Burden of proof in election cases

“In our country, election is a fairly costly and expensive venture and the Representation of People Act has provided sufficient safeguards to make the elections fair and free. In these circumstances, therefore, election results cannot be lightly brushed aside in election disputes”.

Appreciation of evidence and burden of proof in election cases

Burden of proof resting on a person seeking a declaration of the voidness of election

It will be seen from the following decisions that it has been consistently laid down by the Supreme Court in a number of cases that burden of proof resting on a person seeking a declaration of voidness of election is very heavy in the sense that he is required to prove every charge of corrupt practice beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the burden to be discharged by the petitioner in a case is the same as the burden on the prosecution to prove a criminal charge.

The first decision, which was cited at the Bar in this connection was the decision in the case of D. Venkta Reddy v. R. Sultan and others (A.I.R. 1976 SC 1599), where in it is observed.

“In a democracy such as ours, the purity and sanctity of elections, the sacrosanct and sacred nature of the electoral process must be preserved and maintained. The valuable verdict of the people at the polls must be given due respect and candour and should not be disregarded or set at naught on vague, indefinite, frivolous or fanciful allegations or on evidence which is of a shaky or prevaricating character. It is well settled that the onus lies heavily on the election petitioner to make out a strong case for setting aside an election.

In our country, election is a fairly costly and expensive venture and the Representation of People Act has provided sufficient safeguards to make the elections fair and free. In these circumstances, therefore, election results cannot be lightly brushed aside in election disputes. At the same time, it is necessary to protect the purity and sobriety of the elections by ensuring that the candidates do not secure the valuable votes of the people by undue influence, fraud, communal propaganda, bribery or other corrupt practices as laid down in the Act.

Another principle that is equally well settled is that the election petitioner in order to succeed must plead all material particulars and prove them by clear and cogent evidence. The allegations of corrupt practices being in the nature of a quasi criminal charge the same must be proved beyond any shadow of doubt. Where the election petitioner seeks to prove charge by purely partisan evidence consisting of his workers, agents, supporters and friends, the Court would have to approach the evidence with great care and caution, scrutiny and circumspection and would, as a matter of prudence though not as a rule of law, require corroboration of such evidence from independent quarters, unless the Court is fully satisfied that the evidence is so credit-worthy and true, spotless and blemishless, cogent and consistent, that no corroboration to land further assurance is necessary.”

The Supreme Court in the case of Kanhaiyalal v. Mannalal & Ors. (A.I.R. 1976 SC 1886) reproduced with approval the following passage from the case of Rahimkhan v. Khurshid Ahmed (A.I.R. 1975 SC 290) dealing with the appreciation of oral testimony in election cases, namely.

“We must emphasise the danger of believing at its face value oral evidence in an election case without the backing of sure circumstances or indubitable documents. It must be remembered that corrupt practices may perhaps be proved by hiring half-a- dozen witnesses apparently respectable and dis-interested to speak to short of simple episodes such as that a small village meeting took place where the candidate accused his rival of personal vices. There is no X-ray whereby the dishonesty of the story can be established and, if the Court were gullible enough to qulp such oral versions and invalidate elections, a new meance to our electoral system would have been invented through the judicial apparatus. We regard it as extremely unsafe, in the present climate of kil-kenny cat election competitions and partisan witnesses wearing robes of veracity, to upturn a hard won electoral victory merely because lip service to a corrupt practice has been rendered by some sanctimonious witnesses. The court must look for serious assurance, unlying circumstances or unimpeachable documents to uphold grave charges of corrupt practices which might not merely cancel the election result, but extinguish many a man’s public life.”

In Amolak Chand Chhazad v. Bhagwandas Arya & Anr, (A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 813) also, it has been laid down that election petition alleging corrupt practice are proceedings of quasi-criminal nature and burden is on the person alleging corrupt practice to prove allegations beyond reasonable doubt.

Similarly, it is held in Rajendra Singh Yadav v. Chandra Sen & Ors. (A.I.R. 1979 SC 882) that it is well settled that allegation of corrupt practices have to be made and proved like a charge in a criminal case and that what is not pleaded cannot be allowed to be the subject matter of evidence, as also that the allegations must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and not merely by way of preponderance of probabilities. It is also pointed out in this case that it is not at all difficult for a defealted candidate to produce a few witnesses in support of allegations of corrupt practice after the event, even though the truth may be far different from what they state.

In the case of A. Younus Kunju v. R.S. Unit and others (A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 960), while reiterating the same position as to the onus of proof to be discharged by the election petitioner, the Supreme Court, has referring to the evidence before it pointed out,

“Admittedly, all these witnesses were the workers of the appellant. There is overwhelming material on the record, and even counsel fairly admitted, that the election was fought on party basis and there was sharp division of the electorate on the basis of political parties. That being the position, workers at the election with party alignment would necessarily be political supporters of the respective candidates and when called as witnesses, they would support their stand. Instances are not uncommon where such witnesses support their respective candidates and their cases even though the same be far from truth. In such circumstances, we do not think on the oral testimony of these four witnesses the charge of publication of objectional materials can be said to have been established.”

Of course in the two cases of Ram Sharan Yadav v. Thakur Muneshwar Nath Singh and others (A.I.R. 1985 SC 24) and S. Harcharan Singh v. S. Sajjan Singh and others (A.I.R. 1985 SC 236). The Supreme Court has sounded a note of caution by observing that there is no ritualistic formula nor a cut-and- driend test to lay down as to how a charge of undue influence can be proved, but if the circumstances taken together lead to the irresistible inference that the voters were pressurised, threatened or assaulted at the instance of either the candidate of his supports or agent with his consent or with his agent’s consent that should be sufficient to vitiate the election of the returned candidate. It is also pointed out that while insisting on standard of strict proof, the court should not extend or stretch this doctrine to such an extreme extent as to make it well-nigh impossible to prove an allegation of corrupt practice because such an approach would defeat and frustrate the very loudable and sacrosanct object of the Act in maintaining purity of the electoral process. This note of caution, however, does not in any way dilute the doctrine of insistence of proof beyond reasonable doubt in case of allegations of corrupt practice in an election petition.

It may be mentioned here that the above principle of having to insist on strict proof of allegations of corrupt practices are demanded.

Security Guidelines for Certifying Authorities

Cyber Crime,Cyber Security,Cyber Law

 Under Information Technology (Certifying Authorities) Rules, 2000

SCHEDULE-III

[See rule 19(2)]

Index

1. Introduction
2. Security Management
3. Physical controls – site location, construction and physical access 57
4. Media Storage
5. Waste Disposal
6. Off-site Backup
7. Change and Configuration Management
8. Network and Communications Security
9. System Security Audit Procedures
9.1 Types of event recorded
9.2 Frequency of Audit Log Monitoring
9.3 Retention Period for Audit Log
9.4 Protection of Audit Log
9.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures
9.6 Vulnerability Assessments
10. Records Archival
11. Compromise and Disaster Recovery
11.1 Computing Resources, Software and/or Data are Corrupted
11.2 Secure facility after a natural or other type of disaster
11.3 Incident Management Plan
12. Number of Persons required per task
13. Identification and Authentication for each role
14. Personnel Security Controls
15. Training Requirements
16. Retaining Frequency and Requirements
17. Documentation supplied to Personnel
18. Key Management
18.1 Generation
18.2 Distribution of keys
18.3 Storage
18.4 Usage
18.5 Certifying Authority’s Public Key Delivery to Users
19. Private Key Protection and Backup
20. Method of Destroying Private Key
21. Usage Periods for the Public and Private Keys
21.1 Key Change
21.2 Destruction
21.3 Key Compromise
22. Confidentiality of Subscriber’s Information

Security Guidelines for Certifying Authorities

1. Introduction

This document prescribes security guidelines for the management and operation of Certifying Authorities (CAs) and is aimed at protecting the integrity, confidentiality and availability of their services, data and systems. These guidelines apply to Certifying Authorities that perform all the functions associated with generation, issue and management of Digital Signature Certificate such as:
(1) Verification of registration, suspension and revocation request;
(2) Generation, issuance, suspension and revocation of Digital Signature Certificates; and
(3) Publication and archival of Digital Signature Certificates, suspension and revocation of information.

2. Security Management

The Certifying Authority shall define Information Technology security policies for its operation on the lines defined in Schedule-II and Schedule-III. The policy shall be communicated to all personnel and widely published throughout the organisation to ensure that the personnel follow the policies.

3. Physical controls – site location, construction and physical access
(1) The site location, design, construction and physical security of the operational site of Certifying Authority shall be in accordance with para 4 of the Information Technology Security Guidelines given at Schedule-II.
(2) Physical access to the operational site housing computer servers, PKI server, communications and network devices shall be controlled and restricted to the authorized individuals only in accordance with para 4.4 of the Information Technology Security Guidelines given at Schedule-II.

(3) A Certifying Authority must:
(i) ensure that the operational site housing PKI servers, communications and networks is protected with fire suppression system in accordance with para 4.2 of the Information Technology Security Guidelines given at Schedule-II.
(ii) ensure that power and air-conditioning facilities are installed in accordance with para 4.1 of the Information Technology Security Guidelines given at Schedule-II.
(iii) ensure that all removable media and papers containing sensitive or plain text information are listed, documented and stored in a container properly identified.
(iv) ensure unescorted access to Certifying Authority’s server is limited to those personnel identified on an access list.
(v) ensure that the exact location of Digital Signature Certification System shall not be publicly identified.
(vi) ensure that access security system is installed to control and audit access to the Digital Signature Certification System.
(vii) ensure that dual control over the inventory and access cards/keys are in place.
(viii) ensure that up-to-date list of personnel who possess the access cards/keys is maintained at the Certifying Authority’s operational site. Loss of access cards/keys shall be reported immediately to the Security Administrator; who shall take appropriate actions to prevent unauthorised access.
(ix) ensure personnel not on the access list are properly escorted and supervised.
(x) ensure a site access log is maintained at the Certifying Authority’s operational site and inspected periodically.
(4) Multi-tiered access mechanism must be installed at the Certifying Authority’s operational site. The facility should have clearly laid out security zones within its facility with well-defined access rights to each security zone. Each security zone must be separated from the other by floor to ceiling concrete reinforced walls. Alarm and intrusion detection system must be installed at every stage with adequate power backup capable of continuing operation even in the event of loss of main power. Electrical/Electronic circuits to external security alarm monitoring service (if used) must be supervised. No single person must have complete access to PKI Server, root keys or any computer system or network device on his/her own.
(5) Entrance to the main building where the Certifying Authority’s facilities such as Data Centre, PKI Server and Network devices are housed and entrance to each security zone must be video recorded round the clock. The recording should be carefully scrutinized and maintained for at least one year.
(6) A Certifying Authority site must be manually or electronically monitored for unauthorised intrusion at all times in accordance with the Information Technology Security Guidelines given at Schedule-II.
(7) Computer System/PKI Server performing Digital Signature Certification function shall be located in a dedicated room or partition to facilitate enforcement of physical access control. The entry and exit of the said room or partition shall be automatically locked with time stamps and shall be reviewed daily by the Security Administrator.
(8) Access to infrastructure components essential to operation of Certifying Authority such as power control panels, communication infrastructure, Digital Signature Certification system, cabling, etc. shall be restricted to authorised personnel.
(9) By-pass or deactivation of normal physical security arrangements shall be authorised and documented by security personnel.
(10) Intrusion detection systems shall be used to monitor and record physical access to the Digital Signature Certification system during and after office hours.
(11) Computer System or PKI Server performing the Digital Signature Certification functions shall be dedicated to those functions and should not be used for any other purposes.
(12) System software shall be verified for integrity in accordance with para 15 of the Information Technology Security Guidelines given at Schedule-II.

