEKITTIL GEOPALANKUTTY NAIR  – The position, however, is different where a suit for defamation has resulted in a decree in favour of the plaintiff because in such a case the cause of action has merged in the decree and the decretal debt forms part of his estate and the appeal from the decree by the defendant becomes a question of benefit or detriment to the estate of the plaintiff-respondent which his legal representatives is entitled to uphold and defend and is, therefore, entitled to be substituted in place of the deceased respondent-plaintiff. [ Supreme Court- 29-11-1985]

Mithilesh Kumari & Anr vs Prem Behari Khare [All SC 1989 February]

A retrospective operation is, therefore, not to be given to a statute so as to impair existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure .unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. Before applying a statute retrospectively the Court has to be satisfied that the statute is in fact retrospective. The presumption against retrospective operation is strong in .cases in which the statute, if operated retrospectively, would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality of the past transactions, or impair contracts, or impose new duty or attach new disability in respect of past transactions or consideration already passed.

What is a substantial question of law- SC explained

What is a substantial question of law would certainly depend upon facts and circumstances of every case and if a question of law had been settled by the highest court of the country that question however important and difficult it may have been regarded in the past and however large may be its effect on any of the parties, would not be regarded as substantial question of law. In Raghunath Prasad v. Deputy Commissioner of Partabgarh [1927] 54 LA. 126 the Judicial Committee observed that a question of law to be considered a “substantial question of law” need not be one of general importance and it could be a substantial question “as between the parties”.

STATE OF HARYANA Vs. RAMA DIYA [All SC 1990 APRIL]

According to Section 433(A) that a prisoner who has been sentenced to death and whose death sentence has been commuted into one of imprisonment for life and persons who have been sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law should undergo actual imprisonment of 14 years in Jail. We are referring to Section 433(A) in this judgment only for a limited purpose of showing that after the introduction of this section, the life convicts falling within the purview of Section 433(A) has to undergo the mandatory minimum 14 years of actual imprisonment. It may be mentioned at this juncture that no one has got a vested right to claim premature release on the ground that he has suffered the minimum actual imprisonment as prescribed under Section 433(A) because a sentence of ‘imprisonment for life’ is incarceration until death, that is, for the remaining period of convicted prison’s actual life