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UN three days Education Summit-Transforming education (16/09/2022)-Press Brief and Vision Documents

Education Summit offers ‘once-in-a-lifetime’ chance to recover learning losses, advance badly off-track goals and rethink education systems

Global leaders set to make major commitments at largest gathering on transforming education

Transforming education (theme)

New York, 16 September – Significant new commitments on key issues such as foundational learning, digital connectivity and financing are expected to be announced at the Transforming Education Summit, which falls during the 77th session of the UN General Assembly. The three-day Summit (16, 17 and 19 September) will bring together dozens of Heads of State, as well as leaders from, business, philanthropy, youth and civil society.

Convened by UN Secretary-General António Guterres, the theme of the Summit focuses on ‘transforming education,’ in response to major challenges relating to the relevance of education in a rapidly changing work and to the wake-up call provided by the COVID-19 pandemic when more than 90% of the world’s children have had their learning interrupted — the largest disruption of education systems in history. For many students, especially girls and young women, this break may become permanent, with implications for their future, as well as the economy, with a potential loss of US$ 10 trillion in earnings over their working lives. For others, deeply-ingrained exclusion and outdated curricula and learning methods leave them ill-prepared to deal with fundamental changes in the world of work, the climate crisis and heightened political polarization globally. Against this backdrop, the Summit intends to elevate education to the top of the global political agenda.

A youth-led Mobilization Day will kickstart Summit proceedings on 16 September, followed by a Solutions Day on 17 September, featuring stakeholders from civil society and the private sector, and other education actors. Finally, on Leaders Day on 19 September, national commitments will be announced.

COMMITMENTS CRUCIAL TO END EDUCATION CRISIS

In his message to education minsters gathered at the Transforming Education Pre-Summit in Paris on 29 June, the Secretary-General called on Heads of State and Government: “to lay out in crystal clear terms their promise and their plans to fundamentally transform education for the future.”

Over the past six months, national consultations have been organized in close to 150 countries to gather recommendations on the most urgent asks from teachers, students, civil society and other partners. These will be the foundations of national statements of commitments expected to be made at the Summit in New York, to set a new path for education to prepare learners of today for a rapidly changing tomorrow.

Commitments to thoroughly reimagine and reinvest in education are needed to reverse the slide on progress towards achieving the targets set out in Sustainable Development Goal 4, to ensure that lessons are learned from pandemic responses for resilience, social prosperity and environmental sustainability in the post-COVID world, and to think big on how we imagine education systems of the future.

YOUTH CALL ON LEADERS TO TAKE DECISIVE ACTION

Youth advocates have mobilized for action from the start of the Summit preparation process. On the first day of the Summit, youth advocates will share a Youth Declaration with the Secretary-General, which lays out their collective recommendations to policymakers on the transformation they want to see, along with their commitments for action on education. The Declaration is the result of months-long consultations and drafting process involving hundreds of thousands of young people worldwide. 

Children and young people have the most at stake in reimagining education, as highlighted by the Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohamed as she addressed the Pre-Summit Youth Forum: “Young people will determine whether the transformation of education comes to pass or not.”

The global campaign #LetMeLearn has also galvanized youth in the run up to the Summit, giving young people a platform to voice their demands for education transformation and have it shared at the Summit. Video messages from youth carried on social media in more than 100 countries have called on leaders to tackle exclusion, ensure gender equality, transform the teaching profession, renew curricula and end the digital divide.

SUMMIT HIGHLIGHTS

Leaders Day will open following the SDG Moment. A key outcome of the Summit will be the Secretary-General’s Vision Statement, which charts a roadmap of action for education in the 21st century. Further, the Statement will serve as an input to negotiations in preparation of the Summit of the Future which will be held at the UN General Assembly in 2024.

Another highlight will be the announcement of new commitments, including the establishment of a new International Finance Facility for Education by the United Nations Special Envoy for Global Education, Gordon Brown, and other partners, with details presented to world leaders at the Leaders Day,

The campaign organization Avaaz will also deliver a call to expand the international right to education, backed by more than 60 Nobel Peace Prize winners, current and former UN Special Rapporteurs, the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and other leading experts.

Personalities participating in the Summit include:

Sara Marley (Jamaica-USA), singer, who will perform at the opening of the Youth Mobilization Day
Maysoon Zayid (Palestine-USA), comedian, Princeton fellow, and disability advocate who will participate in the opening of the Solutions Day
Leaders Day will feature:

Malala Yousufzai (Pakistan), Nobel Peace Prize laureate and UN Messenger of Peace
Priyanka Chopra Jonas (India), Actress and UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador
Angelique Kidjo (Benin), Singer and UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador
Vanessa Nakate (Uganda), Climate Activist and newly appointed UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador (as of 15 September)

Vision Statement of the Secretary-General on Transforming Education

Education is a fundamental human right. It has long held a special place in the hearts and minds of people across the world, and for good reason. Throughout history, it has been a source of personal dignity and empowerment and a driving force for the advancement of social, economic, political, and cultural development. Yet today, beset by inequalities and struggling to adjust to the needs of the 21st century, education is in crisis. The impacts of this crisis play out over time and often go unseen. But they are profound and will be felt for decades to come. If we are to transform our world by 2030 as envisaged by the Sustainable Development Goals, then the international community must give this crisis the attention it deserves. We must respond decisively, with conviction, imagination, and in solidarity to transform education. Informed by an extensive and inclusive preparatory process, we offer this Vision Statement to Member States and the global public to support our joint efforts towards that transformation, to contribute to the upcoming Summit of the Future, and as a manifesto for collective action.






Remarks by PM Modi at the SCO Summit : Making India a manufacturing hub (16/09/2022)

DATE: 16 SEP 2022

Original in Hindi

Excellencies,

I heartily congratulate President Mirziyoyev for SCO’s effective leadership in this year’s challenging global and regional environment.

Today, when the whole world is facing the challenges of economic recovery after the pandemic, the role of SCO becomes very important. SCO member countries contribute about 30 percent of global GDP, and 40 percent of the world’s population also lives in SCO countries. India supports greater cooperation and mutual trust among SCO members. The pandemic and the crisis in Ukraine caused many obstacles in global supply chains, due to which the whole world is facing an unprecedented energy and food crisis. SCO must make efforts to develop reliable, resilient and diversified supply chains in our region. This will require better connectivity, as well as it will be important that we all give each other full right to transit.

Excellencies,

We are making progress on making India a manufacturing hub. India’s young and talented workforce makes us naturally competitive. India’s economy is expected to grow by 7.5 percent this year, which will be the highest among the world’s largest economies. A lot of focus is also being given on the proper use of technology in our people-centric development model. We are supporting innovation in every sector. Today, there are more than 70,000 Start-ups in India, of which more than 100 are unicorns. Our experience can also be useful for many other SCO members. For this purpose, we are ready to share our experience with SCO member countries by establishing a new Special Working Group on Start-ups and Innovation.

Excellencies,

The world faces another major challenge today – and that is ensuring the food security of our citizens. One possible solution to this problem is to promote the cultivation and consumption of millets. Millets are a superfood that has been grown for thousands of years, not just in SCO countries, but in many parts of the world, and is a traditional, nutritious, and low-cost alternative to dealing with the food crisis. The year 2023 will be celebrated as the UN International Year of Millets. We should consider organizing a ‘Millet Food Festival’ under the SCO.

India is today one of the most affordable destinations for medical and wellness tourism in the world. WHO Global Centre for Traditional Medicine was inaugurated in Gujarat in April 2022. This will be WHO’s first and only global centre for traditional medicine. We must increase cooperation on traditional medicine among SCO countries. For this, India will take the initiative for a new SCO Working Group on Traditional Medicine.

Before I conclude, I would again like to thank President Mirziyoyev for the excellent conduct of today’s meeting and his warm hospitality.

Thank you so much!


SCO-Shanghai Cooperation Organisation




Alarm about Childhood Vaccinations: A Persistent Panic? – Brian Martin-29/04/2022

The vaccination issue is also a scientific controversy, suggesting the value of drawing on insights from controversy studies. Like many other public scientific controversies, in the public debate over vaccination the two main sides are highly polarised: there is little space or encouragement for intermediate positions. There are groups involved with vested interests in vaccination, enabling a continuation of the debate irrespective of any new evidence.

Alarm about Childhood Vaccinations: A Persistent Panic?

Brian Martin
University of Wollongong, Australia; bmartin@uow.edu.au

Published: 29 April 2022

Abstract: Some threats to the social order, such as crime, drugs and terrorism, give rise to ongoing alarms. To understand both the alarms and their persistence, it is useful to draw on two bodies of theory. Moral panic theory addresses alarms about groups or activities that transgress social norms, proposing several characteristic features, but does not explain why a moral panic would persist. Several concepts from studies of scientific controversies, including the lack of impact of new evidence, help to explain how a moral panic might continue indefinitely. To illustrate the combined use of moral panic and controversy theory, the case study of the alarm over unvaccinated children and criticisms of childhood vaccines is used. Persistent panics potentially have several negative consequences, especially for groups targeted as causing a danger.

Keywords: moral panics; scientific controversies; vaccination

Introduction

A moral panic is an alarm in society about a group or activity that is seen as transgressing social boundaries, posing a threat to the moral order. Sociologist Stanley Cohen conceptualised moral panics, using the examples of the Mods and the Rockers in Britain in the 1960s.1 These groups, through their dress and behaviour, challenged conventional moral expectations. Cohen called them “folk devils”.

Since Cohen’s formulation, many social scientists have studied moral panics, in the process proposing modifications or extensions of the original idea.2 Among the host of examples of moral panics that have been named or examined are youth, girl gangs, AIDS, social media and sex on the screen.

In some cases, moral panics may seem relatively harmless, being in retrospect little more than a manifestation of current moral strictures. However, many panics have significant consequences for the stigmatised group, namely the folk devils, and can lead to laws, policies and practices with far-reaching effects.

Of special interest are panics that involve major social mobilisations over a lengthy period, with ongoing impacts. Examples are the war on drugs, the war on crime and the war on terror. In each case the “war” has continued for decades and has had drastic consequences for individuals, groups and entire countries caught up in campaigns of attempted eradication.

In each of these examples, the so-called war has served to define and unify an in-group by vilifying an out-group. The out-groups are variously users of illegal drugs, criminals and terrorists. By stigmatising these groups, the rest of society is sanctified: the danger to the in-group is expelled symbolically, and sometimes sent to prison or death.

Underlying the concept of moral panic is the assumption that a society’s response to folk devils is unreasonable or disproportionate to any danger.3 After all, if the Mods and Rockers in Cohen’s day had posed a significant physical danger to members of society, then it would have been sensible to raise alarms about them. Crime and terrorism undoubtedly pose a danger to society, so to call the war on crime or the war on terror a moral panic is based on the assumption that these “wars” constitute a reaction disproportionate to the danger, or perhaps a reaction that perpetuates and aggravates the danger. (The issue of proportionality is addressed later.)

Moral panic theory has most commonly been applied to relatively transient issues, ones that in retrospect seem misguided or even amusing, as revealing more about society than about the folk devil in question. Sustained alarm-based mobilisations, such as the wars on crime, drugs and terrorism, have attracted extensive popular and scholarly attention, but more commonly from the framework of social problems than moral panics.4 This raises the question of whether using a moral panic analysis provides useful insights into persistent panics.

Cohen’s original formulation of moral panics has been modified and extended in various ways. For example, it has been linked to processes of moral regulation,5 and has been applied to climate change in contrasting ways, with folk devils in the issue being seen to be climate sceptics6 or climate scientists.7 Moral panics have been contrasted with “moral breaches” in which folk devils have been treated as victims rather than threats to the moral order.8

The approach here is to analyse a particular long-standing social issue using a moral panic framework to see what insights it can provide. For this purpose, the starting point is close to the original formulation of moral panic theory by Cohen and his interpreters. The issue addressed is vaccination, a highly contentious topic. In the next section, the usual moral panic stages and features are presented and mapped onto the vaccination controversy. After this, the issue of whether alarm about vaccine hesitancy and vaccine critics is proportionate to the danger they pose is addressed. At this point in the analysis, concepts from the study of scientific controversies are introduced and applied to the vaccination debate, helping explain the persistence of the vaccination controversy. In the conclusion, the relevance of this analysis to other issues is outlined.

The focus here will be on childhood vaccines, in particular the ones recommended by governments for all children for the past few decades and that have been the focus of public discussion about vaccination during this time.9 The advent of Covid10 and the development of vaccines to prevent or ameliorate the disease have generated a huge new set of vaccine debates, for example over adverse reactions, mandatory vaccination and vaccine passports. Given the intense publicity and contention over Covid vaccines, it can be difficult to reflect back on the concerns raised about childhood vaccines. The primary reason for excluding Covid vaccines from this analysis is that concerns about them are too new for any associated panic to be considered persistent. Perhaps by the year 2030 it will be possible to judge whether alarms about critics of Covid vaccines have been “persistent”. Nevertheless, some of the arguments presented here may also apply to Covid vaccines.

Vaccination Matters

Vaccination involves exposing a person to a small dose of an agent, called a vaccine, with the aim of stimulating the immune system so that the person is resistant to exposure to a virus or a bacterium causing a disease. For example, the polio vaccine contains small amounts of modified versions of polio viruses designed to stimulate the immune system but not cause polio.

Vaccines have been developed for a large number of infectious diseases, and many more are in development. Governments recommend that children receive specified vaccines at particular ages, for example, in Australia, hepatitis B vaccine at birth and the combined vaccine for measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) at 12 and 18 months, as well as many other vaccines.11

Vaccines are supposed to provide protection against full-blown disease, but sometimes immunity is not sufficiently stimulated, or wears off over time. Furthermore, some people receive little or no benefit from certain vaccines, for instance very young children and people whose immune systems are compromised, for example due to drugs to treat cancer.

An important concept is herd immunity. For infectious agents that spread from person to person, if very few people are susceptible to the agent, then it has difficulty spreading—local outbreaks are more likely to contract over time than to expand—thus providing protection to the community, known as the herd, hence the term herd immunity.12 The level of immunity needed for herd immunity depends on the disease; for a highly infectious disease like measles, authorities may seek vaccination rates of 95% or more.

Vaccination is routinely lauded as one of the greatest contributions to public health. It is backed by nearly all governments and health authorities, as well as by nearly all researchers in the area.13 Nevertheless, there has been opposition to vaccination from its earliest days.

Critics of vaccination raise a number of concerns.14 Most important are adverse reactions to vaccination, which affect a small percentage of people and can sometimes lead to disability or death. Some critics question the value of vaccination, arguing that its benefits are not as large as claimed. Critics usually argue that parents should be able to choose whether or not their children are vaccinated.

The vaccination issue is commonly posed as a conflict between supporters and opponents, between pro-vaxxers and anti-vaxxers. This misrepresents the diversity of views in the area. Many parents want their children to receive most but not all vaccines, or to receive them all spaced out in a schedule different from the recommended one. Some proponents consider all such parents to be anti-vaxxers, so classifying anyone who does not adhere to the recommended vaccination schedule. Also muddying the picture are parents who support vaccination but whose children are not fully vaccinated due to obstacles, for example difficulties in accessing a doctor; such parents outnumber those conscientiously opposed to vaccination. The misleading dichotomisation into pro-vax and anti-vax treats vaccination as a unity, to be supported or opposed in full, and lays the basis for stigmatising critics.15

In the past two decades, alarm about reluctance to vaccinate and criticism of vaccination has become a frequent theme in countries such as Australia and the US. In 2019, the World Health Organization declared vaccine hesitancy—“the reluctance or refusal to vaccinate despite the availability of vaccines”—to be one of the top ten threats to public health worldwide.16 Here, I initially examine this continuing concern using moral panic theory.

Kenneth Thompson in his book Moral Panics lists five elements or stages in a moral panic.17 These can readily be related to the vaccination issue, at least in Australia, the US and some other countries.

First, a group or activity is defined as a threat to the community. Children who are not fully vaccinated are seen as a threat to other children. In the US, this threat is used to justify barring unvaccinated children from school. Parents who do not ensure that their children are vaccinated are often seen as responsible for disease outbreaks.18 In some circles, such parents are shunned. In Australia, they are penalised by receiving a reduced level of government welfare payments. People who openly question vaccination are seen as the greatest threat. One particular critic, gastroenterologist Andrew Wakefield, has been widely condemned for undermining trust in vaccination. He is the most prominent folk devil in the panic about vaccination criticism.19

Second, in Thompson’s model, there is a suitable media portrayal of the threat. In Australia and the US, cases of measles are newsworthy, with media reports commonly quoting authorities who comment about the danger and blame “anti-vaxxers” for the danger.20

Third, public concern builds rapidly. Vaccination does not fit this feature of moral panics particularly well. Alarm about infectious diseases has been around for decades. There are some periods when concern grew about particular diseases, but concern about vaccine scepticism and hesitancy seems to have developed gradually.

Fourth, opinion leaders and authorities respond. This is certainly the case for vaccination. Opinion leaders, including politicians and health authorities, have raised the alarm about vaccine-preventable diseases. As noted above, governments have taken measures to promote vaccination. The most extreme measures are in some US states, such as California, where religious and conscientious objections to vaccination have been disallowed for the purposes of children attending school.

Fifth, in Thompson’s model, eventually the panic fades away, with or without social changes. In the case of vaccination, the panic is in full swing. Some major changes have been made, and more can be anticipated.

In summary, the moral panic framework applies reasonably well to vaccination, except that concerns about vaccine critics have developed more gradually and been more persistent than the typical panics studied. Vaccination might be classified as a slow-motion panic, or a sustained panic, in contrast to relatively short-lived or localised concerns about Mods, Rockers, satanic rituals, school violence or teenage pregnancy.

Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yuhuda provide a somewhat different set of indicators for moral panics: heightened concern over the behaviour of a group; hostility towards the group; general consensus that the threat from the group is real and serious; alarm about the group’s activities being disproportionate to its threat; alarm rising suddenly and then fading away suddenly.21 The first three of these—concern, hostility and consensus—apply to vaccination, and the question of disproportionality will be addressed in the next section. The final indicator, volatility, does not apply: concern about vaccination is persistent rather than transient.

Since the original formulation of moral panic theory, there have been several new developments: the mass media are no longer so dominant; the concept of moral panic has gained currency outside the academy; folk devils can fight back, including by using social media; and entrepreneurs can try to manufacture moral panics for commercial reasons.22 However, these factors seem not to have much effect on persistent panics, which continue much the same as before.

Proportionality

In applying the moral panic framework to vaccination, there is an important issue to address: proportionality. Supporters of vaccination can and do argue that unvaccinated children and vaccine critics are actually a serious danger to public health and that strong measures to ensure high levels of vaccination are warranted. In other words, if there is a panic, it is a reasonable response proportionate to the risk.
Addressing the issue of proportionality is challenging because it goes to the heart of vaccination as a scientific controversy, a topic introduced in the next section. On many points there are claims and counterclaims seemingly without end, so reaching a definitive endpoint can seem impossible. Rather than trying to make a conclusive statement about proportionality, all that will be attempted here is to show that a plausible case can be made that a generalised alarm about unvaccinated children and vaccine critics is disproportionate to the danger they pose, and hence that strong measures to ensure high levels of childhood vaccination for all vaccine-preventable illnesses are excessive in relation to the danger they are intended to counter, recognising that any conclusion in this area is bound to be disputed. What constitutes a “strong measure” is a matter of judgement, and can be debated. Barring unvaccinated children from attending school is treated here as a strong measure.23

It is important to acknowledge that not being vaccinated for a particular disease can permit harm to a person’s health and, should they contract the disease, they may possibly infect others. In addition, someone who questions vaccination and discourages this person from being vaccinated can be contributing to harm to the person’s health. The question is not whether non-vaccination and vaccine criticism are potentially harmful but rather whether the alarm about them is proportionate to the danger they pose. That is a complex issue for a number of reasons, so it is worthwhile unpacking some of the assumptions often made in discussions about vaccination.

In talking about a panic about vaccination, it is useful to distinguish between two related alarms. The first is alarm, or simply concern, about children who have not been vaccinated. The second is alarm about people who raise concerns about vaccination—vaccine critics—and about people who have concerns, even if not expressed, something called vaccine hesitancy. These two alarms are related in various ways, the most important of which is that vaccine critics may cause others to develop reservations about vaccination.

For the purposes of assessing whether alarms associated with vaccination are unnecessarily great, it is useful to refer to two claims, each corresponding to one of the two related alarms. The first claim is that the panic about children who have not been vaccinated is disproportionate to the danger they pose. The second claim is that the panic about vaccine critics is disproportionate to the danger they pose.

To look at the issue of proportionality, there is yet another complication. Vaccination, as a practice, is not a unitary entity but consists of different vaccines for different diseases. Much of the alarm about unvaccinated children and vaccine critics is undifferentiated: all vaccines are packaged together so far as public discourse is concerned. But when looking at risk and proportionality, it is important to note that the contents of the package are not uniform.

The dynamics of different vaccine-preventable diseases differ considerably. Some are highly contagious, most notably measles, whereas others are less so: tetanus is not contagious at all. Therefore, the collective benefits from widespread vaccination vary considerably from one vaccine to another. Similarly, the individual benefits vary enormously. Without vaccines, some diseases previously infected nearly every child, for example mumps and chickenpox; vaccines prevent most of these illnesses, but with variable personal benefits, since only a few who contract mumps or chickenpox suffer long-lasting harm. On the other hand, without vaccines, some diseases, for example rotavirus and pneumococcal disease, affect only a small proportion of the population. More generally, the harms caused by different diseases vary dramatically from person to person. For example, many people have HPV (human papillomavirus) in their system, but only in a small proportion does this lead to cervical cancer. Then there are the risks from vaccines, which can vary from one to another. Some vaccines lead to vanishingly small numbers of reports of adverse events, whereas many more adverse events are reported for others, such as the HPV vaccine.24

Because the patterns of vaccine-preventable diseases vary so considerably, as do the benefits and risks of vaccines for different diseases, it can be argued that there should be separate policies for different vaccines, or at least groups of vaccines that have similar impacts, rather than a single category of “vaccination”. Various analogies can be drawn, for example to transport or sport. The danger from riding a motorbike is, per kilometre, far greater than the danger from travelling by passenger jet, so it makes sense to raise concerns about specific modes of travel rather than transport in general. Similarly, the danger to health from boxing is far greater than the danger from swimming, so it makes sense to raise concerns about specific sports rather than sport in general.

Here, I will distinguish between claim 1-vax, that the alarm about children who are not fully vaccinated is disproportionate to the danger they pose, and claim 1-measles, the alarm that children who are not vaccinated against measles is disproportionate to the danger they pose, and other analogous claims such as 1-polio and 1-rotavirus. Similarly, I will distinguish between claims 2-vax, 2-measles, et al., that the alarm about people who raise concerns about vaccination in general, or about specific vaccines, is disproportionate to the danger they pose.

The argument here is that there is strong evidence for more than one of the specific claims in the 1 category and, ipso facto, for the corresponding claims in the 2 category. There is also evidence for the more general claim 1-vax, but it is not as strong as for some of the specific claims in category 1. Note again that these are claims about disproportionality, not about the benefits of vaccines. It is quite possible for a vaccine to have nett benefits (for individuals and the population) yet for the alarm about unvaccinated children and about vaccine criticism to be excessive compared to the danger they pose.

First consider 1-polio: the claim that alarm about children not being vaccinated against polio is disproportionate to the danger they pose. Not being vaccinated against polio is sufficient for a child to be considered unvaccinated and hence, in the US, unable to attend school without an exemption, and some states allow exemptions only for medical reasons. Also, not being vaccinated against polio is enough for the parents of such a child to be given the label “anti-vax” and otherwise stigmatised. In short, not being vaccinated against polio is enough, in the US at least, for invocation of the full set of measures and attitudes associated with vaccine refusers.

What is the danger? In the US, there have been no cases of polio for two decades. The level of vaccination needed to achieve herd immunity is probably less than 90%.25 Hence there should be no worry about a resurgence of polio due to 10% of children not being vaccinated. Most parents ensure that their children have polio vaccinations. The alarm about children who are not vaccinated against polio, because it is wrapped up with alarm about children who are not vaccinated against other diseases, or not vaccinated at all, is thus excessive compared to the danger.

Second consider 1-tetanus. Not being vaccinated against tetanus is sufficient for a US child to be considered unvaccinated. Herd immunity is irrelevant because tetanus is not contagious. Hence the alarm about children who are not vaccinated against tetanus is excessive compared to the danger—certainly the danger to others.26

Third consider 1-mumps. Prior to the availability of a vaccine, mumps was “a nuisance widely considered so harmless it was a frequent butt of jokes.”27 There was no alarm about dangers from mumps, but with the availability of a vaccine came a campaign to make people fear the disease by emphasising the most concerning effects, however rare or unproven. This set a pattern for other vaccine-preventable diseases: their dangers were highlighted and all the diseases were lumped together in a single category, regardless of their danger.28

So, next consider 1-vax, the claim that the alarm about unvaccinated children is disproportionate to the danger they pose. This claim can be considered an amalgam of the claims for each vaccine in the schedule. A child who has received only three of the four doses of the inactivated polio vaccine recommended in the US, while receiving all other vaccines, is considered unvaccinated. Alarm about the danger posed by this child is, if 1-polio is accepted, disproportionate. To rebut 1-vax, it is necessary to show that some unvaccinated children pose such a danger that public alarm is warranted. To consider this issue, it is useful to look at four risk comparisons: deaths, collective benefits, economic costs and resurgence. Of various possible comparators, here alcohol is used most commonly because reducing alcohol consumption has both individual and collective benefits.29

The first risk comparison concerns deaths. The number of deaths from vaccine-preventable childhood diseases is extremely low compared to those from many other causes. For example, the number of deaths per year of US children from measles is close to zero, and there are very few childhood deaths from other infectious diseases.30 This can be compared to the number of excess deaths due to drinking alcohol, which is far greater.31 Even though vaccination rates in Australia are high and stable,32 the government withdrew financial benefits to push rates even higher.33 Yet there is no great alarm about people who drink alcohol or those who foster drinking, such as companies that sell and advertise alcoholic drinks.34

The second risk comparison concerns collective benefits. Proponents of vaccination continually highlight the importance of herd immunity, by which high levels of individual immunity to a disease protect those who cannot be immunised. However, the same sort of collective benefit would result from lower levels of drinking: as well as benefits to drinkers themselves, there would be benefits to others in the form of less domestic violence and fewer traffic accidents. A community of teetotallers would provide collective health benefits. Governments have introduced some measures to reduce the dangers, for example random breath testing. However, the level of alarm about alcohol is far less than that about vaccine-preventable disease. There are news stories about a few cases of measles35 but it is rare to see a news story about a few people who became drunk.

The third risk comparison concerns economic costs. Illnesses often result in loss of income or interruption to schooling. It can reasonably be argued that high levels of vaccination for a particular disease, even if the disease caused no deaths or disability, could result in considerable cost savings, thus benefiting the community through lowered expenditures. However, do cost savings provide a suitable rationale for a continual alarm about unvaccinated children and vaccine critics? There would be cost savings from a reduction in alcohol consumption, soft drink consumption, and various other changes in diet and behaviour, but failure to make such changes, while increasing costs to the community, seldom lead to alarms. Another possible comparison is with exercise: lack of exercise contributes to ill health, yet there is little in the way of a continual alarm about individuals who do not exercise and the costs they impose on the community through their greater levels of ill health.

The fourth risk comparison concerns resurgence of disease. It is important to address the argument that rates of vaccination-preventable diseases are low today precisely because vaccines are successful. If this is the case, then alarm about possible declines in vaccination rates, and about the influence of vaccine critics, might be warranted, namely proportionate to the danger. This is analogous to arguing that alarm about declining investment in fire prevention, such as fire engines and fire drills, is warranted even though the damage due to fires is fairly small, because the damage might increase.

How can this argument be addressed? One possibility is to compare rates of disease and death due to vaccination-preventable diseases in countries with and without high levels of vaccination. The challenge is finding comparator countries that are otherwise similar, and this is likely only for diseases where governments in some countries recommend vaccination whereas those in other countries do not. Furthermore, to the extent that recommendations vary according to the circumstances, as they should, including varying assessments of risks, benefits, costs and priorities, this sort of comparison will not be very informative. Another possibility is to examine rates of disease and death in the same country before and after introduction of mass vaccination for specific diseases. If the rates of disease before mass vaccination were large and seen as unacceptable, then it can reasonably be argued that concern about declining rates of vaccination today, and about vaccine critics, is warranted.

There is yet another complication. In before-and-after-mass-vaccination comparisons, should the measure be the number of cases of disease, the economic cost of disease or the number of cases of disability and death? If someone has the flu or mumps or chickenpox and recovers, is this of sufficient import to raise an alarm?

Vaccination proponents regularly cite the massive death toll from influenza in the aftermath of World War I, the high levels of deaths from measles and diphtheria a century ago, and the human cost of polio before vaccinations. However, a possible resurgence of infectious diseases does not provide a rationale for present vaccination policies. For highly infectious diseases such as measles and pertussis, the death rate prior to mass vaccination in countries such as Australia and the US was not all that great compared to today’s major causes of death.36 Furthermore, if death rates for such diseases started to escalate due to lower levels of immunity, it would be straightforward to protect the population by increased or improved vaccination.

The scare about mass death from infectious diseases sometimes is about a new virus, such as swine flu or bird flu. But current vaccines (pre-Covid) are unlikely to provide protection against a new virus37—that is precisely why new diseases warrant concern. It makes little sense to justify high levels of community immunity to polio or hepatitis as protection against a deadly new coronavirus.38

This examination of the rationales shows that there is a lack of strong evidence warranting alarms about unvaccinated children and vaccine critics. This is especially true when children are considered unvaccinated because, although receiving some or most vaccines, they have not received all of them, or not within the recommended time frame. In other words, they are partially vaccinated or have had their vaccines spaced out, but are categorised as unvaccinated and considered a cause for alarm, as evidenced by policies banning them from attending school. The possibility of a resurgence of an infectious disease does not offer a sensible rationale for creating alarm about the relatively small number of children who have not received some or all recommended vaccines.

It is reasonable to have a concern about infectious disease and to take measures to prevent illness and death. Furthermore, it is plausible that the nett benefits of widespread vaccination, in terms of health and cost, are significant. The point here is that the alarm about unvaccinated children and criticism of vaccines is disproportionate to the danger when comparisons are made with other causes of preventable death and disease.

In summary, there is strong evidence for claims 1-polio, 1-tetanus and 1-mumps, namely that alarms about children unvaccinated against these diseases are disproportionate to the dangers they pose; there is similar evidence for many other claims in the 1 category. This evidence is also strong for claims 2-polio et al., namely that alarms about critics of vaccines for these particular diseases are disproportionate to the dangers they, the critics, pose. As for claims 1-vax and 2-vax, there is also more general evidence, via risk comparisons, regarding deaths, collective benefits, economic costs and resurgence, though this evidence is not as strong as for many of the specific claims such as 1-polio and 2-polio. In addition, claims 1-vax and 2-vax can be thought of as an amalgamation of various specific claims, such as 1-polio and 2-polio, for which there is strong evidence, indicating that the alarm about anyone who is not fully vaccinated or who criticises any vaccine is far too sweeping, incorporating as it does a disparate collection of partially unvaccinated individuals. Although by the assessment here, the evidence is strong, it is neither definitive nor uncontested. It is to be expected that vaccination proponents will argue that concerns about less-than-fully-vaccinated children and vaccine critics are fully justified. Note again that the argument here is about a public alarm, not about the benefits of vaccination. It is quite possible to conclude that measures to promote vaccination are beneficial to individuals and society, while at the same time the alarm about unvaccinated children and vaccine critics is disproportionate to the danger they pose.

Pulling together these strands, persistent moral panics are likely to have these features:
A group or set of ideas defined as a threat to the community
Widespread condemnation of the group or ideas
Attacks on the group or ideas by some politicians and media
Alarm disproportionate to the danger.

Dynamics of Scientific Controversies

However, there is more to the vaccination issue than these features. To get a handle on other features, it is useful to turn to studies of scientific controversies.39 Some such controversies proceed primarily inside the scientific community, for example the dispute over gravitational waves.40 The vaccination debate is an example of a public scientific controversy: there is debate and disagreement both within professional circles and in the wider public sphere.41 Examples include debates over climate change, nuclear power, pesticides, fluoridation, genetic modification and microwaves—and vaccination.42 Among the common features of such controversies are polarisation, the role of interests, the limited impact of new evidence and the sidelining of alternatives.

Polarisation refers to the coalescence of partisan positions into two opposing camps. This is most obvious in the language used: pro-vax and anti-vax. In polarised controversies, partisans deploy standard sets of evidence and argument, and make no concessions to opponents. Public scientific controversies typically involve disagreements about risks, benefits, ethics and decision-making. On all four of these areas, partisans always line up together. Proponents of vaccination say the benefits are large, the risks are minuscule, seeking high levels of community protection through herd immunity is the ethical option, and decisions should be made by health authorities informed by experts. Critics of vaccination say the benefits are overrated, the risks are greater than normally acknowledged, that informed and uncoerced choice is the ethical option, and decisions should be made by individuals and parents. Proponents and critics often talk past each other, not addressing issues and arguments presented by their opponents.43

The significance of this sort of polarisation is that intermediate positions are marginalised. No one prominent in the vaccination debate says the benefits are large and the risks small, yet there should be no encouragement to vaccinate. Nor does anyone say the benefits are overrated and the risks understated, yet the nett benefit warrants strong pressures for vaccination. Anyone of stature who adopts such an intermediate position will have aspects of their stands trumpeted by opponents and be shunned by their erstwhile allies: there are enormous pressures to join one side or the other, or to drop out of the debate. An example is Robert Sears (“Dr Bob”), a US doctor who has recommended modification of vaccination schedules.44 Although he supports vaccination, he has been condemned by advocates.45 Because support for vaccination is the dominant position, anyone who deviates from the standard line is likely to be categorised as anti-vax.