4. Media Storage
A Certifying Authority must ensure that storage media used by his system are protected from environment threats such as temperature, humidity and magnetic and are transported and managed in accordance with para 8.3 and para 8.4 of the Information Technology Security Guidelines given at Schedule-II.

5. Waste Disposal
All media used for storage of information pertaining to all functions associated with generation, production, issue and management of Digital Signature Certificate shall be scrutinized before being destroyed or released for disposal.

6. Off-site Backup
A Certifying Authority must ensure that facility used for off-site backup, if any, shall be within the country and shall have the same level of security as the primary Certifying Authority site.

7. Change and Configuration Management
(1) The components of the Certifying Authority infrastructure (e.g. cryptographic algorithm and its key parameters, operating system, system software, computer system, PKI server, firewalls, physical security, system security etc.) shall be reviewed every year for new technology risks and appropriate action plan shall be developed to manage the risks identified for each component.
(2) The application software, system software and hardware, which are procured from questionable sources, shall not be installed and used for any function associated with generation and management of Digital Signature Certificate.
(3) Software updates and patches shall be reviewed for security implications before being implemented on Certifying Authority’s system.
(4) Software updates and patches to rectify security vulnerability in critical systems used for Certifying Authority’s operation shall be promptly reviewed and implemented.
(5) Information on the software updates and patches and their implementation on Certifying Authority’s system shall be clearly and properly documented.

8. Network and Communications Security
(1) Certifying Authority’s systems shall be protected to ensure network access control to critical systems and services from other systems in accordance with para 17, para 18, para 19 and para 20 of the Information Technology Security Guidelines given at Schedule-II.
(2) Network connections from the Certifying Authority’s system to external networks shall be restricted to only those connections which are essential to facilitate Certifying Authority’s functional processes and services. Such network connections to the external network shall be properly secured and monitored regularly.
(3) Network connections should be initiated by the systems performing the functions of generation and management of Digital Signature Certificate to connect those systems performing the registration and repository functions but not vice versa. If this is not possible, compensating controls (e.g. use of proxy servers) shall be implemented to protect the systems performing the function of generation and management of Digital Signature Certificate from potential attacks.
(4) Systems performing the Digital Signature Certification function should be isolated to minimise their exposure to attempts to compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the certification function.
(5) Communication between the Certifying Authority systems connected on a network shall be secure to ensure confidentiality and integrity of the information. For example, communications between the Certifying Authority’s systems connected on a network should be encrypted and digitally signed.
(6) Intrusion detection tools should be deployed to monitor critical networks and perimeter networks and alert administrators of network intrusions and penetration attempts in a timely manner.

9. System Security Audit Procedures

9.1 Types of event recorded

(1) The Certifying Authority shall maintain record of all events relating to the security of his system. The records should be maintained in audit log file and shall include such events as:
(i) System start-up and shutdown;
(ii) Certifying Authority’s application start-up and shutdown;
(iii) Attempts to create, remove, set passwords or change the system privileges of the PKI Master Officer, PKI Officer, or PKI Administrator;
(iv) Changes to keys of the Certifying Authority or any of his other details;
(v) Changes to Digital Signature Certificate creation policies, e.g. validity period;
(vi) Login and logoff attempts;
(vii) Unauthorised attempts at network access to the Certifying Authority’s system;
(viii) Unauthorised attempts to access system files;
(ix) Generation of own keys;
(x) Creation and revocation of Digital Signature Certificates;
(xi) Attempts to initialize remove, enable, and disable subscribers, and update and recover their keys;
(xii) Failed read-and-write operations on the Digital Signature Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) directory.
(2) Monitoring and Audit Logs
(i) A Certifying Authority should consider the use of automated security management and monitoring tools providing an integrated view of the security situation at any point in time.

Records of the following application transactions shall be maintained:
(a) Registration;
(b) Certification;
(c) Publication;
(d) Suspension; and
(e) Revocation.
(ii) Records and log files shall be reviewed regularly for the following activities:
(a) Misuse;
(b) Errors;
(c) Security violations;
(d) Execution of privileged functions;
(e) Change in access control lists;
(f) Change in system configuration.
(3) All logs, whether maintained through electronic or manual means, should contain the date and time of the event, and the identity of the subscriber/subordinate/entity which caused the event.
(4) A Certifying Authority should also collect and consolidate, either electronically or manually, security information which may not be generated by his system, such as:
(i) Physical access logs;
(ii) System configuration changes and maintenance;
(iii) Personnel changes;
(iv) Discrepancy and compromise reports;
(v) Records of the destruction of media containing key material, activation data, or personal subscriber information.
(5) To facilitate decision-making, all agreements and correspondence relating to services provided by Certifying Authority should be collected and consolidated, either electronically or manually, at a single location.

9.2 Frequency of Audit Log Monitoring
The Certifying Authority must ensure that its audit logs are reviewed by its personnel at least once every two weeks and all significant events are detailed in an audit log summary. Such reviews should involve verifying that the log has not been tampered with, and then briefly inspecting all log entries, with a more thorough investigation of any alerts or irregularities in the logs. Action taken following these reviews must be documented.

9.3 Retention Period for Audit Log
The Certifying Authority must retain its audit logs onsite for at least twelve months and subsequently retain them in the manner described in para 10 of the Information Technology Security Guidelines as given in Schedule-II.

9.4 Protection of Audit Log
The electronic audit log system must include mechanisms to protect the log files from unauthorized viewing, modification, and deletion.
Manual audit information must be protected from unauthorised viewing, modification and destruction.

9.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures
Audit logs and audit summaries must be backed up or copied if in manual form.

9.6 Vulnerability Assessments
Events in the audit process are logged, in part, to monitor system vulnerabilities. The Certifying Authority must ensure that a vulnerability assessment is performed, reviewed and revised, if necessary, following an examination of these monitored events.

10. Records Archival
(1) Digital Signature Certificates stored and generated by the Certifying Authority must be retained for at least seven year after the date of its expiration. This requirement does not include the backup of private signature keys.
(2) Audit information as detailed in para 9, subscriber agreements, verification, identification and authentication information in respect of subscriber shall be retained for at least seven years.
(3) A second copy of all information retained or backed up must be stored at three locations within the country including the Certifying Authority site and must be protected either by physical security alone, or a combination of physical and cryptographic protection. These secondary sites must provide adequate protection from environmental threats such as temperature, humidity and magnetism. The secondary site should be reachable in few hours.
(4) All information pertaining to Certifying Authority’s operation, Subscriber’s application, verification, identification, authentication and Subscriber agreement shall be stored within the country. This information shall be taken out of the country only with the permission of Controller and where a properly constitutional warrant or such other legally enforceable document is produced.
(5) The Certifying Authority should verify the integrity of the backups at least once every six months.
(6) Information stored off-site must be periodically verified for data integrity.

11. Compromise and Disaster Recovery
11.1 Computing Resources, Software and/or Data are Corrupted
The Certifying Authority must establish business continuity procedures that outline the steps to be taken in the event of the corruption or loss of computing and networking resources, nominated website, repository, software and/or data. Where a repository is not under the control of the Certifying Authority, the Certifying Authority must ensure that any agreement with the repository provides for business continuity procedures.

11.2 Secure facility after a natural or other type of disaster
The Certifying Authority must establish a disaster recovery plan outlining the steps to be taken to re-establish a secure facility in the event of a natural or other type of disaster. Where a repository is not under the control of the Certifying Authority, the Certifying Authority must ensure that any agreement with the repository provides that a disaster recovery plan be established and documented by the repository.

11.3 Incident Management Plan
An incident management plan shall be developed and approved by the management. The plan shall include the following areas:
(i) Certifying Authority’s certification key compromise;
(ii) Hacking of systems and network;
(iii) Breach of physical security;
(iv) Infrastructure availability;
(v) Fraudulent registration and generation of Digital Signature Certificates; and
(vi) Digital Signature Certificate suspension and revocation information.

An incident response action plan shall be established to ensure the readiness of the Certifying Authority to respond to incidents.

The plan should include the following areas:

(i) Compromise control;
(ii) Notification to user community; (if applicable)
(iii) Revocation of affected Digital Signature Certificates; (if applicable)
(iv) Responsibilities of personnel handling incidents;
(v) Investigation of service disruption;
(vi) Service restoration procedure;
(vii) Monitoring and audit trail analysis; and
(viii) Media and public relations.

12. Number of Persons Required Per Task
The Certifying Authority must ensure that no single individual may gain access to the Digital Signature Certificate server and the computer server maintaining all information associated with generation, issue and management of Digital Signature Certificate and private keys of the Certifying Authority. Minimum two individuals, preferably using a split-knowledge technique, such as twin passwords, must perform any operation associated with generation, issue and management of Digital Signature Certificate and application of private key of the Certifying Authority.

13. Identification and Authentication for Each Role
All Certifying Authority personnel must have their identity and authorization verified before they are:
(i) included in the access list for the Certifying Authority’s site;
(ii) included in the access list for physical access to the Certifying Authority’s system;
(iii) given a certificate for the performance of their Certifying Authority role;
(iv) given an account on the PKI system.

Each of these certificates and accounts (with the exception of Certifying Authority’s signing certificates) must:
(i) be directly attributable to an individual;
(ii) not be shared;
(iii) be restricted to actions authorized for that role; and
(iv) procedural controls.

Certifying Authority’s operations must be secured using techniques of authentication and encryption, when accessed across-a shared network.

14. Personnel Security Controls
The Certifying Authority must ensure that all personnel performing duties with respect to its operation must:
(i) be appointed in writing;
(ii) be bound by contract or statute to the terms and conditions of the position they are to fill;
(iii) have received comprehensive training with respect to the duties they are to perform;
(iv) be bound by statute or contract not to disclose sensitive Certifying Authority’s security related information or subscriber information;
(v) not be assigned duties that may cause a conflict of interest with their Certifying Authority’s duties; and
(vi) be aware and trained in the relevant aspects of the Information Technology Security Policy and Security Guidelines framed for carrying out Certifying Authority’s operation.

15. Training Requirements
A Certifying Authority shall ensure that all personnel performing duties with respect to its operation, must receive comprehensive training in:
(i) relevant aspects of the Information Technology Security Policy and Security Guidelines framed by the Certifying Authority;
(ii) all PKI software versions in use on the Certifying Authority’s system;
(iii) all PKI duties they are expected to perform; and
(iv) disaster recovery and business continuity procedures.

16. Retraining Frequency and Requirements
The requirements of para 15 must be kept current to accommodate changes in the Certifying Authority’s system. Refresher training must be conducted as and when required, and the Certifying Authority must review these requirements at least once a year.

17. Documentation Supplied to Personnel
A Certifying Authority must make available to his personnel the Digital Signature Certificate policies it supports, its Certification Practice Statement, Information Technology Security Policy and any specific statutes, policies or contracts relevant to their position.

18. Key Management

18.1 Generation

(1) The subscriber’s key pair shall be generated by the subscriber or on a key generation system in the presence of the subscriber.
(2) The key generation process shall generate statistically random key values that are resistant to known attacks.

18.1 Distribution of Keys
Keys shall be transferred from the key generation system to the storage device (if the keys are not stored on the key generation system) using a secure mechanism that ensures confidentiality and integrity.

18.2 Storage

(1) Certifying Authority’s keys shall be stored in tamper-resistant devices and can only be activated under split-control by parties who are not involved in the set-up and maintenance of the systems and operations of the Certifying Authority. The key of the Certifying Authority may be stored in a tamper-resistant cryptographic module or split into sub-keys stored in tamper-resistant devices under the custody of the key custodians.
(2) The Certifying Authority’s key custodians shall ensure that the Certifying Authority’s key component or the activation code is always under his sole custody. Change of key custodians shall be approved by the Certifying Authority’s management and documented.

