It is a settled principle of law that in order to prove that the possession of any person in any immovable property is legal, it is necessary for such person to prove prima facie that he is either the owner of such property or is in possession as a lawful tenant or is in its permissive possession with the express consent of its true owner. Such is not the case here.
Death penalty Commuted to LI for non-availability of exceptionally heinous condition- “We find that a sentence of life imprisonment simpliciter would be inadequate for the appellant Swapan Kumar, as that includes the […]
Interpretation of Will-Whether taking into account the document in question and all the relevant facts into consideration it could be said that the donor intended to confer the right over the property […]
This Court held that a writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. It was further held that jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the High Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court.
MURDER-Acquittal of the accused. DATE: October 26, 2018. ACT: Section 148/149 read with Section 302 IPC SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Ramvir Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [Criminal Appeal No. 183 of 2013] Abhay Manohar […]
The apex court’s five-judge Constitution bench was unanimous in striking down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code dealing with the offence of adultery, holding it as manifestly arbitrary, archaic and violative of the rights to equality and equal opportunity to women
September 11, 2018-TITLE APPEAL-Keeping in view the scope and ambit of the powers of the High Court while deciding the second appeal when we advert to the facts of the case, we find that the High Court committed an error in allowing the defendants’ second appeal and further erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit by answering the substantial question of law. This we say for more than one reason.
First, mere perusal of the impugned order would go to show that the High Court had admitted the second appeal by framing only one substantial question of law, namely, whether the first Appellate Court was justified in dismissing the defendants’ first appeal by taking into consideration one earlier litigation in relation to the suit land, which was not between the same parties. The High Court held that the first Appellate Court was not justified because the earlier litigation was not between the present plaintiffs and the defendants but it was between the different parties and, therefore, any decision rendered in such litigation would not operate as res judicata in the present litigation between the parties. This resulted in allowing of the appeal and dismissing the suit.
Second, the High Court committed another error when it failed to frame any substantial question of law on the issue of the plaintiffs’ ownership over the suit land. So long as no substantial question of law was framed, the High Court had no jurisdiction to examine the said issue in its second appellate jurisdiction. In other words, the High Court having framed only one question, which did not pertain to issue of ownership of the suit land, had no jurisdiction to examine the issue of ownership. It was not permissible in the light of Section 100 (5) of the Code, which empowers the High Court to decide the appeal only on the question framed and not beyond it.
Third, the High Court could invoke its powers under proviso to subsection (5) of Section 100 and frame one or two additional questions, as the case may be, even at the time of hearing of the second appeal. It would have enabled the High Court to examine the issue of ownership of the suit land in its correct perspective. It was, however, not done by the High Court.
Fourth, the High Court, while examining the question framed, also cursorily touched the ownership issue which, in our opinion, the High Court could not have done for want of framing of any substantial question of law on the ownership issue. That apart, the High Court also failed to see that the issue of res judicata and the issue of ownership were independent issues and the decision on one would not have 14 answered the other one. In other words, both the issues had to be examined independent of each other on their respective merits. It was, however, possible only after framing of substantial questions on both the issues as provided under Section 100(4) and (5) of the Code. This was, however, not done in this case.
September 07, 2018 – Direct Recruitment-Supreme Court discussed the following issues for decision:
I Whether the Railways is bound by the rules framed by the DoPT or it can frame its own rules and whether the IREM has statutory force?
II Whether Shri R.K. Kushwaha, the direct recruit had laid challenge to the rules, which provide for giving weightage in the seniority to the promotee officers?
III Whether the findings of the CAT in respect of N.R. Parmar’s case (supra) was limited to removing the arbitrariness only in respect of ‘DITS’?
IV Whether by issuing the memorandum dated 05.03.2018 amendment/modifying rules 327341 the Railways have violated the order issued by the CAT?
I Whether the Railways is bound by the rules framed by the DoPT or it can frame its own rules and whether the IREM has statutory force?
SEPTEMBER 07, 2018 : Ordinarily wherever the word ‘substitute’ or ‘substitution’ is used by the legislature, it has the effect of deleting the old provision and make the new provision operative. The process of substitution consists of two steps: first, the old rule is made to cease to exist and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in its place. The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all. No doubt, in certain situations, the Court having regard to the purport and object sought to be achieved by the Legislature may construe the word “substitution” as an “amendment” having a prospective effect.
September 07, 2018: LAND ACQUISITION-Any act done by the parties in relation to the subject matter of the appeals after the impugned order, cannot be pressed into service to support the impugned order. In other words, the legality and correctness of the impugned order has to be examined in the light of reasoning contained in the impugned order and not on the basis of the acts done by the parties subsequent to the passing of impugned order. It is for this reason the acts done by the party subsequent to passing of the impugned order are of no relevance for deciding the present appeals. APPEAL ALLOWED.