In many public scientific controversies, there are groups with an interest—a stake—in supporting a position. They do not need to be lead players, but their presence provides a continuing controversy driver. In the case of vaccination, pharmaceutical companies that manufacture and sell vaccines have the most obvious vested interest. The companies have not played a strong overt role in the vaccination debate but, at least according to critics, their influence on research and testing of vaccines can be influential.

The medical profession also has a stake in vaccination, because for decades it has lauded vaccination as one of the greatest ever contributions to public health. It would be embarrassing to admit that some vaccines are unnecessary, that the vaccination schedule is too full, or that the adverse effects of some vaccines outweigh their benefits.46
Sociologists use the term “moral entrepreneurs” to refer to groups that promote concern, or panic, about a social issue.47 In the case of vaccination, the groups most active in this process are pro-vaccination campaigners, sections of the medical profession, some politicians and sections of the media. Many members of the public join in the process. The controversy persists because the promoters face resistance, from vaccine-critical groups and from parents who question vaccination, sometimes seeking exemptions or modification of schedules. Some authors have argued that vaccine hesitancy derives from personal experience—in particular, parents’ experiences of adverse effects from vaccinations—and that vaccine-critical groups are the result of such parents seeking support more than the cause of their concern.48 In any case, the existence of resistance to vaccine government recommendations enables campaigners to continue to stoke the panic.

One of the striking features of long-lasting scientific controversies is that new evidence seems to have little impact.49 Typically, partisans trumpet new findings favourable to their position while ignoring, dismissing or attacking unfavourable findings.50 Vaccine critics rarely give any attention to the large volume of research supporting vaccination published in journals such as Vaccine. Similarly, vaccine promoters seldom mention studies arguing that widespread childhood vaccination for chickenpox may be leading to an increase in shingles in adults.51

Another feature of many public scientific controversies is the sidelining of alternatives. In many cases, there are different ways to achieve the goals of campaigners, but these are subordinated to winning against opponents.

The goal of both supporters and critics of vaccination is to protect and improve health, especially children’s health. This is often forgotten in the heated condemnations of the other side. The focus of the confrontation is vaccination, but there are other ways to promote health, including ways to improve immunity to disease. Research has shown the value of good diet, exercise, mindfulness and sleep in improving immunity.52 Some parents who have concerns about vaccines seek other ways to ensure their children’s wellbeing, and pay attention to some of these areas,53 but proponents of vaccination seldom mention other routes to immunity and health.54

From this perspective, vaccine critics are convenient scapegoats, justifying an alarm about vaccine hesitancy and diverting attention from other paths for improving health. This brings controversy analysis in touch with moral panic analysis: the scapegoats are the folk devils.

Studies of scientific controversies thus suggest four additional features of persistent panics. The full set of features thus becomes:

A group or set of ideas defined as a threat to the community
Widespread condemnation of the group or ideas
Attacks or criticisms of the group or ideas by some politicians and media
Alarm disproportionate to the danger
Polarisation of partisan positions into two opposing camps
Groups with a stake in subduing opposition
Failure of new evidence to affect partisan positions
Marginalisation of alternatives.
Negative Consequences

In a persistent panic in which the alarm is disproportionate to the danger, there is an opportunity cost involved: excessive attention is given to a smaller danger, while larger dangers are relatively neglected. There is unfairness for groups targeted as sources of or responsibility for the danger. They, as the folk devils, are condemned and may be subject to harassment and discrimination.

In the usual formulation of moral panics, social changes result, and this includes new laws or selective enforcement of previously neglected laws. The new or newly enforced laws may represent institutionalised unfairness. They are also a key part of what makes a panic persistent: a return to the status quo ante requires changes to laws or enforcement practices.

These facets can be seen in the panic in the vaccination arena. As already noted, the alarm over vaccine criticism and hesitancy leads to relative neglect of other options for boosting immunity and for dealing with preventable causes of ill health. There have been extensive attacks on vaccine critics. In Australia, this has included abusive online commentary, complaints to government agencies, censorship of talks,55 and sending of pornography. The polarisation of the controversy has meant marginalisation of more respectful ways of dealing with vaccine hesitancy, based on non-judgemental conversations with parents, as advocated by some researchers.

There is an injustice involved in measures that are more punitive than necessary to address the likely harm averted. In Australia, parents whose children are not fully vaccinated are denied a portion of welfare benefits they would ordinarily receive. Most parents subject to these penalties are not opposed to vaccination, but have failed to have their children fully vaccinated for practical reasons, for example distance from doctors.56 Many of these parents are on low income, so government payments are crucial to their children’s welfare. The policy thus has a harmful effect on some children’s welfare.57

Conclusions

There have been many studies of crime, drug problems, terrorism and other issues in which there is a long-lasting alarm about dangers to society. To better understand the processes involved in such “persistent panics,” two bodies of theory are drawn upon, using the issue of the alarm over vaccination hesitancy and vaccine critics as an illustration.
Moral panic theory provides a useful framework for understanding how a group or practice can be identified as a threat to the moral order, stigmatised and targeted with adverse actions. The alleged threat serves to unify the community in opposition, drawing on us–them dynamics. However, most moral panic analyses have been of alarms that subside in a matter of months or a few years. This leaves unexplained the phenomenon of persistent panics, ones that continue for decades.

The study of scientific controversies offers several concepts that help explain persistence: polarisation, the role of groups with vested interests, the failure of new evidence to affect partisan positions, and the marginalisation of alternatives. These help to explain why some public scientific controversies, such as those over pesticides and fluoridation, continue largely unchanged over many decades. On the other hand, controversy researchers have less often addressed the phenomenon of alarm over challenges to dominant scientific views, something better addressed by moral panic theory.58

To illustrate the value of combining moral panic theory with controversy studies, the case study of vaccination is useful. The dominant view is that vaccination is beneficial and should be encouraged. But this isn’t all: in some countries for at least the past two decades, parents whose children are not fully vaccinated have become stigmatised, and public criticism of vaccination has been seen as a cause for alarm.
The response to vaccine critics and vaccination hesitancy shows several features of a moral panic, including identification of folk devils (the source of danger to the moral order), media amplification of the threat, responses by authorities, and alarm disproportionate to the danger.

The vaccination issue is also a scientific controversy, suggesting the value of drawing on insights from controversy studies. Like many other public scientific controversies, in the public debate over vaccination the two main sides are highly polarised: there is little space or encouragement for intermediate positions. There are groups involved with vested interests in vaccination, enabling a continuation of the debate irrespective of any new evidence. Finally, the prominence of the debate overshadows other options for improving children’s immunity and health.

The framework of moral panics can also be applied to the approach used by vaccine critics, which can involve trying to create an alarm about vaccine injuries and stigmatising of public health officials and other vaccination proponents. Vaccine critics have far fewer resources—money, jobs, authoritative endorsements, policies, infrastructure—than proponents, which can help to explain why the critics’ efforts have not created a panic except within restricted circles. If we imagine a different world in which alarm about vaccines is and remains greater than alarm about vaccine-preventable diseases, it is plausible that the same features of persistent panics would apply except with a different set of folk devils.

The combination of moral panic theory and controversy studies offers a way to understand persistent panics of various sorts, including panics over crime, drugs and terrorism. In each of these issues, there are stigmatised groups typical of the folk devils in moral panic theory: criminals, drug dealers and terrorists. These issues also show characteristics of public scientific controversies, for example the failure of new evidence to have any significant impact on continuation of the controversy. Therefore, it is safe to predict that these panics will not go away soon. Campaigners who are concerned about the injustices involved in “wars” on crime, drug and terror need to accept that logic and evidence are unlikely to make much difference, and to address the driving forces behind these persistent panics.

That said, addressing driving forces is a massive challenge, and even agreeing about what these driving forces are is likely to be difficult. All that can be done here is to note that a key feature of persistent panics is othering, including the stigmatisation of opponents, the folk devils. The categorisation of certain groups as enemies helps to foster solidarity within the in-group, with the consequence that there is an incentive to maintain an alarm. One counter to this process is fostering dialogue. For example, rather than stigmatising unvaccinated individuals and vaccine critics, engaging in respectful conversations may have more potential.59 The development of principles for challenging persistent panics remains to be done. That these panics have continued for decades, despite the efforts of many campaigners in a range of domains, shows that the challenge is enormous.

Acknowledgments
Thanks to Jason Delborne, Julia LeMonde, Sarah Monod de Froideville, Stephen Holden, and especially two anonymous reviewers for many valuable comments and suggestions.

1
Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2002).
2
For an overview of moral panic analyses, see Sarah Wright Monod, Making Sense of Moral Panics: A Framework for Research (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
3
In the preface to the third edition of his book, Cohen notes the importance of disproportionality to assessing a phenomenon as a moral panic.
4
Representative publications include Nils Christie, Crime Control as Industry: Towards Gulags, Western Style (London: Routledge, 1994); Johann Hari, Chasing the Scream: The First and Last Days of the War on Drugs (London: Bloomsbury, 2015); Lisa Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented “Terrorism” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). For an application of moral panic analysis to terrorism, see Gershon Shafir and Cynthia E. Schairer, “The war on terror as political moral panic,” in Lessons and Legacies of the War on Terror: From Moral Panics to Permanent War, eds. Gershon Shafir, Everard Meade and William J. Aceves (London: Taylor and Francis, 2013) 9–46.
5
Sean P. Hier, Dan Lett, Kevin Walby and André Smith, “Beyond folk devil resistance: Linking moral panic and moral regulation,” Criminology & Criminal Justice 11 (2011): 259–76.
6
Avi Brisman and Nigel South, “New ‘folk devils,’ denials and climate change: Applying the work of Stanley Cohen to green criminology and environmental harm,” Critical Criminology 23 (2015): 449–60.
7
Amanda Rohloff, Climate Change, Moral Panics, and Civilization (New York: Routledge, 2019).
8
Jennifer Carlson, “Moral panic, moral breach: Bernhard Goetz, George Zimmerman, and racialized news reporting in contested cases of self-defense,” Social Problems 63 (2016): 1–20. Carlson describes a “moral breach” in this way: “(1) it is characterized by competing, rather than complementary, narratives; (2) it reframes folk devils as victims and disrupts clear-cut allocations of blame; (3) it emphasizes harm to communities rather than harm to social order; and (4) it elicits calls for dialogue and acknowledgement rather than collective punishment and shaming” (p. 2).
9
To refer to childhood vaccines is a convenient shorthand given that some vaccines are recommended for adults as well as children, notably the flu vaccine. The focus is on vaccines recommended for all or nearly all people, thus excluding ones, such as anthrax or yellow fever vaccines, usually reserved only for those who might be exposed to specific infectious agents.
Young children are not in a position to make informed decisions about vaccination; decisions about childhood vaccines are most commonly made by their parents. This raises important ethical issues, but these are not central to the analysis here drawing on moral panic theory and controversy studies.
10
Covid is used here as shorthand for COVID-19, which in turn is shorthand for coronavirus disease of 2019, the disease caused by the virus labelled SARS-CoV-2.
11
Australian Government, Department of Health. National Immunisation Program Schedule. https://www.health.gov.au/health-topics/immunisation/immunisation-throughout-life/national-immunisation-program-schedule.
12
Scientists continue to analyse matters concerning herd immunity; there are many complications. For an introduction, see Ben Ashby and Alex Best, “Herd immunity,” Current Biology 31 (2021): R174–R7.
13
The case for vaccination is presented, for example, in F. E. Andre, R. Booy, H. L. Bock, J. Clemens, S. K. Datta, T. J. John, B. W. Lee, S. Lolekha, H. Peltola, T. A. Ruff, et al., “Vaccination greatly reduces disease, disability, death and inequity worldwide,” Journal of the World Health Organization 86 (2008): 140–6; Paul A. Offit and Louis M. Bell, Vaccines: What You Should Know, 3rd ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2003); Stanley A. Plotkin, Walter A. Orenstein and Paul A. Offit, Vaccines, 6th ed. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2013).
14
See for example Mateja Cernic, Ideological Constructs of Vaccination (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Vega Press, 2018); Louise Kuo Habakus and Mary Holland (eds.), Vaccine Epidemic: How Corporate Greed, Biased Science, and Coercive Government Threaten Our Human Rights, Our Health, and Our Children (New York: Skyhorse, 2011); Richard Halvorsen, The Truth about Vaccines: How We Are Used as Guinea Pigs without Knowing It (London: Gibson Square, 2007).
15
On the shortcomings of the concepts of “anti-vaxxer” and “antivaccine movement”, see Gabriela Capurro, Josh Greenberg, Eve Dubé and Michelle Driedger, “Measles, moral regulation and the social construction of risk: Media narratives of ‘anti-vaxxers’ and the 2015 Disneyland outbreak,” Canadian Journal of Sociology 43 (2018): 25–47; Jeremy K. Ward, “Rethinking the antivaccine movement concept: A case study of public criticism of the swine flu vaccine’s safety in France,” Social Science & Medicine 159 (2016): 48–57.
16
World Health Organization, “Ten threats to global health in 2019,” 2019, https://www.who.int/emergencies/ten-threats-to-global-health-in-2019.
17
Kenneth Thompson, Moral Panics (London: Routledge, 1998).
18
For example, Steven Reinberg, “Low vaccination rates and Disney measles outbreak,” WebMD, 16 March 2015, quoting prominent vaccination promoter Paul Offit as saying, “I have never seen so much anger towards parents who are choosing not to vaccinate.”
19
For example, Jeremy Laurance, “Andrew Wakefield’s MMR vaccine theory has been discredited for years, but he just won’t go away,” Independent, 5 May 2018. This is just one of thousands of stories. The UK General Medical Council withdrew Wakefield’s licence to practise medicine, but this did not mean he was no longer a gastroenterologist, which is a medical research appellation. Wakefield’s treatment has been the subject of a large body of commentary, pro and con. For a treatment by an historian of science, see Mark A. Largent, Vaccine: The Debate in Modern America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 94–137.
20
For example, Autumn Johnson, “Anti-vaxxers to blame for Disneyland measles outbreak, report concludes,” Patch, 18 March 2018.
21
Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yuhuda, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 33–41.
22
Angela McRobbie and Sarah L. Thornton, “Rethinking ‘moral panic’ for multi-mediated social worlds,” British Journal of Sociology 46 (1995): 559–74.
23
A number of philosophers have argued the case for compulsory vaccination: Jessica Flanigan, “A defense of compulsory vaccination,” HEC Forum 26, no. 1 (2014): 5–25; Alberto Giubilini, “An argument for compulsory vaccination: The taxation analogy,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 37, no. 3 (2020): 446–66; Alberto Giubilini and Julian Savulescu, “Vaccination, risks, and freedom: The seat belt analogy,” Public Health Ethics 12, no. 3 (2019): 237–49; Roland Pierik, “Mandatory vaccination: an unqualified defence,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 35, no. 2 (2018): 381–98. (I thank a reviewer for these citations.) It is quite possible to accept the arguments for compulsory vaccination and yet to consider the alarm about unvaccinated children and vaccine critics as disproportionate to the danger they pose.
24
See figures reported in Lucija Tomljenovic and Christopher A. Shaw, “Human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine policy and evidence-based medicine: Are they at odds?” Annals of Medicine 45 (2013): 182–93, for example Figure 2 on p. 185. Note that Tomljenovic and Shaw’s research has been fiercely criticised by defenders of HPV vaccination programmes.
25
Paul E. M. Fine, “Herd immunity: History, theory, practice,” Epidemiologic Reviews 15, no. 2 (1993): 265–302.
26
There is a complication: tetanus vaccination is normally part of the DTP (diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis) triple vaccine, so in practice it is unlikely that a child would receive vaccines for diphtheria and pertussis but not tetanus. Parents who want to pick and choose vaccines for their children may have limited options. However, this does not change the logic of the 1-tetanus claim.
27
Elena Conis, Vaccine Nation: America’s Changing Relationship with Immunization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 64.
28
Ibid., 81: “… as the seventies progressed, all of the vaccine-preventable diseases were increasingly portrayed as a monolithic category whose members were uniformly threatening to the health of American families. … campaign materials issued by local health departments and the flurry of accompanying media reports all contained the same message: any disease that could be prevented with a vaccine was dangerous, if not deadly, to children. In such accounts, any difference in risk or severity among infections was depicted as negligible.” [emphasis in the original].
29
It is possible to argue that the danger from unvaccinated children and vaccine critics warrants alarm, and that the problem is that there is not sufficient alarm about other dangers, such as those from alcohol. Economists deal with comparative risks by, for example, calculating the cost of preventing one death through various measures, for example installing handrails or mandating airbags in cars. Setting aside the value judgements involved in such calculations, this does not solve the problem of determining whether alarm about a risk should be considered warranted, exaggerated or insufficient: perhaps greater or lesser alarms would be appropriate for a whole suite of risks. Few moral panic analyses address this general issue, seemingly setting the criteria for disproportionality by observing discrepancies from attitudes and policies concerning commonly accepted risks. That is the path taken here.
30
Some assessments of mortality take into account the number of years of life forgone, so that the death of a child involves the loss of more years of potential life than the death of an adult, especially the death of an elderly person. This would mean that the deaths of children from infectious diseases would weigh more heavily than the deaths of adults from, say, cirrhosis of the liver. Another complication is that some children die from domestic violence, much of it perpetrated by alcoholic parents. In addition, children of alcoholics are more likely to become alcoholics themselves and to suffer foetal alcohol syndrome, which can greatly reduce life expectancy. Given these complexities, no attempt is made here to make comparisons that take into account years of life forgone. It is useful to reiterate that the argument here is about alarms, not deaths or years of life.
31
Goodarz Danaei, Eric L. Ding, Dariush Mozaffarian, Ben Taylor, Jürgen Rehm, Christopher J. L. Murray and Majid Ezzati, “The preventable causes of death in the United States: Comparative risk assessment of dietary, lifestyle, and metabolic risk factors,” PLoS Medicine 6, no. 4 (2009): e1000058, gives a figure of 64,000 annual excess deaths in the US from alcohol. To make this comparison more rigorous, it would be necessary to compare, for example, all preventable deaths from vaccine-preventable diseases with all preventable deaths from drinking alcohol. The figures cited here are indicative of the wide difference likely to be found in such a comparison. The comparison here is intended to suggest differences at the level of orders of magnitude rather than offer a detailed enumeration of all deaths from vaccine-preventable illnesses and from other causes.
32
Frank H. Beard, Brynley P. Hull, Julie Leask, Aditi Dey and Peter B. McIntyre, “Trends and patterns in vaccination objection, Australia, 2002–2013,” Medical Journal of Australia 204, no. 7 (18 April 2016): 275.e1–e6.
33
Stephen S Holden, “Who speaks for ‘we’ speaks not for ‘me’—the vaccination debate,” Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity 4, no. 1 (2016): 1–23; Julia LeMonde, “An Australian newspaper campaign and government vaccination policy,” Prometheus: Critical Studies in Innovation 37, no. 2 (2021): 137–54.
34
Advertisements for alcoholic drinks are not permitted in some media and venues, and sales to children are restricted. Taxes on alcoholic drinks are an important economic disincentive. These and other measures intended to reduce alcohol consumption are important. There are alarms about particular behaviours by drinkers, notably driving and domestic violence, but the stigma attached to these behaviours seldom carries over to “social drinkers”. In comparison, the stigma attached to being less than fully vaccinated and criticising vaccines applies to all, not just those with problematic behaviours such as meeting with others while knowingly being infected.
35
Morgan Krakow, “A tourist infected with measles visited Disneyland and other Southern California hot spots in mid-August,” Washington Post, 25 August 2019.
36
In the US in the 1950s, about 450 measles deaths were reported annually: Walter A. Orenstein et al., “Measles elimination in the United States,” Journal of Infectious Diseases 189 (Supplement 1) (2004): S1–S3. This can be compared to the figure, cited earlier, of 64,000 for deaths from alcohol, which is vastly larger even taking into account population increase.
37
To the extent that flu aggravates the effects of Covid, and to the extent that flu vaccines protect against the flu, it might make sense to promote flu vaccination to reduce the burden of Covid. The same could be said of anything that improves health, including exercise, good diet and avoidance of toxins.
38
It is possible that criticism of childhood vaccines can lead to greater vaccine hesitancy so that when a new agent arrives on the scene—as in the case of the new coronavirus—there is greater vaccine hesitancy concerning vaccines for the new disease. On the other hand, if members of the public become sceptical about some childhood vaccines because they seem unnecessary or pose an undue risk of adverse reactions, they may carry this scepticism over to new vaccines for a much more deadly disease. In other words, those who believe the alarm about childhood vaccines is excessive may not respond with alacrity to more urgent alarm bells. How to assess the role of these factors is not obvious.
39
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. and Arthur L. Caplan, eds., Scientific Controversies: Case Studies in the Resolution and Closure of Disputes in Science and Technology (Cambridge: University Press, 1987); Daniel L. Kleinman, Karen A. Cloud-Hansen, Christina Matta and Jo Handelsman, eds., Controversies in Science and technology: From Climate to Chromosomes (New Rochelle, NY: Mary Ann Liebert, 2008); Daniel Kleinman, Jason A. Delborne, Karen A. Cloud-Hansen and Jo Handelsman, eds., Controversies in Science and Technology: From Evolution to Energy (New Rochelle, NY: Mary Ann Liebert, 2010); Daniel L. Kleinman, Abby J. Kinchy and Jo Handelsman, eds., Controversies in Science and Technology: From Maize to Menopause (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005); Dorothy Nelkin, ed., Controversy: Politics of Technical Decision (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979).
40
Harry M. Collins, Gravity’s Kiss: The Detection of Gravitational Waves (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017).
41
Despite the name, these “scientific controversies” are not just about science, but typically involve differences in views about ethics, economics, dissent and decision-making. These seemingly “non-scientific” aspects of the controversy interact with knowledge claims so that, for example, judgements about scientific findings are influenced by ethical factors and research agendas are influenced by governments and corporations with a stake in the controversy, which means that “the science” can be less than comprehensive and objective. On scientific research agendas being shaped, see, for example, David J. Hess, Undone Science: Social Movements, Mobilized Publics, and Industrial Transitions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016). The idea that scientific knowledge is influenced by, or intertwined with, social factors is standard in the field of the sociology of scientific knowledge. See, for example, Barry Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974); David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976); Michael Mulkay, Science and the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Allen and Unwin, 1979).
42
From a sociological perspective, to call a dispute a scientific controversy does not entail a judgement about the validity of the arguments. A controversy can exist even when the overwhelming weight of expert scientific opinion lies on one side; indeed, this is a common configuration. Accordingly, to refer to vaccination as being controversial does not imply that the sides are equally balanced in credibility, influence or anything else.
43
Floriana Gargiulo, Florian Cafiero, Paul Guille-Escuret, Valérie Seror and Jeremy Ward, “Asymmetric participation of defenders and critics of vaccines to debates on French-speaking Twitter,” Scientific Reports 10 (2020): 6599.
44
Robert W. Sears, The Vaccine Book: Making the Right Decision for Your Child, rev. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 2011).
45
Paul A. Offit and Charlotte A. Moser, “The problem with Dr Bob’s alternative vaccine schedule,” Pediatrics 123, no. 1 (2009): e164–e169.
46
For example, Peter Aaby has done research showing that DTP (diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis triple vaccine) increases the mortality rate in poor countries, but this has not affected vaccination recommendations. See Peter C. Gøtzsche, Vaccines: Truth, Lies and Controversy (Copenhagen: People’s Press, 2020). Gøtzsche is one of the few scientists with an intermediate position on vaccination issues, strongly supporting some vaccines while criticising others.
47
See for example Howard S. Becker, “Moral entrepreneurs: The creation and enforcement of deviant categories,” in Deviance: A Symbolic Interactionist Approach, ed. Nancy J. Herman (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), 169–78.
48
Stuart Blume, Immunization: How Vaccines Became Controversial (London: Reaktion Books, 2017).
49
That a controversy lasts for decades despite ongoing research can be taken as indicating that new evidence has little effect, at least on the persistence of the controversy. It is extremely rare for a partisan in such a controversy to significantly change their viewpoint, again suggesting that evidence is not sufficient to bring the controversy to a close. One of the few partisans to change sides after reviewing evidence is John Colquhoun, “New evidence on fluoridation,” Social Science and Medicine 19, no. 11 (1984): 1239–46.
50
In the fluoridation controversy, proponents trumpet studies showing large reductions in tooth decay but rarely mention critiques of the benefits of fluoridation (e.g., Mark Diesendorf, “The mystery of declining tooth decay,” Nature 322 (1986): 125–9). In the nuclear power controversy, critics came under attack (e.g., Leslie J. Freeman, Nuclear Witnesses: Insiders Speak Out (New York: Norton, 1981)). In the controversy over depression and antidepressants, a study showing the benefits of exercise (James A. Blumenthal et al., “Effects of exercise training on older patients with major depression,” Archives of Internal Medicine 159 (1999): 2349–56) did little to alter the views of proponents of antidepressants. Melvin Reuber’s research on links between pesticides and cancer led to attacks on his credibility and career (Keith Schneider, “Hard times: Government scientists fall victim to the administration’s policy to silence debate,” Amicus Journal (Fall 1982): 22–31). Ignacio Chapela’s research on transgenic DNA and Mexican maize triggered attacks on his findings (Jason A. Delborne, “Transgenes and transgressions: Scientific dissent as heterogeneous practice,” Social Studies of Science 38, no. 4 (2008) 509–41). Re the vaccination controversy, there are studies showing that having certain childhood diseases can lower the risk of heart disease and cancer in later life (e.g., Yasuhiko Kubota, Hiroyasu Iso, Akiko Tamakoshi and the JACC Study Group, “Association of measles and mumps with cardiovascular disease: The Japan Collaborative Cohort (JACC) study,” Atherosclerosis 241, no. 2 (18 June 2015): 682–6; Daniel W. Cramer, Allison F. Vitonis, Simone P. Pinheiro, John R. McKolanis, Raina N. Fichorova, Kevin E. Brown, Todd F. Hatchette and Olivera J. Finn, “Mumps and ovarian cancer: Modern interpretation of an historic association,” Cancer Causes and Control 21, no. 8 (2010): 1193–201). The existence of such studies is never mentioned by vaccination proponents.
51
G. S. Goldman and P. G. King, “Review of the United States universal varicella vaccination program: Herpes zoster incidence rates, cost-effectiveness, and vaccine efficacy based primarily on the Antelope Valley Varicella Active Surveillance Project data,” Vaccine 31 (2013): 1680–94. The relationship between chickenpox vaccination and shingles incidence has been debated in scientific journals; it is controversial. The point here is that this issue almost never surfaces in commentary about vaccination that reaches the general public.
52
Richard J. Davidson et al., “Alterations in brain and immune function produced by mindfulness meditation,” Psychosomatic Medicine 65 (2003): 564–70; Charlene E. Gamaldo, Annum K. Shaikh and Justin C. McArthur, “The sleep-immunity relationship,” Neurologic Clinics 30, no. 4 (2012): 1313–43; Peter Katona and Judit Katona-Apte, “The interaction between nutrition and infection,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 46, no. 10 (2008): 1582–8; Neil P. Walsh et al., “Position statement. Part one: Immune function and exercise,” Exercise Immunology Review 17 (2011): 6–63. Diet, exercise, mindfulness and sleep can improve general immune function but do not give specific immunity to diseases such as measles. Mindfulness, for example, is unlikely on its own to provide adequate immunity to exposure to a high level of measles virus. Nevertheless, it is well accepted that only some people exposed to an infectious agent succumb to full-blown disease, so it is reasonable to assume that improvements in general immune functions can make a difference, at the margins, to susceptibility to specific diseases. In other words, for a given exposure, improving immune function is likely to enable some individuals to avoid illness. In this context, it is worth noting that vaccination is not a guarantee against contracting a disease: it does not necessarily lead to immunity and hence is not the same as immunisation, though “vaccination” and “immunisation” are often used synonymously. There are examples of measles outbreaks in fully vaccinated populations (Tracy L. Gustafson, Alan W. Lievens, Philip A. Brunell, Ronald G. Moellenberg, Christopher M. G. Buttery and Lynne M. Sehulster, “Measles outbreak in a fully immunized secondary-school population,” New England Journal of Medicine 316 (1987): 771–74). Vaccination can improve specific immunity, sometimes dramatically, but improvements to immune function can still make a difference in susceptibility to specific diseases. In other words, immunity to any specific disease is not purely a yes or no matter, but one of degree, and the degree of immunity can potentially be improved in a number of ways with varying impact.
53
Jennifer A. Reich, Calling the Shots: Why Parents Reject Vaccines (New York: New York University Press, 2016); Paul R. Ward, Katie Attwell, Samantha B. Meyer, Philippa Rokkas and Julie Leask, “Understanding the perceived logic of care by vaccine-hesitant and vaccine-refusing parents: A qualitative study in Australia,” PLoS ONE 12 (2017): e0185955. (12 October 2017).
54
There are important public health campaigns promoting exercise, good diet and sleep. The point here is that these areas are seldom mentioned in public commentary by vaccination proponents.
55
It is possible to justify censorship, depending on the circumstances. Neil Levy, “No-platforming and higher-order evidence, or anti-anti-no-platforming,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5, no. 4 (2019): 487–502, argues that there are good reasons to no-platform some speakers because appearing on a platform, at least one with some level of credibility, adds to the credibility of the speaker. Ruth Palmer, Becoming the News: How Ordinary People Respond to the Media Spotlight (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018) makes this same point in several places.
However, there are complications in applying Levy’s ideas to the vaccination issue, in which no single person is an expert on all facets of the issue. Levy gives the example of an epidemiologist having opinions about vaccination. However, an epidemiologist is not, solely by virtue of epidemiological expertise, an expert on vaccination policy or on individual vaccination choice. Expertise in relation to such issues is better understood as a collective accomplishment. It may be just as problematical to allow an epidemiologist to comment on vaccination policy as for an economist, psychologist or ethicist.
Another consideration is that some speakers seek to be no-platformed (i.e., to provoke attempts to block their speeches) so they can be seen as victims and attract greater interest and support for their ideas. This has been called censorship backfire.
Levy writes “But audiences seem warranted in assuming that reputable media organisations and other institutions filter out unrepresentative individuals unless they are genuinely exceptional in their expertise” (496). There are too many counterexamples to make this assumption across the board. Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda (Boston: South End Press, 1982) showed that US media favoured terrorism experts who lacked deep expertise and for whom conflicts of interest were treated as giving them greater credibility. In the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a totally unrepresentative intelligence source (later discredited) was given great credibility in the New York Times. More generally, access to the mass media—an important platform—is powerfully shaped by a variety of vested interests, so it is hard to argue that no-platforming in this context is a reliable way of excluding bad views. See for example W. Lance Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2016).
56
Frank H. Beard, Brynley P. Hull, Julie Leask, Aditi Dey and Peter B. McIntyre, “Trends and patterns in vaccination objection, Australia, 2002–2013,” Medical Journal of Australia 204, no. 7, (2016), 275.e1–5.e6.
57
Julie Leask and Kerrie Wiley, Submission 327 to the Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee regarding the Social Services Legislation Amendment (No Jab, No Pay) Bill 2015. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/No_Jab_No_Pay/Submissions.
58
There are many studies seeking to explain questioning of the consensus scientific view about climate change, but few studies probing into why this is such a preoccupation.
59
Julie Leask, Paul Kinnersley, Cath Jackson, Francine Cheater, Helen Bedford and Greg Rowles, “Communicating with parents about vaccination: A framework for health professionals,” BMC Pediatrics 12, no. 154 (2012): 1–11.

© 2022 Copyright by the author. This article is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)





Statute of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts-1999

The Statute of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts

Presidents’ Meeting Warsaw, May 16 and 17, 1999

A. Preamble

The Presidents of European Constitutional Courts and other similar European institutions exercising constitutional jurisdiction declare their intention to organise, in accordance with the practice hitherto established, regular specialised conferences with a view to sharing experience as regards constitutional practice and jurisprudence in a general European context and to maintaining regular contacts between these courts and institutions, on the basis of mutual respect and with due regard to the principle of judicial independence.

B. Provisions of the Statute

Section I. General Provisions

Art. 1
Name and Seat

 

The name of the conference shall be “The Conference of European Constitutional Courts”.

 

Art. 2
Legal Status

 

The Conference derives its existence from the common declaration of intention of the Presidents of the European Constitutional Courts and similar institutions. It shall not produce any legally binding effects outside the Conference.

 

Art. 3
Aims

 

The Conference shall hold at regular intervals a Congress. It shall promote the exchange of information on the working methods and constitutional case-law of member courts together with the exchange of opinions on institutional, structural and operational issues as regards public-law and constitutional jurisdiction. In addition, it shall take steps to enhance the independence of constitutional courts as an essential factor in guaranteeing and implementing democracy and the rule of law, in particular with a view to securing protection of human rights. It shall support efforts to maintain regular contacts between the European Constitutional Courts and similar institutions.

 

Art. 4
Membership

 

There shall be the following categories of members:

 

1. Full members

Full members shall be fully entitled to participate in all matters related to the Conference. In accordance with the provisions of the Statute and the Conference Regulations they shall bear in equal parts the costs of organising the meetings of the Congress.

2. Associate members

Associate members shall be generally entitled to submit proposals, to participate in the Congress and elaborate and present a national report on particular themes on the Congress programme.

Associate members shall not be subject to any general obligation to participate in costs.

The Conference Regulations shall make more detailed provision in this respect.

 

Art. 5
Observers and guests

 

The Conference may admit observers and guests to the events. The Conference Regulations shall make more detailed provision in this respect.

 

Section II. Obtention and loss of membership

Art. 6
Acquisition de la qualité de membre
1.

(a) The status of a full member may be granted only to European Constitutional Courts and similar European institutions which exercise constitutional jurisdiction, in particular reviewing the conformity of legislation and which conduct their judicial activities in accordance with the principle of judicial independence, being bound by the fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law and the duty to respect human rights. In this respect the Conference shall follow the practice established in previous conferences and by the Council of Europe.