18.3 Usage

(1) A system and software integrity check shall be performed prior to Certifying Authority’s key loading.
(2) Custody of and access to the Certifying Authority’s keys shall be under split control. In particular, Certifying Authority’s key loading shall be performed under split control.

18.5 Certifying Authority’s Public Key Delivery to Users
The Certifying Authority’s public verification key must be delivered to the prospective Digital Signature Certificate holder in an on-line transaction in accordance with PKIX-3 Certificate Management Protocol, or via an equally secure manner.

19. Private Key Protection and Backup
(1) The Certifying Authority must protect its private keys from disclosure.
(2) The Certifying Authority must back-up its private keys. Backed-up keys must be stored in encrypted form and protected at a level no lower than those followed for storing the primary version of the key.
(3) The Certifying Authority’s private key backups should be stored in a secure storage facility, away from where the original key is stored.

20. Method of Destroying Private Key
Upon termination of use of a private key, all copies of the private key in computer memory and shared disk space must be securely destroyed by over-writing. Private key destruction procedures must be described in the Certification Practice Statement or other publicly available document.

21. Usage Periods for the Public and Private Keys
21.1 Key Change

(1) Certifying Authority and Subscriber keys shall be changed periodically.
(2) Key change shall be processed as per Key Generation guidelines.
(3) The Certifying Authority shall provide reasonable notice to the Subscriber’s relying parties of any change to a new key pair used by the Certifying Authority to sign Digital Signature Certificates.
(4) The Certifying Authority shall define its key change process that ensures reliability of the process by showing how the generation of key interlocks – such as signing a hash of the new key with the old key.

All keys must have validity periods of no more than five years.
Suggested validity period:
(a) Certifying Authority’s root keys and associated certificates – five years;
(b) Certifying Authority’s private signing key – two years;
( c) Subscriber Digital Signature Certificate key – three years;
(d) Subscriber private key – three years.
Use of particular key lengths should be determined in accordance with departmental Threat-Risk Assessments.

21.2 Destruction

Upon termination of use of a Certifying Authority signature private key, all components of the private key and all its backup copies shall be securely destroyed.

21.3 Key Compromise

(1) A procedure shall be pre-established to handle cases where a compromise of the Certifying Authority’s Digital Signature private key has occurred. In such case, the Certifying Authority shall immediately revoke all affected Subscriber Digital Signature Certificates.
(2) The Certifying Authority should immediately revoke the affected keys and Digital Signature Certificates in the case of Subscriber private key compromise.
(3) The Certifying Authority’s public keys shall be archived permanently to facilitate audit or investigation requirements.
(4) Archives of Certifying Authority’s public keys shall be protected from unauthorised modification.

22. Confidentiality of Subscriber’s Information

(1) Procedures and security controls to protect the privacy and confidentiality of the subscribers’ data under the Certifying Authority’s custody shall be implemented. Confidential information provided by the subscriber must not be disclosed to a third party without the subscribers’ consent, unless the information is required to be disclosed under the law or a court order.
(2) Data on the usage of the Digital Signature Certificates by the subscribers and other transactional data relating to the subscribers’ activities generated by the Certifying Authority in the course of its operation shall be protected to ensure the subscribers’ privacy.
(3) A secure communication channel between the Certifying Authority and its subscribers shall be established to ensure the authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of the exchanges (e.g. transmission of Digital Signature Certificate, password, private key) during the Digital Signature Certificate issuance process.


 

Yashwant Sinha & Ors. Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation through its Director & ANR – 10/04/2019

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA JUDGMENTS

Under the common law both in England and in India the context for material being considered by the court is relevancy. There can be no dispute that the manner in which evidence is got namely that it was procured in an illegal manner would not ordinarily be very significant in itself in regard to the courts decision to act upon the same. Documents which are improperly obtained and which are subject to a claim for privilege, undoubtedly the ordinary rule of relevancy alone may not suffice as larger public interest may warrant in a given case refusing to legitimise what is forbidden on grounds of overriding public interest.

DATE:- April 10, 2019

ACTS:-Sections 3 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923

BENCH:- CJI. RANJAN GOGOI, J. SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. K.M. JOSEPH

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Yashwant Sinha & Ors. Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation through its Director & ANR.

[Review Petition (Criminal) No. 46 of 2019]

[Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 298 of 2018]

[M.A.No. 58/2019 In W.P. (CRL.) 225/2018 R.P. (CRL.) No. 122/2019 In W.P. (Crl.) 297/2018]

[M.A. No. 403/2019]

[W.P. (CRL.) No. 298/2018 R.P.(C) No. 719/2019 In W.P.(C) 1205/2018]

RANJAN GOGOI, CJI

1. A preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the review petition has been raised by the Attorney General on behalf of the respondents. The learned Attorney General contends that the review petition lacks in bona fides inasmuch as three documents unauthorizedly removed from the office of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, have been appended to the review petition and relied upon by the review petitioners.

The three documents in question are:

(a) An eightpage note written by three members of the Indian Negotiating Team (‘INT’) charged in reference to the Rafale Deal (note dated 01.06.2016)

(b) Note of the Ministry of Defence (Government of India), F.No. AirHQ/S/96380/3/ASR PCXXVI (Marked Secret under the Official Secrets Act) (c) Note10 written by S.K. Sharma (Deputy Secretary, MoD, AirIII), Note dated 24.11.2015 (Marked Secret under the Official Secrets Act)

2. It is contented that the alleged unauthorized removal of the documents from the custody of the competent authority of the Government of India and the use thereof to support the pleas urged in the review petition is in violation of the provisions of Sections 3 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923. It is further contended that the documents cannot be accessed under the Right to Information Act in view of the provisions contained in Section 8(1)(a) of the said Act. Additionally, the provisions contained in Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 have been pressed into service and privilege has been claimed so as to bar their disclosure in the public domain. Section 3, 5(1) of the Official Secrets Act; Section 8(1)(a) and 8(2) of the Right to Information Act and Section 123 of the Evidence Act on which the learned Attorney has relied upon is extracted below.

3. Penalties for spying.

(1) If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State –

(a) approaches, inspects, passes over or is in the vicinity of, or enters, any prohibited place; or

(b) makes any sketch, plan, model or note which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly, useful to any enemy; or

(c) obtains, collects, records or publishes or communicates to any other person any secret official code or password, or any sketch, plan, model, article or note or other document or information which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be, directly or indirectly, useful to an enemy or which relates to a matter the disclosure of which is likely to affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State or friendly relations with foreign States:

he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend, where the offence is committed in relation to any work of defence, arsenal, naval, military or air force establishment or station, mine, minefield, factory, dockyard, camp, ship or aircraft or otherwise in relation to the naval, military or air force affairs of Government or in relation to any secret official code, to fourteen years and in other cases to three years.

(2) On a prosecution for an offence punishable under this section it shall not be necessary to show that the accused person was guilty of any particular act tending to show a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, and, notwithstanding that no such act is proved against him, he may be convicted if, from the circumstances of the case or his conduct or his known character as proved, it appears that his purpose was a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State; and if any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information relating to or used in any prohibited place, or relating to anything in such a place, or any secret official code or password is made, obtained, collected, recorded, published or communicated by any person other than a person acting under lawful authority, and from the circumstances of the case or his conduct or his known character as proved it appears that his purpose was a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, such sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, information, code or password shall be presumed to have been made, obtained, collected, recorded, published or communicated for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State.

5. Wrongful communication, etc., of information.

(1) If any person having in his possession or control any secret official code or password or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information which relates to or is used in a prohibited place or relates to anything in such a place, or which is likely to assist, directly or indirectly, an enemy or which relates to a matter the disclosure of which is likely to affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State or friendly relations with foreign States or which has been made or obtained in contravention of this Act, or which has been entrusted in confidence to him by any person 5 holding office under Government, or which he has obtained or to which he has had access owing to his position as a person who holds or has held a contract made on behalf of Government, or as a person who is or has been employed under a person who holds or has held such an office or contract

(a) willfully communicates the code or password, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information to any person other than a person to whom he is authorized to communicate it, or a Court of Justice or a person to whom it is, in the interests of the State, his duty to communicate it; or

(b) uses the information in his possession for the benefit of any foreign power or in any other manner prejudicial to the safety of the State; or

(c) retains the sketch, plan, model, article, note or document in his possession or control when he has no right to retain it, or when it is contrary to his duty to retain it, or willfully fails to comply with all directions issued by lawful authority with regard to the return or disposal thereof; or (d) fails to take reasonable care of, or so conducts himself as to endanger the safety of the sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, secret official code or password or information; He shall be guilty of an offence under this section.

(2) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(3) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

8. Exemption from disclosure of information. –

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation to give any citizen,

(a) information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offence;

(b) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(c) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(d) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(e) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(f) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(g) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(h) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(i) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

Provided that the information which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923) nor any of the exemptions permissible in accordance with subsection (1), a public authority may allow access to information, if public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests.

(3) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

Provided that where any question arises as to the date from which the said period of twenty years has to be computed, the decision of the Central Government shall be final, subject to the usual appeals provided for in this Act.

123. Evidence as to affairs of State. No one shall be permitted to give any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or withhold such permission as he thinks fit.

3. The three documents which are the subject matter of the present controversy, admittedly, was published in ‘The Hindu’ newspaper on different dates in the month of February, 2019. One of the documents i.e. Note18 of the Ministry of Defence was also published in ‘The Wire’ a member of the Digital Print Media.

4. The fact that the three documents had been published in the Hindu and were thus available in the public domain has not been seriously disputed or contested by the respondents. No question has been raised and, in our considered opinion, very rightly, with regard to the publication of the documents in ‘The Hindu’ newspaper. The right of such publication would seem to be in consonance with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.

No law enacted by Parliament specifically barring or prohibiting the publication of such documents on any of the grounds mentioned in Article 19(2) of the Constitution has been brought to our notice. In fact, the publication of the said documents in ‘The Hindu’ newspaper reminds the Court of the consistent views of this Court upholding the freedom of the press in a long line of decisions commencing from Romesh Thappar vs. State of Madras 1 and Brij Bhushan vs. The State of Delhi 2. Though not in issue, the present could very well be an appropriate occasion to recall the views expressed by this Court from time to time. Illustratively and only because of its comprehensiveness the following observations in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Limited vs.Union of India may be extracted:

“The freedom of press, as one of the members of the Constituent Assembly said, is one of the items around which the greatest and the bitterest of constitutional struggles have been waged in all countries where liberal constitutions prevail. The said freedom is attained at considerable sacrifice and suffering and ultimately it has come to be incorporated in the various written constitutions. James Madison when he offered the Bill of Rights to the Congress in 1789 is reported as having said: “The right of freedom of speech is secured, the liberty of the press is expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this Government” (See, 1 Annals of Congress (178996) p. 141).

Even where there are no written constitutions, there are well established constitutional conventions or judicial pronouncements securing the said freedom for the people. The basic documents of the United Nations and of some other international bodies to which reference will be made hereafter give prominence to the said right. The leaders of the Indian independence movement attached special significance to the freedom of speech and expression which included freedom of press apart from other freedoms. During their struggle for freedom, they were moved by the American Bill of Rights containing the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America which guaranteed the freedom of the press. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in his historic resolution containing the aims and objects of the Constitution to be enacted by the Constituent Assembly said that the Constitution should guarantee and secure to all the people of India among others freedom of thought and expression.

