A retrospective operation is, therefore, not to be given to a statute so as to impair existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure .unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. Before applying a statute retrospectively the Court has to be satisfied that the statute is in fact retrospective. The presumption against retrospective operation is strong in .cases in which the statute, if operated retrospectively, would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality of the past transactions, or impair contracts, or impose new duty or attach new disability in respect of past transactions or consideration already passed.
KEYWORDS:-Evidence by Affidavit- In the case of a living person evidence in judicial proceedings must be tendered by calling the witness to the witness stand and cannot be substituted by an affidavit […]
KEYWORDS:-Doing business on the pavements- DATE:- 30-08-1989- Street Trading being a fundamental right has to be made available to the citizens subject to Article 19(6) of the Constitution. AIR 1989 SC 1988 : […]
NINTH SCHEDULE (Article 31B) 1. The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XXX of 1950). 2. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bombay Act LXVII of 1948). 3. The […]
School violence has been a persistent problem in the United States. For example, on January 29, 1979, a 16-year-old opened fire on Grover Cleveland Elementary School in San Diego, CA. She killed two adults […]
What is a substantial question of law would certainly depend upon facts and circumstances of every case and if a question of law had been settled by the highest court of the country that question however important and difficult it may have been regarded in the past and however large may be its effect on any of the parties, would not be regarded as substantial question of law. In Raghunath Prasad v. Deputy Commissioner of Partabgarh [1927] 54 LA. 126 the Judicial Committee observed that a question of law to be considered a “substantial question of law” need not be one of general importance and it could be a substantial question “as between the parties”.
We are of the view that aforesaid directions are not consistent with the law laid down by the larger Bench in Mathew (supra). In Mathew (supra), the direction for consulting the opinion of another doctor before proceeding with criminal investigation was confined only in cases of criminal complaint and not in respect of cases before the Consumer Forum. The reason why the larger Bench in Mathew (supra) did not equate the two is obvious in view of the jurisprudential and conceptual difference between cases of negligence in civil and criminal matter. This has been elaborately discussed in Mathew (supra). This distinction has been accepted in the judgment of this Court in Malay Kumar Ganguly (supra) (See paras 133 and 180 at pages 274 and 284 of the report).
The apex court’s five-judge Constitution bench was unanimous in striking down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code dealing with the offence of adultery, holding it as manifestly arbitrary, archaic and violative of the rights to equality and equal opportunity to women
September 6, 2018:-SECTION 377of IPC-Homosexuality-It is declared that insofar as Section 377 criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults (i.e. persons above the age of 18 years who are competent to consent) in […]
September 04, 2018: ALTERNATIVE SENTENCE-In our considered opinion, firstly, taking into account that the appellant has already undergone one month’s jail sentence out of three months awarded to him, secondly, the fact that the incident in question is quite old and seems to have occurred at the spur of the moment, thirdly, the appellant has no criminal antecedent in his past life and lastly, he is not required in any other criminal case except the one in question which the appellant fairly did not deny having committed and rightly did not challenge his conviction, it is considered to be just and proper to alter the jail sentence awarded to the appellant from three months to the extent of period of one month which was already undergone by him and instead enhance the total fine amount awarded under different Sections from Rs.800/to Rs.15,000/-APPEAL PARTLY ALLOWED
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.10972 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.15436 of 2009) Suresh Kumar Koushal & Anr vs Naz Foundation & Ors Decided on: […]
It may not be out of place to mention that in so far as this Court is concerned, apart from Articles 32 and 142 which empower this Court to issue such directions, as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter, Article 144 of the Constitution also mandates all authorities, civil or judicial in the territory of India, to act in aid of the orders passed by this Court.
The question whether free and fair election is possible to be held or not has to be objectively assessed by the Election Commission by taking into consideration all relevant aspects. Efforts should be to hold the election and not to defer holding of election.
whether the dissolution of Assembly under Article 356(1) of the Constitution of India can be ordered to prevent the staking of claim by a political party on the ground that the majority has been obtained by illegal means.
In the writ petition, there is a further challenge to the amendments in Sections 59, 94 and 128 of the RP Act, 1951 by which Open Ballot System is introduced which, according to the petitioner, violates the principle of ‘secrecy’ which, according to the petitioner, is the essence of free and fair elections as also the voter’s freedom of expression which is the basic feature of the Constitution and the subject matter of the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
In order to exercise the discretion of reducing the sentence and statutory requirement is that the Court has to record ‘adequate and special reasons’ in the judgment and not fanciful reasons which would permit the Court to impose a sentence less than the prescribed minimum. The reason has not only to be adequate but special. What is adequate and special would depend upon several factors and no strait-jacket formula can be imposed.
all cases where the Section 34 petition is filed after the commencement of the Amendment Act, and an application for stay having been made under Section 36 therein, will be governed by Section 34 as amended and Section 36 as substituted. But, what is to happen to Section 34 petitions that have been filed before the commencement of the Amendment Act, which were governed by Section 36 of the old Act? Would Section 36, as substituted, apply to such petitions? To answer this question, we have necessarily to decide on what is meant by “enforcement” in Section 36. On the one hand, it has been argued that “enforcement” is nothing but “execution”, and on the other hand, it has been argued that “enforcement” and “execution” are different concepts, “enforcement” being substantive and “execution” being procedural in nature.