 

 

(b) The status of associate member may be granted to European Constitutional Courts and similar institutions that do not seek full membership or that do not (yet) satisfy the criteria for full membership.

 

2.

Only one institution from each country may be granted the status of a full or associate member.

 

3.

There shall be no right to be admitted to the Conference.

 

4.

A written application to be admitted to the Conference should be addressed to the “Circle of Presidents” and submitted to the President of the “Circle of Presidents”.

 

5. In so far as possible the following documents should accompany an application:

 

(a) legal instruments governing the establishment and composition of the candidate institution and the appointment and status of judges;

(b) the texts establishing the nature and scope of its jurisdiction;

 

Art. 7
Loss of Membership

 

1.

Any member may at any time declare its intention to withdraw from the Conference. This declaration shall be in writing.

 

2.

Where a member defaults, without good reason, on its obligation to contribute to the joint financing of the Conference or where there is another important reason for concluding that effective co-operation in good faith between the Conference and a member is no longer possible, a member may be declared to have lost its membership.
In the event of suspension for failure to respect financial obligations, the suspension will in principle cease on payment of the relevant amounts.

 

 

Section III Organs

Art. 8
Organs

The organs of the Conference shall be:
1. The “Circle of Presidents”;
2. The Congress.

 

Art. 9
“Circle of Presidents”

 

1.

Composition:

The “Circle of Presidents” shall be composed of the Presidents of the Courts and the institutions with full member status. The Presidents shall be accompanied by their Secretary General, or, where appropriate, a member of their court or institution or of its secretariat.

 

2.

Competence:

The “Circle of Presidents” is the central decision-making body and has competence in the following matters:

(a) admission, suspension and expulsion of members;
(b) admission and expulsion of observers and guests;
(c) fixing the date and venue of the meetings of the Congress to be held at regular intervals; the selection of topics and choice of Conference languages;
(d) approval of the Conference budget;
(e) fixing the financial contributions to the Congress;
(f) approving financial gifts from a third party;
(g) adoption of the final declaration of the Congress;
(h) drawing up the Conference regulations;
(i) amending the Statute;
(j) dissolving the Conference.

 

3. Chairmanship

 

The President of the Court which is to host the next Congress shall preside over the “Circle of Presidents”. When dealing with a matter which has no direct link to the preparations for the next Congress, the “Circle of Presidents” may designate one of its other members to preside over it.

 

4. Meetings:

 

The “Circle of Presidents” shall in so far as possible hold at least one meeting between the Congress dates and, in principle, on the day preceding the opening of the Congress.

The invitation in writing shall be accompanied by an agenda for the meeting.

 

5. Venue of meetings:

 

The “Circle of Presidents” shall, as a rule, meet at the seat of the court responsible for organising the next Congress. In a particular case, the “Circle of Presidents” may fix another venue.

 

6. Quorum:

 

a) The “Circle of Presidents” shall be empowered to take decisions if at least half of the members of the Circle are present at the meeting or are represented.

b) A judge, the Secretary General or another designated staff member of the court concerned may represent the President in meetings and vote on his/her behalf.

 

7. Voting regulations:

 

a) The “Circle of Presidents” shall take decisions by a majority of two thirds of members present at a meeting.

(b) Abstentions shall be counted as negative votes.

(c) Each member shall have one vote only.

 

Art. 10
Congress

 

Composition:

The following shall be entitled to participate in the Congress: full members, associate members and observers and guests. The Conference Regulations shall make detailed provision in this respect.

 

Section IV. Financing

Art. 11
Principles of financing
1.

The general rules on the sharing of costs:

The Conference shall be financed primarily by the equal contributions of full members. National financial and budget regulations shall apply.

 

2. Other costs and their financing:

 

(a) The equal contributions of full members shall be fixed to cover the costs of organising the Congress (in particular the hire of premises, printing, translation and interpretation costs, the administrative overheads and the cost of transport to the venues of the main and preparatory meetings).

(b) The “Circle of Presidents” may require associate members and observers to pay a fee to contribute to the costs of organising the Congress. This fee shall be fixed in the light of the costs incurred in respect of the services provided by the Conference to associate members and observers, taking into account the contribution paid by full members.
The Conference Regulations shall make detailed provision in this respect.

(c) The acceptance of all types of financial gifts from third parties shall be subject to prior approval by The “Circle of Presidents”.

 

3. Conference Budget:

 

The Court organising the Congress shall draw up, in so far as possible not later than one year before the opening of the Congress, a budget for the Congress which shall be submitted for the approval of the “Circle of Presidents”.

 

4. Final settlement of accounts:

 

The final settlement is effected on the basis of a final statement of accounts drawn up by the organising Court after the end of the Congress.

 

Art. 12
Final declaration and public access

 

1.

The “Circle of Presidents” may at the conclusion of the Congress adopt a final declaration indicating the constitutional courts and institutions represented at the Congress, describing the course of the conference and setting out the main conclusions reached as a result of the discussions of the plenary assembly.

 

2.

The Congress proceedings shall not be open to the public.

 

3.

The President of the Conference – accompanied if appropriate by other members of the “Circle of Presidents” – shall make public the final declaration at a press conference and shall provide additional information to the representatives of the media (press, radio, television).

 

Art. 13
Secretariat

 

The Secretariat of the Conference shall be Secretariat provided by the Court organising the next Congress

 

Section V. Final Provisions

Art. 14
Entry into force

This Statute shall enter into force on the day of its adoption by the assembly of Presidents. It shall be drawn up in French, English, German and Russian.
The French version shall be authentic.

 

 




Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia

CONSTITUTION (BASIC LAW) OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH OSSETIA

We, the people of the Republic of South Ossetia, based on our responsibility to present and future generations, striving to ensure the security and prosperity of our Fatherland, based on the universally recognized principles of equality and self-determination of peoples, guided by the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Republic of South Ossetia, affirming the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, fixing the foundations of the social and political system, we proclaim and establish the CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH OSSETIA.

 

CHAPTER I

FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH OSSETIA

 

Article 1

1. The Republic of South Ossetia – the State of Alania – is a sovereign democratic legal state created as a result of self-determination of the people of South Ossetia. The names of the Republic of South Ossetia and the State of Alania are equivalent. (1)

2. The bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power in the Republic of South Ossetia is its people.

3. The people exercise their power directly through referendums and free elections, as well as through state authorities and local self-government bodies.

4. No one can appropriate power in the Republic of South Ossetia. The seizure of power or the appropriation of power is the gravest crime against the people and is punishable by law.

 

Article 2

1. The Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia has the highest legal force and direct effect.

2. Laws and other normative legal acts that contradict the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia shall have no legal force.

3. Laws of the Republic of South Ossetia are subject to official publication. Unpublished laws are not subject to application.

4. Regulatory legal acts of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, local authorities of the Republic of South Ossetia, affecting the rights, freedoms and duties of a person and a citizen, cannot be applied on the territory of the Republic of South Ossetia if they are officially not published to the public.

5. The generally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the Republic of South Ossetia are an integral part of its legal system.

6. Bodies of state power and administration, bodies of local self-government, officials, citizens and their associations, other persons located on the territory of the Republic of South Ossetia are obliged to comply with the Constitution and laws of the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 3

1. The Republic of South Ossetia independently determines its state-legal status, resolves issues of political, economic, socio-cultural development.

2. The Republic of South Ossetia consists of five administrative-territorial units: the city of Tskhinvali, Dzau, Znauri, Leningor and Tskhinvali regions.

3. The territory of the Republic of South Ossetia is inviolable and inalienable. Protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of South Ossetia is one of the most important functions of the state.

4. The territory, status and borders of the Republic of South Ossetia cannot be changed without the consent of its people.

5. The capital of the Republic of South Ossetia is the city of Tskhinvali, the status of which is determined by the constitutional law.

 

Article 4

1. The official languages ​​in the Republic of South Ossetia are Ossetian and Russian. The preservation and development of the Ossetian language is the most important task of the state authorities of the Republic of South Ossetia. (2)

2. Ossetian and Russian languages, and in places of compact residence of citizens of the Republic of South Ossetia of Georgian nationality – Georgian, are recognized as the official languages ​​of state authorities, state administration and local self-government in the Republic of South Ossetia.

3. The peoples living in the Republic of South Ossetia are granted the right to freely study, develop and use their native language.

 

Article 5

1. The system of state power in the Republic of South Ossetia is based on the principle of separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers.

2. Bodies of legislative, executive and judicial power are independent within their powers.

3. Disagreements on controversial issues between the state authorities of the Republic of South Ossetia are resolved through conciliation procedures.

 

Article 6

Local self-government is recognized and guaranteed in the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 7

1. State power in the Republic of South Ossetia is exercised by the President of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia, the courts of the Republic of South Ossetia and local authorities.

2. Elections of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, local representative bodies, as well as referendums in the Republic of South Ossetia are held on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot.

 

Article 8 The

Republic of South Ossetia builds its relations with the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania on the basis of ethnic, national, historical and territorial unity, socio-economic and cultural integration.

 

Article 9

The economy of the Republic of South Ossetia operates on the basis of the principles of a socially oriented market economy regulated by the state.

 

Article 10 The

Republic of South Ossetia has the right to enter into an alliance with other states and transfer to the organs of the union the exercise of part of its powers.

 

Article 11

1. The foreign policy of the Republic of South Ossetia is based on the following principles: 1) striving for a universal and just peace; 2) mutually beneficial cooperation; 3) entry into collective security systems; 4) membership in international organizations and other associations.

2. The generally recognized principles and norms of international law, as well as international treaties of the Republic of South Ossetia are the basis of relations with other states.

 

Article 12

1. Land, subsoil and other natural resources, as well as cultural values, monuments of historical significance, are the property of the people, are used and protected by the state as the basis of life and activity of citizens of the Republic of South Ossetia.

2. Ownership, use and disposal of land, its subsoil and other natural resources are regulated by laws.

 

Article 13

In the Republic of South Ossetia state, municipal, private, collective and other forms of ownership are recognized and provided with equal legal protection.

 

Article 14

1. Public and religious associations are equal before the law.

2. It is prohibited to create and operate public and religious associations whose goals and actions are aimed at forcibly changing the foundations of the constitutional order or violating the integrity of the Republic of South Ossetia, undermining the security of the state and the moral foundations of society, inciting ethnic and religious hatred.

3. Religious associations are separated from the state.

 

Article 15 The

Republic of South Ossetia pursues an active youth policy aimed at providing young people with conditions for receiving comprehensive upbringing and education, as well as jobs in accordance with their vocation, abilities and skill level.

 

Article 16

1. The Republic of South Ossetia has its own citizenship.

2. A citizen of the Republic of South Ossetia cannot be deprived of citizenship or the right to change it. The grounds and procedure for acquiring citizenship are determined by constitutional law.

3. Dual citizenship is allowed in the Republic of South Ossetia.

4. Foreign citizens and stateless persons in the Republic of South Ossetia are guaranteed the rights and freedoms provided for by its Basic Law and the norms of international law.

 

Article 17 The

Republic of South Ossetia has state symbols – coat of arms, flag, anthem. Their description and the procedure for official use are established by constitutional laws.

 

CHAPTER II

RIGHTS, FREEDOMS AND DUTIES OF MAN AND CITIZEN

 

Article 18

The Republic of South Ossetia recognizes and guarantees the rights and freedoms of man and citizen in accordance with the generally recognized principles and norms of international law and in accordance with this Constitution.

 

Article 19

1. Fundamental human rights and freedoms are inalienable and belong to everyone from birth.

2. The exercise of human and civil rights and freedoms must not violate the rights and freedoms of other persons.

 

Article 20

1. Labor is free. Everyone has the right to dispose of their abilities to work.

2. Forced labor is allowed only by a court verdict or in a state of emergency or martial law.

3. Recognizes the right to labor disputes using the legal means of their resolution, including the right to strike.

4. Everyone has the right to working conditions that meet the requirements of safety and hygiene.

 

Article 21

1. Everyone has the right to rest.

2. Those working under an employment contract are guaranteed the length of working hours established by law, holidays and weekly days off, as well as paid annual leave.

 

Article 22

1. Everyone has the right to own property, own, use and dispose of it both individually and jointly with other persons.

2. Everyone has the right to free use of their abilities and property for entrepreneurial and other activities not prohibited by law.

3. No one may be deprived of his property except by a court decision. The expropriation of property for state needs may be carried out only on the condition of prior and equivalent compensation.

4. The right to inherit is guaranteed by law.

 

Article 23

Citizens of the Republic of South Ossetia have the right to elect and be elected, to participate in a referendum.

Citizens recognized as legally incompetent by a court, as well as those held in places of deprivation of liberty by a court verdict that has entered into legal force, do not have the right to elect and be elected.

 

Article 24

1. Everyone who is legally located on the territory of the Republic of South Ossetia has the right to free movement on its territory and free choice of place of residence, except in cases stipulated by law.

2. Everyone has the right to travel outside the Republic of South Ossetia.

3. Citizens of the Republic of South Ossetia have the right to unhindered return to the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 25

1. Everyone has the right to health care and qualified medical care. Medical care in state health care institutions is provided to citizens free of charge.

2. Everyone has the right to a safe environment for life and health and to compensation for damage caused by the violation of this right.

3. Concealment by officials of facts and circumstances that endanger the life and health of people shall entail responsibility in accordance with the law.

 

Article 26

1. Every citizen of the Republic of South Ossetia has the right to social protection, including the right to a pension for old age, as well as in connection with disability, loss of a breadwinner and in other cases established by law.

2. The state develops a system of social protection, encourages various forms of public social assistance and charity.

 

Article 27

1. Everyone has the right to housing. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of their home.

2. The dwelling is inviolable. No one has the right to enter a dwelling against the will of the persons residing in it, except in cases established by law or on the basis of a court decision.

 

Article 28

1. Everyone has the right to education and the choice of forms of education.

2. The general availability and free of charge of pre-school, basic general, secondary (complete) general education, secondary vocational and higher education in state educational institutions is guaranteed.

3. Everyone has the right, on a competitive basis, to receive secondary specialized and higher vocational education free of charge in state educational institutions.

4. Basic general education is compulsory. Parents or persons replacing them ensure that children receive basic general education.

5. Various forms of education and self-education are supported in the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 29

1. Everyone is guaranteed freedom of literary, artistic, technical, scientific and other forms of creativity.

2. Intellectual property, artistic heritage and cultural values ​​of citizens are protected by law.

3. The Republic of South Ossetia creates conditions for the preservation and development of the national culture and art of its people.

4. Ethnic communities have the right to create their own associations for the purpose of preserving and developing national cultural traditions and customs.

 

Article 30

1. Every citizen of the Republic of South Ossetia has the right to submit proposals to state bodies, public and other organizations to improve their activities, to criticize shortcomings in their work.

2. Persons persecuting citizens for criticism are held accountable.

 

Article 31

1. Citizens of the Republic of South Ossetia are guaranteed freedom of speech, press, meetings, rallies, street processions and demonstrations in accordance with the current legislation.

2. Each person is provided with the secrecy of correspondence, telephone conversations, telegraph and other forms of communication.

3. Censorship in the Republic of South Ossetia is prohibited.

 

Article 32

1. Citizens of the Republic of South Ossetia have the right to unite in public organizations and movements not prohibited by law.

2. No one may be forced to join any association or movement.

 

Article 33

1. Everyone is guaranteed freedom of conscience and religion, including the right to profess any religion, acting in accordance with the law, or not to profess any.

2. Orthodoxy and traditional Ossetian beliefs are one of the foundations of the national identity of the Ossetian people.

 

Article 34

1. Family, motherhood, fatherhood, childhood, old age in the Republic of South Ossetia are under the protection of the state.

2. Caring for children, their upbringing and maintenance is an equal right and duty of parents.

3. Adult able-bodied children are obliged to take care of their parents.

 

Article 35

1. Everyone is guaranteed the inviolability of the person. His honor and dignity are protected by law.

2. No one may be subjected to arrest or detention otherwise than on the basis of a court decision or with the sanction of a prosecutor.

3. No one may be subjected to violence, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, be subjected to medical, scientific or other experiments without his voluntary consent.

 

Article 36

1. Everyone has the right to protect his honor and good name from encroachment on private and family life.

2. It is prohibited to illegally collect, store, use and disseminate information about a person’s personal and family life.

 

Article 37

1. Judicial protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen is guaranteed in the Republic of South Ossetia.

2. Decisions and actions (or inaction) of public authorities, local governments, public associations and officials may be appealed to the court.

 

Article 38

1. Everyone accused of committing a crime is presumed innocent until his guilt is proven in the manner prescribed by law and established by a court verdict that has entered into force.

2. The accused is not obliged to prove his innocence.

3. No one can be re-convicted for the same crime.

4. A law establishing or aggravating liability has no retroactive effect.

 

Article 39

Every person detained, taken into custody or accused of committing a crime has the right to be assisted by a lawyer (defender), respectively, from the moment of detention, detention or charge.

 

Article 40

Everyone has the right to state compensation for damage caused by illegal actions (or inaction) of state authorities and administration or their officials.

 

Article 41

1. The exercise of rights and freedoms is inseparable from the fulfillment by a citizen of his duties.

2. Ignorance of the law does not exempt from responsibility for its non-compliance.

 

Article 42

1. Defense of the Fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the Republic of South Ossetia. Treason to the motherland is the gravest crime against the people.

2. A citizen of the Republic of South Ossetia is obliged to protect the interests of the state, to help strengthen its defense capability.

 

Article 43

A citizen of the Republic of South Ossetia, in accordance with the law, has a civil obligation to participate in the administration of justice as a people’s assessor or a juror.

 

Article 44

Everyone is obliged to protect nature, protect its wealth, take care of the preservation of historical, national and cultural heritage.

 

Article 45

Everyone is obliged to pay taxes and fees prescribed by law.

 

Article 46

1. The rights and freedoms enshrined in this Constitution are not exhaustive and cannot be interpreted as a denial of other universally recognized rights and freedoms of man and citizen.

2. It is forbidden to use any rights and freedoms for the purpose of violent overthrow of the constitutional order, propaganda of violence and war.

3. In a state of emergency, in order to ensure the safety of citizens and protect the constitutional order, in accordance with the law, separate restrictions on rights and freedoms may be established, indicating the limits and duration of their validity.

 

CHAPTER III

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH OSSETIA

 

Article 47

1. The President of the Republic of South Ossetia is the head of state and head of the executive branch.

2. The President of the Republic of South Ossetia is the guarantor of the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia, the rights and freedoms of man and citizen. In accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia, he takes the necessary measures to protect the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the Republic of South Ossetia, ensures the coordinated functioning and interaction of state authorities. (3)

3. The President of the Republic of South Ossetia, in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the Republic of South Ossetia, determines the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the state.

4. The President of the Republic of South Ossetia, as the head of state, represents the Republic of South Ossetia within the country and in international relations.

 

Article 48

1. A citizen of the Republic of South Ossetia, not younger than 35 years old, who knows the state languages ​​of the Republic of South Ossetia and has permanently resided in the territory of the Republic of South Ossetia for the last 10

years preceding the day of registration, may be elected President of the Republic of South Ossetia. (4)

2. The President of the Republic of South Ossetia is elected by the citizens of the Republic of South Ossetia for a term of five years.

3. The same person cannot hold the office of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia for more than two consecutive terms.

4. The procedure for the election of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia is determined by the constitutional law.

 

Article 49

1. Upon taking office, the President of the Republic of South Ossetia takes an oath to the people: “I swear, in exercising the powers of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia, to respect and protect the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, to observe and protect the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia, to protect sovereignty and independence, security and territorial integrity of the Republic of South Ossetia, faithfully serve the people.”

2. The oath by the President of the Republic of South Ossetia is taken in a solemn atmosphere on the tenth day after the official announcement of the election results in the presence of deputies of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, judges of the Constitutional Court. (five)

3. For the duration of his powers, the President of the Republic of South Ossetia suspends his membership in political parties and public associations.

4. The President of the Republic of South Ossetia cannot be a member of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, hold other positions in state bodies, business structures.

 

Article 50 (6)

The President of the Republic of South Ossetia:

1) exercises general leadership of foreign and domestic policy;

2) coordinates the work of executive authorities, has the right to chair meetings of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia;

3) approve the system and structure of the executive authorities of the Republic of South Ossetia;

4) approve the structure of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia;

5) appoints the Chairman of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia with the consent of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia and dismisses him from office by notifying the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia;

6) appoints the Chairman of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia by his Decree in the event of a three-time rejection by the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia of the submitted candidates for the position of Chairman of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia, while presenting the same candidate no more than twice;

7) appoints and dismisses members of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia and heads of other republican executive bodies;

8) appoints and dismisses the head of the Administration of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia and his deputies; (7)

9) appoints and dismisses the heads of administrations of administrative-territorial units in agreement with the relevant representative body;

10) forms, reorganizes and abolishes the Administration of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Office of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia;

11) forms, reorganizes and abolishes republican executive bodies;

12) have the right, on their own initiative, to decide on the resignation of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia;

13) calls elections to the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia;

14) have the right to dissolve the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia in cases and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia;

15) have the right to demand the convocation of extraordinary and extraordinary sessions of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia;

16) calls a referendum in accordance with the procedure established by the constitutional law;

17) signs and promulgates laws;

18) has the right of legislative initiative;

19) addresses the people and the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia with annual messages on the situation in the country, on the main directions of the foreign and domestic policy of the state;

20) negotiates and signs interstate and international treaties and agreements of the Republic of South Ossetia;

21) submits candidates to the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia for appointment to the position of Chairman, Deputy Chairman, judges of the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia, chairmen, deputy chairmen and judges of district (city) courts and the Arbitration Court of the Republic of South Ossetia; makes proposals to the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia on the dismissal of the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, judges of the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia, chairmen, deputy chairmen and judges of district (city) courts and the Arbitration Court of the Republic of South Ossetia; (8)

22) appoints two judges of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia; the third judge of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia is appointed with the consent of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia;

23) submit to the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia for appointment and dismissal of the candidature of the Prosecutor General of the Republic of South Ossetia;

24) appoints the Chairman of the Chamber of Control and Accounts of the Republic of South Ossetia and his deputy with the consent of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia and dismisses them from office by notifying the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia; (9)

25) submit to the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia for appointment and dismissal of a candidate for the Chairman of the National Bank of the Republic of South Ossetia;

26) submit to the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia for appointment a candidature of the Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of South Ossetia; appoints half of the members of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of South Ossetia;

27) appoints and dismisses authorized representatives of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia;

28) suspend or cancel the operation of normative and other legal acts of executive authorities if they contradict the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia and the current legislation;

29) appoints the Chairman of the Pension Fund of the Republic of South Ossetia;

30) form and head the Security Council;

31) is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of South Ossetia;

32) approves the military doctrine of the Republic of South Ossetia;

33) appoints and dismisses persons of the high military command;

34) introduces and cancels a state of war or a state of emergency on the territory of the Republic of South Ossetia or its individual areas in cases and in the manner established by the laws of the Republic of South Ossetia, with an immediate notification of this to the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia;

35) establish public holidays and public holidays;

36) awards state awards, confers honorary, special and higher military ranks;

37) resolve issues of citizenship and political asylum;

38) grant pardon;

39) approves the concepts of the state economic, social, cultural, national development of the Republic of South Ossetia;

40) has other powers provided for by the Constitution and laws of the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 51

1. The President of the Republic of South Ossetia issues decrees and orders that are binding on the entire territory of the Republic of South Ossetia. (10)

2. Decrees and orders of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia must not contradict the Constitution and laws of the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 52

The President of the Republic of South Ossetia has the right to create coordinating councils and other advisory bodies on issues within the scope of his authority, determine their composition, goals and tasks.

 

Article 53

1. The President of the Republic of South Ossetia has immunity, his honor and dignity are protected by constitutional law. (11)

2. The rights and guarantees of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia and ex-presidents are determined by the constitutional law. (12)

 

Article 54

1. The President of the Republic of South Ossetia has the right to dissolve the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia in the event that he revises the foundations of the constitutional order of the Republic of South Ossetia, subject to the relevant conclusion of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia.

2. In the event of the dissolution of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, the President of the Republic of South Ossetia sets a date for new elections so that the newly elected Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia begins to exercise its powers no later than 90 days from the date of dissolution of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia of the previous convocation. (13)

3. The Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia cannot be dissolved during a state of emergency or martial law, as well as within six months before the end of the term of office of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 55

1. The President of the Republic of South Ossetia begins to exercise his powers from the moment he takes the oath and ceases to exercise them from the moment the newly elected President of the Republic of South Ossetia takes the oath.

2. The President of the Republic of South Ossetia terminates the exercise of powers ahead of schedule in the event of:

1) removal from office;

2) resignations at their own request;

3) persistent inability to exercise their powers for health reasons.

3. Elections of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia must be held no later than 90 days from the date of early termination of the exercise of powers by the former head of state. (fourteen)

4. If the President of the Republic of South Ossetia is unable to fulfill his duties, they are temporarily performed by the Chairman of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia, in case of impossibility to implement this provision – the Chairman of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia.

5. The Acting President of the Republic of South Ossetia has no right to raise the issue of dissolving the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, call a referendum, or make proposals for amendments and additions to the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

CHAPTER IV

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH OSSETIA

 

Article 56

1. The Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia is the highest representative and sole legislative body of the Republic of South Ossetia.

2. The procedure for organizing the activities of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia is determined by the constitutional law. (15)

 

Article 57

1. The Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia is elected for a term of five years and consists of 34 deputies, 17 of which are elected in single-member constituencies, 17 – in a proportional electoral system in a single republican constituency. (16)

2. Excluded. (17)

3. The procedure for the election of deputies of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, their status and powers are established by constitutional laws.

 

Article 58

1. A citizen of the Republic of South Ossetia who has reached the age of 21 on the voting day and has permanently resided on the territory of the Republic of South Ossetia for the last 5 years may be elected as a Deputy of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia. (18)

2. A deputy of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia cannot be a deputy of other representative bodies.

3. A deputy may work in the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia on a professional permanent basis. In this case, he cannot engage in other paid activities, except for teaching, scientific and other creative activities.

4. A deputy may be deprived of deputy powers only in accordance with the law.

 

Article 59

1. A deputy of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia has immunity during the entire term of his powers. In the Republic of South Ossetia, he cannot be detained, arrested, subjected to a search, except in cases of detention at the scene of a crime, and also subjected to a personal search, except as otherwise provided by law.

2. The issue of deprivation of immunity of a deputy is decided by the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia on the proposal of the Prosecutor General of the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 60

1. The Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia is convened for the first session by the Central Election Commission of the Republic of South Ossetia no later than fifteen days after the election.

2. The first session of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia is opened by the oldest deputy and leads it until the election of the Chairman of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia.

3. From the moment the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia begins its work, the powers of deputies of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia of the previous convocation shall cease.

 

Article 61 (19)

The Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia:

1) makes changes and additions to the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia;

2) adopts constitutional laws, laws of the Republic of South Ossetia and exercises control over their implementation; carries out interpretation of constitutional laws and laws of the Republic of South Ossetia;

3) considers and approves the State budget of the Republic of South Ossetia and controls the course of its implementation;

4) establishes, cancels republican taxes and other obligatory payments and fees;

5) decide on the administrative-territorial structure of the Republic of South Ossetia;

6) approves the change of boundaries between the administrative-territorial units of the Republic of South Ossetia;

7) form the Central Election Commission of the Republic of South Ossetia;

8) appoints half of the members of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of South Ossetia;

9) appoints the Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of South Ossetia on the proposal of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia;

10) calls elections of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia;

11) gives consent to the President of the Republic of South Ossetia for the appointment of the Chairman of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia;

12) appoints and dismisses the Prosecutor General of the Republic of South Ossetia on the proposal of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia;

13) appoints and dismisses the Chairman of the National Bank of the Republic of South Ossetia on the proposal of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia;

14) appoints and dismisses, on the proposal of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, judges of the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia, chairmen, deputy chairmen, judges of district (city) courts and the Arbitration Court of the Republic of South Ossetia; (20)

15) give consent to the President of the Republic of South Ossetia for the appointment of the Chairman of the Chamber of Control and Accounts of the Republic of South Ossetia and his deputy; (21)

16) puts a question before the President of the Republic of South Ossetia on confidence in the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia;

17) considers and approves state programs of economic, social and cultural development, hears reports on their implementation;

18) considers decrees of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia on the introduction of martial law or a state of emergency and makes appropriate decisions;

19) ratifies and denounces international treaties of the Republic of South Ossetia;

20) gives consent to the deployment of military formations of other states in the Republic of South Ossetia;

21) establish state awards, honorary, special and military ranks, diplomatic ranks and class ranks;

22) announces an amnesty;

23) cancel decisions of local representative bodies that are of a normative nature, in cases of their non-compliance with the laws of the Republic of South Ossetia;

24) dismiss the President of the Republic of South Ossetia from office in cases and in the manner established by the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia;

25) appoints two judges of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia;

26) gives consent to the President of the Republic of South Ossetia for the appointment of the third judge of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia; 27) exercise other powers provided for by the Constitution and laws of the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 62 (22)

The President of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Chairman of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia and members of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Chairmen of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Prosecutor General of the Republic South Ossetia, Chairman of the State Security Committee of the Republic of South Ossetia, Chairman of the Chamber of Control of the Republic of South Ossetia, authorized representatives of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia and invited persons.

 

Article 63

The Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia elects from among its members by secret ballot the Chairman of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia and his deputies, who are considered elected if the majority of the total number of elected deputies voted for each of them.

 

Article 64

The Chairman of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia and his deputies conduct meetings of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, are in charge of internal regulations and exercise other powers provided for by the Constitution and laws of the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 65

1. The Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia elects committees and commissions from among the deputies for conducting legislative work, preliminary consideration and preparation of issues submitted for consideration by the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, control over the implementation of laws and other legal acts of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, holding parliamentary hearings .

2. Candidates for the election of chairmen of standing committees and commissions are presented by the Chairman of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia.

3. The Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia has the right to form temporary deputy commissions and other working bodies on issues referred to its jurisdiction by the Constitution and laws of the Republic of South Ossetia.

4. The procedure for the election and work of committees and commissions are determined by law.

 

Article 66

The Chairman of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, his deputies, as well as chairmen of committees and commissions may be early dismissed from their positions in case of expression of no confidence or violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of South Ossetia. The decision of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia is taken by secret ballot by a majority vote of the total number of elected deputies.

 

Article 67

1. The Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia forms the Presidium of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia.

2. The Presidium of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia is a body accountable to the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, exercising its powers in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the Republic of South Ossetia.

3. The Presidium of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia includes the Deputy Chairmen of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia and the chairmen of its permanent committees and commissions.

4. The Presidium of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia is headed by the Chairman of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 68

1. The Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia may express no confidence in any member of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia by a majority of votes from the number of elected deputies of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia. In this case, the President of the Republic of South Ossetia has the right to dismiss the said member of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia or disagree with the opinion of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia.

2. In the event that the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia within two months repeatedly expresses no confidence in a member of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia, the President of the Republic of South Ossetia issues a decree on the dismissal of the said member of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia from office.

Article 69 (23)

The right of legislative initiative belongs to the President of the Republic of South Ossetia, deputies of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia, as well as the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Prosecutor General of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Central Election Commission of the Republic of South Ossetia Ossetia on issues of their conduct.

 

Article 70

1. Constitutional laws, amendments and additions to them are considered adopted if at least two thirds of the total number of elected deputies of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia voted for them.

2. Laws, resolutions and other normative legal acts are adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia by a simple majority of votes from the total number of elected deputies of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 71

1. A law adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia shall be sent to the President of the Republic of South Ossetia within five days for signing and promulgation.

2. The President of the Republic of South Ossetia signs the law within ten days and promulgates it.

3. If the President of the Republic of South Ossetia rejects it within ten days from the date of receipt of the law, the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, in accordance with the established procedure, reconsiders this law.

4. If, upon reconsideration, the law is approved by the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia in the previously adopted edition by at least two-thirds of the votes of the total number of elected deputies, it is subject to signing and promulgation by the President of the Republic of South Ossetia within five days.

 

Article 72

1. The Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia has the right to raise the issue of dismissal of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia from office in the event that he commits treason or other intentional crime, confirmed by the conclusion of the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia on the presence of signs of a crime in the actions of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia and the conclusion of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia on compliance with the established procedure for bringing charges.

2. The issue of dismissal of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia from office is initiated by at least one third of the total number of elected deputies of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia.

3. If there are grounds, the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia may dismiss the President of the Republic of South Ossetia from office by a majority of at least three-quarters of the total number of elected deputies of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia.

4. The decision of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia on the removal of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia from office must be taken no later than one month after the accusation against him is brought. If a decision is not made within this period, the charge is considered dismissed.

 

CHAPTER V

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH OSSETIA

Article 73 (24)

1. The Government of the Republic of South Ossetia is the highest collegial state body of the unified system of executive power in the Republic of South Ossetia.

2. The Government of the Republic of South Ossetia consists of members of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia: Chairman of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia, First Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia, Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia, Ministers of the Republic of South Ossetia, Head of the Administration of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia.

3. In accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia and the laws of the Republic of South Ossetia, the President of the Republic of South Ossetia, as the head of the executive power of the Republic of South Ossetia, determines the main directions of activity of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia and organizes its work. (25)

4. The powers, procedure and organization of work of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia are determined by the Constitutional Law and the Regulations of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia, which is approved by the relevant decree of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia. (26)

 

Article 74

On the basis of and in pursuance of the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia, the current legislation, decrees of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia and other normative legal acts, the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia issues resolutions and orders binding on the entire territory of the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 75

1. Before the newly elected President of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia resigns its powers.

2. The dismissal of the Chairman of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia means the termination of the powers of the entire Government of the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 76

1. The Government of the Republic of South Ossetia may submit a resignation, which is accepted or rejected by the President of the Republic of South Ossetia.