He also stated elsewhere that “I would rather have a completely free press with all the dangers involved in the wrong use of that freedom than a suppressed or regulated press” [See, D. R Mankekar: The Press under Pressure (1973) p. 25]. The Constituent Assembly and its various committees and subcommittees considered freedom of speech and expression which included freedom of press also as a precious right. The Preamble to the Constitution says that it is intended to secure to all citizens among others liberty of thought expression, and 10 belief. In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras 4 and Brij Bhushan v. The State of Delh i5, this Court firmly expressed its view that there could not be any kind of restriction on the freedom of speech and expression other than those mentioned in Article 19(2) and thereby made it clear that there could not be any interference with that freedom in the name of public interest.

Even when clause (2) of Article 19 was subsequently substituted under the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, by a new clause which permitted the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality in relation to contempt of Court defamation or incitement to an offence, Parliament did not choose to include a clause enabling the imposition of reasonable restrictions in the, public interest.”

A later view equally eloquent expressed by this Court in Printers (Mysore) Limited vs. Assistant Commercial Tax Officer 6 may also be usefully recapitulated. “Freedom of press has always been a cherished right in all democratic countries. The newspapers not only purvey news but also ideas, opinions and ideologies besides much else. They are supposed to guard public interest by bringing to fore the misdeeds, failings and lapses of the government and other bodies exercising governing power. Rightly, therefore, it has been described as the Fourth Estate. The democratic credentials of a State is judged today by the extent of freedom the press enjoys in that State. According to Justice Douglas (An Almanac of Liberty) “acceptance by government of a dissident press is a measure of the maturity of the nation”.

The learned Judge observed in Terminiello v. Chicago, (1949) 93 L.Edn. 1131., that “a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effect as it presses for acceptance of an idea. …There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardisation of ideas either by legislatures, courts, “or dominant political or community ground”.

The said observations were of course made with reference to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which expressly guarantees freedom of press but they are no less relevant in the India context; subject, of course, to clause (2) of Article 19 of our Constitution. We may be pardoned for quoting another passage from Hughese, C.J., in De Jonge v. State of Oregon, (1937) 299 U.S. 353, to emphasise the fundamental significance of free speech.

The learned Chief Justice said: “the greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, ferrets and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political 12 discussion, to the end that Government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.”

It is true that very often the press, whether out of commercial reason or excessive competition, descends to undesirable levels and may cause positive public mischief but the difficulty lies in the fact, recognised by Thomas Jefferson, that this freedom “cannot be limited without being lost”. Thomas Jefferson said, “it is, however, an evil for which there is no remedy; our liberty depends on the freedom of the press and that cannot be limited without being lost”. (In a letter to Dr. J. Currie, 1786). It is evident that “an able, disinterested, publicspirited press, with trained intelligence to know the right and courage to do it, can preserve that public virtue without which popular government is a sham and a mockery.

A cynical, mercenary, demagogic press will produce in time a people as base as itself. The power to mould the future of the Republic will be in the hands of the journalism of future generations”, as stated by Joseph Pulitzer.”

5. The above views of the Supreme Court of India on the issue of the freedom of the press has been echoed by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York Times Company vs. United States 7 wherein Marshall, J. refused to recognize a right in the executive government to seek a restraint order or publication of certain papers titled “Pentagon Papers” primarily on the ground that the first Amendment guaranteed freedom of the press and 18 U.S. Code § 793 did not contemplate any restriction on publication of items or materials specified in the said Code. By a majority of 6:3 the U.S. Supreme Court declined to pass prohibitory orders on publication of the “Pentagon Papers” on the ground that the Congress itself not having vested any such power in the executive, which it could have so done, the courts cannot carve out such a jurisdiction as the same may amount to unauthorized judicial law making thereby violating the sacred doctrine of separation of powers.

We do not see how and why the above principle of law will not apply to the facts of the present case. There is no provision in the Official Secrets Act and no such provision in any other statute has been brought to our notice by which Parliament has vested any power in the executive arm of the government either to restrain publication of documents marked as secret or from placing such documents before a Court of Law which may have been called upon to adjudicate a legal issue concerning the parties.

6. Insofar as the claim of privilege is concerned, on the very face of it, Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 relates to unpublished public records. As already noticed, the three documents have been published in different editions of ‘The Hindu’ newspaper. That apart, as held in S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India a claim of immunity against disclosure under Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act has to be essentially adjudged on the touchstone of public interest and to satisfy itself that public interest is not put to jeopardy by requiring disclosure the Court may even inspect the document in question though the said power has to be sparingly exercised.

Such an exercise, however, would not be necessary in the present case as the document(s) being in public domain and within the reach and knowledge of the entire citizenry, a practical and common sense approach would lead to the obvious conclusion that it would be a meaningless and an exercise in utter futility for the Court to refrain from reading and considering the said document or from shutting out its evidentiary worth and value. As the claim of immunity under Section 123 of the Indian Evidence 8 AIR 1982 SC, 149 15 Act is plainly not tenable, we do not consider it necessary to delve into the matter any further.

7. An issue has been raised by the learned Attorney with regard to the manner in which the three documents in question had been procured and placed before the Court. In this regard, as already noticed, the documents have been published in ‘The Hindu’ newspaper on different dates. That apart, even assuming that the documents have not been procured in a proper manner should the same be shut out of consideration by the Court? In Pooran Mal vs. Director of Inspection (Investigation) of Income Tax, New Delhi 9 this Court has taken the view that the “test of admissibility of evidence lies in its relevancy, unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law evidence obtained as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out.”

8. Insofar as the Right to Information Act is concerned in Chief Information Commissioner vs. State of Manipur this Court had occasion to observe the object and purpose behind the enactment of the Act in the following terms: “The preamble (of the Right to Information Act, 2005) would obviously show that the Act is based on the concept of an open society.

As its preamble shows, the Act was enacted to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority in order to strengthen the core constitutional values of a democratic republic. It is clear that the Parliament enacted the said Act keeping in mind the rights of an informed citizenry in which transparency of information is vital in curbing corruption and making the Government and its instrumentalities accountable. The Act is meant to harmonise the conflicting interests of Government to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information with the right of citizens to know the functioning of the governmental process in such a way as to preserve the paramountcy of the democratic ideal.”

9. Section 8(2) of the Right to Information Act (already extracted) contemplates that notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets Act and the exemptions permissible under subsection (1) of Section 8, a public authority would be justified in allowing access to information, if on proper balancing, public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm sought to be protected. When the documents in question are already in the public domain, we do not see how the protection under Section 8(1)(a) of the Act would serve public interest.

10. An omnibus statement has been made by the learned Attorney that there are certain State actions that are outside the purview of judicial review and which lie within the political domain. The present would be such a case. In the final leg of the arguments, the learned Attorney General states that this case, if kept alive, has the potential to threaten the security of each and every citizen residing within our territories. The learned Attorney General thus exhorts us to dismiss this case, in limine, in light of public policy considerations.

11. All that we would like to observe in this regard is a reiteration of what had already been said by this Court in Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala 11 “Judicial review is not intended to create what is sometimes called Judicial Oligarchy, the Aristocracy of the Robe, Covert Legislation, or Judge Made Law. The proper forum to fight for the wise use of the legislative authority is that of public opinion and legislative assemblies. Such contest cannot be transferred to the judicial arena.

That all Constitutional interpretations have political consequences should not obliterate the fact that the decision has to be arrived at in the calm and dispassionate atmosphere of the court room, that judges in order to give legitimacy to their decision have to keep aloof from the din and controversy of politics and that the fluctuating fortunes of rival political parties can have for them only academic interest. Their primary duty is to uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear or favour and in doing so, they cannot allow any political ideology or economic theory, which may have caught their fancy, to colour the decision.” (Justice Khanna – para 1535)

12. In the light of the above, we deem it proper to dismiss the preliminary objections raised by the Union of India questioning the maintainability of the review petitions and we hold and affirm that the review petitions will have to be adjudicated on their own merit by taking into account the relevance of the contents of the three documents, admissibility of which, in the judicial decision making process, has been sought to be questioned by the respondents in the review petitions.

CJI. [RANJAN GOGOI]

J. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]

NEW DELHI

APRIL 10, 2019

1 AIR 1950 SC 124

2 AIR 1950 SC 129

3 1985(1) SCC 641

4 AIR 1950 SC 124

5 AIR 1950 SC 129

6 1994 (2) SCC 434

7 403 U.S. 713 (1971)

8 AIR 1982 SC, 149

9 AIR 1974 SC 348

10 (2011) 15 SCC,1

11 AIR 1973 SC 1461

Yashwant Sinha & Ors. Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation through Its Director & ANR.

[Review Petition (Criminal) No. 46 of 2019 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No.298 of 2018]

[M.A.No.58/2019 in W.P. (CRL.) No.225/2018

[R.P. (CRL.)No.122/2019 in W.P. (CRL.) No.297/2018]

[M.A.No.403/2019 in W.P. (CRL.) No.298/2018]

[R.P.(C)No.719/2019 in W.P.(C)No.1205/2018]

O R D E R

K.M. JOSEPH,J.

1. I have read the order proposed in the matter by the learned Chief Justice. While I agree with the decision, I think it fit to give the following reasons and hence, the concurring order:-

2. I do agree with the observations made by the learned chief Justice in regard to the importance which has been attached to the freedom of Press. The Press in India has greatly contributed to the strengthening of democracy in the country. It will have a pivotal role to play for the continued existence of a vibrant democracy in the country. It is indisputable that the press out of which the visual media in particular wields power, the reach of which appears to be limitless. No segment of the population is impervious to its influence. In Rajendra Sail v. M.P. High Court Br Association and Others 2005 (6) SCC 109, this Court dealing with a case under the Contempt of Court Act held inter alia as follows:

“31. The reach of the media, in the present times of 24-hour channels, is to almost ever nook and corner of the world. Further, large number of people believe as correct that which appears in media, print or electronic……”

(emphasis supplied)

It must realise that its consumers are entitled to demand that the stream of information that flows from it, must remain unpolluted by considerations other than truth.

3. I would think that freedom involves many elements. A free person must be fearless. Fear can be of losing all or any of the things that is held dear by the journalist. A free man cannot be biased. Bias comes in many forms. Bias if it is established as per the principles which are applicable is sufficient to vitiate the decisions of public authorities. The rule against bias is an important axiom to be observed by Judges. Equally the Press including the visual media cannot be biased and yet be free. Bias ordinarily implies a pre-disposition towards ideas or persons, both expressions to be comprehended in the broadest terms. It may stem from personal, political or financial considerations.

Transmitting biased information, betrays absence of true freedom. It is, in fact, a wholly unjustifiable onslaught on the vital right of the people to truthful information under Article 19(1)(a) which, in turn, is the bedrock of many other rights of the citizens also. In fact, the right of the Press in India is no higher than the right of the citizens under Article 19(1)(a) and is traced to the same provision. The ability of truth to be recognised by a discerning public in the supposedly free market place of ideas forms much of the basis for the grant of the unquestionable freedom to the Press including the Media Houses. If freedom is enjoyed by the Press without a deep sense of responsibility, it can weaken democracy.

In some sections, there appears to be a disturbing trend of bias. Controlling business interests and political allegiances appear to erode the duty of dispassionate and impartial purveying of information. In this regard in an article styled ‘the Indian Media’ which is annexed to the Autobiography under the title “Beyond the Lines” veteran journalist Late Shri Kuldip Nayyar has voiced the following lament: “Journalism as a profession has changed a great deal from what it was in our times. I feel acute sense of disappointment, not only because it has deteriorated in quality and direction but also because I do not see journalist attempting to revive the values ones practiced. The proliferation of newspapers and television channels has no doubt affected the quality of content, particularly reporting. Too many individuals are competing for the same space. What appals me most is that editorial primacy has been sacrificed at the alter of commercialism and vested interests. It hurts to see many journalists bending backwards to remain handmaidens of the proprietors, on the one hand, and of the establishment, on the other. This is so different from what we were used to.”