2. The Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia may raise the issue of no confidence in the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia. The resolution on a vote of confidence in the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia is adopted by a simple majority of the total number of elected deputies of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia.

If the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia expresses no confidence in the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia, the President of the Republic of South Ossetia has the right to announce the resignation of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia or disagree with the decision of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia. If the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia within two months repeatedly expresses no confidence in the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia, the President of the Republic of South Ossetia announces the resignation of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia.

3. If the President of the Republic of South Ossetia accepts the resignation of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia on behalf of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia continues to perform its functions until the formation of a new Government of the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

CHAPTER VI

JUDICIAL AUTHORITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH OSSETIA

Article 77

1. Justice in the Republic of South Ossetia is carried out only by the court.

2. Judicial power is exercised through constitutional, civil, administrative and criminal proceedings. (27)

3. The judicial system of the Republic of South Ossetia is established by the Constitution and the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia. (28)

4. The creation of emergency courts is not allowed.

 

Article 78

1. Citizens of the Republic of South Ossetia who have reached the age of 25 and have a higher legal education and work experience in the legal profession for at least three years may be judges. (29)

2. The law may establish additional requirements for judges of the courts of the Republic of South Ossetia. (thirty)

 

Article 79

1. When administering justice, judges are independent and subject only to the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia and the law. (31)

2. The powers of a judge may be terminated or suspended only in accordance with the procedure established by law. (32)

3. Judges are inviolable. A judge cannot be held accountable otherwise than in the manner and on the grounds established by law. (33)

 

Article 80

1. Proceedings in all courts are public. Hearing of the case in closed session is allowed in cases stipulated by law.

2. Trial of criminal cases in absentia in courts is not allowed, except for the cases provided for by law.

3. Judicial proceedings are carried out on the basis of competitiveness and equality of the parties.

4. Judges of the Republic of South Ossetia make decisions in the name of the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 81

A judge in the Republic of South Ossetia cannot be a deputy, a member of a political party, and cannot be engaged in other activities, except for teaching, scientific and other creative activities.

 

Article 82

1. Constitutional control over the compliance of laws and other normative legal acts of the Republic of South Ossetia with the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia is exercised by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia. (34)

2. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia is formed by the President of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia in the amount of five judges from highly qualified specialists in the field of law. (35)

3. The term of office of judges of the Constitutional Court is ten years.

4. A person not younger than thirty-five years of age may be elected as a judge of the Constitutional Court. (36)

5. The procedure for the organization and activities of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia are determined by the constitutional law.

 

Article 83

1. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia, at the request of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Prosecutor General of the Republic of South Ossetia, as well as local government bodies, resolves cases on compliance with the Constitution of the Republic South Ossetia:

1) laws, regulations of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia;

2) international treaties of the Republic of South Ossetia that have not entered into force. (37)

2. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia:

1) resolves disputes on competence between republican and local authorities;

2) gives an opinion on compliance with the established procedure for bringing charges against the President of the Republic of South Ossetia;

3) resolve other issues provided for by law.

3. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia, on complaints of violation of the rights and freedoms of citizens and at the request of the courts, checks the constitutionality of the law applied or to be applied in a particular case, in the manner prescribed by law.

4. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia gives an interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia.

5. Normative legal acts or their separate provisions, recognized as unconstitutional, lose their force and are subject to cancellation.

6. Resolutions, conclusions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia are subject to immediate publication in official publications of state authorities. The decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Ossetia is final, not subject to appeal and enters into force immediately after its announcement.

 

Article 84 (38)

1. The Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia is the highest judicial body for civil cases, resolution of economic disputes, criminal, administrative and other cases, jurisdictional courts, formed in accordance with the Constitutional Law, and exercises judicial supervision in the procedural forms provided for by law over the activities of these courts, and also provides clarifications on issues of judicial practice.

2. The powers, the procedure for the formation and activities of the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia are determined by the Constitutional Law.

 

Article 85 (39)

Excluded by the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia” “On the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia.

 

Article 86 (40)

The Bar Association operates to provide legal assistance to citizens and organizations. The organization and procedure for advocacy are determined by law.

 

CHAPTER VII

PROSECUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH OSSETIA

 

Article 87

1. The Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of South Ossetia, on behalf of the state, exercises supreme supervision over the exact and uniform execution of laws, decrees of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia and other regulatory legal acts throughout the territory of the Republic of South Ossetia.

2. Bodies of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of South Ossetia constitute a single centralized system with the subordination of lower prosecutors to the Prosecutor General of the Republic of South Ossetia. Bodies of the prosecutor’s office exercise their powers independently of other state bodies and officials.

3. The Prosecutor General of the Republic of South Ossetia is appointed and dismissed by the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia on the proposal of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia.

4. Other prosecutors are appointed and dismissed by the Prosecutor General of the Republic of South Ossetia, subordinate and accountable to him.

5. The term of office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic of South Ossetia is five years. (41)

6. The powers, organization and activities of the prosecutor’s office of the Republic of South Ossetia are determined by law.

 

CHAPTER VIII

LOCAL STATE AUTHORITIES. LOCAL GOVERNMENT (42)

Article 88

State power in the administrative-territorial units of the Republic of South Ossetia is exercised by local bodies of state power, the procedure for the formation and issues of conducting which are determined by law.

 

Article 89

1. Local self-government ensures the independent solution of issues of local importance by the population.

2. Local self-government is exercised by citizens through a referendum, elections, gatherings, other forms of direct expression of will through elected and other bodies of local self-government.

 

Article 90

1. The order of formation and issues of conducting local self-government bodies are determined by law.

2. Changing the boundaries of the territory in which local self-government is exercised is allowed, taking into account the opinion of the population of the corresponding territory.

 

Article 91

1. Local self-government bodies independently manage municipal property, form and execute the local budget, and also resolve other issues of local importance.

2. Bodies of local self-government may be endowed by law with separate state powers with the transfer of material and financial resources necessary for their implementation. The implementation of the delegated powers is controlled by the state.

3. Local self-government bodies in the Republic of South Ossetia are guaranteed the right to judicial protection, to compensation for additional expenses incurred as a result of decisions taken by state authorities.

 

CHAPTER IX

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND THE PROCEDURE FOR REVISING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH OSSETIA

 

Article 92

1. Proposals to amend the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia may be submitted by the President of the Republic of South Ossetia, deputies of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia in an amount of at least one third of the number of elected deputies.

2. The issue of changing the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia and revising its provisions cannot be put forward and considered during a state of war or a state of emergency.

3. The provisions of Chapter I of the Constitution “Fundamentals of the constitutional system”, Chapter II “Rights, freedoms and duties of man and citizen” and Chapter IX “Constitutional amendments and revision of the Constitution” may be changed only as a result of a referendum.

 

Article 93

1. Amendments to Chapters III-VIII of the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia are adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia by a two-thirds majority of the total number of elected deputies.

2. The adopted law on amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia is sent to the President of the Republic of South Ossetia within 7 days for signing and official publication.

3. The President of the Republic of South Ossetia, within a month from the date of entry into force of the law on amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia, officially publishes the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia with the amendments made to it, as well as indicating the date on which the relevant amendments come into force.

FINAL AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

1. The Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia shall enter into force on the day of its official publication based on the results of a popular vote.

The day of the national vote is considered the day of the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia.

At the same time, the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia, adopted on November 2, 1993, with subsequent amendments and additions, is terminated.

2. Laws and other normative legal acts that were in force before the entry into force of this Constitution shall be applied in the part that does not contradict it, and within two years from the date of adoption of the Constitution must be brought in accordance with it.

3. Constitutional laws must be adopted within one year from the day this Constitution comes into force. Other laws named in the Constitution must be adopted in the manner and within the time limits determined by the Parliament, but not later than two years from the day the Constitution enters into force.

4. The President of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, from the date of entry into force of the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia, exercise their powers until the expiration of the term for which they were elected.

5. The Government of the Republic of South Ossetia from the date of entry into force of this Constitution acquires the rights, duties and responsibilities established by the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia.

6. The courts of the Republic of South Ossetia administer justice in accordance with their powers established by this Constitution.

7. Excluded. (43)

8. Excluded. (44)


NOTES:

(1) The wording of Part 1 of Article 1 is given in accordance with the results of the Referendum of the Republic of South Ossetia on April 9, 2017.

(2) The wording of paragraph 1 of Article 4 is given in accordance with the results of the Referendum of the Republic of South Ossetia on November 14, 2011.

(3) The wording of Part 2 of Article 47 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29

, 2008 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on November 5, 2008 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(4) The wording of part 1 of Article 48 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated April 20, 2011 “On the introduction of amendments and additions to Chapter III of paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia, adopted by referendum on April 8, 2001 of the year”, which came into force from the date of its official publication on April 30, 2011 (South Ossetia Newspaper, 2011, April 30, No. 48) and the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia of February 8, 2012 “On Amendments and Additions to the Chapter III of paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia, adopted by referendum on April 8, 2001”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on November 2, 2013 (South Ossetia Newspaper, 2013, November 2, No. 140 ).

(5) The wording of Part 2 of Article 49 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29, 2008 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on November 5, 2008 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(6) Article 50 is reworded in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29, 2008 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on November 5, 2008 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(7) The wording of paragraph 8 of Article 50 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated 20

March 2013 “On Amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on April 4, 2013 (South Ossetia Newspaper, 2013, April 4, No. 45).

(8) The wording of paragraph 21 of Article 50 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated March 20, 2013 “On Amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on April 4, 2013. (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2013, April 4, No. 45) and the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated May 7, 2014 No. 135 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day its official publication on June 12, 2014 (South Ossetia Newspaper, 2014, June 12, Nos. 85–86).

(9) Article 50 is supplemented with a new paragraph in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated February 3

, 2010 “On Amendments and Additions to Articles 50, 61 and 62 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on February 24, 2010 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2010, February 24, No. 16).

(10) The wording of part 1 of Article 51 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29 , 2008 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on November 5, 2008 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(11) The wording of part 1 of Article 53 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29, 2008 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on November 5, 2008 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(12) The wording of Part 2 of Article 53 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29, 2008 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on November 5, 2008 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(13) The wording of Part 2 of Article 54 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29, 2008 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on November 5, 2008 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(14) The wording of part 3 of Article 55 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29, 2008 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on November 5, 2008 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(15) The wording of Part 2 of Article 56 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29, 2008 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on November 5, 2008 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(16) The wording of part 1 of Article 57 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated November 30, 2016 “On Amendments to Article 57 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on December 13, 2016 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2016, December 13, No. 163).

(17) Part 2 of Article 57 is excluded in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia of January 21, 2004

of the year “On the introduction of amendments, additions and amendments to Article 57 and Chapter VIII of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia, adopted at a referendum on April 8, 2001”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on January 31, 2004 (Newspaper “Yuzhnaya Ossetia”, 2004, January 31, No. 9).

(18) The wording of Part 1 of Article 58 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated March 3

, 2004 “On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to Article 58 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia, Adopted at a Referendum on April 8, 2001”, entered into in force from the date of its official publication on March 16, 2004 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2004, March 16, Nos. 24–29).

(19) Article 61 was reworded in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29, 2008 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on November 5, 2008 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(20) The wording of paragraph 14 of Article 61 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated March 20, 2013 “On Amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on April 4, 2013. (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2013, April 4, No. 45) and the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated May 7, 2014 No. 135 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia” On the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia ”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on June 12, 2014 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2014, June 12, No. 85–86).

(21) Article 61 was supplemented with a new paragraph in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated 3

February 2010 “On the introduction of amendments and additions to Articles 50, 61 and 62 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on February 24, 2010 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2010, February 24 , No. 16).

(22) The wording of Article 62 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated July 10, 2002 “On the Introduction of Amendments, Additions and Amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on July 27, 2002 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2002, July 27, No. 58), the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29, 2008 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day its official publication on November 5, 2008 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103) and the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated May 7, 2014 No. 135 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia “On the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia”,which entered into force on the day of its official publication on June 12, 2014 (South Ossetia Newspaper, June 12, 2014, Nos. 85–86).

(23) The wording of Article 69 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia of July 10, 2002 “On the Introduction of Amendments, Additions and Amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force from the date of its official publication on July 27, 2002 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2002, July 27, No. 58), and the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated May 7, 2014 No. 135 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia” On the Supreme Court of the Republic South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on June 10, 2014 (South Ossetia Newspaper, 2014, June 10, Nos. 83–84).

(24) The wording of Article 73 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29, 2008 “On Amendments to Article 73 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on November 5, 2008. (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(25) Parts 4-6 of Article 73 became invalid in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated March 20, 2013 “On Amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on April 4, 2013 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2013, April 4, No. 45).

(26) The wording of Part 7 of Article 73 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated 20

March 2013 “On Amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on April 4, 2013 (South Ossetia Newspaper, 2013, April 4, No. 45).

(27) The wording of Part 2 of Article 77 is given in accordance with the Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated May 19, 2006 “On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to Articles 77, 78, 79 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on June 3, 2006 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2006, June 3, No. 50).

(28) The wording of part 3 of Article 77 is given in accordance with the Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated May 19, 2006 “On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to Articles 77, 78, 79 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on June 3, 2006 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2006, June 3, No. 50).

(29) The wording of part 1 of Article 78 is given in accordance with the Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated May 19, 2006 “On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to Articles 77, 78, 79 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on June 3, 2006 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2006, June 3, No. 50).

(30) The wording of Part 2 of Article 78 is given in accordance with the Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated May 19, 2006 “On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to Articles 77, 78, 79 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on June 3, 2006 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2006, June 3, No. 50).

(31) The wording of part 1 of Article 79 is given in accordance with the Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated May 19, 2006 “On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to Articles 77, 78, 79 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on June 3, 2006 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2006, June 3, No. 50).

(32) The wording of Part 2 of Article 79 is given in accordance with the Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated May 19, 2006 “On Amendments and Additions to Articles 77, 78, 79 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on June 3, 2006 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2006, June 3, No. 50).

(33) Parts 4, 5 and 7 of Article 79 are excluded in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29, 2008 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication November 5, 2008 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(34) Part 1 of Article 82 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29, 2008 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on November 5, 2008 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(35) The wording of paragraph 2 of Article 82 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated March 20

, 2013 “On Amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on April 4, 2013. (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2013, April 4, No. 45).

(36) The wording of paragraph 4 of Article 82 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated 20

March 2013 “On Amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on April 4, 2013 (South Ossetia Newspaper, 2013, April 4, No. 45).

(37) The wording of paragraph 2 of part 1 of Article 83 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated May 7, 2014 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia “On the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia””, which entered into in force from the date of its official publication on June 12, 2014 (South Ossetia Newspaper, 2014, June 12, Nos. 85–86).

(38) The wording of Article 84 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated May 7, 2014

No. 135 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia “On the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia””, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on June 12, 2014 (South Ossetia Newspaper, 2014, June 12, nos. 85–86).

(39) The wording of Article 85 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated March 20, 2013 “On Amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force from the date of its official publication on April 4, 2013 (Gazeta “South Ossetia”, 2013, April 4, No. 45) and the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated May 7, 2014 No. 135 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia” On the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia “” , which entered into force on the day of its official publication on June 12 , 2014 (South Ossetia Newspaper, June 12, 2014, Nos. 85–86).

(40) The wording of Article 86 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29, 2008 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on November 5, 2008. (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(41) The wording of Part 5 of Article 87 is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29, 2008 “On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on November 5, 2008 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(42) The wording of Chapter VIII is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated 21

January 2004 “On the introduction of amendments, additions and amendments to Article 57 and Chapter VIII of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia, adopted at a referendum on April 8, 2001”, which entered into force from the date of its official publication on January 31, 2004 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2004, January 31, No. 9) and the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated October 29, 2008 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication 5 November 2008 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2008, November 5, No. 103).

(43) Part 7 of the Final and Transitional Provisions is excluded in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated May 7, 2014 No. 135 “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia “On the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Ossetia””, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on June 12, 2014 (South Ossetia Newspaper, June 12, 2014, Nos. 85–86).

(44) The wording of Part 8 of the Final and Transitional Provisions is given in accordance with the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated December 30, 2009 “On Amendments to Part 8 of the Final and Transitional Provisions of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day its official publication on January 30, 2010 (South Ossetia Newspaper, 2010, January 30, Nos. 7–8), by the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia of December 24, 2010 “On Amendments to Part 8 of the Final and Transitional Provisions of the Constitution ( Fundamental Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on January 24, 2011 (South Ossetia Newspaper, 2011, January 24, No. 8),The Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated January 30, 2013 “On Amendments to Part 8 of the Final and Transitional Provisions of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force on the day of its official publication on February 12, 2013 (South Ossetia Newspaper 2013, February 12, No. 21) and the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated December 27, 2013 “On Amendments to Part 8 of the Final and Transitional Provisions of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force from the date of its official publication on January 9 2014 (Newspaper “South Ossetia”, 2014, January 9, No. 1).No. 21) and the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated December 27, 2013 “On Amendments to Part 8 of the Final and Transitional Provisions of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force from the date of its official publication on January 9, 2014 (Gazeta “South Ossetia”, 2014, January 9, No. 1).No. 21) and the Constitutional Law of the Republic of South Ossetia dated December 27, 2013 “On Amendments to Part 8 of the Final and Transitional Provisions of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia”, which entered into force from the date of its official publication on January 9, 2014 (Gazeta “South Ossetia”, 2014, January 9, No. 1).

 





International Science Council Statement on Ukraine-28/02/2022

Paris, France

28 February 2022

The ISC expresses its deep dismay and concerns regarding the military offensives being carried out in Ukraine. This conflict has already generated a grave humanitarian crisis.

Science has proven to act as a platform for dialogue even in times of war, and therefore is a resource on which to capitalize to avoid further loss of life and disruption including that to scientific research and infrastructures. The ISC counts members in all countries involved in this conflict.

At a time when the demand and the potential for science to provide actionable knowledge to our global challenges on multiple fronts – climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and growing inequalities – are greater than ever, the current conflict in Ukraine and its consequences will hamper the power of science to solve problems when we should be harnessing it.

The ISC also warns against the severe outcomes that conflict will have on the research and academic community. Our capacity to work collaboratively on global challenges, and on cutting edge research such as Arctic and space research, is only equal to our capacity to maintain strong collaboration amidst geopolitical turmoil. Ultimately the isolation and exclusion of important scientific communities is detrimental to all.

The ISC and its partners are committed to assisting the global scientific community in welcoming and protecting scientists who have been placed at-risk or become displaced by this conflict by providing them opportunities to continue their work.

The ISC is committed to continue advancing the equal participation and collaboration between scientists in all countries in its activities and the principle of the free and responsible practice of science which is enshrined in its statutes.





UNO Arms Trade Treaty – 2013

The Arms Trade Treaty (or ATT as it is widely known) establishes common global standards for the international trade in conventional weapons. It encourages States Parties to trade conventional arms responsibly and transparently, thereby helping to deter their diversion to the illicit market. The ATT text adopted by the United Nations General Assembly was the product of a Final Arms Trade Treaty Conference chaired by Australia’s then Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, Mr Peter Woolcott. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Arms Trade Treaty on 2 April 2013. The treaty entered into force on 24 December 2014.

Dept of Foreign affairs and trade, Govt of Australia

Law

The A TT requires each State Party to regulate, on a national basis, the international transfer of conventional arms covered by the Treaty, as well as the export of parts and components and ammunition/munitions covered by the Treaty (“covered arms or items”). A State Party is required to establish and maintain a national control system, including a national control list, in order to regulate such international transfers. A State Party is prohibited from authorizing the international transfer of covered arms or items if the transfer would violate its obligations under measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) or relevant international obligations under international agreements to which it is a party. The ATT also prohibits a State Party from authorizing any international transfer of covered arms or items if it has actual knowledge, at the time of the authorization, that the covered arms or items would be used in the commission of certain serious violations of international law, such as genocide. A State Party is also required to conduct a national assessment of proposed exports to assess the potential that covered arms or items could be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or an act constituting a terrorism offense or transnational organized crime offense under treaties to which the exporting State is a party, as well as take into account certain other specified factors.

PREAMBLE

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations which seeks to promote the establishment and maintenance of internatio nal peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world ’s human and economic resources,

Underlining the need to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and to prevent their diversion to the illicit market, or for unauthorized end use and end users, including in the commission of terrorist acts,

Recognizing the legitimate political, security, economic and commercial interests of States in the international trade in conventional arms,

Reaffirming the sovereign right of any State to regulate and control conventional arms exclusively within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or constitutional system,

Acknowledging that peace and security, development and human rights are pillars of the United Nations system and foundations for collective security and recognizing that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing,

Recalling the United Nations Disarmament Commission Guidelines for international arms transfers in the cont ext of General Assembly resolution 46/36H of 6 December 1991,

Noting the contribution made by the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, as well as the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the International Instrument to Enable States to Ident ify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons,

Recognizing the security, social, economic and humanitarian consequences of the illicit and unregulated trade in conventional arms,

Bearing in mind that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict and armed violence,

Recognizing also the challenges faced by victims of armed conflict and their need for adequate care, rehabilitation and social and economic inclusion,

Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty prevents States from maintaining and adopting additional effective measures to further the object and purpose of this Treaty,

Mindful of the legitimate trade and lawful ownership, and use of certain conventional arms for recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities, where such trade, ownership and use are permitted or protected by law,

Mindful also of the role regional organizations can play in assisting States Parties, upon request, in implementing this Treaty,

Recognizing the voluntary and active role that civil society, including non-governmental organizations, and industry, can play in raising awareness of the object and purpose of this Treaty, and in supporting its implementation,

Acknowledging that regulation of the international trade in conventional arms and preventing their diversion should not hamper international cooperation and legitimate trade in materiel, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing the desirability of achieving universal adherence to this Treaty,

Determined to act in accordance with the following principles;


Note: The Preamble serves as an introduction to the Treaty and provides the general context of the Treaty. None of the preambular provisions impose an international legal obligation. These preambular paragraphs underscore that the Treaty does not apply to wholly domestic trade in conventional arms, nor does it prohibit or place any obligations on the
ownership or use of conventional arms. The fifth and thirteenth preambular paragraphs are of particular note in this regard. The fifth preambular paragraph reaffirms “the sovereign right of any State to regulate and control conventional arms exclusively within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or constitutional system,” which makes clear that wholly domestic trade in or ownership of conventional arms remain exclusively the prerogative of each State Party to regulate and control within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or constitutional system. The thirteenth preambular paragraph recognizes “the legitimate trade and lawful ownership, and use  of certain conventional arms for recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities, where such trade, ownership and use are permitted or protected by law.” 


PRINCIPLES

  • The inherent right of all States to individual or collective self-defence as recognized in Article 51  of the Charter of the United Nations;
  • The settlement of international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered in accordance with Article 2 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations;
  • Refraining in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations in accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations;
  • Non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State in accordance with Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations;
  • Respecting and ensuring respect for international humanitarian law in accordance with, inter alia, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and respecting and ensuring respect for human rights in accordance with, inter alia, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
  • The responsibility of all States, in accordance with their respective international obligations, to effectively regulate the international trade in conventional arms, and to prevent their diversion, as well as the primary responsibility of all States in establishing and implementing their respective national control systems;
  • The respect for the legitimate interests of States to acquire conventional arms to exercise their right to self-defence and for peacekeeping operations; and to produce, export, import and transfer conventional arms;
  • Implementing this Treaty in a consistent, objective and non-discriminatory manner,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1 – OBJECT AND PURPOSE

The object of this Treaty is to:

  • Establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms;
  • Prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion;

for the purpose of:

  • Contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability;
  • Reducing human suffering;
  • Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties.

Note: Article I describes the object of the Treaty as establishing the highest possible common international standards for regulating the international trade in conventional arms; preventing and eradicating the illicit trade in conventional arms; and preventing their diversion. The Article also describes the purpose of the Treaty as contributing to international and regional peace, security, and stability; reducing human suffering; and promoting cooperation, transparency, and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms. 


Article 2

Scope

1. This Treaty shall apply to all conventional arms within the following categories:

(a) Battle tanks;

(b) Armoured combat vehicles;

(c) Large-calibre artillery systems;

(d) Combat aircraft;

(e) Attack helicopters;

(f) Warships;

(g) Missiles and missile launchers; and

(h) Small arms and light weapons.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the activities of the international trade comprise export, import, transit, trans -shipment and brokering, hereafter referred to as “transfer”.

3. This Treaty shall not apply to the international movement of conventional arms by, or on behalf of, a State Party for its use provided that the conventional arms remain under that State Party’s ownership.


NOTE : Paragraph 2 defines the key Treaty term “transfer” as export, import, transit, transshipment, and brokering. The essential aspect of this definition is that the term “transfer” is defined for purposes of the Treaty only to include the specified activities of the international trade in the conventional arms and items covered by the Treaty. The Treaty does not apply to the wholly domestic trade in such conventional arms or items. To re-iterate this important point, I
recommend that the United States include the following understanding in its instrument of ratification:

The  term “transfer” in Article 2(2) of the Treaty applies exclusively to the international trade in the conventional arms and items covered by the Treaty. Consistent with the scope of the Treaty, the use of the term “transfer” in this document relates exclusively to international trade.

Paragraph 3 makes clear that the Treaty does not apply to the international movement of conventional arms by, or on behalf of, a State Party for its own use, provided the conventional arms remain under that State Party’s ownership. Such movement does not amount to a “transfer” for purposes of the Treaty. This provision recognizes that States move conventional arms in and out of their territory for various purposes, including when deploying their armed forces, law
enforcement personnel, diplomatic security personnel, or other official personnel overseas, and that such movements are not covered by the Treaty. The phrase “or on behalf of” recognizes that such movements may be carried out by entities other than the State Party that owns the arms, including commercial or common carriers or another State, so long as the arms remain under that State Party’s ownership. 


Article 3

Ammunition/Munitions

Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to authorizing the export of such ammunition/munitions.


NOTE:  Article 3 obligates States Parties to establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of ammunition/munitions fired, launched, or delivered by the conventional arms covered under Article 2(1 ). The term “ammunition/munitions” is meant to indicate that the obligation applies to small caliber “ammunition” that are to be fired, launched, or delivered from small arms and light weapons, as well as larger caliber “munitions” that are to be fired, launched, or delivered from larger conventional arms covered under Article 2(1 ), such as battle tanks, large
caliber artillery systems, and attack helicopters. The obligation in Article 3 applies exclusively to ammunition/munitions that are fired, launched, or delivered by the conventional arms covered under Article 2(1 ). In this regard, for example, a grenade launched from a hand-held underbarrel or mounted grenade launcher (e.g., an M203 grenade launcher) would be considered to be ammunition/munitions covered under Article 3, but a hand-thrown grenade would not be covered
under Article 3.


Article 4

Parts and Components

Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of parts and components where the export is in a fo rm that provides the capability to assemble the conventional arms covered under Article 2

(1) and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to authorizing the export of such parts and components.

Article 5

General Implementation

1. Each State Party shall implement this Treaty in a consistent, objective and non-discriminatory manner, bearing in mind the principles referred to in this Treaty.

2. Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system, including a national control list, in order to implement the provisions of this Treaty.

3. Each State Party is encouraged to apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range of conventional arms. National definitions of any of the categories covered under Article 2 (1) (a)-(g) shall not cover less than the descriptions used in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms at the time of entry into force of this Treaty. For the category covered under Article 2 (1) (h), national definitions shall not cover less than the descriptions used in relevant United Nations instruments at the time of entry into force of this Treaty.

4. Each State Party, pursuant to its national laws, shall provide its national control list to the Secretariat, which shall make it available t o other States Parties. States Parties are encouraged to make their control lists publicly available.

5. Each State Party shall take measures necessary to implement the provisions of this Treaty and shall designate competent national authorities in order t o have an effective and transparent national control system regulating the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) and of items covered under Article 3 and Article 4.

6. Each State Party shall designate one or more national points of con tact to exchange information on matters related to the implementation of this Treaty. Each State Party shall notify the Secretariat, established under Article 18, of its national point(s) of contact and keep the information updated.

Article 6

Prohibitions

1. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if the transfer would violate its obligations under measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular arms embargoes.

2. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if the t ransfer would violate its relevant international obligations under international agreements to which it is a Party, in particular those relating to the transfer of, or illicit trafficking in, conventional arms.

3. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if it has knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a Party.

Article 7

Export and Export Assessment

1. If the export is not prohibited under Article 6, each exporting State Party, prior to authorization of the export of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, under its jurisdiction and pursuant to its national control system, shall, in an objective and non -discriminatory manner, taking into account relevant factors, including information provided by the importing State in accordance with Article 8 (1), assess the potential that the conventional arms or items:

(a) would contribute to or undermine peace and security;

(b) could be used to:

(i) commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law;

(ii) commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human rights law;

(iii) commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism to which the exporting State is a Party; or

(iv) commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to transnational organized crime to which the exporting State is a Party.

2. The exporting State Party shall also consider whether there are measures that could be undertaken to mitigate risks identified in (a) or (b) in paragraph 1, such as confidence-building measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes by the exporting and importing States.

3. If, after conducting this assessment and considering available mitigating measures, the exporting State Party determines that there is an overrid ing risk of any of the negative consequences in paragraph 1, the exporting State Party shall not authorize the export.

4. The exporting State Party, in making this assessment, shall take into account the risk of the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of the items covered under Article 3 or Article 4 being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender – based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.

5. Each exporting State Party shall take measures to ensure that all authorizations for the export of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4 are detailed and issued prior to the export.

6. Each exporting State Party shall make available appropriate information about the authorization in question, upon request, to the importing State Party and to the transit or trans-shipment States Parties, subject to its national laws, practices or policies.

7. If, after an authorization has been granted, an exporting State Party bec omes aware of new relevant information, it is encouraged to reassess the authorization after consultations, if appropriate, with the importing State.

Article 8

Import

1. Each importing State Party shall take measures to ensure that appropriate and relevant information is provided, upon request, pursuant to its national laws, to the exporting State Party, to assist the exporting State Party in conducting its national export assessment under Article 7. Such measures may include end use or end user documentation.

2. Each importing State Party shall take measures that will allow it to regulate, where necessary, imports under its jurisdiction of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Such measures may include import systems.

3. Each importing State Party may request information from the exporting State Party concerning any pending or actual export authorizations where the importing State Party is the country of final destination.

Article 9

Transit or trans-shipment

Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to regulate, where necessary and feasible, the transit or trans-shipment under its jurisdiction of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) through its territory in accordance with relevant international law.

Article 10

Brokering

Each State Party shall take measures, pursuant to its national laws, to regulate brokering taking place under its jurisdiction for conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Such measures may include requiring brokers to register or obtain written authorization before engaging in brokering.

Article 11

Diversion

1. Each State Party involved in the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) shall take measures to prevent their diversion.

2. The exporting State Party shall seek to prevent the diversion of the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) through its national control system, established in accordance with Article 5 (2), by assessing the risk of diversion of the export and considering the establishment of mitigation measures such as confidence-building measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes by the exporting and importing States. Other prevention measures may include, where appropriate: examining parties involved in the export, requiring addit ional documentation, certificates, assurances, not authorizing the export or other appropriate measures.

3. Importing, transit, trans-shipment and exporting States Parties shall cooperate and exchange information, pursuant to their national laws, where ap propriate and feasible, in order to mitigate the risk of diversion of the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

4. If a State Party detects a diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), the State Party shall take appropriate measures, pursuant to its national laws and in accordance with international law, to address such diversion. Such measures may include alerting potentially affected States Parties, examining diverted shipments of such conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and taking follow-up measures through investigation and law enforcement.

5. In order to better comprehend and prevent the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), States Parties are encouraged to share relevant information with one another on effective measures to address diversion. Such information may include information on illicit activities including corruption, international trafficking routes, illicit brokers, sources of illicit supply, methods of concealment, common points of dispatch, or destinations used by organized groups engaged in diversion.

6. States Parties are encouraged to report to other States Parties, through the Secretariat, on measures taken in addressing the diversion of tran sferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

Article 12

Record keeping

1. Each State Party shall maintain national records, pursuant to its national laws and regulations, of its issuance of export authorizations or its actual exports of the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

2. Each State Party is encouraged to maintain records of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) that are transferred to its territory as the final destination or that are authorized to transit or trans -ship territory under its jurisdiction.

3. Each State Party is encouraged to include in those records: the quantity, value, model/type, authorized international transfers of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), conventional arms actually transferred, details of exporting State(s), importing State(s), transit and trans-shipment State(s), and end users, as appropriate.

4. Records shall be kept for a minimum of ten years.

Article 13

Reporting

1. Each State Party shall, within the first year after entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, in accordance with Article 22, provide an initial report to the Secretariat of measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, including national laws, national control lists and other regulations and administrative measures. Each State Party shall report to the Secretariat on any new measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate. Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat.

2. States Parties are encouraged to report to other States Parties, through the Secretariat, information on measures taken that have been proven effective in addressing the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

3. Each State Party shall submit annually to the Secretariat by 31 May a report for the preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat. The report submitted to the Secretariat may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Reports may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.

Article 14

Enforcement

Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to enforce national laws and regulations that implement the provisions of this Treaty.

Article 15

International Cooperation

1. States Parties shall cooperate with each other, consistent with their respective security interests and national laws, to effectively implement this Treaty.

2. States Parties are encouraged to facilitate international cooperation, including exchanging information on matters of mutual interest regarding the implementation and application of this Treaty pursuant to their respective security interests and national laws.

3. States Parties are encouraged to consult on matters of mutual interest and to share information, as appropriate, to support the implementation of this Treaty.

4. States Parties are encouraged to cooperate, pursuant to their national laws, in order to assist national implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, including through sharing information regarding illicit activities and actors and in order to prevent and eradicate diversion of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

5. States Parties shall, where jointly agreed and consistent with their national laws, afford one another the widest measure of assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to violations of national measures established pursuant to this Treaty.

6. States Parties are encouraged to take national measures and to cooperate with each other to prevent the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) becoming subject to corrupt practices.

7. States Parties are encouraged to exchange experience and information on lessons learned in relation to any aspect of this Treaty.

Article 16

International Assistance

1. In implementing this Treaty, each State Party may seek assistance including legal or legislative assistance, institutional capacity -building, and technical, material or financial assistance. Such assistance may include stockpile management, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, model legislation, and effective practices for implementation. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide such assistance, upon request.

2. Each State Party may request, offer or receive assistance through, inter alia, the United Nations, international, regional, subregional or national organizations, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

3. A voluntary trust fund shall be established b y States Parties to assist requesting States Parties requiring international assistance to implement this Treaty. Each State Party is encouraged to contribute resources to the fund.

Article 17

Conference of States Parties

1. A Conference of States Parties shall be convened by the provisional Secretariat, established under Article 18, no later than one year following the entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter at such other times as may be decided by the Conference of States Parties.

2. The Conference of States Parties shall adopt by consensus its rules of procedure at its first session.

3. The Conference of States Parties shall adopt financial rules for itself as well as governing the funding of any subsidiary bodies it may establish as well as fi nancial provisions governing the functioning of the Secretariat. At each ordinary session, it shall adopt a budget for the financial period until the next ordinary session.

4. The Conference of States Parties shall:

(a) Review the implementation of this Treaty, including developments in the field of conventional arms;

(b) Consider and adopt recommendations regarding the implementation and operation of this Treaty, in particular the promotion of its universality;

(c) Consider amendments to this Treaty in accordance with Article 20;

(d) Consider issues arising from the interpretation of this Treaty;

(e) Consider and decide the tasks and budget of the Secretariat;

(f) Consider the establishment of any subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to improve the functioning of this Treaty; and

(g) Perform any other function consistent with this Treaty.

5. Extraordinary meetings of the Conference of States Parties shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference of States Parties, o r at the written request of any State Party provided that this request is supported by at least two-thirds of the States Parties.

Article 18

Secretariat

1. This Treaty hereby establishes a Secretariat to assist States Parties in the effective implementation of this Treaty. Pending the first meeting of the Conference of States Parties, a provisional Secretariat will be responsible for the administrative functions covered under this Treaty.

2. The Secretariat shall be adequately staffed. Staff shall have the necessary expertise to ensure that the Secretariat can effectively undertake the responsibilities described in paragraph 3.

3. The Secretariat shall be responsible to States Parties. Within a minimized structure, the Secretariat shall undertake the following responsibilities:

(a) Receive, make available and distribute the reports as mandated by this Treaty;

(b) Maintain and make available to States Parties the list of national points of contact;

(c) Facilitate the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for Treaty implementation and promote international cooperation as requested;

(d) Facilitate the work of the Conference of States Parties, including making arrangements and providing the necessary services for meetings under this Treaty; and

(e) Perform other duties as decided by the Conferences of States Parties.

Article 19

Dispute Settlement

1. States Parties shall consult and, by mutual consent, cooperate to pursue settlement of any dispute that may arise between them with regard t o the interpretation or application of this Treaty including through negotiations, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement or other peaceful means.

2. States Parties may pursue, by mutual consent, arbitration to settle any dispute between them, regarding issues concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty.

Article 20

Amendments

1. Six years after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose an amendment to this Treaty. Thereafter, proposed amendments may only b e considered by the Conference of States Parties every three years.

2. Any proposal to amend this Treaty shall be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, which shall circulate the proposal to all States Parties, not less than

180 days before the next meeting of the Conference of States Parties at which amendments may be considered pursuant to paragraph 1. The amendment shall be considered at the next Conference of States Parties at which amendments may be considered pursuant to paragraph 1 if, no later than 120 days after its circulation by the Secretariat, a majority of States Parties notify the Secretariat that they support consideration of the proposal.

3. The States Parties shall make every effort to achieve consensus on each amendment. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall, as a last resort, be adopted by a three -quarters majority vote of the States Parties present and voting at the meeting of the Conference of States Parties. For the purposes of this Article, States Parties present and voting means States Parties present and casting an affirmative or negative vote. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted amendment to all States Parties.

4. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 shall enter into force for each State Party that has deposited its instrument of acceptance for that amendment, ninety days following the date of deposit with the Depositary of the instruments of acceptance by a majority of the number of States Parties at the time of the adoption of the amendment. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party ninety days following the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance for that amendment.

Article 21

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York by all States from 3 June 2013 until its entry into force.

2. This Treaty is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by each signatory State.

3. Following its entry into force, this Treaty shall be open for accession by any State that has not signed the Treaty.

4. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

Article 22

Entry into Force

1. This Treaty shall enter into force ninety days following the date of the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval with the Depositary.

2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acc eptance, approval or accession subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, this Treaty shall enter into force for that State ninety days following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 23

Provisional Application

Any State may at the time of signature or the deposit of instrument of its of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally Article 6 and Article 7 pending the entry into force of thi s Treaty for that State.

Article 24

Duration and Withdrawal

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty. It shall give notification of suc h withdrawal to the Depositary, which shall notify all other States Parties. The notification of withdrawal may include an explanation of the reasons for its withdrawal. The notice of withdrawal shall take effect ninety days after the receipt of the notifi cation of withdrawal by the Depositary, unless the notification of withdrawal specifies a later date.

3. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this Treaty while it was a Party to this Treaty, includ ing any financial obligations that it may have accrued.

Article 25

Reservations

1. At the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, each State may formulate reservations, unless the reservations are incompatible with the object and purpose of this Treaty.

2. A State Party may withdraw its reservation at any time by notification to this effect addressed to the Depositary.

Article 26

Relationship with other international agreements

1. The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing or future international agreements, to which they are parties, where those obligations are consistent with this Treaty.

2. This Treaty shall not be cited as grounds for voiding defence cooperation agreements concluded between States Parties to this Treaty.

Article 27

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Treaty.

Article 28

Authentic Texts

The original text of this Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,

Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the

Secretary-General of the United Nations.


UN Member State that have not yet joined the treaty

  1. Algeria
  2. Armenia
  3. Azerbaijan
  4. Belarus
  5. Bhutan
  6. Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
  7. Brunei Darussalam
  8. Cuba
  9. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
  10. Democratic Republic of the Congo
  11. Ecuador
  12. Egypt
  13. Equatorial Guinea
  14. Eritrea
  15. Ethiopia
  16. Fiji
  17. Gambia (Islamic Republic of the)
  18. India
  19. Indonesia
  20. Iran (Islamic Republic of)
  21. Iraq
  22. Jordan
  23. Kenya
  24. Kuwait
  25. Kyrgyzstan
  26. Lao People’s Democratic Republic
  27. Marshall Islands
  28. Micronesia (Federated States of)
  29. Morocco
  30. Myanmar
  31. Nepal
  32. Nicaragua
  33. Oman
  34. Pakistan
  35. Papua New Guinea
  36. Qatar
  37. Russian Federation
  38. Saudi Arabia
  39. Solomon Islands
  40. Somalia
  41. South Sudan
  42. Sri Lanka
  43. Sudan
  44. Syrian Arab Republic
  45. Tajikistan
  46. Timor-Leste
  47. Tonga
  48. Tunisia
  49. Turkmenistan
  50. Uganda
  51. Uzbekistan
  52. Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
  53. Viet Nam
  54. Yemen




Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1996)

Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

CTBT Art 1 and 2

Law

PREAMBLE

The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as “the States Parties”),

Welcoming the international agreements and other positive measures of recent years in the field of nuclear disarmament, including reductions in arsenals of nuclear weapons, as well as in the field of the prevention of nuclear proliferation in all its aspects,

Underlining the importance of the full and prompt implementation of such agreements and measures,

Convinced that the present international situation provides an opportunity to take further effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and declaring their intention to take such measures,

Stressing therefore the need for continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects,

Further recognizing that an end to all such nuclear explosions will thus constitute a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament,

Convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through the conclusion of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, which has long been one of the highest priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation,

Noting the aspirations expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Noting also the views expressed that this Treaty could contribute to the protection of the environment,

Affirming the purpose of attracting the adherence of all States to this Treaty and its objective to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

BASIC OBLIGATIONS

1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

ARTICLE II

THE ORGANIZATION

A. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The States Parties hereby establish the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (hereinafter referred to as “the Organization”) to achieve the object and purpose of this Treaty, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.

2. All States Parties shall be members of the Organization. A State Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Organization.

3. The seat of the Organization shall be Vienna, Republic of Austria.

4. There are hereby established as organs of the Organization: the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, which shall include the International Data Centre.

5. Each State Party shall cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Treaty. States Parties shall consult, directly among themselves, or through the Organization or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the object and purpose, or the implementation of the provisions, of this Treaty.

6. The Organization shall conduct its verification activities provided for under this Treaty in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request only the information and data necessary to fulfil its responsibilities under this Treaty. It shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military activities and facilities coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Treaty and, in particular, shall abide by the confidentiality provisions set forth in this Treaty.

7. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to information and data that it receives in confidence from the Organization in connection with the implementation of this Treaty. It shall treat such information and data exclusively in connection with its rights and obligations under this Treaty.

8. The Organization, as an independent body, shall seek to utilize existing expertise and facilities, as appropriate, and to maximize cost efficiencies, through cooperative arrangements with other international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Such arrangements, excluding those of a minor and normal commercial and contractual nature, shall be set out in agreements to be submitted to the Conference of the States Parties for approval.

9. The costs of the activities of the Organization shall be met annually by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the Organization.

10. Financial contributions of States Parties to the Preparatory Commission shall be deducted in an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular budget.

11. A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the payment of its assessed contribution to the Organization shall have no vote in the Organization if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two full years. The Conference of the States Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.

B. THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES

Composition, Procedures and Decision-making

12. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as “the Conference”) shall be composed of all States Parties. Each State Party shall have one representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.

13. The initial session of the Conference shall be convened by the Depositary no later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Treaty.

14. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions, which shall be held annually, unless it decides otherwise.

15. A special session of the Conference shall be convened:

 (a) When decided by the Conference;

(b) When requested by the Executive Council; or

(c) When requested by any State Party and supported by a majority of the States Parties.

The special session shall be convened no later than 30 days after the decision of the Conference, the request of the Executive Council, or the attainment of the necessary support, unless specified otherwise in the decision or request.

16. The Conference may also be convened in the form of an Amendment Conference, in accordance with Article VII.

17. The Conference may also be convened in the form of a Review Conference in accordance with Article VIII.

18. Sessions shall take place at the seat of the Organization unless the Conference decides otherwise.

19. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of each session, it shall elect its President and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new President and other officers are elected at the next session.

20. A majority of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum.

21. Each State Party shall have one vote.

22. The Conference shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance shall be taken as far as possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision, the President of the Conference shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take a decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this Treaty. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.

23. When exercising its function under paragraph 26 (k), the Conference shall take a decision to add any State to the list of States contained in Annex 1 to this Treaty in accordance with the procedure for decisions on matters of substance set out in paragraph 22. Notwithstanding paragraph 22, the Conference shall take decisions on any other change to Annex 1 to this Treaty by consensus.

Powers and Functions

24. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty, including those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, in accordance with this Treaty. It may make recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council.

25. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of, and review compliance with, this Treaty and act in order to promote its object and purpose. It shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines to either of them for the exercise of their functions.

26. The Conference shall:

 (a) Consider and adopt the report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty and the annual programme and budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive Council, as well as consider other reports;

(b) Decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States Parties in accordance with paragraph 9;

(c) Elect the members of the Executive Council;

(d) Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as “the Director-General”);

(e) Consider and approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the latter;

(f) Consider and review scientific and technological developments that could affect the operation of this Treaty. In this context, the Conference may direct the Director-General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him or her, in the performance of his or her functions, to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Treaty to the Conference, to the Executive Council or to States Parties. In that case, the Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts serving in their individual capacity and appointed, in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference, on the basis of their expertise and experience in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of this Treaty;

(g) Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation that contravenes the provisions of this Treaty, in accordance with Article V;

(h) Consider and approve at its initial session any draft agreements, arrangements, provisions, procedures, operational manuals, guidelines and any other documents developed and recommended by the Preparatory Commission;

(i) Consider and approve agreements or arrangements negotiated by the Technical Secretariat with States Parties, other States and international organizations to be concluded by the Executive Council on behalf of the Organization in accordance with paragraph 38 (h);

(j) Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Treaty; and

(k) Update Annex 1 to this Treaty, as appropriate, in accordance with paragraph 23.

C. THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Composition, Procedures and Decision-making

27. The Executive Council shall consist of 51 members. Each State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, to serve on the Executive Council.

28. Taking into account the need for equitable geographical distribution, the Executive Council shall comprise:

 (a) Ten States Parties from Africa;

(b) Seven States Parties from Eastern Europe;

(c) Nine States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean;

(d) Seven States Parties from the Middle East and South Asia;

(e) Ten States Parties from North America and Western Europe; and

(f) Eight States Parties from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East.

All States in each of the above geographical regions are listed in Annex 1 to this Treaty. Annex 1 to this Treaty shall be updated, as appropriate, by the Conference in accordance with paragraphs 23 and 26 (k). It shall not be subject to amendments or changes under the procedures contained in Article VII.

29. The members of the Executive Council shall be elected by the Conference. In this connection, each geographical region shall designate States Parties from that region for election as members of the Executive Council as follows:

 (a) At least one-third of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled, taking into account political and security interests by States Parties in that region designated on the basis of the nuclear capabilities relevant to the Treaty as determined by international data as well as all or any of the following indicative criteria in the order of priority determined by each region:

      • (i) Number of monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System;
      • (ii) Expertise and experience in monitoring technology; and
      • (iii) Contribution to the annual budget of the Organization;

 (b) One of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled on a rotational basis by the State Party that is first in the English alphabetical order among the States Parties in that region that have not served as members of the Executive Council for the longest period of time since becoming States Parties or since their last term, whichever is shorter. A State Party designated on this basis may decide to forgo its seat. In that case, such a State Party shall submit a letter of renunciation to the Director-General, and the seat shall be filled by the State Party following next-in-order according to this sub-paragraph; and

(c) The remaining seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled by States Parties designated from among all the States Parties in that region by rotation or elections.

30. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one representative on the Executive Council, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.

31. Each member of the Executive Council shall hold office from the end of the session of the Conference at which that member is elected until the end of the second regular annual session of the Conference thereafter, except that for the first election of the Executive Council, 26 members shall be elected to hold office until the end of the third regular annual session of the Conference, due regard being paid to the established numerical proportions as described in paragraph 28.

32. The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit them to the Conference for approval.

33. The Executive Council shall elect its Chairman from among its members.

34. The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions. Between regular sessions it shall meet as may be required for the fulfilment of its powers and functions.

35. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote.

36. The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of all its members. The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of all its members unless specified otherwise in this Treaty. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.

Powers and Functions

37. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Organization. It shall be responsible to the Conference. It shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it in accordance with this Treaty. In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and ensure their continuous and proper implementation.

38. The Executive Council shall:

 (a) Promote effective implementation of, and compliance with, this Treaty;

(b) Supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat;

(c) Make recommendations as necessary to the Conference for consideration of further proposals for promoting the object and purpose of this Treaty ;

(d) Cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party;

(e) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft annual programme and budget of the Organization, the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty, the report on the performance of its own activities and such other reports as it deems necessary or that the Conference may request;

(f) Make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference, including the preparation of the draft agenda;

(g) Examine proposals for changes, on matters of an administrative or technical nature, to the Protocol or the Annexes thereto, pursuant to Article VII, and make recommendations to the States Parties regarding their adoption;

(h) Conclude, subject to prior approval of the Conference, agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations on behalf of the Organization and supervise their implementation, with the exception of agreements or arrangements referred to in sub-paragraph (i);

(i) Approve and supervise the operation of agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation of verification activities with States Parties and other States; and

(j) Approve any new operational manuals and any changes to the existing operational manuals that may be proposed by the Technical Secretariat.

 39. The Executive Council may request a special session of the Conference.

40. The Executive Council shall:

 (a) Facilitate cooperation among States Parties, and between States Parties and the Technical Secretariat, relating to the implementation of this Treaty through information exchanges;

(b) Facilitate consultation and clarification among States Parties in accordance with Article IV; and

(c) Receive, consider and take action on requests for, and reports on, on-site inspections in accordance with Article IV.

41. The Executive Council shall consider any concern raised by a State Party about possible non-compliance with this Treaty and abuse of the rights established by this Treaty. In doing so, the Executive Council shall consult with the States Parties involved and, as appropriate, request a State Party to take measures to redress the situation within a specified time. To the extent that the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the following measures:

 (a) Notify all States Parties of the issue or matter;

(b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference;

(c) Make recommendations to the Conference or take action, as appropriate, regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance in accordance with Article V.

D. THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

42. The Technical Secretariat shall assist States Parties in the implementation of this Treaty. The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive Council in the performance of their functions. The Technical Secretariat shall carry out the verification and other function entrusted to it by this Treaty, as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference or the Executive Council in accordance with this Treaty. The Technical Secretariat shall include, as an integral part, the International Data Centre.

43. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with regard to verification of compliance with this Treaty shall, in accordance with Article IV and the Protocol, include inter alia:

    • (a) Being responsible for supervising and coordinating the operation of the International Monitoring System;

(b) Operating the International Data Centre;

(c) Routinely receiving, processing, analysing and reporting on International Monitoring System data;

(d) Providing technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and operation of monitoring stations;

(e) Assisting the Executive Council in facilitating consultation and clarification among States Parties;

(f) Receiving requests for on-site inspections and processing them, facilitating Executive Council consideration of such requests, carrying out the preparations for, and providing technical support during, the conduct of on-site inspections, and reporting to the Executive Council;

(g) Negotiating agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations and concluding, subject to prior approval by the Executive Council, any such agreements or arrangements relating to verification activities with States Parties or other States; and

(h) Assisting the States Parties through their National Authorities on other issues of verification under this Treaty.

44. The Technical Secretariat shall develop and maintain, subject to approval by the Executive Council, operational manuals to guide the operation of the various components of the verification regime, in accordance with Article IV and the Protocol. These manuals shall not constitute integral parts of this Treaty or the Protocol and may be changed by the Technical Secretariat subject to approval by the Executive Council. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the States Parties of any changes in the operational manuals.

45. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with respect to administrative matters shall include:

    • (a) Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization;

(b) Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty and such other reports as the Conference or the Executive Council may request;

(c) Providing administrative and technical support to the Conference, the Executive Council and other subsidiary organs;

(d) Addressing and receiving communications on behalf of the Organization relating to the implementation of this Treaty; and

(e) Carrying out the administrative responsibilities related to any agreements between the Organization and other international organizations.

46. All requests and notifications by States Parties to the Organization shall be transmitted through their National Authorities to the Director-General. Requests and notifications shall be in one of the official languages of this Treaty. In response the Director-General shall use the language of the transmitted request or notification.

47. With respect to the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat for preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization, the Technical Secretariat shall determine and maintain a clear accounting of all costs for each facility established as part of the International Monitoring System. Similar treatment in the draft programme and budget shall be accorded to all other activities of the Organization.

48. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the Executive Council of any problems that have arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions that have come to its notice in the performance of its activities and that it has been unable to resolve through consultations with the State Party concerned.

49. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who shall be its head and chief administrative officer, and such scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required. The Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference upon the recommendation of the Executive Council for a term of four years, renewable for one further term, but not thereafter. The first Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference at its initial session upon the recommendation of the Preparatory Commission.

50. The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and the Executive Council for the appointment of the staff and for the organization and functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of professional expertise, experience, efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as the Director-General, as inspectors or as members of the professional and clerical staff. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper discharge of the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat.

51. The Director-General may, as appropriate, after consultation with the Executive Council, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific issues.

52. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other source external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action that might reflect adversely on their positions as international officers responsible only to the Organization. The Director-General shall assume responsibility for the activities of an inspection team.

53. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

E. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

54. The Organization shall enjoy on the territory and in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions.

55. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers, representatives of members elected to the Executive Council, together with their alternates and advisers, the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff of the Organization shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.

56. The legal capacity, privileges and immunities referred to in this Article shall be defined in agreements between the Organization and the State Parties as well as in an agreement between the Organization and the State in which the Organization is seated. Such agreements shall be considered and approved in accordance with paragraph 26 (h) and (i).

57. Notwithstanding paragraphs 54 and 55, the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff of the Technical Secretariat during the conduct of verification activities shall be those set forth in the Protocol.

ARTICLE III

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES

1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty. In particular, it shall take any necessary measures:

    • (a) To prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;

(b) To prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any such activity anywhere under its control; and

(c) To prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons possessing its nationality from undertaking any such activity anywhere.

2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations under paragraph 1.

3. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the measures taken pursuant to this Article.

4. In order to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty, each State Party shall designate or set up a National Authority and shall so inform the Organization upon entry into force of the Treaty for it. The National Authority shall serve as the national focal point for liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties.

ARTICLE IV

VERIFICATION

A. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. In order to verify compliance with this Treaty, a verification regime shall be established consisting of the following elements:

    • (a) An International Monitoring System;

(b) Consultation and clarification;

(c) On-site inspections; and

(d) Confidence-building measures.

At entry into force of this Treaty, the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of this Treaty.

2. Verification activities shall be based on objective information, shall be limited to the subject matter of this Treaty, and shall be carried out on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of States Parties and in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of their objectives. Each State Party shall refrain from any abuse of the right of verification.

3. Each State Party undertakes in accordance with this Treaty to cooperate through its National Authority established pursuant to Article III, paragraph 4, with the Organization and with other States Parties to facilitate the verification of compliance with this Treaty by, inter alia:

    • (a) Establishing the necessary facilities to participate in these verification measures and establishing the necessary communication;

(b) Providing data obtained from national stations that are part of the International Monitoring System;

(c) Participating, as appropriate, in a consultation and clarification process;

(d) Permitting the conduct of on-site inspections; and

(e) Participating, as appropriate, in confidence-building measures.

4. All States Parties, irrespective of their technical and financial capabilities, shall enjoy the equal right of verification and assume the equal obligation to accept verification.

5. For the purposes of this Treaty, no State Party shall be precluded from using information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, including that of respect for the sovereignty of States.

6. Without prejudice to the right of States Parties to protect sensitive installations, activities or locations not related to this Treaty, States Parties shall not interfere with elements of the verification regime of this Treaty or with national technical means of verification operating in accordance with paragraph 5.

7. Each State Party shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related to this Treaty.

8. Moreover, all necessary measures shall be taken to protect the confidentiality of any information related to civil and military activities and facilities obtained during verification activities.

9. Subject to paragraph 8, information obtained by the Organization through the verification regime established by this Treaty shall be made available to all States Parties in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol.

10. The provisions of this Treaty shall not be interpreted as restricting the international exchange of data for scientific purposes.

11. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization and with other States Parties in the improvement of the verification regime, and in the examination of the verification potential of additional monitoring technologies such as electromagnetic pulse monitoring or satellite monitoring, with a view to developing, when appropriate, specific measures to enhance the efficient and cost-effective verification of this Treaty. Such measures shall, when agreed, be incorporated in existing provisions in this Treaty, the Protocol or as additional sections of the Protocol, in accordance with Article VII, or, if appropriate, be reflected in the operational manuals in accordance with Article II, paragraph 44.

12. The States Parties undertake to promote cooperation among themselves to facilitate and participate in the fullest possible exchange relating to technologies used in the verification of this Treaty in order to enable all States Parties to strengthen their national implementation of verification measures and to benefit from the application of such technologies for peaceful purposes.

13. The provisions of this Treaty shall be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering the economic and technological development of the States Parties for further development of the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

Verification Responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat

14. In discharging its responsibilities in the area of verification specified in this Treaty and the Protocol, in cooperation with the State Parties the Technical Secretariat shall, for the purpose of this Treaty:

    • (a) Make arrangements to receive and distribute data and reporting products relevant to the verification of this Treaty in accordance with its provisions, and to maintain a global communications infrastructure appropriate to this task;

(b) Routinely through its International Data Centre, which shall in principle be the focal point within the Technical Secretariat for data storage and data processing:

      • (i) Receive and initiate requests for data from the International Monitoring System;
      • (ii) Receive data, as appropriate, resulting from the process of consultation and clarification, from on-site inspections, and from confidence-building measures; and
      • (iii) Receive other relevant data from States Parties and international organizations in accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol;

    • (c) Supervise, coordinate and ensure the operation of the International Monitoring System and its component elements, and of the International Data Centre, in accordance with the relevant operational manuals;

(d) Routinely process, analyse and report on International Monitoring System data according to agreed procedures so as to permit the effective international verification of this Treaty and to contribute to the early resolution of compliance concerns;

(e) Make available all data, both raw and processed, and any reporting products, to all States Parties, each State Party taking responsibility for the use of International Monitoring System data in accordance with Article II, paragraph 7, and with paragraphs 8 and 13 of this Article;

(f) Provide to all States Parties equal, open, convenient and timely access to all stored data;

(g) Store all data, both raw and processed, and reporting products;

(h) Coordinate and facilitate requests for additional data from the International Monitoring system;

(i) Coordinate requests for additional data from one State Party to another State Party;

(j) Provide technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and operation of monitoring facilities and respective communication means, where such assistance and support are required by the State concerned;

(k) Make available to any State Party, upon its request, techniques utilized by the Technical Secretariat and its International Data Centre in compiling, storing, processing, analysing and reporting on data from the verification regime; and

(l) Monitor, assess and report on the overall performance of the International Monitoring System and of the International Data Centre.

15. The agreed procedures to be used by the Technical Secretariat in discharging the verification responsibilities referred to in paragraph 14 and detailed in the Protocol shall be elaborated in the relevant operational manuals.

B. THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM

16. The International Monitoring System shall comprise facilities for seismological monitoring, radionuclide monitoring including certified laboratories, hydroacoustic monitoring, infrasound monitoring, and respective means of communication, and shall be supported by the International Data Centre of the Technical Secretariat.

17. The International Monitoring System shall be placed under the authority of the Technical Secretariat. All monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System shall be owned and operated by the States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for them in accordance with the Protocol.

18. Each State Party shall have the right to participate in the international exchange of data and to have access to all data made available to the International Data Centre. Each State Party shall cooperate with the International Data Centre through its National Authority.

Funding the International Monitoring System

19. For facilities incorporated into the International Monitoring System and specified in Tables 1-A, 2-A, 3 and 4 of Annex 1 to the Protocol, and for their functioning, to the extent that such facilities are agreed by the relevant State and the Organization to provide data to the International Data Centre in accordance with the technical requirements of the Protocol and relevant operational manuals, the Organization, as specified in agreements or arrangements pursuant to Part I, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, shall meet the costs of:

    • (a) Establishing any new facilities and upgrading existing facilities unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself;

(b) Operating and maintaining International Monitoring System facilities, including facility physical security if appropriate, and application of agreed data authentication procedures;

(c) Transmitting International Monitoring System data (raw or processed) to the International Data Centre by the most direct and cost effective means available, including, if necessary, via appropriate communications nodes, from monitoring stations, laboratories, analytical facilities or from national data centres; or such data (including samples where appropriate) to laboratory and analytical facilities from monitoring stations; and

(d) Analysing samples on behalf of the Organization.

20. For auxiliary network seismic stations specified in Table 1-B of Annex 1 to the Protocol the Organization, as specified in agreements or arrangements pursuant to Part I, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, shall meet the costs only of:

    • (a) Transmitting data to the International Data Centre;

(b) Authenticating data from such stations;

(c) Upgrading stations to the required technical standard, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself;

(d) If necessary, establishing new stations for the purposes of this Treaty where no appropriate facilities currently exist, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself; and

(e) Any other costs related to the provision of data required by the Organization as specified in the relevant operational manuals.

21. The Organization shall also meet the cost of provision to each State Party of its requested selection from the standard range of International Data Centre reporting products and services, as specified in Part I, Section F of the Protocol. The cost of preparation and transmission of any additional data or products shall be met by the requesting State Party.

22. The agreements or, if appropriate, arrangements concluded with States Parties or States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for facilities of the International Monitoring System shall contain provisions for meeting these costs. Such provisions may include modalities whereby a State Party meets any of the costs referred to in paragraphs 19 (a) and 20 (c) and (d) for facilities which it hosts or for which it is responsible, and is compensated by an appropriate reduction in its assessed financial contribution to the Organization. Such a reduction shall not exceed 50 percent of the annual assessed financial contribution of a State Party, but may be spread over successive years. A State Party may share such a reduction with another State Party by agreement or arrangement between themselves and with the concurrence of the Executive Council. The agreements or arrangements referred to in this paragraph shall be approved in accordance with Article II, paragraphs 26 (h) and 38 (i).

Changes to the International Monitoring System

23. Any measures referred to in paragraph 11 affecting the International Monitoring System by means of addition or deletion of a monitoring technology shall, when agreed, be incorporated into this Treaty and the Protocol pursuant to Article VII, paragraphs 1 to 6.

24. The following changes to the International Monitoring System, subject to the agreement of those States directly affected, shall be regarded as matters of an administrative or technical nature pursuant to Article VII, paragraphs 7 and 8:

    • (a) Changes to the number of facilities specified in the Protocol for a given monitoring technology; and

(b) Changes to other details for particular facilities as reflected in the Tables of Annex 1 to the Protocol (including, inter alia, State responsible for the facility; location; name of facility; type of facility; and attribution of a facility between the primary and auxiliary seismic networks).

If the Executive Council recommends, pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 8 (d) that such changes be adopted, it shall as a rule also recommend pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 8 (g) that such changes enter into force upon notification by the Director-General of their approval.

25. The Director-General, in submitting to the Executive Council and States Parties information and evaluation in accordance with Article VII, paragraph 8 (b), shall include in the case of any proposal made pursuant to paragraph 24:

    • (a) A technical evaluation of the proposal;

(b) A statement on the administrative and financial impact of the proposal; and

(c) A report on consultations with States directly affected by the proposal, including indication of their agreement.

Temporary Arrangements

26. In cases of significant or irretrievable breakdown of a monitoring facility specified in the Tables of Annex 1 to the Protocol, or in order to cover other temporary reductions of monitoring coverage, the Director-General shall, in consultation and agreement with those States directly affected, and with the approval of the Executive Council, initiate temporary arrangements of no more than one year’s duration, renewable if necessary by agreement of the Executive Council and of the States directly affected for another year. Such arrangements shall not cause the number of operational facilities of the International Monitoring System to exceed the number specified for the relevant network; shall meet as far as possible the technical and operational requirements specified in the operational manual for the relevant network; and shall be conducted within the budget of the Organization. The Director-General shall furthermore take steps to rectify the situation and make proposals for its permanent resolution. The Director-General shall notify all States Parties of any decision taken pursuant to this paragraph.

Cooperating National Facilities

27. States Parties may also separately establish cooperative arrangements with the Organization, in order to make available to the International Data Centre supplementary data from national monitoring stations that are not formally part of the International Monitoring System.

28. Such cooperative arrangements may be established as follows:

    • (a) Upon request by a State Party, and at the expense of that State, the Technical Secretariat shall take the steps required to certify that a given monitoring facility meets the technical and operational requirements specified in the relevant operational manuals for an International Monitoring System facility, and make arrangements for the authentication of its data. Subject to the agreement of the Executive Council, the Technical Secretariat shall then formally designate such a facility as a cooperating national facility. The Technical Secretariat shall take the steps required to revalidate its certification as appropriate;

(b) The Technical Secretariat shall maintain a current list of cooperating national facilities and shall distribute it to all States Parties and;

(c) The International Data Centre shall call upon data from cooperating national facilities, if so requested by a State Party, for the purposes of facilitating consultation and clarification and the consideration of on-site inspection requests, data transmission costs being borne by that State Party.

The conditions under which supplementary data from such facilities are made available, and under which the International Data Centre may request further or expedited reporting, or clarifications, shall be elaborated in the operational manual for the respective monitoring network.

C. CONSULTATION AND CLARIFICATION

29. Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request an on-site inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, among themselves or with or through the Organization, any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty.

30. A State Party that receives a request pursuant to paragraph 29 directly from another State Party shall provide the clarification to the requesting State Party as soon as possible, but in any case no later than 48 hours after the request. The requesting and requested States Parties may keep the Executive Council and the Director-General informed of the request and the response.

31. A State Party shall have the right to request the Director-General to assist in clarifying any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty. The Director-General shall provide appropriate information in the possession of the Technical Secretariat relevant to such a concern. The Director-General shall inform the Executive Council of the request and of the information provided in response, if so requested by the requesting State Party.

32. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty. In such a case, the following shall apply:

    • (a) The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to the requested State Party through the Director-General no later than 24 hours after its receipt;

(b) The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Executive Council as soon as possible, but in any case no later than 48 hour after receipt of the request;

(c) The Executive Council shall take note of the clarification and forward it to the requesting State Party no later than 24 hours after its receipt;

(d) If the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain further clarification from the requested State Party.

The Executive Council shall inform without delay all other States Parties about any request for clarification pursuant to this paragraph as well as any response provided by the requested State Party.

33. If the requesting State Party considers the clarification obtained under paragraph 32 (d) to be unsatisfactory, it shall have the right to request a meeting of the Executive Council in which States Parties involved that are not members of the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part. At such a meeting, the Executive Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure in accordance with Article V.

D. ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

Request for an On-Site Inspection

34. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site inspection in accordance with the provisions of this Article and Part II of the Protocol in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any State Party, or in any area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State.

35. The sole Purpose of an on-site inspection shall be to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I and, to the extent possible, to gather any facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator.