4. The exhortation as to who are the true beneficiaries of the freedom of speech and the Press 4 was articulated in the judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Time v. Hill 385 US 374 in the following words: “The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and press are not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all the people.”

(emphasis supplied)

5. In Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. And Others v. Union of India 1985 (1) SCC 641, this Court made the following observations: “……………The public interest in freedom of discussion (of which the freedom of the press is one aspect) stems from the requirement that members of a democratic society should be sufficiently informed that they may influence intelligently the decisions which may affect ‘themselves.” (Per Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Attorney- General vs. Times Newspapers Limited (1973) 3 ALL ER 54). Freedom of expression, as learned writers have observed, has four broad social purposes to serve:

(i) it helps an individual to attain self fulfilment,

(ii) it assists in the discovery of truth,

(iii)it strengthens the capacity of an individual in participating in decision making, and

(iv) it provides a mechanism by which it would be possible to establish a reasonable balance between stability and social change. All members of society should be able to form their own beliefs and communicate them freely to others. In sum, the fundamental principle involved here is the people’s right to know. …………..”

6. The wise words of Justice Douglas to be found in his dissenting judgment in Dennis v. United States 341 US 494 reminds one of the true goal of free speech and consequently the role of a free press. The same reads as under: “Free speech has occupied an exalted position because of the high service it has given society. Its protection is essential to the very existence of a democracy. The airing of ideas releases pressures which otherwise might become destructive. When idea compete in the market for acceptance, full and free discussion exposes the false and they gain few adherents. Full and free discussion even of ideas we hate encourages the testing of our own prejudices and preconceptions. Full and free discussion keeps a society from becoming stagnant and unprepared for the stresses and strains that work to tear all civilzations apart. Full and free discussion has indeed been the first article of our faith. We have founded our political system on it.

It has been the safeguard of every religious, political, philosophical, economic and racial group amongst us. We have counted on it to keep us from embracing what is cheap and false; we have trusted the common sense of our people to choose the doctrine true to our genius and to reject the rest. This has been the one single outstanding tenet that has made our institutions the symbol of freedom and equality. We have deemed it more costly to liberty to suppress a despised minority than to let them vent their spleen. We have above all else feared the political censor. We have wanted a land where our people can be exposed to all the diverse creeds and cultures of the world.”

7. Law in India relating to Crown privilege as it was originally styled in England is mainly embedded in a statutory provision namely Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act. Also Section 124 of the said Act is relied upon in the affidavit of the Secretary. Section 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 reads as follows:-

“124. Official communications. – No public officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official confidence, when he considers that the public interests would suffer by the disclosure.” There can be no matter of doubt that Section 124 is confined to public officers and the decisive aspect even under Section 124 is the protection of public interest.

8. Section 162 deals with the aspect of inspection of documents covered by privilege. In England, the law relating to privilege has been entirely court made. It cannot be in dispute that the claim for privilege under Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act being based on public policy cannot be waived (see in this regard judgment of this 7 Court in M/s. Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others 1988 (2) SCC 299 at page 327). The basis for the claim of privilege is and can only be public interest.

9. In the judgment of this Court in State of U.P. v. Raj Narain; AIR 1975 SC 865, Chief Justice A.N. Ray speaking on behalf of the Constitution Bench observed:-

“The Court will proprio motu exclude evidence the production of which is contrary to public interest. It is in public interest that confidentiality shall be safeguarded. The reason is that such documents become subject to privilege by reason of their contents. Confidentiality is not a head of privilege. It is a consideration to bear in mind. It is not that the contents contain material which it would be damaging to the national interest to divulge but rather that the documents would be of class which demand protection. (See 1973 AC 388 (supra) at p. 40).

To illustrate, the class of documents which would embrace Cabinet papers, Foreign Office dispatches, papers regarding the security of the State and high level interdepartmental minutes.”

10. I may also refer to the following discussion contained in S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India 1981 (Suppl) SCC 87 which has been also followed by the Bench in M/s. Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others 1988 (2) SCC 299.

“45………..”It is settled law and it was so clearly recognised in Raj Narain’s case 1975 (4) SCC 428 that there may be classes of documents which public interest requires should not be disclosed, no matter what the individual documents in those classes may contain or in other words, the law recognises that there may be classes of documents which in the public interest should be immune from disclosure. There is one such class of documents which for years has been recognised by the law as entitled in the public interest to be protected against disclosure and that class consists of documents which it is really necessary for the proper functioning of the public service to withhold from disclosure.

The documents falling within this class are granted immunity from disclosure not because of their contents but because of the class to which they belong. This class includes cabinet minutes, minutes of discussions between heads of departments, high level inter-departmental communications and despatches from ambassadors abroad (vide Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] Appeal Cases 910 at pp. 952, 973, 979, 987 and 993 and Reg v. Lewes Justices, ex parte Home Secretary, [1973] A.C. 388 at 412, papers brought into existence for the purpose of preparing a submission to cabinet (vide Lanyon Property Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 129 Commonwealth Law Reports 650) and indeed any documents which relate to the framing of government policy at a high level (vide Re. Grosvenor Hotel, London [1964] 3 All E.R. 354 (CA)”. The Court in Doypack (supra) held as follows:-

“46. Cabinet papers are, therefore, protected from disclosure not by reason of their contents but because of the class to 9 which they belong. It appears to us that Cabinet papers also include papers brought into existence for the purpose of preparing submission to the Cabinet. See Geoffrey Wilson cases and Materials on Constitutional and Administrative Law, 2nd edn., pages 462 to 464. At page 463 para 187, it was observed:

“The real damage with which I are concerned would be caused by the publication of the actual documents of the Cabinet for consideration and the minutes recording its discussions and its conclusions. Criminal sanctions should apply to the unauthorised communication of these papers.” See in this Connection State of Bihar v. Kripalu Shankar, AIR 1987 SC 1554 at page 1559 and also the decision of Bachittar Singh v. State of Punjab [1962] Suppl. 3 SCR 713. Reference may also be made to the observations of Lord Denning in Air Canada and others v. Secretary of State, [1983] 1 All ER 161 at 180.”

11. In fact, the foundation for the law relating to privilege is contained in the candour principles and also the possibility of ill-informed criticism. Regarding candour forming the premise I find the following discussion in the decision of this Court in S.P. Gupta’s case (supra). “We agree with these learned Judges that the need for candour and frankness cannot justify granting of complete immunity against disclosure of documents of this class, but as pointed out by Gibbs, ACJ in Sankey v. Whitlam (1978) 21 Australian LR 505:53, it would not be altogether unreal to suppose “that in some matters at least communications between ministers and servants of the Crown may be more frank and candid if these concerned believe that they are protected from disclosure” because not all Crown servants can be expected to be made of “sterner stuff”.

The need for candour and frankness must therefore certainly be regarded as a factor to be taken into account in determining whether, on balance, the public interest lies in favour of disclosure or against it (vide: the observations of Lord Denning in Neilson v, Lougharne (1981) 1 All ER 829 at P. 835.”

12. Regarding the other premise for supporting the claim of privilege namely the possibility that disclosure will occasion ill-informed criticism and impair the smooth functioning of the Governmental machine, I notice the following in S.P. Gupta’s case in paragraph 72 which read as follows:

“72. There was also one other reason suggested by Lord Reid in Conway v. Rimmer 1968 AC 910 for according protection against disclosure of documents belonging to this case: “To my mind”, said the learned Law Lord : “the most important reason is that such disclosure would create or fan ill-informed or captious public or political criticism. The business of government is difficult enough as it is, and no government could contemplate with equanimity the inner workings of the government machine being exposed to the gaze of those ready to criticise without adequate knowledge of the background and perhaps with some axe to grind.” But this reason does not commend itself to us.

The object of granting immunity to documents of this kind is to ensure the proper working of the government and not to protect the ministers and other government servants from criticism however intemperate and unfairly based. Moreover, this reason can have little validity in a democratic society which believes in an open government. It is only through exposure of its functioning that a democratic government can hope to win the trust of the people. If full information is made available to the people and every action of the government is bona fide and actuated only by public interest, there need be no fear of “ill-informed or captious public or political criticism”.

But at the same time it must be conceded that even in a democracy, government at a high level cannot function without some degree of secrecy. No minister or senior public servant can effectively discharge the responsibility of his office if every document prepared to enable policies to be formulated was liable to be made public. It is therefore in the interest of the State and necessary for the proper functioning of the public service that some protection be afforded by law to documents belonging to this class. What is the measure of this protection is a matter which we shall immediately proceed to discuss?” The role of the Court has been set out in para 73:-

“73. We have already pointed out that whenever an objection to the disclosure of a document under Section 123 is raised, two questions fall for the determination of the court, namely, whether the document relates to affairs of State and whether its disclosure would, in the particular case before the court, be injurious to public interest. The court in reaching its decision on these two questions has to balance two competing aspects of public interest, because the document being one relating to affairs of State, its disclosure would cause some injury to the interest of the State or the proper functioning of the public service and on the other hand if it is not disclosed, the non-disclosure would thwart the administration of justice by keeping back from the court a material document.

There are two aspects of public interest clashing with each other out of which the court has to decide which predominates. The approach to this problem is admirably set out in a passage from the judgment of Lord Reid in Conway v. Rimmer 1968 AC 910: It is universally recognised that there are two kinds of public interest which may clash. There is the public interest that harm shall not be done to the nation or the public service by disclosure of certain documents, and there is the public interest that the administration of justice shall not be frustrated by the withholding of documents which must be produced if justice is to be done.

There are many cases where the nature of the injury which would of might be done to the nation, or the public service is of so grave a character that no other interest, public or private, can be allowed to prevail over it. With regard to such cases it would be proper to say, as Lord Simon did, that to order production of the document in question, would put the interest of the State in jeopardy. But there are many other cases where the possible injury to the public service is much less and there one would think that it would he proper to balance the public interests involved. The court has to balance the detriment to the public interest on the administrative or executive side which would result from the disclosure of the document against the detriment to the public interest on the judicial side which would result from non- disclosure of the document though relevant to the proceeding. [Vide the observations of Lord Pearson in Reg, v. Lewes JJ. Ex parte Home Secy 1973 AC 388 at page 406 of the report].

The court has to decide which aspect of the public interest predominates or in other words, whether the public interest which requires that the document should not be produced, outweighs the public interest that a court of justice in performing its function should not be denied access to relevant evidence. The court has thus to perform a balancing exercise and after weighing the one competing aspect of public interest against the other, decide where the balance lies.

If the court comes to the conclusion that, on the balance, the disclosure of the document would cause greater injury to public interest than its non-disclosure, the court would uphold the objection and not allow the document to be disclosed but if, on the other hand, the court finds that the balance between competing public interests lies the other way, the court would order the disclosure of the document. This balancing between two competing aspects of public interest has to be performed by the court even where an objection to the disclosure of the document is taken on the ground that it belongs to a class of documents which are protected irrespective of their contents, because there is no absolute immunity for documents belonging to such class………………….”

(emphasis supplied)

13. I notice that the claim for privilege may arise in the following situations. The claim for privilege may arise in a system of law where there is no statutory framework provided for such a claim. It has been considered to be the position in the United 14 Kingdom. In India as already noticed, Section 123 of the Evidence Act read with Section 124 and Section 162 does provide for the statutory basis for a claim of public interest privilege. The next aspect relating to the law of compelled production of documents is the constitutional embargo contained in Article 74(2) of the Constitution. Article 74(2) reads as follows: “74(2) The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the President shall not be inquired into in any court.”