36. The requesting State Party shall be under the obligation to keep the on-site inspection request within the scope of this Treaty and to provide in the request information in accordance with paragraph 37. The requesting State Party shall refrain from unfounded or abusive inspection requests.

37. The on-site inspection request shall be based on information collected by the International Monitoring System, on any relevant technical information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, or on a combination thereof. The request shall contain information pursuant to Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol.

38. The requesting State Party shall present the on-site inspection request to the Executive Council and at the same time to the Director-General for the latter to begin immediate processing.

Follow-up After Submission of an On-Site Inspection Request

39. The Executive Council shall begin its consideration immediately upon receipt of the on-site inspection request.

40. The Director-General, after receiving the on-site inspection request, shall acknowledge receipt of the request to the requesting State Party within two hours and communicate the request to the State Party sought to be inspected within six hours. The Director-General shall ascertain that the request meets the requirements specified in Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol, and, if necessary, shall assist the requesting State Party in filing the request accordingly, and shall communicate the request to the Executive Council and to all other states Parties within 24 hours.

41. When the on-site inspection request fulfils the requirements, the Technical Secretariat shall begin preparations for the on-site inspection without delay.

42. The Director-General, upon receipt of an on-site inspection request referring to an inspection area under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, shall immediately seek clarification from the State Party sought to be inspected in order to clarify and resolve the concern raised in the request.

43. A State Party that receives a request for clarification pursuant to paragraph 42 shall provide the Director-General with explanations and with other relevant information available as soon as possible, but no later than 72 hours after receipt of the request for clarification.

44. The Director-General, before the Executive Council takes a decision on the on-site inspection request, shall transmit immediately to the Executive Council any additional information available from the International Monitoring System or provided by any State Party on the event specified in the request, including any clarification provided pursuant to paragraphs 42 and 43, as well as any other information from within the Technical Secretariat that the Director-General deems relevant or that is requested by the Executive Council.

45. Unless the requesting State Party considers the concern raised in the on-site inspection request to be resolved and withdraws the request, the Executive Council shall take a decision on the request in accordance with paragraph 46.

Executive Council Decisions

46. The Executive Council shall take a decision on the on-site inspection request no later than 96 hours after receipt of the request from the requesting State Party. The decision to approve the on-site inspection shall be made by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of the Executive Council. If the Executive Council does not approve the inspection, preparations shall be stopped and no further action on the request shall be taken.

47. No later than 25 days after the approval of the on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 46, the inspection team shall transmit to the Executive Council, through the Director-General, a progress inspection report. The continuation of the inspection shall be considered approved unless the Executive Council, no later than 72 hours after receipt of the progress inspection report, decides by a majority of all its members not to continue the inspection. If the Executive Council decides not to continue the inspection, the inspection shall be terminated, and the inspection team shall leave the inspection area and the territory of the inspected State Party as soon as possible in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Protocol.

48. In the course of the on-site inspection, the inspection team may submit to the Executive Council, through the Director-General, a proposal to conduct drilling. The Executive Council shall take a decision on such a proposal no later than 72 hours after receipt of the proposal. The decision to approve drilling shall be made by a majority of all members of the Executive Council.

49. The inspection team may request the Executive Council, through the Director-General, to extend the inspection duration by a maximum of 70 days beyond the 60-day time-frame specified in Part II, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, if the inspection team considers such an extension essential to enable it to fulfil its mandate. The inspection team shall indicate in its request which of the activities and techniques listed in Part II, paragraph 6 of the Protocol it intends to carry out during the extension period. The Executive Council shall take a decision on the extension request no later than 72 hours after receipt of the request. The decision to approve an extension of the inspection duration shall be made by a majority of all members of the Executive Council.

50. Any time following the approval of the continuation of the on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 47, the inspection team may submit to the Executive Council, through the Director-General, a recommendation to terminate the inspection. Such a recommendation shall be considered approved unless the Executive Council, no later than 72 hours after receipt of the recommendation, decides by a two-thirds majority of all its members not to approve the termination of the inspection. In case of termination of the inspection, the inspection team shall leave the inspection area and the territory of the inspected State Party as soon as possible in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Protocol.

51. The requesting State Party and the State Party sought to be inspected may participate in the deliberations of the Executive Council on the on-site inspection request without voting. The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party may also participate without voting in any subsequent deliberations of the Executive Council related to the inspection.

52. The Director-General shall notify all States Parties within 24 hours about any decision by and reports, proposals, requests and recommendations to the Executive Council pursuant to paragraphs 46 to 50.

Follow-up after Executive Council Approval of an On-Site Inspection

53. An on-site inspection approved by the Executive Council shall be conducted without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director-General and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol. The inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry no later than six days following the receipt by the Executive Council of the on-site inspection request from the requesting State Party.

54. The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct of the on-site inspection. The inspection mandate shall contain the information specified in Part II, paragraph 42 of the Protocol.

55. The Director-General shall notify the inspected State Party of the inspection no less than 24 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, in accordance with Part II, paragraph 43 of the Protocol.

The Conduct of an On-Site Inspection

56. Each State Party shall permit the Organization to conduct an on-site inspection on its territory or at places under its jurisdiction or control in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol. However, no State Party shall have to accept simultaneous on-site inspections on its territory or at places under its jurisdiction or control.

57. In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol, the inspected State Party shall have:

    • (a) The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with this Treaty and, to this end, to enable the inspection team to fulfil its mandate;

(b) The right to take measures it deems necessary to protect national security interests and to prevent disclosure of confidential information not related to the purpose of the inspection;

(c) The obligation to provide access within the inspection area for the sole purpose of determining facts relevant to the purpose of the inspection, taking into account sub-paragraph (b) and any constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures;

(d) The obligation not to invoke this paragraph or Part II, paragraph 88 of the Protocol to conceal any violation of its obligations under Article I; and

(e) The obligation not to impede the ability of the inspection team to move within the inspection area and to carry out inspection activities in accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol.

Access, in the context of an on-site inspection, means both the physical access of the inspection team and the inspection equipment to, and the conduct of inspection activities within, the inspection area.

58. The on-site inspection shall be conducted in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with the efficient and timely accomplishment of the inspection mandate, and in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol. Wherever possible, the inspection team shall begin with the least intrusive procedures and then proceed to more intrusive procedures only as it deems necessary to collect sufficient information to clarify the concern about possible non-compliance with this Treaty. The inspectors shall seek only the information and data necessary for the purpose of the inspection and shall seek to minimize interference with normal operations of the inspected State Party.

59. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the on-site inspection and facilitate its task.

60. If the inspected State Party, acting in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 86 to 96 of the Protocol, restricts access within the inspection area, it shall make every reasonable effort in consultations with the inspection team to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Treaty.

Observer

61. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply:

    • (a) The requesting State Party, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party, may send a representative, who shall be a national either of the requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to observe the conduct of the on-site inspection;

(b) The inspected State Party shall notify its acceptance or non-acceptance of the proposed observer to the Director-General within 12 hours after approval of the on-site inspection by the Executive Council;

(c) In case of acceptance, the inspected State Party shall grant access to the observer in accordance with the Protocol;

(d) The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed observer, but if the inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall be recorded in the inspection report.

There shall be no more than three observers from an aggregate of requesting States Parties.

Reports of an On-Site Inspection

62. Inspection reports shall contain:

    • (a) A description of the activities conducted by the inspection team;

(b) The factual findings of the inspection team relevant to the purpose of the inspection,

(c) An account of the cooperation granted during the on-site inspection;

(d) A factual description of the extent of the access granted, including the alternative means provided to the team, during the on-site inspection; and

(e) Any other details relevant to the purpose of the inspection.

Differing observations made by inspectors may be attached to the report.

63. The Director-General shall make draft inspection reports available to the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide the Director-General within 48 hours with its comments and explanations, and to identify any information and data which, in its view, are not related to the purpose of the inspection and should not be circulated outside the Technical Secretariat. The Director-General shall consider the proposals for changes to the draft inspection report made by the inspected State Party and shall wherever possible incorporate them. The Director-General shall also annex the comments and explanations provided by the inspected State Party to the inspection report.

64. The Director-General shall promptly transmit the inspection report to the requesting State Party, the inspected State Party, the Executive Council and to all other States Parties. The Director-General shall further transmit promptly to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties any results of sample analysis in designated laboratories in accordance with Part II, paragraph 104 of the Protocol, relevant data from the International Monitoring System, the assessments of the requesting and inspected States Parties, as well as any other information that the Director-General deems relevant. In the case of the progress inspection report referred to in paragraph 47, the Director-General shall transmit the report to the Executive Council within the time-frame specified in that paragraph.

65. The Executive Council, in accordance with its powers and functions, shall review the inspection report and any material provided pursuant to paragraph 64, and shall address any concerns as to:

    • (a) Whether any non-compliance with this Treaty has occurred; and

(b) Whether the right to request an on-site inspection has been abused.

66. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and functions, that further action may be necessary with regard to paragraph 65, it shall take the appropriate measures in accordance with Article V.

Frivolous or Abusive On-Site Inspection Requests

67. If the Executive Council does not approve the on-site inspection on the basis that the on-site inspection request is frivolous or abusive, or if the inspection is terminated for the same reasons, the Executive Council shall consider and decide on whether to implement appropriate measures to redress the situation, including the following:

    • (a) Requiring the requesting State Party to pay for the cost of any preparations made by the Technical Secretariat;

(b) Suspending the right of the requesting State Party to request an on-site inspection for a period of time, as determined by the Executive Council; and

(c) Suspending the right of the requesting State Party to serve on the Executive Council for a period of time.

E. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

68. In order to:

    • (a) Contribute to the timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising from possible misinterpretation of verification data relating to chemical explosions, and

(b) Assist in the calibration of the stations that are part of the component networks of the International Monitoring System,

each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization and with other States Parties in implementing relevant measures as set out in Part III of the Protocol.

ARTICLE V

MEASURES TO REDRESS A SITUATION AND TO ENSURE
COMPLIANCE, INCLUDING SANCTIONS

1. The Conference, taking into account, inter alia, the recommendations of the Executive Council, shall take the necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3, to ensure compliance with this Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Treaty.

2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or the Executive Council to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance and fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, decide to restrict or suspend the State Party from the exercise of its rights and privileges under this Treaty until the Conference decides otherwise.

3. In cases where damage to the object and purpose of this Treaty may result from non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty, the Conference may recommend to States Parties collective measures which are in conformity with international law.

4. The Conference, or alternatively, if the case is urgent, the Executive Council, may bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions to the attention of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VI

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

1. Disputes that may arise concerning the application or the interpretation of this Treaty shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties, or between one or more States Parties and the Organization, relating to the application or interpretation of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties’ choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of this Treaty and, by mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court. The parties involved shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions being taken.

3. The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of a dispute that may arise concerning the application or interpretation of this Treaty by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties to a dispute to seek a settlement through a process of their own choice, bringing the matter to the attention of the Conference and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

4. The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes raised by States Parties or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. The Conference shall, as it finds necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to the settlement of these disputes in conformity with Article II, paragraph 26 (j).

5. The Conference and the Executive Council are separately empowered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the activities of the Organization. An agreement between the Organization and the United Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in accordance with Article II, paragraph 38 (h).

6. This Article is without prejudice to Articles IV and V.

ARTICLE VII

AMENDMENTS

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes to the Protocol. Any State Party may also propose changes, in accordance with paragraph 7, to the Protocol or the Annexes thereto. Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures in paragraphs 2 to 6. Proposals for changes, in accordance with paragraph 7, shall be subject to the procedures in paragraph 8.

2. The proposed amendment shall be considered and adopted only by an Amendment Conference.

3. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and the Depositary and seek the views of the States Parties on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Director-General no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Director-General shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

4. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a regular session of the Conference unless all States Parties that support the convening of an Amendment Conference request that it be held earlier. In no case shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days after the circulation of the proposed amendment.

5. Amendments shall be adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a majority of the States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote.

6. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit of the instruments of ratification or acceptance by all those States Parties casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.

7. In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, Parts I and III of the Protocol and Annexes 1 and 2 to the Protocol shall be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 8, if the proposed changes are related only to matters of an administrative or technical nature. All other provisions of the Protocol and the Annexes thereto shall not be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 7 shall be made in accordance with the following procedures:

    • (a) The text of the proposed changes shall be transmitted together with the necessary information to the Director-General. Additional information for the evaluation of the proposal may be provided by any State Party and the Director-General. The Director-General shall promptly communicate any such proposals and information to all States Parties, the Executive Council and the Depositary;

(b) No later than 60 days after its receipt, the Director-General shall evaluate the proposal to determine all its possible consequences for the provisions of this Treaty and its implementation and shall communicate any such information to all States Parties and the Executive Council;

(c) The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of all information available to it, including whether the proposal fulfils the requirements of paragraph 7. No later than 90 days after its receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its recommendation, with appropriate explanations, to all States Parties for consideration. States Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 days;

(d) If the Executive Council recommends to all States Parties that the proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, it shall be considered rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation;

(e) If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet with the acceptance required under sub-paragraph (d), a decision on the proposal, including whether it fulfils the requirements of paragraph 7, shall be taken as a matter of substance by the Conference at its next session;

(f) The Director-General shall notify all States Parties and the Depositary of any decision under this paragraph;

(g) Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for all States Parties 180 days after the date of notification by the Director-General of their approval unless another time period is recommended by the Executive Council or decided by the Conference.

ARTICLE VIII

REVIEW OF THE TREATY

1. Unless otherwise decided by a majority of the States Parties, ten years after the entry into force of this Treaty a Conference of the States Parties shall be held to review the operation and effectiveness of this Treaty, with a view to assuring itself that the objectives and purposes in the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Treaty. On the basis of a request by any State Party, the Review Conference shall consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. If the Review Conference decides by consensus that such nuclear explosions may be permitted, it shall commence work without delay, with a view to recommending to States Parties an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude any military benefits of such nuclear explosions. Any such proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General by any State Party and shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Article VII.

2. At intervals of ten years thereafter, further Review Conferences may be convened with the same objective, if the Conference so decides as a matter of procedure in the preceding year. Such Conferences may be convened after an interval of less than ten years if so decided by the Conference as a matter of substance.

3. Normally, any Review Conference shall be held immediately following the regular annual session of the Conference provided for in Article II.

ARTICLE IX

DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

3. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice six months in advance to all other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Security Council. Notice of withdrawal shall include a statement of the extraordinary event or events which a State Party regards as jeopardizing its supreme interests.

ARTICLE X

STATUS OF THE PROTOCOL AND THE ANNEXES

The Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol, and the Annexes to the Protocol form an integral part of the Treaty. Any reference to this Treaty includes the Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol and the Annexes to the Protocol.

ARTICLE XI

SIGNATURE

This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature before its entry into force.

ARTICLE XII

RATIFICATION

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States according to their respective constitutional processes.

ARTICLE XIII

ACCESSION

Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force may accede to it at any time thereafter.

ARTICLE XIV

ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature.

2. If this Treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature, the Depositary shall convene a Conference of the States that have already deposited their instruments of ratification on the request of a majority of those States. That Conference shall examine the extent to which the requirement set out in paragraph 1 has been met and shall consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty.

3. Unless otherwise decided by the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 or other such conferences, this process shall be repeated at subsequent anniversaries of the opening for signature of this Treaty, until its entry into force.

4. All States Signatories shall be invited to attend the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 and any subsequent conferences as referred to in paragraph 3, as observers.

5. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

ARTICLE XV

RESERVATIONS

The Articles of and the Annexes to this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. The provisions of the Protocol to this Treaty and the Annexes to the Protocol shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XVI

DEPOSITARY

1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Treaty and shall receive signatures, instruments of ratification and instruments of accession.

2. The Depositary shall promptly inform all States Signatories and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and of any amendments and changes thereto, and the receipt of other notices.

3. The Depositary shall send duly certified copies of this Treaty to the Governments of the States Signatories and acceding States.

4. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XVII

AUTHENTIC TEXTS

This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

ANNEX 1 TO THE TREATY

LIST OF STATES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 28

Africa

Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Eastern Europe

Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Middle East and South Asia

Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Maldives, Oman, Nepal, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.

North America and Western Europe

Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

South East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East

Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam.

ANNEX 2 TO THE TREATY

LIST OF STATES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE XIV

List of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s April 1996 edition of “Nuclear Power Reactors in the World”, and of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s December 1995 edition of “Nuclear Research Reactors in the World”:

Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam, Zaire.

PROTOCOL TO THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY

PART I

THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM AND
INTERNATIONAL DATA CENTRE FUNCTIONS

A. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The International Monitoring System shall comprise monitoring facilities as set out in Article IV, paragraph 16, and respective means of communication.

2. The monitoring facilities incorporated into the International Monitoring System shall consist of those facilities specified in Annex 1 to this Protocol. The International Monitoring System shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the relevant operational manuals.

3. The Organization, in accordance with Article II, shall, in cooperation and consultation with the States Parties, with other States, and with international organizations as appropriate, establish and coordinate the operation and maintenance, and any future agreed modification or development of the International Monitoring System.

4. In accordance with appropriate agreements or arrangements and procedures, a State Party or other State hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for International Monitoring System facilities and the Technical Secretariat shall agree and cooperate in establishing, operating, upgrading, financing, and maintaining monitoring facilities, related certified laboratories and respective means of communication within areas under its jurisdiction or control or elsewhere in conformity with international law. Such cooperation shall be in accordance with the security and authentication requirements and technical specifications contained in the relevant operational manuals. Such a State shall give the Technical Secretariat authority to access a monitoring facility for checking equipment and communication links, and shall agree to make the necessary changes in the equipment and the operational procedures to meet agreed requirements. The Technical Secretariat shall provide to such States appropriate technical assistance as is deemed by the Executive Council to be required for the proper functioning of the facility as part of the International Monitoring System.

5. Modalities for such cooperation between the Organization and States Parties or States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for facilities of the International Monitoring System shall be set out in agreements or arrangements as appropriate in each case.

B. SEISMOLOGICAL MONITORING

6. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of seismological data to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of primary and auxiliary seismological monitoring stations. These stations shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre.

7. The network of primary stations shall consist of the 50 stations specified in Table 1-A of Annex 1 to this Protocol. These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Seismological Monitoring and the International Exchange of Seismological Data. Uninterrupted data from the primary stations shall be transmitted, directly or through a national data centre, on-line to the International Data Centre

8. To supplement the primary network, an auxiliary network of 120 stations shall provide information, directly or through a national data centre, to the International Data Centre upon request. The auxiliary stations to be used are listed in Table 1-B of Annex 1 to this Protocol. The auxiliary stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Seismological Monitoring and the International Exchange of Seismological Data. Data from the auxiliary stations may at any time be requested by the International Data Centre and shall be immediately available through on-line computer connections.

C. RADIONUCLIDE MONITORING

9. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of data on radionuclides in the atmosphere to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of radionuclide monitoring stations and certified laboratories. The network shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre.

10. The network of stations to measure radionuclides in the atmosphere shall comprise an overall network of 80 stations, as specified in Table 2-A of Annex 1 to this Protocol. All stations shall be capable of monitoring for the presence of relevant particulate matter in the atmosphere. Forty of these stations shall also be capable of monitoring for the presence of relevant noble gases upon the entry into force of this Treaty. For this purpose the Conference, at its initial session, shall approve a recommendation by the Preparatory Commission as to which 40 stations from Table 2-A of Annex 1 to this Protocol shall be capable of noble gas monitoring. At its first regular annual session, the Conference shall consider and decide on a plan for implementing noble gas monitoring capability throughout the network. The Director-General shall prepare a report to the Conference on the modalities for such implementation. All monitoring stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Radionuclide Monitoring and the International Exchange of Radionuclide Data.

11. The network of radionuclide monitoring stations shall be supported by laboratories, which shall be certified by the Technical Secretariat in accordance with the relevant operational manual for the performance, on contract to the Organization and on a fee-for-service basis, of the analysis of samples from radionuclide monitoring stations. Laboratories specified in Table 2-B of Annex 1 to this Protocol, and appropriately equipped, shall, as required, also be drawn upon by the Technical Secretariat to perform additional analysis of samples from radionuclide monitoring stations. With the agreement of the Executive Council, further laboratories may be certified by the Technical Secretariat to perform the routine analysis of samples from manual monitoring stations where necessary. All certified laboratories shall provide the results of such analysis to the International Data Centre, and in so doing shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual on Radionuclide Monitoring and the International Exchange of Radionuclide Data.

D. HYDROACOUSTIC MONITORING

12. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of hydroacoustic data to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of hydroacoustic monitoring stations. These stations shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre.

13. The network of hydroacoustic stations shall consist of the stations specified in Table 3 of Annex 1 to this Protocol, and shall comprise an overall network of six hydrophone and five T- phase stations. These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Hydroacoustic Monitoring and the International Exchange of Hydroacoustic Data.

E. INFRASOUND MONITORING

14. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of infrasound data to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of infrasound monitoring stations. These stations shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre.

15. The network of infrasound stations shall consist of the stations specified in Table 4 of Annex 1 to this Protocol, and shall comprise an overall network of 60 stations. These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Infrasound Monitoring and the International Exchange of Infrasound Data.

F. INTERNATIONAL DATA CENTRE FUNCTIONS

16. The International Data Centre shall receive, collect, process, analyse, report on and archive data from International Monitoring System facilities, including the results of analysis conducted at certified laboratories.

17. The procedures and standard event screening criteria to be used by the International Data Centre in carrying out its agreed functions, in particular for the production of standard reporting products and for the performance of standard range of services for States Parties, shall be elaborated in the Operational Manual for the International Data Centre and shall be progressively developed. The procedures and criteria developed initially by the Preparatory Commission shall be approved by the Conference at its initial session.

International Data Centre Standard Products

18. The International Data Centre shall apply on a routine basis automatic processing methods and interactive human analysis to raw International Monitoring System data in order to produce and archive standard International Data Centre products on behalf of all States Parties. These products shall be provided at no cost to States Parties and shall be without prejudice to final judgements with regard to the nature of any event, which shall remain the responsibility of States Parties, and shall include:

    • (a) Integrated lists of all signals detected by the International Monitoring System, as well as standard event lists and bulletins, including the values and associated uncertainties calculated for each event located by the International Data Centre, based on a set of standard parameters;

(b) Standard screened event bulletins that result from the application to each event by the International Data Centre of standard event screening criteria, making use of the characterization parameters specified in Annex 2 to this Protocol, with the objective of characterizing, highlighting in the standard event bulletin, and thereby screening out, events considered to be consistent with natural phenomena or non-nuclear, man-made phenomena. The standard event bulletin shall indicate numerically for each event the degree to which that event meets or does not meet the event screening criteria. In applying standard event screening, the International Data Centre shall use both global and supplementary screening criteria to take account of regional variations where applicable. The International Data Centre shall progressively enhance its technical capabilities as experience is gained in the operation of the International Monitoring System;

(c) Executive summaries, which summarize the data acquired and archived by the International Data Centre, the products of the International Data Centre, and the performance and operational status of the International Monitoring System and International Data Centre; and

(d) Extracts or subsets of the standard International Data Centre products specified in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c), selected according to the request of an individual State Party.

19. The International Data Centre shall carry out, at no cost to States Parties, special studies to provide in-depth, technical review by expert analysis of data from the International Monitoring System, if requested by the Organization or by a State Party, to improve the estimated values for the standard signal and event parameters.

International Data Centre Services to States Parties

20. The International Data Centre shall provide States Parties with open, equal, timely and convenient access to all International Monitoring System data, raw or processed, all International Data Centre products, and all other International Monitoring System data in the archive of the International Data Centre or, through the International Data Centre, of International Monitoring System facilities. The methods for supporting data access and the provision of data shall include the following services:

    • (a) Automatic and regular forwarding to a State Party of the products of the International Data Centre or the selection by the State Party thereof, and, as requested, the selection by the State Party of International Monitoring System data;

(b) The provision of the data or products generated in response to ad hoc requests by States Parties for the retrieval from the International Data Centre and International Monitoring System facility archives of data and products, including interactive electronic access to the International Data Centre database; and

(c) Assisting individual States Parties, at their request and at no cost for reasonable efforts, with expert technical analysis of International Monitoring System data and other relevant data provided by the requesting State Party, in order to help the State Party concerned to identify the source of specific events. The output of any such technical analysis shall be considered a product of the requesting State Party, but shall be available to all States Parties.

The International Data Centre services specified in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be made available at no cost to each State Party. The volumes and formats of data shall be set out in the Operational Manual for the International Data Centre.

National Event Screening

21. The International Data Centre shall, if requested by a State Party, apply to any of its standard products, on a regular and automatic basis, national event screening criteria established by that State Party, and provide the results of such analysis to that State Party. This service shall be undertaken at no cost to the requesting State Party. The output of such national event screening processes shall be considered a product of the requesting State Party.

Technical Assistance

22. The International Data Centre shall, where required, provide technical assistance to individual States Parties;

    • (a) In formulating their requirements for selection and screening of data and products;

(b) By installing at the International Data Centre, at no cost to a requesting State Party for reasonable efforts, computer algorithms or software provided by that State Party to compute new signal and event parameters that are not included in the Operational Manual for the International Data Centre, the output being considered products of the requesting State Party; and

(c) By assisting States Parties to develop the capability to receive, process and analyse International Monitoring System data at a national data centre.

23. The International Data Centre shall continuously monitor and report on the operational status of the International Monitoring System facilities, of communications links, and of its own processing systems. It shall provide immediate notification to those responsible should the operational performance of any component fail to meet agreed levels set out in the relevant operational manual.

PART II

ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

A. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The procedures in this Part shall be implemented pursuant to the provisions for on-site inspections set out in Article IV.

2. The on-site inspection shall be carried out in the area where the event that triggered the on-site inspection request occurred.

3. The area of an on-site inspection shall be continuous and its size shall not exceed 1,000 square kilometres. There shall be no linear distance greater than 50 kilometres in any direction.

4. The duration of an on-site inspection shall not exceed 60 days from the date of the approval of the on-site inspection request in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 46, but may be extended by a maximum of 70 days in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 49.

5. If the inspection area specified in the inspection mandate extends to the territory or other place under the jurisdiction or control of more than one State Party, the provisions on on-site inspections shall, as appropriate, apply to each of the States Parties to which the inspection area extends.

6. In cases where the inspection area is under the jurisdiction or control of the inspected State Party but is located on the territory of another State Party or where the access from the point of entry to the inspection area requires transit through the territory of a State Party other than the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations concerning such inspections in accordance with this Protocol. In such a case, the State Party on whose territory the inspection area is located shall facilitate the inspection and shall provide for the necessary support to enable the inspection team to carry out its tasks in a timely and effective manner. States Parties through whose territory transit is required to reach the inspection area shall facilitate such transit.

7. In cases where the inspection area is under the jurisdiction or control of the inspected State Party but is located on the territory of a State not Party to this Treaty, the inspected State Party shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the inspection can be carried out in accordance with this Protocol. A State Party that has under its jurisdiction or control one or more areas on the territory of a State not Party to this Treaty shall take all necessary measures to ensure acceptance by the State on whose territory the inspection area is located of inspectors and inspection assistants designated to that State Party. If an inspected State Party is unable to ensure access, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access.

8. In cases where the inspection area is located on the territory of a State Party but is under the jurisdiction or control of a State not Party to this Treaty, the State Party shall take all necessary measures required of an inspected State Party and a State Party on whose territory the inspection area is located, without prejudice to the rules and practices of international law, to ensure that the on-site inspection can be carried out in accordance with this Protocol. If the State Party is unable to ensure access to the inspection area, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access, without prejudice to the rules and practices of international law.

9. The size of the inspection team shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper fulfilment of the inspection mandate. The total number of members of the inspection team present on the territory of the inspected State Party at any given time, except during the conduct of drilling, shall not exceed 40 persons. No national of the requesting State Party or the inspected State Party shall be a member of the inspection team.

10. The Director-General shall determine the size of the inspection team and select its members from the list of inspectors and inspection assistants, taking into account the circumstances of a particular request.

11. The inspected State Party shall provide for or arrange the amenities necessary for the inspection team, such as communication means, interpretation services, transportation, working space, lodging, meals, and medical care.

12. The inspected State Party shall be reimbursed by the Organization, in reasonably short period of time after conclusion of the inspection, for all expenses, including those mentioned in paragraphs 11 and 49, related to the stay and functional activities of the inspection team on the territory of the inspected State Party.

13. Procedures for the implementation of on-site inspections shall be detailed in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections.

B. STANDING ARRANGEMENTS

Designation of Inspectors and Inspection Assistants

14. An inspection team may consist of inspectors and inspection assistants. An on-site inspection shall only be carried out by qualified inspectors specially designated for this function. They may be assisted by specially designated inspection assistants, such as technical and administrative personnel, aircrew and interpreters.

15. Inspectors and inspection assistants shall be nominated for designation by the States Parties or, in case of staff of the Technical Secretariat, by the Director-General, on the basis of their expertise and experience relevant to the purpose and functions of on-site inspections. The nominees shall be approved in advance by the States Parties in accordance with paragraph 18.

16. Each State Party, no later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for it, shall notify the Director-General of the names, dates of birth, sex, ranks, qualifications and professional experience of the persons proposed by the State Party for designation as inspectors and inspection assistants.

17. No later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty, the Technical Secretariat shall communicate in writing to all States Parties an initial list of the names, nationalities, dates of birth, sex and ranks of the inspectors and inspection assistants proposed for designation by the Director-General and the States Parties, as well as a description of their qualifications and professional experience.

18. Each State Party shall immediately acknowledge receipt of the initial list of inspectors and inspection assistants proposed for designation. Any inspector or inspection assistant included in this list shall be regarded as accepted unless a State Party, no later than 30 days after acknowledgment of receipt of the list, declares its non-acceptance in writing. The State Party may include the reason for the objection. In the case of non-acceptance, the proposed inspector or inspection assistant shall not undertake or participate in on-site inspection activities on the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party that has declared its non-acceptance. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately confirm receipt of the notification of objection.

19. Whenever additions or changes to the list of inspectors and inspection assistants are proposed by the Director-General or a State Party, replacement inspectors and inspection assistants shall be designated in the same manner as set forth with respect to the initial list. Each State Party shall promptly notify the Technical Secretariat if an inspector or inspection assistant nominated by it can no longer fulfil the duties of an inspector or inspection assistant.

20. The Technical Secretariat shall keep the list of inspectors and inspection assistants up to date and notify all States Parties of additions or changes to the list.

21. A State Party requesting an on-site inspection may propose that an inspector from the list of inspectors and inspection assistants serve as its observer in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 61.

22. Subject to paragraph 23, a State Party shall have the right at any time to object to an inspector or inspection assistant who has already been accepted. It shall notify the Technical Secretariat of its objection in writing and may include the reason for the objection. Such objection shall come into effect 30 days after receipt of the notification by the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately confirm receipt of the notification of the objection and inform the objecting and nominating States Parties of the date on which the inspector or inspection assistant shall cease to be designated for that State Party.

23. A State Party that has been notified of an inspection shall not seek the removal from the inspection team of any of the inspectors or inspection assistants named in the inspection mandate.

24. The number of inspectors and inspection assistants accepted by a State Party must be sufficient to allow for availability of appropriate numbers of inspectors and inspection assistants. If, in the opinion of the Director-General, the non-acceptance by a State Party of proposed inspectors or inspection assistants impedes the designation of a sufficient number of inspectors and inspection assistants or otherwise hampers the effective fulfilment of the purposes of an on-site inspection, the Director-General shall refer the issue to the Executive Council.

25. Each inspector included in the list of inspectors and inspection assistants shall receive relevant training. Such training shall be provided by the Technical Secretariat pursuant to the procedures specified in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections. The Technical Secretariat shall co-ordinate, in agreement with the States Parties, a schedule of training for the inspectors.

Privileges and Immunities

26. Following acceptance of the initial list of inspectors and inspection assistants as provided for in paragraph 18 or as subsequently altered in accordance with paragraph 19, each State Party shall be obliged to issue, in accordance with its national procedures and upon application by an inspector or inspection assistant, multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas and other relevant documents to enable each inspector and inspection assistant to enter and to remain on the territory of that State Party for the sole purpose of carrying out inspection activities. Each State Party shall issue the necessary visa or travel documents for this purpose no later than 48 hours after receipt of the application or immediately upon arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry on the territory of the State Party. Such documents shall be valid for as long as is necessary to enable the inspector or inspection assistant to remain on the territory of the inspected State Party for the sole purpose of carrying out the inspection activities.

27. To exercise their functions effectively, members of the inspection team shall be accorded privileges and immunities as set forth in sub-paragraphs (a) to (i). Privileges and immunities shall be granted to members of the inspection team for the sake of this Treaty and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. Such privileges and immunities shall be accorded to them for the entire period between arrival on and departure from the territory of the inspected State Party, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions.

    • (a) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961;

(b) The living quarters and office premises occupied by the inspection team carrying out inspection activities pursuant to this Treaty shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded to the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

(c) The papers and correspondence, including records, of the inspection team shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to all papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The inspection team shall have the right to use codes for their communications with the Technical Secretariat;

(d) Samples and approved equipment carried by members of the inspection team shall be inviolable subject to provisions contained in this Treaty and exempt from all customs duties. Hazardous samples shall be transported in accordance with relevant regulations;

(e) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the immunities accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

(f) The members of the inspection team carrying out prescribed activities pursuant to this Treaty shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

(g) The members of the inspection team shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the inspected State Party, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations;

(h) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the same currency and exchange facilities as are accorded to representatives of foreign Governments on temporary official missions; and

(i) The members of the inspection team shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected State Party.

28. When transiting the territory of States Parties other than the inspected State Party, the members of the inspection team shall be accorded the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Papers and correspondence, including records, and samples and approved equipment carried by them, shall be accorded the privileges and immunities set forth in paragraph 27 (c) and (d).

29. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities the members of the inspection team shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected State Party and, to the extent that is consistent with the inspection mandate, shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State. If the inspected State Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities specified in this Protocol, consultations shall be held between the State Party and the Director-General to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.

30. The immunity from jurisdiction of members of the inspection team may be waived by the Director-General in those cases when the Director-General is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty. Waiver must always be express.

31. Observers shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities accorded to members of the inspection team pursuant to this section, except for those accorded pursuant to paragraph 27 (d).

Points of Entry

32. Each State Party shall designate its points of entry and shall supply the required information to the Technical Secretariat no later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for it. These points of entry shall be such that the inspection team can reach any inspection area from at least one point of entry within 24 hours. Locations of points of entry shall be provided to all States Parties by the Technical Secretariat. Points of entry may also serve as points of exit.

33. Each State Party may change the points of entry by giving notice of such change to the Technical Secretariat. Changes shall become effective 30 days after the Technical Secretariat receives such notification, to allow appropriate notification to all States Parties.

34. If the Technical Secretariat considers that there are insufficient points of entry for the timely conduct of inspections or that changes to the points of entry proposed by a State Party would hamper such timely conduct of inspections, it shall enter into consultations with the State Party concerned to resolve the problem.

Arrangements for Use of Non-Scheduled Aircraft

35. Where timely travel to the point of entry is not feasible using scheduled commercial flights, an inspection team may utilize non-scheduled aircraft. No later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for it, each State Party shall inform the Technical Secretariat of the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft transporting an inspection team and equipment necessary for inspection. Aircraft routings shall be along established international airways that are agreed upon between the State Party and the Technical Secretariat as the basis for such diplomatic clearance.

Approved Inspection Equipment

36. The Conference, at its initial session, shall consider and approve a list of equipment for use during on-site inspections. Each State Party may submit proposals for the inclusion of equipment in the list. Specifications for the use of the equipment, as detailed in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections, shall take account of safety and confidentiality considerations where such equipment is likely to be used.

37. The equipment for use during on-site inspections shall consist of core equipment for the inspection activities and techniques specified in paragraph 69 and auxiliary equipment necessary for the effective and timely conduct of on-site inspections.

38. The Technical Secretariat shall ensure that all types of approved equipment are available for on-site inspections when required. When required for an on-site inspection, the Technical Secretariat shall duly certify that the equipment has been calibrated, maintained and protected. To facilitate the checking of the equipment at the point of entry by the inspected State Party, the Technical Secretariat shall provide documentation and attach seals to authenticate the certification.

39. Any permanently held equipment shall be in the custody of the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall be responsible for the maintenance and calibration of such equipment.

40. As appropriate, the Technical Secretariat shall make arrangements with States Parties to provide equipment mentioned in the list. Such States Parties shall be responsible for the maintenance and calibration of such equipment.

C. ON-SITE INSPECTION REQUEST, INSPECTION MANDATE
AND NOTIFICATION OF INSPECTION

On-Site Inspection Request

41. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 37, the on-site inspection request shall contain at least the following information:

    • (a) The estimated geographical and vertical coordinates of the location of the event that triggered the request with an indication of the possible margin of error;

(b) The proposed boundaries of the area to be inspected, specified on a map and in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3;

(c) The State Party or States Parties to be inspected or an indication that the area to be inspected or part thereof is beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State;

(d) The probable environment of the event that triggered the request;

(e) The estimated time of the event that triggered the request with indication of the possible margin of error;

(f) All data upon which the request is based;

(g) The personal details of the proposed observer, if any; and

(h) The results of a consultation and clarification process in accordance with Article IV, or an explanation, if relevant, of the reasons why such a consultation and clarification process has not been carried out.

Inspection Mandate

42. The mandate for an on-site inspection shall contain:

    • (a) The decision of the Executive Council on the on-site inspection request;

(b) The name of the State Party or States Parties to be inspected or an indication that the inspection area or part thereof is beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State;

(c) The location and boundaries of the inspection area specified on a map, taking into account all information on which the request was based and all other available technical information, in consultation with the requesting State Party;

(d) The planned types of activity of the inspection team in the inspection area;

(e) The point of entry to be used by the inspection team;

(f) Any transit or basing points, as appropriate;

(g) The name of the head of the inspection team;

(h) The names of members of the inspection team;

(i) The name of the proposed observer, if any; and

(j) The list of equipment to be used in the inspection area.

If a decision by the Executive Council pursuant to Article IV, paragraphs 46 to 49 necessitates a modification of the inspection mandate, the Director-General may update the mandate with respect to sub-paragraphs (d), (h) and (j), as appropriate. The Director-General shall immediately notify the inspected State Party of any such modification.

Notification of Inspection

43. The notification made by the Director-General pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 55 shall include the following information:

    • (a) The inspection mandate;

(b) The date and estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry;

(c) The means of arrival at the point of entry;

(d) If appropriate, the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft; and

(e) A list of any equipment which the Director-General requests the inspected State Party to make available to the inspection team for use in the inspection area.

44. The inspected State Party shall acknowledge receipt of the notification by the Director-General no later than 12 hours after having received the notification.

D. PRE-INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

Entry Into the Territory of the Inspected State Party, Activities at the Point of Entry and Transfer to the Inspection Area

45. The inspected State Party that has been notified of the arrival of the inspection team shall ensure the immediate entry of the inspection team into its territory.

46. When a non-scheduled aircraft is used for travel to the point of entry, the Technical Secretariat shall provide the inspected State Party with a flight plan, through the National Authority, for the flight of the aircraft from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of that State Party to the point of entry, no less than six hours before the scheduled departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. The Technical Secretariat shall include in the remarks section of the flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the appropriate notation identifying the aircraft as an inspection aircraft. If a military aircraft is used, the Technical Secretariat shall request prior authorization from the inspected State Party to enter its airspace.

47. No less than three hours before the scheduled departure of the inspection team from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall ensure that the flight plan filed in accordance with paragraph 46 is approved, so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time.

48. Where necessary, the head of the inspection team and the representative of the inspected State Party shall agree on a basing point and a flight plan from the point of entry to the basing point and, if necessary, to the inspection area.

49. The inspected State Party shall provide for or arrange parking, security protection, servicing and fuel as required by the Technical Secretariat for the aircraft of the inspection team at the point of entry and, where necessary, at the basing point and at the inspection area. Such aircraft shall not be liable for landing fees, departure tax, and similar charges. This paragraph shall also apply to aircraft used for overflight during the on-site inspection.

50. Subject to paragraph 51, there shall be no restriction by the inspected State Party on the inspection team bringing approved equipment that is in conformity with the inspection mandate into the territory of that State Party, or on its use in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol.

51. The inspected State Party shall have the right, without prejudice to the time-frame specified in paragraph 54, to check in the presence of inspection team members at the point of entry that the equipment has been approved and certified in accordance with paragraph 38. The inspected State Party may exclude equipment that is not in conformity with the inspection mandate or that has not been approved and certified in accordance with paragraph 38.

52. Immediately upon arrival at the point of entry and without prejudice to the time-frame specified in paragraph 54, the head of the inspection team shall present to the representative of the inspected State Party the inspection mandate and an initial inspection plan prepared by the inspection team specifying the activities to be carried out by it. The inspection team shall be briefed by representatives of the inspected State Party with aid of maps and other documentation as appropriate. The briefing shall include relevant natural terrain features, safety and confidentiality issues, and logistical arrangements for the inspection. The inspected State Party may indicate locations within the inspection area that, in its view, are not related to the purpose of the inspection.

53. After the pre-inspection briefing, the inspection team shall, as appropriate, modify the initial inspection plan, taking into account any comments by the inspected State Party. The modified inspection plan shall be made available to the representative of the inspected State Party.

54. The inspected State Party shall do everything in its power to provide assistance and to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team, the approved equipment specified in paragraphs 50 and 51 and baggage from the point of entry to the inspection area no later than 36 hours after arrival at the point of entry, if no other timing has been agreed upon within the time-frame specified in paragraph 57.

55. To confirm that the area to which the inspection team has been transported corresponds to the inspection area specified in the inspection mandate, the inspection team shall have the right to use approved location-finding equipment. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team in this task.

E. CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS

General Rules

56. The inspection team shall discharge its functions in accordance with the provisions for the Treaty and this Protocol.

57. The inspection team shall begin its inspection activities in the inspection area as soon as possible, but in no case later than 72 house after arrival at the point of entry.

58. The activities of the inspection team shall be so arranged as to ensure the timely and effective discharge of its functions and the least possible inconvenience to the inspected State Party and disturbance to the inspection area.

59. In cases where the inspected State Party has been requested, pursuant to paragraph 43 (e) or in the course of the inspection, to make available any equipment for use by the inspection team in the inspection area, the inspected State Party shall comply with the request to the extent it can.

60. During the on-site inspection the inspection team shall have, inter alia:

    • (a) The right to determine how the inspection will proceed, consistent with the inspection mandate and taking into account any steps taken by the inspected State Party consistent with the provisions on managed access;

(b) The right to modify the inspection plan, as necessary, to ensure the effective execution of the inspection;

(c) The obligation to take into account the recommendations and suggested modifications by the inspected State Party to the inspection plan;

(d) The right to request clarifications in connection with ambiguities that may arise during the inspection;

(e) The obligation to use only those techniques specified in paragraph 69 and to refrain from activities that are not relevant to the purpose of the inspection. The team shall collect and document such facts as are related to the purpose of the inspection, but shall neither seek nor document information that is clearly unrelated thereto. Any material collected and subsequently found not to be relevant shall be returned to the inspected State Party;

(f) The obligation to take into account and include in its report date and explanations on the nature of the event that triggered the request, provided by the inspected State Party from the national monitoring networks of the inspected State Party and from other sources;

(g) The obligation to provide the inspected State Party, at its request, with copies of the information and data collected in the inspection area; and

(h) The obligation to respect the confidentiality and the safety and health regulations of the inspected State Party.

61. During the on-site inspection the inspected State Party shall have, inter alia:

    • (a) The right to make recommendations at any time to the inspection team regarding possible modification of the inspection plan;

(b) The right and the obligation to provide a representative to liaise with the inspection team;

(c) The right to have representatives accompany the inspection team during the performance of its duties and observe all inspection activities carried out by the inspection team. This shall not delay or otherwise hinder the inspection team in the exercise of its functions;

(d) The right to provide additional information and to request the collection and documentation of additional facts it believes are relevant to the inspection;

(e) The right to examine all photographic and measurement products as well as samples and to retain any photographs or parts thereof showing sensitive sites not related to the purpose of the inspection. The inspected State Party shall have the right to receive duplicate copies of all photographic and measurement products. The inspected State Party shall have the right to retain photographic originals and first-generation photographic products and to put photographs or parts thereof under joint seal within its territory. The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide its own camera operator to take still/video photographs as requested by the inspection team. Otherwise, these functions shall be performed by members of the inspection team;

(f) The right to provide the inspection team, from its national monitoring networks and from other sources, with data and explanations on the nature of the event that triggered the request; and

(g) The obligation to provide the inspection team with such clarification as may be necessary to resolve any ambiguities that arise during the inspection.

Communications

62. The members of the inspection team shall have the right at all times during the on-site inspection to communicate with each other and with the Technical Secretariat. For this purpose they may use their own duly approve and certified equipment with the consent of the inspected State Party to the extent that the inspected State Party does not provide them with access to other telecommunication.

Observer

63. In accordance with Article IV, paragraph 61, the requesting State Party shall liaise with the Technical Secretariat to coordinate the arrival of the observer at the same point of entry or basing point as the inspection team within a reasonable period of the arrival of the inspection team.

64. The observer shall have the right throughout the inspection to be in communication with the embassy of the requesting State Party located in the inspected State Party or, in the case of absence of an embassy, with the requesting State Party itself.

65. The observer shall have the right to arrive at the inspection area and to have access to and within the inspection area as granted by the inspected State Party.

66. The observer shall have the right to make recommendations to the inspection team throughout the inspection.

67. Throughout the inspection, the inspection team shall keep the observer informed about the conduct of the inspection and the findings.

68. Throughout the inspection, the inspected State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the observer similar to those enjoyed by the inspection team as described in paragraph 11. All costs in connection with the stay of the observer on the territory of the inspected State Party shall be borne by the requesting State Party.

Inspection Activities and Techniques

69. The following inspection activities may be conducted and techniques used, in accordance with the provisions on managed access, on collection, handling and analysis of samples, and on overflights:

    • (a) Position finding from the air and at the surface to confirm the boundaries of the inspection area and establish coordinates of locations therein, in support of the inspection activities;

(b) Visual observation, video and still photography and multi-spectral imaging, including infrared measurements, at and below the surface, and from the air, to search for anomalies or artifacts;

(c) Measurement of levels of radioactivity above, at and below the surface, using gamma radiation monitoring and energy resolution analysis from the air, and at or under the surface, to search for and identify radiation anomalies;

(d) Environmental sampling and analysis of solids, liquids and gases from above, at and below the surface to detect anomalies;

(e) Passive seismological monitoring for aftershocks to localize the search area and facilitate determination of the nature of an event;

(f) Resonance seismometry and active seismic surveys to search for and locate underground anomalies, including cavities and rubble zones;

(g) Magnetic and gravitational field mapping, ground penetrating radar and electrical conductivity measurements at the surface and from the air, as appropriate, to detect anomalies or artifacts; and

(h) Drilling to obtain radioactive samples.

70. Up to 25 days after the approval of the on-site inspection in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 46, the inspection team shall have the right to conduct any of the activities and use any of the techniques listed in paragraph 69 (a) to (e). Following the approval of the continuation of the inspection in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 47, the inspection team shall have the right to conduct any of the activities and use any of the techniques listed in paragraph 69 (a) to (e). The inspection team shall only conduct drilling after the approval of the Executive Council in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 48. If the inspection team requests an extension of the inspection duration in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 49, it shall indicate in its request which of the activities and techniques listed in paragraph 69 it intends to carry out in order to be able to fulfil its mandate.

Overflights

71. The inspection team shall have the right to conduct an overflight over the inspection area during the on-site inspection for the purposes of providing the inspection team with a general orientation of the inspection area, narrowing down and optimizing the locations for ground-based inspection and facilitating the collection of factual evidence, using equipment specified in paragraph 79.

72. The overflight shall be conducted as soon as practically possible. The total duration of the overflight over the inspection area shall be no more than 12 hours.

73. Additional overflights using equipment specified in paragraphs 79 and 80 may be conducted subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party.

74. The area to be covered by overflights shall not extend beyond the inspection area.

75. The inspected State Party shall have the right to impose restrictions or, in exceptional cases and with reasonable justification, prohibitions on the overflight of sensitive sites not related to the purpose of the inspection. Restrictions may relate to the flight altitude, the number of passes and circling, the duration of hovering, the type of aircraft, the number of inspectors on board, and the type of measurements or observations. If the inspection team considers that the restrictions or prohibitions on the overflight of sensitive sites may impede the fulfilment of its mandate, the inspected State Party shall make every reasonable effort to provide alternative means of inspection.

76. Overflights shall be conducted according to a flight plan duly filed and approved in accordance with aviation rules and regulations of the inspected State Party. Flight safety regulations of the inspected State Party shall be strictly observed throughout all flying operations.

77. During overflights landing should normally be authorized only for purposes of staging or refuelling.

78. Overflights shall be conducted at altitudes as requested by the inspection team consistent with the activities to be conducted, visibility conditions, as well as the aviation and the safety regulations of the inspected State Party and its right to protect sensitive information not related to the purposes of the inspection. Overflights shall be conducted up to a maximum altitude of 1,500 metres above the surface.

79. For the overflight conducted pursuant to paragraphs 71 and 72, the following equipment may be used on board the aircraft:

    • (a) Field glasses;

(b) Passive location-finding equipment;

(c) Video cameras; and

(d) Hand-held still cameras.

80. For any additional overflights conducted pursuant to paragraph 73, inspectors on board the aircraft may also use portable, easily installed equipment for:

    • (a) Multi-spectral (including infrared) imagery;

(b) Gamma spectroscopy; and

(c) Magnetic field mapping.

81. Overflights shall be conducted with a relatively slow fixed or rotary wing aircraft. The aircraft shall afford a broad, unobstructed view of the surface below.

82. The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide its own aircraft, pre-equipped as appropriate in accordance with the technical requirements of the relevant operational manual, and crew. Otherwise, the aircraft shall be provided or rented by the Technical Secretariat.

83. If the aircraft is provided or rented by the Technical Secretariat, the inspected State Party shall have the right to check the aircraft to ensure that it is equipped with approved inspection equipment. Such checking shall be completed within the time-frame specified in paragraph 57.

84. Personnel on board the aircraft shall consist of:

    • (a) The minimum number of flight crew consistent with the safe operation of the aircraft;

(b) Up to four members of the inspection team;

(c) Up to two representatives of the inspected State Party;

(d) An observer, if any, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party; and

(e) An interpreter, if necessary.

85. Procedures for the implementation of overflights shall be detailed in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections.

Managed Access

86. The inspection team shall have the right to access the inspection are in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol.

87. The inspected State Party shall provide access within the inspection area in accordance with the time-frame specified in paragraph 57.

88. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 57 and paragraph 86 above, the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party shall include:

    • (a) The right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and locations in accordance with this Protocol;

(b) The obligation, when access is restricted within the inspection area, to make every reasonable effort to satisfy the requirements of the inspection mandate through alternative means. Resolving any questions regarding one or more aspects of the inspection shall not delay or interfere with the conduct of the inspection team of other aspects of the inspection; and

(c) The right to make the final decision regarding any access of the inspection team, taking into account its obligations under this Treaty and the provisions on managed access.

89. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 57 (b) and paragraph 88 (a) above, the inspected State Party shall have the right throughout the inspection area to take measures to protect sensitive installations and locations and to prevent disclosure of confidential information not related to the purpose of the inspection. Such measures may include, inter alia:

    • (a) Shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and equipment;

(b) Restricting measurements of radionuclide activity and nuclear radiation to determining the presence or absence of those types and energies of radiation relevant to the purpose of the inspection;

(c) Restricting the taking of or analysing of samples to determining the presence or absence of radioactive or other products relevant to the purpose of the inspection;

(d) Managing access to buildings and other structures in accordance with paragraphs 90 and 91; and

(e) Declaring restricted-access sites in accordance with paragraphs 92 to 96.

90. Access to buildings and other structures shall be deferred until after the approval of the continuation of the on-site inspection in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 47, except for access to buildings and other structures housing the entrance to a mine, other excavations, or caverns of large volume not otherwise accessible. For such buildings and structures, the inspection team shall have the right only of transit, as directed by the inspected State Party, in order to enter such mines, caverns or other excavations.

91. If, following the approval of the continuation of the inspection in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 47, the inspection team demonstrates credibly to the inspected State Party that access to buildings and other structures is necessary to fulfil the inspection mandate and that the necessary activities authorized in the mandate could not be carried out from the outside, the inspection team shall have the right to gain access to such buildings or other structures. The head of the inspection team shall request access to a specific building or structure indicating the purpose of such access, the specific number of inspectors, as well as the intended activities. The modalities for access shall be subject to negotiation between the inspection team and the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall have the right to impose restrictions or, in exceptional cases and with reasonable justification, prohibitions, on the access to buildings and other structures.

92. When restricted-access sites are declared pursuant to paragraph 89 (e), each such site shall be no larger than 4 square kilometres. The inspected State Party has the right to declare up to 50 square kilometres of restricted-access sites. If more than one restricted-access site is declared, each such site shall be separated from any other such site by a minimum distance of 20 metres. Each restricted-access site shall have clearly defined and accessible boundaries.

93. The size, location, and boundaries of restricted-access sites shall be presented to the head of the inspection team no later than the time that the inspection team seeks access to a location that contains all or part of such a site.

94. The inspection team shall have the right to place equipment and take other steps necessary to conduct its inspection up to the boundary of a restricted-access site.

95. The inspection team shall be permitted to observe visually all open places within the restricted-access site from the boundary of the site.

96. The inspection team shall make every reasonable effort to fulfil the inspection mandate outside the declared restricted-access sites prior to requesting access to such sites. If at any time the inspection team demonstrates credibly to the inspected State Party that the necessary activities authorized in the mandate could not be carried out from the outside and that access to a restricted-access site is necessary to fulfil the mandate, some members of the inspection team shall be granted access to accomplish specific tasks within the site. The inspected State Party shall have the right to shroud or otherwise protect sensitive equipment, objects and materials not related to the purpose of the inspection. The number of inspectors shall be kept to the minimum necessary to complete the tasks related to the inspection. The modalities for such access shall be subject to negotiation between the inspection team and the inspected State Party.

Collection, Handling and Analysis of Samples

97. Subject to paragraphs 86 to 96 and 98 to 100, the inspection team shall have the right to collect and remove relevant samples from the inspection area.

98. Whenever possible, the inspection team shall analyse samples on-site. Representatives of the inspected State Party shall have the right to be present when samples are analysed on-site. At the request of the inspection team, the inspected State Party shall, in accordance with agreed procedures, provide assistance for the analysis of samples on-site. The inspection team shall have the right to transfer samples for off-site analysis at laboratories designated by the Organization only if it demonstrates that the necessary sample analysis cannot be performed on-site.

99. The inspected State Party shall have the right to retain portions of all samples collected when these samples are analysed and may take duplicate samples.

100. The inspected State Party shall have the right to request that any unused samples or portions thereof be returned.

101. The designated laboratories shall conduct chemical and physical analysis of the samples transferred for off-site analysis. Details of such analysis shall be elaborated in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections.

102. The Director-General shall have the primary responsibility for the security, integrity and preservation of samples and for ensuring that the confidentiality of samples transferred for off-site analysis is protected. The Director-General shall do so in accordance with procedures contained in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections. The Director-General shall in any case:

    • (a) Establish a stringent regime governing the collection, handling, transport and analysis of samples;

(b) Certify the laboratories designated to perform different types of analysis;

(c) Oversee the standardization of equipment and procedures at these designated laboratories and of mobile analytical equipment and procedures;

(d) Monitor quality control and overall standards in relation to the certification of these laboratories and in relation to mobile equipment and procedures; and

(e) Select from among the designated laboratories those which shall perform analytical or other functions in relation to specific investigations.

103. When off-site analysis is to be performed, samples shall be analysed in at least two designated laboratories. The Technical Secretariat shall ensure the expeditious processing of the analysis. The samples shall be accounted for by the Technical Secretariat and any unused samples or portions thereof shall be returned to the Technical Secretariat.

104. The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of the laboratory analysis of samples relevant to the purpose of the inspection. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 63, the Director-General shall transmit any such results promptly to the inspected State Party for comments and thereafter to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties and shall include detailed information concerning the equipment and methodology employed by the designated laboratories.

Conduct of Inspections in Areas beyond the Jurisdiction or Control of any State

105. In case of an on-site inspection in an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State, the Director-General shall consult with the appropriate States Parties and agree on any transit or basing points to facilitate a speedy arrival of the inspection team in the inspection area.

106. The States Parties on whose territory transit or basing points are located shall, as far as possible, assist in facilitating the inspection, including transporting the inspection team, its baggage and equipment to the inspection area, as well as providing the relevant amenities specified in paragraph 11. The Organization shall reimburse assisting States Parties for all costs incurred.

107. Subject to the approval of the Executive Council, the Director-General may negotiate standing arrangements with States Parties to facilitate assistance in the event of an on-site inspection in an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State.

108. In cases where one or more States Parties have conducted an investigation of an ambiguous event in an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State before a request is made for an on-site inspection in that area, any results of such investigation may be taken into account by the Executive Council in its deliberations pursuant to Article IV.

Post-Inspection Procedures

109. Upon conclusion of the inspection, the inspection team shall meet with the representative of the inspected State Party to review the preliminary findings of the inspection team and to clarify any ambiguities. The inspection team shall provide the representative of the inspected State Party with its preliminary findings in written form according to a standardized format, together with a list of any samples and other material taken from the inspection area pursuant to paragraph 98. The document shall be signed by the head of the inspection team. In order to indicate that he or she has taken notice of the contents of the document, the representative of the inspected State Party shall countersign the document. The meeting shall be completed no later than 24 hours after the conclusion of the inspection.

Departure

110. Upon completion of the Post-inspection procedures, the inspection team and the observer shall leave, as soon as possible, the territory of the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall do everything in its power to provide assistance and to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team, equipment and baggage to the point of exit. Unless agreed otherwise by the inspected State Party and the inspection team, the point of exit used shall be the same as the point of entry.

PART III

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

1. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 68, each State Party shall, on a voluntary basis, provide the Technical Secretariat with notification of any chemical explosion using 300 tonnes or greater of TNT-equivalent blasting material detonated as a single explosion anywhere on its territory, or at any place under its jurisdiction or control. If possible, such notification shall be provided in advance. Such notification shall include details on location, time, quantity and type of explosive used, as well as on the configuration and intended purpose of the blast.

2. Each State Party shall, on a voluntary basis, as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Treaty provide to the Technical Secretariat, and at annual intervals thereafter update, information related to its national use of all other chemical explosions greater than 300 tonnes TNT-equivalent. In particular, the State Party shall seek to advise:

    • (a) The geographic locations of sites where the explosions originate:

(b) The nature of activities producing them and the general profile and frequency of such explosions;

(c) Any other relevant detail, if available; and

to assist the Technical Secretariat in clarifying the origins of any such event detected by the International Monitoring System.

3. A State Party may, on a voluntary and mutually acceptable basis, invite representatives of the Technical Secretariat or of other States Parties to visit sites within its territory referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.

4. For the purpose of calibrating the International Monitoring System, States Parties may liaise with the Technical Secretariat to carry out chemical calibration explosions or to provide relevant information on chemical explosions planned for other purposes.

ANNEX 1 TO THE PROTOCOL

Table 1-A
List of seismological stations comprising the primary network

/TR>

# State responsible for station Location Latitude Longitude Type
1 Argentina PLCA
Paso Flores
40.7 S 70.6 W 3-C
2 Australia WRA
Warramunga, NT
19.9 S 134.3 E array
3 Australia ASAR
Alice Springs, NT
23.7 S 133.9 E array
4 Australia STKA
Stephens Creek, SA
31.9 S 141.6 E 3-C
5 Australia MAW
Mawson, Antarctica
67.6 S 62.9 E 3-C
6 Bolivia LPAZ
La Paz
16.3 S 68.1 W 3-C
7 Brazil BDFB
Brasilia
15.6 S 48.0 W 3-C
8 Canada ULMC
Lac du Bonnet, Man.
50.2 N 95.9 W 3-C
9 Canada YKAC
Yellowknife,
N.W.T.
62.5 N 114.6 W array
10 Canada SCH
Schefferville,
Quebec
54.8 N 66.8 W 3-C
11 Central African
Republic
BGCA
Bangui
05.2 N 18.4 E 3-C
12 China HAI
Hailar
49.3 N 119.7 E 3-C >
array
13 China LZH
Lanzhou
36.1 N 103.8 E 3-C >
array
14 Colombia XSA
El Rosal
04.9 N 74.3 W 3-C
15 Côte d’Ivoire DBIC
Dimbroko
06.7 N 04.9 W 3-C
16 Egypt LXEG
Luxor
26.0 N 33.0 E array
17 Finland FINES
Lahti
61.4 N 28.1 E array
18 France PPT
Tahiti
17.6 S 149.6 W 3-C
19 Germany GEC2
Freyung
48.9 N 13.7 E array
20 To be determined To be determined To be determined To be determined To be determined
21 Iran
(Islamic Republic of)
THR
Tehran
35.8 N 51.4 E 3-C
22 Japan MJAR
Matsushiro
36.5 N 138.2 E array
23 Kazakstan MAK
Makanchi
46.8 N 82.0 E array
24 Kenya KMBO
Kilimambogo
01.1 S 37.2 E 3-C
25 Mongolia JAVM
Javhlant
48.0 N 106.8 E 3-C >
array
26 Niger New Site To be determined To be determined 3-C >
array
27 Norway NAO
Hamar
60.8 N 10.8 E array
28 Norway ARAO
Karasjok
69.5 N 25.5 E array
29 Pakistan PRPK
Pari
33.7 N 73.3 E array
30 Paraguay CPUP
Villa Florida
26.3 S 57.3 W 3-C
31 Republic of Korea KSRS
Wonju
37.5 N 127.9 E array
32 Russian Federation KBZ
Khabaz
43.7 N 42.9 E 3-C
33 Russian Federation ZAL
Zalesovo
53.9 N 84.8 E 3-C >
array
34 Russian Federation NRI
Norilsk
69.0 N 88.0 E 3-C
35 Russian Federation PDY
Peleduy
59.6 N 112.6 E 3-C >
array
36 Russian Federation PET
Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatskiy
53.1 N 157.8 E 3-C >
array
37 Russian Federation USK
Ussuriysk
44.2 N 132.0 E 3-C >
array
38 Saudi Arabia New Site To be determined To be determined array
39 South Africa BOSA
Boshof
28.6 S 25.6 E 3-C
40 Spain ESDC
Sonseca
39.7 N 04.0 W array
41 Thailand CMTO
Chiang Mai
18.8 N 99.0 E array
42 Tunisia THA
Thala
35.6 N 08.7 E 3-C
43 Turkey BRTR
Belbashi
The array is subject to relocation at Keskin
39.9 N 32.8 E array
44 Turkmenistan GEYT
Alibeck
37.9 N 58.1 E array
45 Ukraine AKASG
Malin
50.4 N 29.1 E array
46 United States of America LJTX
Lajitas, TX
29.3 N 103.7 W array
47 United States of America MNV
Mina, NV
38.4 N 118.2 W array
48 United States of America PIWY
Pinedale, WY
42.8 N 109.6 W array
49 United States of America ELAK
Eielson, AK
64.8 N 146.9 W array
50 United States of America VNDA
Vanda, Antarctica
77.5 S 161.9 E 3-C

 Key:

3-C > array: indicates that the site could start operations in the International Monitoring System as a three-component station and be upgraded to an array at a later time.