Therefore, it would be impermissible for a court to inquire into the advice which is tendered by the cabinet. The objection in this case raised under the Right to Information Act, is based only on Section 8(1)(a). I notice Section 8(1)(i) which provides as follows:-

“8(1)(i) cabinet papers including records of deliberations of the Council of Ministers, Secretaries and other officers;

Provided that the decisions of Council of Ministers, the reasons thereof, and the material on the basis of which the decisions were taken shall be made public after the decision has been taken, and the matter is complete, or over: Provided further that those matters which come under the exemptions specified in this section shall not be disclosed;”. The said provision having not been pressed into service, neither its scope nor the ramification of Article 74(2) need be pursued further in this case.

14. It is at once apposite to notice the change that was introduced by the Right to Information Act, 2005. Section 2(i) defines ‘record’ in the following fashion:

“2 (i) “record” includes-

(i) any document, manuscript and file;

(ii) any microfilm, microfiche and facsimile copy of a document;

(iii) any reproduction of image or images embodied in such microfilm (whether enlarged or not); and (iv) any other material produced by a computer or any other device;” The word ‘right to information’ defined in Section 2(j) as follows:

“(j) “right to information” means the right to information accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of any public authority and includes the right to-

(i) inspection of work, documents, records;

(ii) taking notes, extracts, or certified copies of documents or records;

(iii) taking certified samples of material;

(iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies, tapes, video cassettes or in any other electronic mode or through printouts where such information is stored in a computer or in any other device;” All citizens are conferred with the right to information subject to the provisions of the Act under Section 3.

15. Section 8 deals with exemption from disclosure of information. Section 8(1)(a) which is pressed before us reads as follows:

“8. Exemption from disclosure of information –

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation to give any citizen,-

(a) information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offence;”

This is followed by Section 8(2).

It reads as follows:

“8(2) Notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 nor any of the exemptions permissible in accordance with sub-section (1), a public authority may allow access to information, if public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests.”

16. Before I delve more into Section (8) it is apposite that I also notice Section 22 which provides as follows:

“22. Act to have overriding effect.- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923, and any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.”

17. I may lastly notice Section 24. “24(1). Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the intelligence and security organisations specified in the Second Schedule, being organisations established by the Central Government or any information furnished by such organisations to that Government: Provided that the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations shall not be excluded under this sub -section:

Provided further that in the case of information sought for is in respect of allegations of violation of human rights, the information shall only be provided after the approval of the Central Information Commission, and notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7, such information shall be provided within forty-five days from the date of the receipt of request.”

18. Sections 22 and 24 bring up the rear. I may highlight their significance in the new dispensation which has been ushered in by Parliament. In no unambiguous terms Parliament has declared that the Official Secrets Act, a law made in the year 1923 and for that matter any other law for the time being in force inter alia notwithstanding the provisions of the RTI Act will hold the field. The first proviso to Section 24 indeed marks a paradigm shift, in the perspective of the body polity through its elected representatives that corruption and human rights violations are completely incompatible and hence anathema to the very basic principles of democracy, the rule of law and constitutional morality.

The proviso declares that even though information available with intelligence and security organisations are generally outside the purview of the open disclosure regime contemplated under the Act, if the information pertains to allegations of corruption or human rights violations such information is very much available to be sought for under the Act. The economic development of a country is closely interconnected with the attainment of highest levels of probity in public life. In some of the poorest countries in the world, poverty is rightfully intricately associated with corruption. In fact, human rights violations are very often the offsprings of corruption. However, the law giver has indeed dealt with corruption and human rights separately. Hence I say no more on this.

19. Reverting back to Section (8) it is clear that Parliament has indeed intended to strengthen democracy and has sought to introduce the highest levels of transparency and openness. With the passing of the Right to Information Act, the citizens fundamental right of expression under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India, which itself has been recognised as encompassing, a basket of rights has been given fruitful meaning. Section 8(2) of the Act manifests a legal revolution that has been introduced in that, none of the exemptions declared under sub-section(1) of Section 8 or the Official Secrets Act, 1923 can stand in the way of the access to information if the public interest in disclosure overshadows, the harm to the protected interests.

20. It is true that under Section 8(1)(a), information the disclosure of which will prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security and strategic security and strategic scientific or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or information leading to incitement of an offence are ordinarily exempt from the obligation of disclosure but even in respect of such matters Parliament has advanced the law in a manner which can only be described as dramatic by giving recognition to the principle that disclosure of information could be refused only on the foundation of public interest being jeopardised. What interestingly Section 8(2) recognises is that there cannot be absolutism even in the matter of certain values which were formerly considered to provide unquestionable foundations for the power to withhold information. Most significantly, Parliament has appreciated that it may be necessary to pit one interest against another and to compare the relative harm and then decide either to disclose or to decline information. It is not as if there would be no harm.

If, for instance, the information falling under clause (a) say for instance the security of the nations or relationship with a foreign state is revealed and is likely to be harmful, under the Act if higher public interest is established, then it is the will of Parliament that the greater good should prevail though at the cost of lesser harm being still occasioned. I indeed would be failing to recognise the radical departure in the law which has been articulated in Section 8(2) if I did not also contrast the law which in fact been laid down by this court in the decisions of this Court which I have adverted to. Under the law relating to privilege there are two classes of documents which ordinarily form the basis of privilege. In the first category, the claim for privilege is raised on the basis of contents of the particular documents.

The second head under which privilege is ordinarily claimed is that the document is a document which falls in a class of documents which entitles it to protection from disclosure and production. When a document falls in such a class, ordinarily courts are told that it suffices and the court may not consider the contents. When privilege was claimed as for instance in the matter relating to security of the nation, traditionally, courts both in England and in India have held that such documents would fall in the class of documents which entitles it to protection from production. (See paragraph ‘9’ of this order). The RTI Act through Section 8(2) has conferred upon the citizens a priceless right by clothing them with the right to demand information even in respect of such matters as security of the country and matters relating to relation with foreign state. No doubt, information is not be given for the mere asking. The applicant must establish that withholding of such information produces greater harm than disclosing it.

21. It may be necessary also to consider as to what could be the premise for disclosure in a matter relating to security and relationship with foreign state. The answer is contained in Section 8(2) and that is public interest. Right to justice is 23 immutable. It is inalienable. The demands it has made over other interests has been so overwhelming that it forms the foundation of all civilised nations. The evolution of law itself is founded upon the recognition of right to justice as an indispensable hallmark of a fully evolved nation.

22. The preamble to the constitution proclaims justice -social, economic or political, as the goal to be achieved. It is the duty of every State to provide for a fair and effective system of administration of justice. Judicial review is, in fact, recognised as a basic feature of the Constitution. Section 24 of the Act also highlights the importance attached to the unrelenting crusade against corruption and violation of human rights. The most important aspect in a justice delivery system is the ability of a party to successfully establish the case based on materials. Subject to exceptions it is settled beyond doubt that any person can set the criminal law into motion. It is equally indisputable however that among the seemingly insuperable obstacles a litigant faces are the limitations on the ability to prove the case with evidence and more importantly relevant evidence.

Ability to secure evidence thus forms the most important aspect in ensuring the triumph of truth and justice. It is imperative therefore that Section 8(2) must be viewed in the said context. Its impact on the operation on the shield of privilege is unmistakable.

23. It is clear that under the Right to Information Act, a citizen can get a certified copy of a document under Section 8(2) of the RTI Act even if the matter pertains to security or relationship with a foreign nation, if a case is made out thereunder. If such a document is produced surely a claim for privilege could not lie.

24. Coming to privilege it may be true that Section 123 of the Evidence Act stands unamended. It is equally true that there is no unqualified right to obtain information in respect of matters under Section 8(1)(a) of the RTI Act. However, the Court cannot be wholly unaffected by the new regime introduced by Parliament under the RTI Act on the 25 question regarding a claim for privilege. It is pertinent to note that an officer of the department is permitted under the RTI Act to allow access to information under the Act in respect of matters falling even under Section 8(1)(a) if a case is made out under Section 8(2). If an officer does not accede to the request, a citizen can pursue remedies before higher authorities and finally the courts. Could it be said that what an officer under the RTI Act can permit, cannot be allowed by a court and that too superior courts under Section 123 of the Evidence Act. I would think that the court indeed can subject no doubt to one exception, namely, if it is a matter which is tabooed under Article 74(2) of the Constitution.

25. In this case in fact, the documents in respect of which the privilege is claimed are already on record. Section 123 of the Evidence Act in fact contemplates a situation where party seeks the production of document which is with a public authority and the public authority raises claim for privilege by contending that the document cannot be produced by it. Undoubtedly, the foundation for such a claim is based on public interest and nothing more and nothing less. In fact, in State of U.P. VS. Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 861 I notice the following paragraph about the effect of publication in part in the concurring judgment of K.K. Mathew,J. which reads as under:

“81. I do not think that there is much substance in the contention that since, the Blue Book had been published in parts, it must be deemed to have been published as a whole and, therefore, the document could not be regarded as an unpublished official record relating to affairs of state. If some parts of the document which are innocuous have been published, it does not follow that the whole document has been published. No authority has been cited for the proposition that if a severable and innocuous portion of a document is published, the entire document shall be deemed to have been published for the purpose of S. 123.”

26. I may also notice another aspect. Under the common law both in England and in India the context for material being considered by the court is relevancy. There can be no dispute that the manner in which evidence is got namely that it was procured in an illegal manner would not ordinarily be very significant in itself in regard to the courts decision to act upon the same (see in this context judgment of this Court in Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection (Investigation) of Income Tax AIR 1974 SC 348). Therein I notice the following statements:

“25. So far as India is concerned its law of evidence is modeled on the rules of evidence, which prevailed in English law, and courts in India and in England have consistently refused to exclude relevant evidence merely on the ground that it is obtained by illegal search or seizure. In Barindra Kumar Ghose and others v. Emperor (1910)ILR 37 Cal 467 the learned Chief Justice Sir Lawrence Jenkins says at page, 500 : “Mr. Das has attacked the searches and has urged that, even if there was jurisdiction to direct the issue of search warrants, as I hold there was, still the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code have been completely disregarded. On this assumption he has contended that the evidence discovered by the searches is not admissible, but to this view I cannot accede.

For without in any way countenancing disregard of the provisions prescribed by the Code, I hold that what would otherwise be relevant does not become irrelevant because it was discovered in the course of a search in which those provisions were disregarded. As Jimutavahana with his shrewd common-sense observes-“a fact cannot be altered by 100 texts,” and as his commentator quaintly remarks : “If a Brahmana be slain, the precept ‘slay not a Brahmana’ does not annul the murder.” But the absence of the precautions designed. by the legislature lends support to the argument that the alleged discovery should be carefully scrutinized.

……. …… ……. It would thus be seen that in India, as in England, where the test of admissibility of evidence lies in relevancy, unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law evidence obtained as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out.”

(Emphasis supplied)

27. Now in the context of a claim of privilege raised under Section 123 however, the evidence being requisitioned by a party against the state or public authority it may happen however that a party may obtain a copy of the document in an improper manner. A question may arise as to whether the copy is true copy of the original. If a copy is wholly improperly obtained and an attempt is made by production thereof to compel the State to produce the original, a question may and has in fact arisen whether the Court is bound to order production. In the landmark judgment by the High court of Australia in Sankey v. Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, informations were laid against Mr. Whitlam the former Prime Minister of Australia and three members of his Ministry alleging offence under Section 86 of the Crimes Act 1914 and a conspiracy at common law. The case also threw up the scope of the claim for privilege. It was held inter alia as follows in the judgment rendered by Sir Harry Gibbs, A.C.J.:

“43. If state papers were absolutely protected from production, great injustice would be caused in cases in which the documents were necessary to support the defence of an accused person whose liberty was at stake in a criminal trial, and it seems to be accepted that in those circumstances the documents must be disclosed: Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co. [1942] UKHL 3; (1942) AC 624, at pp 633-634 ; Conway v. Rimmer (1968) AC, at pp 966-967, 987 ; Reg. v. Lewes Justices; Ex parte Home Secretary (1973) AC, at pp 407- 408. Moreover, a Minister might produce a document of his own accord if it were necessary to do so to support a criminal prosecution launched on behalf of the government. The fact that state papers may come to light in some circumstances is impossible to reconcile with the view that they enjoy absolute protection from disclosure.

48. In Robinson v. South Australia (No. 2) (1931) AC, at p 718 , it was said that “the privilege, the reason for it being what it is, can hardly be asserted in relation to documents the contents of which have already been published”. Other cases support that view: see Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth (No. 2) (1913) 16 CLR, at pp 188, 195, 199 ; Christie v. Ford (1957) 2 FLR 202, at p 209 . However the submission made by counsel 30 for Mr. Whitlam was that the position is different when the exclusion of a document is sought not because of its contents but because of the class to which it belongs. In such a case the document is withheld irrespective of its contents; therefore, it was said, it is immaterial that the contents are known.

That is not so; for the reasons I have suggested, it may be necessary for the proper functioning of the public service to keep secret a document of a particular class, but once the document has been published to the world there no longer exists any reason to deny to the court access to that document, if it provides evidence that is relevant and otherwise admissible. It was further submitted that if one document forming part of a series of cabinet papers has been published, but others have not, it would be unfair and unjust to produce one document and withhold the rest. That may indeed be so, and where one such document has been published it becomes necessary for the court to consider whether that circumstance strengthens the case for the disclosure of the connected documents. However even if other related documents should not be produced, it seems to me that once a document has been published it becomes impossible, and indeed absurd, to say that the public interest requires that it should not be produced or given in evidence.”

28. No doubt regarding publication by an unauthorised person and it being unauthenticated, the learned Judge had this to say:

“49. What I have just said applies to cases where it is established that a true copy of the document sought to be produced has in fact been published. The publication by an unauthorized person of something claimed to be a copy of an official document, but unauthenticated and not proved to be correct, would not in itself lend any support to a claim that the document in question ought to be produced. In such a case it would remain uncertain whether the contents of the document had in truth been disclosed. In some cases the court might resolve the problem by looking at the document for the purpose of seeing whether the published copy was a true one, but it would not take that course if the alleged publication was simply a device to assist in procuring disclosure, and it might be reluctant to do so if the copy had been stolen or improperly obtained.”

29. In the same case in the judgment rendered by Stephen. J., the learned Judge observes: –

“26. The character of the proceedings has a triple significance. First, it makes it very likely that, for the prosecution to be successful, its evidence must include documents of a class hitherto regarded as undoubtedly the subject of Crown privilege. But, then, to accord privilege to such documents as a matter of course is to come close to conferring immunity from conviction upon those who may occupy or may have occupied high offices of State if proceeded against in relation to their conduct in those offices.

Those in whom resides the power ultimately to decide whether or not to claim privilege will in fact be exercising a far more potent power: by a decision to claim privilege dismissal of the charge will be well-nigh ensured. Secondly, and assuming for the moment that there should prove to be any substance in the present charges, their character must raise doubts about the reasons customarily given as justifying a claim to Crown privilege for classes of documents, being the reasons in fact relied upon in this case.

Those reasons, the need to safeguard the proper functioning of the executive arm of government and of the public service, seem curiously inappropriate when to uphold the claim is to prevent successful prosecution of the charges: inappropriate because what is charged is itself the grossly improper functioning of that very arm of government and of the public service which assists it. Thirdly, the high offices which were occupied by those charged and the nature of the conspiracies sought to be attributed to them in those offices must make it a matter of more than usual public interest that in the disposition of the charges the course of justice be in no way unnecessarily impeded.

For such charges to have remained pending and unresolved for as long as they have is bad enough; if they are now to be met with a claim to Crown privilege, invoked for the protection of the proper functioning of the executive government, some high degree of public interest in non-disclosure should be shown before his privilege should be accorded. “

“31. What are now equally well established are the respective roles of the court and of those, usually the Crown, who assert Crown privilege. A claim to Crown privilege has no automatic operation; it always remains the function of the court to determine upon that claim. The claim, supported by whatever material may be thought appropriate to the occasion, does no more than draw to the court’s attention what is said to be the entitlement to the privilege and provide the court with material which may assist it in determining whether or not Crown privilege should be accorded. A claim to the privilege is not essential to the invoking of Crown privilege. In cases of defence secrets, matters of diplomacy or affairs of government at the highest level, it will often appear readily enough that the balance of public interest is against disclosure.

It is in these areas that, even in the absence of any claim to Crown privilege (perhaps because the Crown is not a party and may be unaware of what is afoot), a court, readily recognizing the proffered evidence for what it is, can, as many authorities establish, of its own motion enjoin its disclosure in court. Just as a claim is not essential, neither is it ever conclusive, although, in the areas which I have instanced, the court’s acceptance of the claim may often be no more than a matter of form. It is not conclusive because the function of the court, once it becomes aware of the existence of material to which Crown privilege may apply, is always to determine what shall be done in the light of how best the public interest may be served, how least it will be injured. “

“38 . Those who urge Crown privilege for classes of documents, regardless of particular contents, carry a heavy burden. As Lord Reid said in Rogers v. Home Secretary (1973) AC, at p 400 the speeches in Conway v. Rimmer[1968] UKHL 2; (1968) AC 910 have made it clear “that there is a heavy burden of proof” on those who make class claims. Sometimes class claims are supported by reference to the need to encourage candour on the part of public servants in their advice to Ministers, the immunity from subsequent disclosure which privilege affords being said to promote such candour. The affidavits in this case make reference to this aspect. Recent authorities have disposed of this ground as a tenable basis for privilege.

Lord Radcliffe in the Glasgow Corporation Case remarked 1956 SC (HL), at p 20 that he would have supposed Crown servants to be “made of sterner stuff”, a view shared by Harman L.J. in the Grosvenor Hotel Case (1965) Ch, at p 1255 : then, in Conway v. Rimmer (1968) AC 901 , Lord Reid dismissed the “candour” argument but found the true basis for the public interest in secrecy, in the case of cabinet minutes and the like, to lie in the fact that were they to 34 be disclosed this would “create or fan illinformed or captious public or political criticism. . . . the inner workings of the government machine being exposed to the gaze of those ready to criticize without adequate knowledge of the background and perhaps with some axe to grind” (1968) AC, at p 952 and see as to the ground of “candour” per Lord Morris (1968) AC, at p 959 , Lord Pearce (1968) AC, at pp 987-988 and Lord Upjohn (1968) AC, at pp 933-934 . In Rogers v. Home Secretary (1973) AC, at p 413 Lord Salmon spoke of the “candour” argument as “the old fallacy”.

“41. There is, moreover, a further factor pointing in the same direction. The public interest in non-disclosure will be much reduced in weight if the document or information in question has already been published to the world at large. There is much authority to this effect, going back at least as far as Robinson v. South Australia (No. 2) (1931) AC 704, at p 718 per Lord Blanesburgh. In 1949 Kriewaldt J., sitting in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, had occasion to review the relevant authorities in his judgment in Christie v. Ford (1957) 2 FLR 202, at p 209 . The reason of the thing necessarily tends to deny privilege to information which is already public knowledge. As Lord Blanesburgh observed (25) “the privilege, the reason for it being what it is, can hardly be asserted in relation to documents the contents of which have already been published”.

In Whitehall v. Whitehall 1957 SC 30, at p 38 the Lord President (Clyde) in referring to a document already the subject of some quite limited prior publicity observed that “The necessity for secrecy, which is the primary purpose of the certificate, then no longer operates…”

“44. In Rogers v. Home Secretary Lord Reid had occasion to distinguish between documents lawfully published and those which, as a result of “some wrongful means”, have become public (1973) AC, at p 402 . That case was, however, concerned with a quite special class of document, confidential reports on applicants for 35 licences to run gaming establishments, a class to which must apply considerations very similar to those which affect the reports of, or information about, police informers. There is, in those cases, the clearest public interest in preserving the flow of information by ensuring confidentiality and by not countenancing in any way breach of promised confidentiality. Those quite special considerations do not, I think, apply in the present case.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

30. In Rogers Vs. Home Secretary 1973 A.C. 388, the request to produce a letter written by the Police Officer to the Gaming Board by way of response to the Gaming Board request for information in regard to applications by the appellant for certificates of consent, was not countenanced by the House of Lords. The appellant had commenced an action for criminal libel in regard to the information. Lord Reid in the course of his judgment held:- “In my judgment on balance the public interest clearly requires that documents of this kind should not be disclosed, and that public interest is not affected by the fact that by some wrongful means a copy of such a document has been obtained and published by some person. I would therefore dismiss the appellant’s appeal.”

31. In this case however as I have already noticed there are the following aspects. The documents in question have been published in ‘The Hindu’, a national daily as noticed in the order of the learned Chief Justice. It is true that they have not been officially published. The correctness of the contents per se of the documents are not questioned. Lastly, the case does not strictly involve in a sense the claim for privilege as the petitioners have not called upon the respondents to produce the original and as already noted the state does not take objection to the correctness of the contents of the documents.

The request of the respondents is to remove the documents from the record. I would observe that in regard to documents which are improperly obtained and which are subject to a claim for privilege, undoubtedly the ordinary rule of relevancy alone may not suffice as larger public interest may warrant in a given case refusing to legitimise what is forbidden on grounds of overriding public interest. In the writ petition out of which the review arises the complaint is that there has been grave wrong doing in the highest echelons of power and the petitioners seek action inter alia under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act. The observations made by Stephen,J. in para 26 of his judgment and extracted by me in para 29 of my order may not be out of place.

32. I agree with the order of the learned Chief Justice.

J. [K.M. JOSEPH]

NEW DELHI

APRIL 10, 2019

Expert witness rendering opinion evidence, DNA testing & Superimposition technique

The role of an expert witness rendering opinion evidence before the Court may be explained by referring to the following observations of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Agrawal v. Regency Hospital Limited & Ors., (2009) 9 SCC 709:

“16. The law of evidence is designed to ensure that the court considers only that evidence which will enable it to reach a reliable conclusion. The first and foremost requirement for expert evidence to be admissible is that it is necessary to hear the expert evidence. The test is that the matter is outside the knowledge and experience of the layperson. Thus, there is a need to hear an expert opinion where there is a medical issue to be settled. The scientific question involved is assumed to be not within the court’s knowledge. Thus cases where the science involved, is highly specialized and perhaps even esoteric, the central role of an expert cannot be disputed…”

(emphasis supplied)

Undoubtedly, it is the duty of an expert witness to assist the Court effectively by furnishing it with the relevant report based on his expertise along with his reasons, so that the Court may form its independent judgment by assessing such materials and reasons furnished by the expert for coming to an appropriate conclusion. Be 38 that as it may, it cannot be forgotten that opinion evidence is advisory in nature, and the Court is not bound by the evidence of the experts. (See The State (Delhi Adminstration) v. Pali Ram, (1979) 2 SCC 158; State of H.P. v. Jai Lal & Ors., (1999) 7 SCC 280; Baso Prasad & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2006) 13 SCC 65; Ramesh Chandra Agrawal v. Regency Hospital Ltd. & Ors. (supra); Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee & Ors., (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 299).

Like all other opinion evidence, the probative value accorded to DNA evidence also varies from case to case, depending on facts and circumstances and the weight accorded to other evidence on record, whether contrary or corroborative. This is all the more important to remember, given that even though the accuracy of DNA evidence may be increasing with the advancement of science and technology with every passing day, thereby making it more and more reliable, we have not yet reached a juncture where it may be said to be infallible. Thus, it cannot be said that the absence of DNA evidence would lead to an adverse inference against a party, especially in the 39 presence of other cogent and reliable evidence on record in favour of such party.

This leads us to the question of the propriety of relying upon the superimposition test conducted in the instant case for identifying the deceased. As noted supra, the learned counsel for the appellants has argued that evidence pertaining to the use of the superimposition technique is not a tangible piece of evidence. We find ourselves unable to agree with this view. There cannot be any dispute that evidence on superimposition is also based on experts’ opinion. We would like to note that the use of the superimposition technique in Indian investigations for identification purposes is not a new phenomenon. Notably, it has been employed in the investigations pertaining to the Nithari murders, the Russian murder incident in Goa in 2008, and even before that in the Morni Hill murder case and the Paharganj bomb blast case as far back as in 1996, and the Udhampur murder case in 2005 (See Modi, A Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 26th edn., 2018, pp. 267271).

This Court itself has placed reliance on the identification of the deceased through superimposition on several occasions (see 40 Shankar & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 4 SCC 478; Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 12 SCC 288; Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu v. John David, (2011) 5 SCC 509; Mahesh Dhanaji Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 4 SCC 292), clearly indicating that it is an acceptable piece of opinion evidence.

 It is relevant to note that all of the decisions of this Court cited in the above paragraph were based on circumstantial evidence, involving aspects such as the last seen circumstance, motive, recovery of personal belongings of the deceased, and so on, and therefore in none of the cases was the superimposition technique the sole incriminating factor relied upon to reach a conclusion of guilt of the accused. Indeed, in Mahesh Dhanaji Shinde (supra), the Court also had the advantage of referring to a DNA test, and in John David (supra), of referring to a DNA test as well as a dental examination of the deceased, to determine the identity of the victim. This is in line with the settled practice of the Courts, which generally do not rely upon opinion evidence as the sole incriminating circumstance, given its fallibility. This is particularly true for the superimposition technique, which cannot be regarded as infallible.

The meaning of “discovery of fact”

The Supreme Court has explained the meaning of “discovery of fact” in consequence of information received from the accused laid down in Section 27 of the Evidence Act in paragraph 35 of “State of Maharashtra V. Damu” reported in (2000) 6 SCC 269, as follows:

“The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered in a search made on the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is
true. The information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature, but if it results in discovery of a fact it becomes a reliable information. Hence the legislature permitted such information to be used as evidence by restricting the admissible portion to the minimum. It is now well settled that recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact as envisaged in the section. The decision of the Privy Council in “Pulukuri Kottaya V. Emperor” is the most quoted authority for supporting the interpretation that the “fact discovered” envisaged in the section embraces the place from which the object was produced, the knowledge of the accused as to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that effect.”

It is also pertinent to point out from paragraph 42 of “Vikram Singh and Others V. State of Punjab” reported in (2010) 3 SCC 56 to the effect that the statement made by the person accused of any offence and in the custody of police is relevant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, if the statement leads to discovery of facts and as such there is no need of formal arrest of the person for making his statement relevant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Mr. S. K. Mondal, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the State has also relied on “State of Maharashtra V. Suresh” reported in (2000) 1 SCC 471 wherein it is laid down in paragraph 26 that there are three possibilities when an accused person points out the place where a dead body or an incriminating material was concealed without stating that it was concealed by himself. The first possibility is that he himself would have concealed it. The second possibility is that he would have seen somebody else concealing it. The third possibility is that he would have been told by another person that it was concealed there. If the accused person declines to tell the court that his knowledge about the concealment was on account of first two possibilities, the criminal court can presume that it was concealed by the accused himself. This is because the accused is the only person who can offer the explanation as to how else he came to know of such concealment and if he chooses to refrain from telling the court as to how else he came to know of it, the presumption is a well-justified course to be adopted by the court
that the concealment was made by himself.

It is also laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraph 27 of State of Maharashtra V. Suresh (Supra) as follows:
“a false answer offered by the accused when his attention was drawn to the aforesaid circumstance renders that circumstance capable of inculpating him. In a situation like this such a false answer can also be counted as providing “a missing link” for completion of the chain of circumstances.”

 In cases based upon circumstantial evidence, motive assumes greater importance

Regarding law on the circumstance of last seen, the observation of Supreme Court in Mohibur Rahman and Another Vs. State of Assam, are relevant:

The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. There must be something more establishing connectivity between the accused and the crime. There may be cases where, on account of close proximity of place and time between the event of the accused having been last seen with the deceased and the factum of death, a rational mind may be persuaded to reach an irresistible conclusion that either the accused should explain how and in what circumstances the victim suffered the death or should own the liability for the homicide. In the present case there is no such proximity of time and place.

In the case of ‘ State of Goa Vs. Sanjay Thakran and Another, the Supreme Court noted general principles with reference to the principles of last seen together in Bodh Raj @ Bodha and Others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, as under:

The last seen theory comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases.”

In Ramreddy Rajeshkhanna Reddy and Another Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, this Court further opined that even in the cases where time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased was found dead is too small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible, the courts should look for some corroboration.

34……Hence, if the prosecution proves that in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no possibility of any other person meeting or approaching the deceased at the place of incident or before the commission of the crime, in the intervening period, the proof of last seen together would be relevant evidence. For instance, if it can be demonstrated by showing that the accused persons were in exclusive possession of the place where the incident occurred or where they were last seen together with the deceased, and there was no possibility of any intrusion to that place by any third party, then a relatively wider time gap would not affect the prosecution case.

Chance witness

On scrutiny of the below decisions, we find that the Hon’ble Apex Court has specifically observed that presence of witness was doubtful and no reliance can be placed on such chance witness.

(1) , AIR 1992 SC page 1433 (Rajinder Singh @ Kada v. State of Punjab),

(2) , AIR 1976 SC 2032 (Bahal Singh v. State of Haryana),

(3) , 2001(2) Crimes (SC) 49 (Sohan & Another v. State of Haryana),

(4) 1991(0) Supreme (SC) 1368, , AIR 1998 (SC) 275 (Raju Alias Rajendra v. State of Maharashtra,

(5) 2004(0) Supreme (Raj) 677 (Hirjinder Singh & Bhola v. State of Punjab,

(6) 2003(0) Supreme (Raj) p.109 (Ramswaroop and another v. State of Rajasthan),

(7) 1992(2) Crimes (HC) 755 (Rajendran and another v. State)

(8) 1996(1) Crimes (HC) 107 (Daulat Ram & Others v. State of Rajasthan).”

 

Understand Hearsay

A “statement” is:
1. An oral or written assertion; or
2. Nonverbal conduct of a person if it is intended by the person as an assertion.

A “declarant” is a person who makes a statement.

“Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is:
(a) Inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition;
(b) Consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of improper influence, motive, or recent fabrication; or
(c) One of identification of a person made after perceiving the person.
Hearsay rule.—Except as provided by statute, hearsay evidence is inadmissible.

Refreshing the memory of a witness

When a witness uses a writing or other item to refresh memory while testifying, an adverse party is entitled to have such writing or other item produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce it, or, in the case of a writing, to introduce those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness, in evidence.

If it is claimed that the writing contains matters not related to the subject matter of the testimony, the judge shall examine the writing in camera, excise any portions not so related, and order delivery of the remainder to the party entitled thereto. Any portion withheld over objection shall be preserved and made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.

If a writing or other item is not produced or delivered pursuant to order under this section, the testimony of the witness concerning those matters shall be stricken.

Rule under Section 101 of the Evidence Act -the burden to prove a fact

The elementary Rule under Section 101 of the Evidence Act, is inflexible. Ordinarily, the burden to prove the fact rests on the party who substantially asserts affirmative of the issue and not on the party who denies it. In terms of Section 102 of the Act, the initial onus is always on the plaintiff and if he discharges that onus and makes out a case which entitles him to a relief, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove those circumstances, if any, which would dis-entitle the plaintiff to the relief. In the case of Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558 (para-19), Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a distinction exists between a burden of proof and onus of proof. The right to begin follows onus probandi. It assumes importance in the early stage of a case. The question of onus of proof has greater force, where the question is which party is to begin. Burden of proof is used in three ways : (i) to indicate the duty of bringing forward evidence in support of a proposition at the beginning or later; (ii) to make that of establishing a proposition as against all counter evidence; and (iii) an indiscriminate use in which it may mean either or both of the others.

 In the case of Rangmmal v. Kuppuswami and another, (2011) 12 SCC 220 (para-21), Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Section 101 of the Evidence Act has clearly laid down that the burden of proving a fact always lies upon the person who asserts the fact. Until such burden is discharged, the other party is not required to be called upon to prove his case. The court has to examine as to whether the person upon whom burden lies has been able to discharge his burden. Until he arrives at such conclusion, he cannot proceed on the basis of weakness of the other party. In paragraph 29 of the judgment, Supreme Court further held that the party who alleged the sale deed to be not genuine, sham or bogus, had to prove nothing until the party relying upon the document, establishes its genuineness. In the present set of facts, the plaintiff respondent No.1 has neither proved the alleged two bank drafts nor its encashment by the defendant appellant and thus failed to discharge the burden to prove.

Apart from this, the evidences led by the plaintiff respondent No.1 and the defendant-appellant clearly shows that the plaintiff respondent No.1 has completely failed to establish that the alleged two bank drafts in question were got prepared by him and were given by him to the defendant-appellant towards cost of 1620 MT coal. In the case of Bala Shankar Mama Shankar Bhattji v. Charity Commissioner, Gujrat State, 1995 Suppl. (1) SCC 485 (para-19), Hon’ble Supreme Court held that burden of proof would mean that a party has to prove an allegation before he is entitled to a judgment in his favour. Either of the two contending parties has to introduce evidence on a contested issue. The question of onus is material only when the party on which it is placed, would eventually lose if he failed to discharge the same. Where, however, parties joined the issue and led evidence then such evidence can be weighed in order to determine the issue and in that situation, the question of burden becomes academic.

In Subhra Mukherjee v. Bharat Coling Coal Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 312, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the party that makes allegation, must prove it but where the question before the court was “whether the transaction in question was a bona fide and genuine one” the party relying upon the transaction has to prove its genuineness first and only thereafter would the defendant be required to dislodge such proof and prove that the transaction was sham and fictitious.

 In the case of Deena v. Union of India, 1983 (4) SCC 645, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the question of burden of proof ceases to have the same importance when the entire evidence is before the Court, each side having placed before it such material as it considers necessary to support its case. But then, the fact that parties have produced their respective data before the Court does not absolve the Court from considering the question whether, on the basis of the entire material before it, the burden can be said to have been discharged by the party on whom it lies.

The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 completely failed to lay any evidence to establish that he made payment to the defendant-appellant through the alleged two bank drafts. In the case of State of J. & K. v. Hindustan Forest Company, (2006) 12 SCC 198, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the onus is on the plaintiff to establish positively its case on the basis of material available and it cannot rely on the weakness or absence of defence to discharge onus. In the case of Corporation of City of Bengalore v. Zulekha Bi, (2008) 11 SCC 306, it was held that it is for the plaintiff to prove his title to the property.