Table 1-B
List of seismological stations comprising the auxiliary network

# State responsible for station Location Latitude Longitude Type
1 Argentina CFA
Coronel Fontana
31.6 S 68.2 W 3-C
2 Argentina USHA
Ushuaia
55.0 S 68.0 W 3-C
3 Armenia GNI
Garni
40.1 N 44.7 E 3-C
4 Australia CTA
Charters Towers, QLD
20.1 S 146.3 E 3-C
5 Australia FITZ
Fitzroy Crossing, WA
18.1 S 125.6 E 3-C
6 Australia NWAO
Narrogin, WA
32.9 S 117.2 E 3-C
7 Bangladesh CHT
Chittagong
22.4 N 91.8 E 3-C
8 Bolivia SIV
San Ignacio
16.0 S 61.1 W 3-C
9 Botswana LBTB
Lobatse
25.0 S 25.6 E 3-C
10 Brazil PTGA
Pitinga
0.7 S 60.0 W 3-C
11 Brazil RGNB
Rio Grande do Norte
6.9 S 37.0 W 3-C
12 Canada FRB
Iqaluit, N.W.T.
63.7 N 68.5 W 3-C
13 Canada DLBC
Dease Lake, B.C.
58.4 N 130.0 W 3-C
14 Canada SADO
Sadowa, Ont.
44.8 N 79.1 W 3-C
15 Canada BBB
Bella Bella, B.C.
52.2 N 128.1 W 3-C
16 Canada MBC
Mould Bay, N.W.T.
76.2 N 119.4 W 3-C
17 Canada INK
Inuvik, N.W.T.
68.3 N 133.5 W 3-C
18 Chile RPN
Easter Island
27.2 S 109.4 W 3-C
19 Chile LVC
Limon Verde
22.6 S 68.9 W 3-C
20 China BJT
Baijiatuan
40.0 N 116.2 E 3-C
21 China KMI
Kunming
25.2 N 102.8 E 3-C
22 China SSE
Sheshan
31.1 N 121.2 E 3-C
23 China XAN
Xi’an
34.0 N 108.9 E 3-C
24 Cook Islands RAR
Rarotonga
21.2 S 159.8 W 3-C
25 Costa Rica JTS
Las Juntas de Abangares
10.3 N 85.0 W 3-C
26 Czech Republic VRAC
Vranov
49.3 N 16.6 E 3-C
27 Denmark SFJ
Søndre Strømfjord. Greenland
67.0 N 50.6 W 3-C
28 Djibouti ATD
Arta Tunnel
11.5 N 42.9 E 3-C
29 Egypt KEG
Kottamya
29.9 N 31.8 E 3-C
30 Ethiopia FURI
Furi
8.9 N 38.7 E 3-C
31 Fiji MSVF
Monasavu, Viti Levu
17.8 S 178.1 E 3-C
32 France NOUC
Port Laguerre, New Caledonia
22.1 S 166.3 E 3-C
33 France KOG
Kourou, French Guiana
5.2 N 52.7 W 3-C
34 Gabon BAMB
Bambay
1.7 S 13.6 E 3-C
35 Germany/South Africa
SANAE Station, Antarctica
71.7 S 2.9 W 3-C
36 Greece IDI
Anogia, Crete
35.3 N 24.9 E 3-C
37 Guatemala RDG
Rabir
15.0 N 90.5 W 3-C
38 Iceland BORG
Borgames
64.8 N 21.3 W 3-C
39 To be determined To be determined To be determined To be determined To be determined
40 Indonesia PACI
Cibinong, Jawa Barat
6.5 S 107.0 E 3-C
41 Indonesia JAY
Jayapura, Irian Jaya
2.5 S 140.7 E 3-C
42 Indonesia SWI
Sorong, Irian Jaya
0.9 S 131.3 E 3-C
43 Indonesia PSI
Parapat, Sumatera
2.7 N 98.9 E 3-C
44 Indonesia KAPI
Kappang, Sulawesi Selatan
5.0 S 119.8 E 3-C
45 Indonesia KUG
Kupang, Nusatenggara Timur
10.2 S 123.6 E 3-C
46 Iran
(Islamic Republic of)
KRM
Kerman
30.3 N 57.1 E 3-C
47 Iran
(Islamic Republic of)
MSN
Masjed-e-Soleyman
31.9 N 49.3 E 3-C
48 Israel MBH
Eilath
29.8 N 34.9 E 3-C
49 Israel PARD
Parod
32.6 N 35.3 E array
50 Italy ENAS
Enna, Sicily
37.5 N 14.3 E 3-C
51 Japan JNU
Ohita, Kyushu
33.1 N 130.9 E 3-C
52 Japan JOW
Kunigami, Okinawa
26.8 N 128.3 E 3-C
53 Japan JHJ
Hachijojima, Izu Islands
33.1 N 139.8 E 3-C
54 Japan JKA
Kamikawa-asahi, Hokkaido
44.1 N 142.6 E 3-C
55 Japan JCJ
Chichijima, Ogasawara
27.1 N 142.2 E 3-C
56 Jordan
Ashqof
32.5 N 37.6 E 3-C
57 Kazakstan BRVK
Borovoye
53.1 N 70.3 E array
58 Kazakstan KURK
Kurchatov
50.7 N 78.6 E array
59 Kazakstan AKTO
Aktyubinsk
50.4 N 58.0 E 3-C
60 Kyrgyzstan AAK
Ala-Archa
42.6 N 74.5 E 3-C
61 Madagascar TAN
Antananarivo
18.9 S 47.6 E 3-C
62 Mali KOWA
Kowa
14.5 N 4.0 W 3-C
63 Mexico TEYM
Tepich, Yucatan
20.2 N 88.3 W 3-C
64 Mexico TUVM
Tuzandepeti, Veracruz
18.0 N 94.4 W 3-C
65 Mexico LPBM
La Paz, Baja California Sur
24.2 N 110.2 W 3-C
66 Morocco MDT
Midelt
32.8 N 4.6 W 3-C
67 Namibia TSUM
Tsumeb
19.1 S 17.4 E 3-C
68 Nepal EVN
Everest
28.0 N 86.8 E 3-C
69 New Zealand EWZ
Erewhon, South Island
43.5 S 170.9 E 3-C
70 New Zealand RAO
Raoul Island
29.2 S 177.9 W 3-C
71 New Zealand UPZ
Urewera, North Island
38.3 S 177.1 E 3-C
72 Norway SPITS
Spitsbergen
78.2 N 16.4 E array
73 Norway JMI
Jan Mayen
70.9 N 8.7 W 3-C
74 Oman WSAR
Wadi Sarin
23.0 N 58.0 E 3-C
75 Papua New Guinea PMG
Port Moresby
9.4 S 147.2 E 3-C
76 Papua New Guinea BIAL
Bialla
5.3 S 151.1 E 3-C
77 Peru CAJP
Cajamarca
7.0 S 78.0 W 3-C
78 Peru NNA
Nana
12.0 S 76.8 W 3-C
79 Philippines DAV
Davao, Mindanao
7.1 N 125.6 E 3-C
80 Philippines TGY
Tagaytay, Luzon
14.1 N 120.9 E 3-C
81 Romania MLR
Muntele Rosu
45.5 N 25.9 E 3-C
82 Russian Federation KIRV
Kirov
58.6 N 49.4 E 3-C
83 Russian Federation KIVO
Kislovodsk
44.0 N 42.7 E array
84 Russian Federation OBN
Obninsk
55.1 N 36.6 E 3-C
85 Russian Federation ARU
Arti
56.4 N 58.6 E 3-C
86 Russian Federation SEY
Seymchan
62.9 N 152.4 E 3-C
87 Russian Federation TLY
Talaya
51.7 N 103.6 E 3-C
88 Russian Federation YAK
Yakutsk
62.0 N 129.7 E 3-C
89 Russian Federation URG
Urgal
51.1 N 132.3 E 3-C
90 Russian Federation BIL
Bilibino
68.0 N 166.4 E 3-C
91 Russian Federation TIXI
Tiksi
71.6 N 128.9 E 3-C
92 Russian Federation YSS
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk
47.0 N 142.8 E 3-C
93 Russian Federation MA2
Magadan
59.6 N 150.8 E 3-C
94 Russian Federation ZIL
Zilim
53.9 N 57.0 E 3-C
95 Samoa AFI
Afiamalu
13.9 S 171.8 W 3-C
96 Saudi Arabia RAYN
Ar Rayn
23.6 N 45.6 E 3-C
97 Senegal MBO
Mbour
14.4 N 17.0 W 3-C
98 Solomon Islands HNR
Honiara, Guadalcanal
9.4 S 160.0 E 3-C
99 South Africa SUR
Sutherland
32.4 S 20.8 E 3-C
100 Sri Lanka COC
Colombo
6.9 N 79.9 E 3-C
101 Sweden HFS
Hagfors
60.1 N 13.7 E array
102 Switzerland DAVOS
Davos
46.8 N 9.8 E 3-C
103 Uganda MBRU
Mbarara
0.4 S 30.4 E 3-C
104 United Kingdom EKA
Eskdalemuir
55.3 N 3.2 W array
105 United States of America GUMO
Guam, Marianas Islands
13.6 N 144.9 E 3-C
106 United States of America PMSA
Palmer Station, Antarctica
64.8 S 64.1 W 3-C
107 United States of America TKL
Tuckaleechee Caverns, TN
35.7 N 83.8 W 3-C
108 United States of America PFCA
Piñon Flat, CA
33.6 N 116.5 W 3-C
109 United States of America YBH
Yreka, CA
41.7 N 122.7 W 3-C
110 United States of America KDC
Kodiak Island, AK
57.8 N 152.5 W 3-C
111 United States of America ALQ
Albuquerque, NM
35.0 N 106.5 W 3-C
112 United States of America ATTU
Attu Island, AK
52.8 N 172.7 E 3-C
113 United States of America ELK
Elko, NV
40.7 N 115.2 W 3-C
114 United States of America SPA
South Pole, Antarctica
90.0 S – – 3-C
115 United States of America NEW
Newport, WA
48.3 N 117.1 W 3-C
116 United States of America SJG
San Juan, PR
18.1 N 66.2 W 3-C
117 Venezuela SDV
Santo Domingo
8.9 N 70.6 W 3-C
118 Venezuela PCRV
Puerto la Cruz
10.2 N 64.6 W 3-C
119 Zambia LSZ
Lusaka
15.3 S 28.2 E 3-C
120 Zimbabwe BUL
Bulawayo
to be advised to be advised 3-C

Table 2-A
List of radionuclide stations

# State responsible for station Location Latitude Longitude
1 Argentina Buenos Aires 34.0 S 58.0 W
2 Argentina Salta 24.0 S 65.0 W
3 Argentina Bariloche 41.1 S 71.3 W
4 Australia Melbourne, VIC 37.5 S 144.6 E
5 Australia Mawson, Antarctica 67.6 S 62.5 E
6 Australia Townsville, QLD 19.2 S 146.8 E
7 Australia Macquarie Island 54.0 S 159.0 E
8 Australia Cocos Islands 12.0 S 97.0 E
9 Australia Darwin, NT 12.4 S 130.7 E
10 Australia Perth, WA 31.9 S 116.0 E
11 Brazil Rio de Janeiro 22.5 S 43.1 W
12 Brazil Recife 8.0 S 35.0 W
13 Cameroon Douala 4.2 N 9.9 E
14 Canada Vancouver, B.C. 49.3 N 123.2 W
15 Canada Resolute, N.W.T. 74.7 N 94.9 W
16 Canada Yellowknife, N.W.T. 62.5 N 114.5 W
17 Canada St. John’s, N.L. 47.0 N 53.0 W
18 Chile Punta Arenas 53.1 S 70.6 W
19 Chile Hanga Roa, Easter Island 27.1 S 108.4 W
20 China Beijing 39.8 N 116.2 E
21 China Lanzhou 35.8 N 103.3 E
22 China Guangzhou 23.0 N 113.3 E
23 Cook Islands Rarotonga 21.2 S 159.8 W
24 Ecuador Isla San Cristóbal, Galápagos Islands 1.0 S 89.2 W
25 Ethiopia Filtu 5.5 N 42.7 E
26 Fiji Nadi 18.0 S 177.5 E
27 France Papeete, Tahiti 17.0 S 150.0 W
28 France Pointe-á-Pitre, Guadeloupe 17.0 N 62.0 W
29 France Réunion 21.1 S 55.6 E
30 France Port-aux-Francais, Kerguelen 49.0 S 70.0 E
31 France Cayenne, French Guiana 5.0 N 52.0 W
32 France Dumont d’Urville, Antarctica 66.0 S 140.0 E
33 Germany Schauinsland/Freiburg 47.9 N 7.9 E
34 Iceland Reykjavik 64.4 N 21.9 W
35 To be determined To be determined To be determined To be determined
36 Iran (Islamic Republic of) Tehran 35.0 N 52.0 E
37 Japan Okinawa 26.5 N 127.9 E
38 Japan Takasaki, Gunma 36.3 N 139.0 E
39 Kiribati Kiritimati 2.0 N 157.0 W
40 Kuwait Kuwait City 29.0 N 48.0 E
41 Libya Misratah 32.5 N 15.0 E
42 Malaysia Kuala Lumpur 2.6 N 101.5 E
43 Mauritania Nouakchott 18.0 N 17.0 W
44 Mexico Baja California 28.0 N 113.0 W
45 Mongolia Ulaanbaatar 47.5 N 107.0 E
46 New Zealand Chatham Island 44.0 S 176.5 W
47 New Zealand Kaitaia 35.1 S 173.3 E
48 Niger Bilma 18.0 N 13.0 E
49 Norway Spitsbergen 78.2 N 16.4 E
50 Panama Panama City 8.9 N 79.6 W
51 Papua New Guinea New Hanover 3.0 S 150.0 E
52 Philippines Quezon City 14.5 N 121.0 E
53 Portugal Ponta Delgada, São Miguel, Azores 37.4 N 25.4 W
54 Russian Federation Kirvov 58.6 N 49.4 E
55 Russian Federation Norilsk 69.0 N 88.0 E
56 Russian Federation Peleduy 59.6 N 112.6 E
57 Russian Federation Bilibino 68.0 N 166.4 E
58 Russian Federation Ussuriysk 43.7 N 131.9 E
59 Russian Federation Zalesovo 53.9 N 84.8 E
60 Russian Federation Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy 53.1 N 158.8 E
61 Russian Federation Dubna 56.7 N 37.3 E
62 South Africa Marion Island 46.5 S 37.0 E
63 Sweden Stockholm 59.4 N 18.0 E
64 Tanzania Dar es Salaam 6.0 S 39.0 E
65 Thailand Bangkok 13.8 N 100.5 E
66 United Kingdom BIOT/Chagos Archipelago 7.0 S 72.0 E
67 United Kingdom St. Helena 16.0 S 6.0 W
68 United Kingdom Tristan da Cunha 37.0 S 12.3 W
69 United Kingdom Halley, Antarctica 76.0 S 28.0 W
70 United States of America Sacramento, CA 38.7 N 121.4 W
71 United States of America Sand Point, AK 55.0 N 160.0 W
72 United States of America Melbourne, FL 28.3 N 80.6 W
73 United States of America Palmer Station, Antarctica 64.5 S 64.0 W
74 United States of America Ashland, KS 37.2 N 99.8 W
75 United States of America Charlottesville, VA 38.0 N 78.0 W
76 United States of America Salchaket, AK 64.4 N 147.1 W
77 United States of America Wake Island 19.3 N 166.6 E
78 United States of America Midway Islands 28.0 N 177.0 W
79 United States of America Oahu, HI 21.5 N 158.0 W
80 United States of America Upi, Guam 13.7 N 144.9 E

Table 2-B
List of radionuclide laboratories

# State responsible for laboratory Name and place of laboratory
1 Argentina National Board of Nuclear Regulation
Buenos Aires
2 Australia Australian Radiation Laboratory
Melbourne, VIC
3 Austria Austrian Research Center
Seibersdorf
4 Brazil Institute of Radiation Protection and Dosimetry
Rio de Janeiro
5 Canada Health Canada
Ottawa, Ont.
6 China Beijing
7 Finland Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety
Helsinki
8 France Atomic Energy Commission
Montlhéry
9 Israel Soreq Nuclear Research Centre
Yavne
10 Italy Labortory of the National Agency for the Protection of the Enivironment
Rome
11 Japan Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute
Tokai, Ibaraki
12 New Zealand National Radiation Laboratory
Christchurch
13 Russian Federation Central Radiation Control Laboratory, Ministry of Defense Special Verification Service
Moscow
14 South Africa Atomic Energy Corporation
Pelindaba
15 United Kingdom AWE Blacknest
Chilton
16 United States of America McClellan Central Laboratories
Sacramento, CA

Table 3
List of hydroacoustic stations

# State responsible for station Location Latitude Longitude Type
1 Australia Cape Lecuwin, WA 34.4 S 115.1 E Hydrophone
2 Canada Queen Charlotte Islands, B.C. 53.3 N 132.5 W T-phase
3 Chile Juan Fernández Island 33.7 S 78.8 W Hydrophone
4 France Crozet Islands 46.5 S 52.2 E Hydrophone
5 France Guadeloupe 16.3 N 61.1 W T-phase
6 Mexico Clarión Island 18.2 N 114.6 W T-phase
7 Portugal Flores 39.3 N 31.3 W T-phase
8 United Kingdom BIOT/Chagos Archipelago 7.3 S 72.4 E Hydrophone
9 United Kingdom Tristan da Cunha 37.2 S 12.5 W T-phase
10 United Kingdom Ascension 8.0 S 14.4 W Hydrophone
11 United States of America Wake Island 19.3 N 166.6 W Hydrophone

Table 4
List of Infrasound Stations

# State responsible for station Location Latitude Longitude
1 Argentina Paso Flores 40.7 S 70.6 W
2 Argentina Ushuaia 55.0 S 68.0 W
3 Australia Davis Base, Antarctica 68.4 S 77.6 E
4 Australia Narrogin, WA 32.9 S 117.2 E
5 Australia Hobart, TAS 42.1 S 147.2 E
6 Australia Cocos Islands 12.3 S 97.0 E
7 Australia Warramunga, NT 19.9 S 134.3 E
8 Bolivia La Paz 16.3 S 68.1 W
9 Brazil Brasilia 15.6 S 48.0 W
10 Canada Lac du Bonnet, Man. 50.2 N 95.9 W
11 Cape Verde Cape Verde Islands 16.0 N 24.0 W
12 Central African Republic Bangui 5.2 N 18.4 E
13 Chile Easter Island 27.0 S 109.2 W
14 Chile Juan Fernández Island 33.8 S 80.7 W
15 China Beijing 40.0 N 116.0 E
16 China Kunming 25.0 N 102.8 E
17 Côte d’Ivoire Dimbokro 6.7 N 4.9 W
18 Denmark Dundas, Greenland 76.5 N 68.7 W
19 Djibouti Djibouti 11.3 N 43.5 E
20 Ecuador Galápagos Islands 0.0 N 91.7 W
21 France Marquesas Islands 10.0 N 140.0 W
22 France Port LaGuerre, New Caledonia 22.1 S 166.3 E
23 France Kerguelen 49.2 S 69.1 E
24 France Tahiti 17.6 S 149.6 W
25 France Kourou, French Guiana 5.2 N 52.7 W
26 Germany Freyung 48.9 N 13.7 E
27 Germany Georg von Neumayer, Antarctica 70.6 S 8.4 W
28 To be determined To be determined To be determined To be determined
29 Iran (Islamic Republic of) Tehran 35.7 N 51.4 E
30 Japan Tsukuba 36.0 N 140.1 E
31 Kazakstan Aktyubinsk 50.4 N 58.0 E
32 Kenya Kilmanbogo 1.3 S 36.8 E
33 Madagascar Antananarivo 18.8 S 47.5 E
34 Mongolia Javhlant 48.0 N 106.8 E
35 Namibia Tsumeb 19.1 S 17.4 E
36 New Zealand Chatham Island 44.0 S 176.5 W
37 Norway Karasjok 69.5 N 25.5 E
38 Pakistan Rahimyar Khan 28.2 N 70.3 E
39 Palau Palau 7.5 N 134.5 E
40 Papua New Guinea Rabaul 4.1 S 152.1 E
41 Paraguay Villa Florida 26.3 S 57.3 W
42 Portugal Azores 37.8 N 25.5 W
43 Russian Federation Dubna 56.7 N 37.3 E
44 Russian Federation Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy 53.1 N 158.8 E
45 Russian Federation Ussuriysk 43.7 N 131.9 E
46 Russian Federation Zalesovo 53.9 N 84.8 E
47 South Africa Boshof 28.6 S 25.4 E
48 Tunisia Thala 35.6 N 8.7 E
49 United Kingdom Tristan da Cunha 37.0 S 12.3 W
50 United Kingdom Ascension 8.0 S 14.3 W
51 United Kingdom Bermuda 32.0 N 64.5 W
52 United Kingdom BIOT/Chagos Archipelago 5.0 S 72.0 E
53 United States of America Eielson, AK 64.8 N 146.9 W
54 United States of America Siple Station, Antarctica 75.5 S 83.6 W
55 United States of America Windless Bight, Antarctica 77.5 S 161.8 E
56 United States of America Newport, WA 48.3 N 117.1 W
57 United States of America Piñon Flat, CA 33.6 N 116.5 W
58 United States of America Midway Islands 28.1 N 177.2 W
59 United States of America Hawaii, HI 19.6 N 155.3 W
60 United States of America Wake Island 19.3 N 166.6 W

ANNEX 2 TO THE PROTOCOL

List of Characterisation Parameters for International Data Centre Standard Event Screening

1. The International Data Centre standard event screening criteria shall be based on the standard event characterisation parameters determined during the combined processing of data from all the monitoring technologies in the International Monitoring System. Standard event screening shall make use of both global and supplementary screening criteria to take account of regional variations where applicable.

2. For events detected by the International Monitoring System seismic component, the following parameters, inter alia, may be used:

  • location of the event;
  • depth of the event;
  • ratio of the magnitude of surface waves to body waves;
  • signal frequency content;
  • spectral ratios of phases;
  • spectral scalloping;
  • first motion of the P-wave;
  • focal mechanism;
  • relative excitation of seismic phases;
  • comparative measures to other events and groups of events; and
  • regional discriminants where applicable.

3. For events detected by the International Monitoring System hydroacoustic component, the following parameters, inter alia, may be used:

  • signal frequency content including corner frequency, wide-band energy and mean centre frequency and bandwidth;
  • frequency-dependent duration of signals;
  • spectral ratio; and
  • indications of bubble-pulse signals and bubble-pulse delay.

4. For events detected by the International Monitoring System infrasound component, the following parameters, inter alia, may be used:

  • signal frequency content and dispersion;
  • signal duration; and
  • peak amplitude.

5. For events detected by the International Monitoring System radionuclide component, the following parameters, inter alia, may be used:

  • concentration of background natural and man-made radionuclides;
  • concentration of specific fission and activation products outside normal observations; and
  • ratios of one specific fission and activation product to another.




Convention on access to justice in international cases-1980

The Hague, 25-10-1980

Convention on International Access to Justice

CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE

(Concluded 25 October 1980)

The States signatory to this Convention,

Desiring to facilitate international access to justice,

Have resolved to conclude a Convention for this purpose and have agreed upon the following provisions –

chapter i – legal aid

Article 1

Nationals of any Contracting State and persons habitually resident in any Contracting State shall be entitled to legal aid for court proceedings in civil and commercial matters in each Contracting State on the same conditions as if they themselves were nationals of and habitually resident in that State.

Persons to whom paragraph 1 does not apply, but who formerly had their habitual residence in a Contracting State in which court proceedings are to be or have been commenced, shall nevertheless be entitled to legal aid as provided by paragraph 1 if the cause of action arose out of their former habitual residence in that State.

In States where legal aid is provided in administrative, social or fiscal matters, the provisions of this Article shall apply to cases brought before the courts or tribunals competent in such matters.

Article 2

Article 1 shall apply to legal advice provided the person seeking advice is present in the State where advice is sought.

Article 3

Each Contracting State shall designate a Central Authority to receive, and take action on, applications for legal aid submitted under this Convention.

Federal States and States which have more than one legal system may designate more than one Central Authority. If the Central Authority to which an application is submitted is not competent to deal with it, it shall forward the application to whichever other Central Authority in the same Contracting State is competent to do so.

Article 4

Each Contracting State shall designate one or more transmitting authorities for the purpose of forwarding applications for legal aid to the appropriate Central Authority in the requested State.

Applications for legal aid shall be transmitted, without the intervention of any other authority, in the form of the model annexed to this Convention.

Nothing in this Article shall prevent an application from being submitted through diplomatic channels.

Article 5

Where the applicant for legal aid is not present in the requested State, he may submit his application to a transmitting authority in the Contracting State where he has his habitual residence, without prejudice to any other means open to him of submitting his application to the competent authority in the requested State.

The application shall be in the form of the model annexed to this Convention and shall be accompanied by any necessary documents, without prejudice to the right of the requested State to require further information or documents in appropriate cases.

Any Contracting State may declare that its receiving Central Authority will accept applications submitted by other channels or methods.

Article 6

The transmitting authority shall assist the applicant in ensuring that the application is accompanied by all the information and documents known by it to be necessary for consideration of the application. It shall ensure that formal requirements are met.

If it appears to the transmitting authority that the application is manifestly unfounded, it may refuse to transmit the application.

It shall assist the applicant in obtaining without charge a translation of the documents where such assistance is appropriate.

It shall reply to requests for further information from the receiving Central Authority in the requested State.

Article 7

The application, the supporting documents and any communications in response to requests for further information shall be in the official language or in one of the official languages of the requested State or be accompanied by a translation into one of those languages.

However, where in the requesting State it is not feasible to obtain a translation into the language of the requested State, the latter shall accept the documents in either English or French, or the documents accompanied by a translation into one of those languages.

Communications emanating from the receiving Central Authority may be drawn up in the official language or one of the official languages of the requested State or in English or French. However, where the application forwarded by the transmitting authority is in either English or French, or is accompanied by a translation into one of those languages, communications emanating from the receiving Central Authority shall also be in one of those languages.

The costs of translation arising from the application of the preceding paragraphs shall be borne by the requesting State, except that any translations made in the requested State shall not give rise to any claim for reimbursement on the part of that State.

Article 8

The receiving Central Authority shall determine the application or shall take such steps as are necessary to obtain its determination by a competent authority in the requested State.

The receiving Central Authority shall transmit requests for further information to the transmitting authority and shall inform it of any difficulty relating to the examination of the application and of the decision taken.

Article 9

Where the applicant for legal aid does not reside in a Contracting State, he may submit his application through consular channels, without prejudice to any other means open to him of submitting his application to the competent authority in the requested State.

Any Contracting State may declare that its receiving Central Authority will accept applications submitted by other channels or methods.

Article 10

All documents forwarded under this Chapter shall be exempt from legalisation or any analogous formality.

Article 11

No charges shall be made for the transmission, reception or determination of applications for legal aid under this Chapter.

Article 12

Applications for legal aid shall be handled expeditiously.

Article 13

Where legal aid has been granted in accordance with Article 1, service of documents in any other Contracting State in pursuance of the legally aided person’s proceedings shall not give rise to any charges regardless of the manner in which service is effected. The same applies to Letters of Request and social enquiry reports, except for fees paid to experts and interpreters.

Where a person has received legal aid in accordance with Article 1 for proceedings in a Contracting State and a decision has been given in those proceedings, he shall, without any further examination of his circumstances, be entitled to legal aid in any other Contracting State in which he seeks to secure the recognition or enforcement of that decision.

 

chapter ii – security for costs and enforceability of orders for costs

Article 14

No security, bond or deposit of any kind may be required, by reason only of their foreign nationality or of their not being domiciled or resident in the State in which proceedings are commenced, from persons (including legal persons) habitually resident in a Contracting State who are plaintiffs or parties intervening in proceedings before the courts or tribunals of another Contracting State.

The same rule shall apply to any payment required of plaintiffs or intervening parties as security for court fees.

Article 15

An order for payment of costs and expenses of proceedings, made in one of the Contracting States against any person exempt from requirements as to security, bond, deposit or payment by virtue of Article 14 or of the law of the State where the proceedings have been commenced shall, on the application of the person entitled to the benefit of the order, be rendered enforceable without charge in any other Contracting State.

Article 16

Each Contracting State shall designate one or more transmitting authorities for the purpose of forwarding to the appropriate Central Authority in the requested State applications for rendering enforceable orders to which Article 15 applies.

Each Contracting State shall designate a Central Authority to receive such applications and to take the appropriate steps to ensure that a final decision on them is reached.

Federal States and States which have more than one legal system may designate more than one Central Authority. If the Central Authority to which an application is submitted is not competent to deal with it, it shall forward the application to whichever other Central Authority in the requested State is competent to do so.

Applications under this Article shall be transmitted without the intervention of any other authority, without prejudice to an application being transmitted through diplomatic channels.

Nothing in this Article shall prevent applications from being made directly by the person entitled to the benefit of the order unless the requested State has declared that it will not accept applications made in this manner.

Article 17

Every application under Article 15 shall be accompanied by –

a) a true copy of the relevant part of the decision showing the names and capacities of the parties and of the order for payment of costs or expenses;
b) any document necessary to prove that the decision is no longer subject to the ordinary forms of review in the State of origin and that it is enforceable there;
c) a translation, certified as true, of the above-mentioned documents into the language of the requested State, if they are not in that language.

The application shall be determined without a hearing and the competent authority in the requested State shall be limited to examining whether the required documents have been produced. If so requested by the applicant, that authority shall determine the amount of the costs of attestation, translation and certification, which shall be treated as costs and expenses of the proceedings. No legalisation or analogous formality may be required.

There shall be no right of appeal against the decision of the competent authority except in accordance with the law of the requested State.

 

chapter iii – copies of entries and decisions

Article 18

Nationals of any Contracting State and persons habitually resident in any Contracting State may obtain in any other Contracting State, on the same terms and conditions as its nationals, copies of or extracts from entries in public registers and decisions relating to civil or commercial matters and may have such documents legalised, where necessary.

 

chapter iv – physical detention and safe-conduct

Article 19

Arrest and detention, whether as a means of enforcement or simply as a precautionary measure, shall not, in civil or commercial matters, be employed against nationals of a Contracting State or persons habitually resident in a Contracting State in circumstances where they cannot be employed against nationals of the arresting and detaining State. Any fact which may be invoked by a national habitually resident in such State to obtain release from arrest or detention may be invoked with the same effect by a national of a Contracting State or a person habitually resident in a Contracting State even if the fact occurred abroad.

Article 20

A person who is a national of or habitually resident in a Contracting State and who is summoned by name by a court or tribunal in another Contracting State, or by a party with the leave of the court or tribunal, in order to appear as a witness or expert in proceedings in that State shall not be liable to prosecution or detention, or subjected to any other restriction on his personal liberty, in the territory of that State in respect of any act or conviction occurring before his arrival in that State.

The immunity provided for in the preceding paragraph shall commence seven days before the date fixed for the hearing of the witness or expert and shall cease when the witness or expert having had, for a period of seven consecutive days from the date when he was informed by the judicial authorities that his presence is no longer required, an opportunity of leaving has nevertheless remained in the territory, or having left it, has returned voluntarily.

 

chapter v – general provisions

Article 21

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 22, nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting any rights in respect of matters governed by this Convention which may be conferred upon a person under the law of any Contracting State or under any other convention to which it is, or becomes, a party.

Article 22

Between Parties to this Convention who are also Parties to one or both of the Conventions on civil procedure signed at The Hague on the 17th of July 1905 and the 1st of March 1954, this Convention shall replace Articles 17 to 24 of the Convention of 1905 or Articles 17 to 26 of the Convention of 1954 even if the reservation provided for under paragraph 2 c) of Article 28 of this Convention has been made.

Article 23

Supplementary agreements between Parties to the Conventions of 1905 and 1954 shall be considered as equally applicable to the present Convention, to the extent that they are compatible therewith, unless the Parties otherwise agree.

Article 24

A Contracting State may by declaration specify a language or languages other than those referred to in Articles 7 and 17 in which documents sent to its Central Authority may be drawn up or translated.

Article 25

A Contracting State which has more than one official language and cannot, for reasons of internal law, accept for the whole of its territory documents referred to in Articles 7 and 17 drawn up in one of those languages shall by declaration specify the language in which such documents or translations thereof shall be drawn up for submission in the specified parts of its territory.

Article 26

If a Contracting State has two or more territorial units in which different systems of law are applicable in relation to matters dealt with in this Convention, it may at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession declare that this Convention shall extend to all its territorial units or only to one or more of them and may modify that declaration by submitting another declaration at any time.

Any such declaration shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and shall state expressly the territorial units to which the Convention applies.

Article 27

Where a Contracting State has a system of government under which executive, judicial and legislative powers are distributed between central and other authorities within that State, its signature or ratification, acceptance, or approval of, or accession to this Convention, or its making of any declaration under Article 26 shall carry no implication as to the internal distribution of powers within that State.

Article 28

Any Contracting State may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, reserve the right to exclude the application of Article 1 in the case of persons who are not nationals of a Contracting State but who have their habitual residence in a Contracting State other than the reserving State or formerly had their habitual residence in the reserving State, if there is no reciprocity of treatment between the reserving State and the State of which the applicants for legal aid are nationals.

Any Contracting State may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, reserve the right to exclude –

a) the use of English or French, or both, under paragraph 2 of Article 7;
b) the application of paragraph 2 of Article 13;
c) the application of Chapter II;
d) the application of Article 20.

Where a State has made a reservation –

e) under paragraph 2 a) of this Article, excluding the use of both English and French, any other State affected thereby may apply the same rule against the reserving State;
f) under paragraph 2 b) of this Article, any other State may refuse to apply paragraph 2 of Article 13 to persons who are nationals of or habitually resident in the reserving State;
g) under paragraph 2 c) of this Article, any other State may refuse to apply Chapter II to persons who are nationals of or habitually resident in the reserving State.

No other reservation shall be permitted.

Any Contracting State may at any time withdraw a reservation it has made. The withdrawal shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The reservation shall cease to have effect on the first day of the third calendar month after the notification.

Article 29

Every Contracting State shall, at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession, or at a later date, inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands of the designation of authorities pursuant to Articles 3, 4 and 16.

It shall likewise inform the Ministry, where appropriate, of the following –

a) declarations pursuant to Articles 5, 9, 16, 24, 25, 26 and 33;
b) any withdrawal or modification of the above designations and declarations;
c) the withdrawal of any reservation.

Article 30

The model forms annexed to this Convention may be amended by a decision of a Special Commission convoked by the Secretary General of the Hague Conference to which all Contracting States and all Member States shall be invited. Notice of the proposal to amend the forms shall be included in the agenda for the meeting.

Amendments adopted by a majority of the Contracting States present and voting at the Special Commission shall come into force for all Contracting States on the first day of the seventh calendar month after the date of their communication by the Secretary General to all Contracting States.

During the period provided for by paragraph 2 any Contracting State may by notification in writing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands make a reservation with respect to the amendment. A Party making such reservation shall until the reservation is withdrawn be treated as a State not a Party to the present Convention with respect to that amendment.

 

chapter vi – final clauses

Article 31

The Convention shall be open for signature by the States which were Members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law at the time of its Fourteenth Session and by non-Member States which were invited to participate in its preparation.

It shall be ratified, accepted or approved and the instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Article 32

Any other State may accede to the Convention.

The instrument of accession shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Such accession shall have effect only as regards the relations between the acceding State and those Contracting States which have not raised an objection to its accession in the twelve months after the receipt of the notification referred to in sub-paragraph 2 of Article 36. Such an objection may also be raised by Member States at the time when they ratify, accept or approve the Convention after an accession. Any such objection shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Article 33

Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that the Convention shall extend to all the territories for the international relations of which it is responsible, or to one or more of them. Such a declaration shall take effect at the time the Convention enters into force for that State.

Such declaration, as well as any subsequent extension, shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Article 34

The Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the third calendar month after the deposit of the third instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession referred to in Articles 31 and 32.

Thereafter the Convention shall enter into force –

(1) for each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to it subsequently, on the first day of the third calendar month after the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession;
(2) for any territory or territorial unit to which the Convention has been extended in conformity with Article 26 or 33, on the first day of the third calendar month after the notification referred to in that Article.

Article 35

The Convention shall remain in force for five years from the date of its entry into force in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 34 even for States which subsequently have ratified, accepted, approved it or acceded to it.

If there has been no denunciation, it shall be renewed tacitly every five years.

Any denunciation shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, at least six months before the expiry of the five year period. It may be limited to certain of the territories or territorial units to which the Convention applies.

The denunciation shall have effect only as regards the State which has notified it. The Convention shall remain in force for the other Contracting States.

Article 36

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands shall notify the States Members of the Conference, and the States which have acceded in accordance with Article 32, of the following –

(1) the signatures and ratifications, acceptances and approvals referred to in Article 31;
(2) the accessions and objections raised to accessions referred to in Article 32;
(3) the date on which the Convention enters into force in accordance with Article 34;
(4) the declarations referred to in Articles 26 and 33;
(5) the reservations and withdrawals referred to in Articles 28 and 30;
(6) the information communicated under Article 29;
(7) the denunciations referred to in Article 35.

 

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed this Convention.

Done at The Hague, on the 25th day of October, 1980, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and of which a certified copy shall be sent, through diplomatic channels, to each of the States Members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law at the date of its Fourteenth Session and to each other State having participated in the preparation of this Convention at this Session.

ANNEX TO THE CONVENTION

FORM FOR TRANSMISSION OF APPLICATION

FOR LEGAL AID

Convention on International Access to Justice,
signed at The Hague, the 25th of October 1980.





Bibliography of International Humanitarian Law-2021- By ICRC

A compilation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) bibliographies issued by the ICRC Library. The bibliography is aimed at: – those who wish to expand their knowledge of IHL; Subject headings include: – types of conflict; – armed forces and non-State actors; – multinational forces; – detention; – protection of persons and objects; – conduct of hostilities; – weapons; – law of occupation; – international criminal law; – human rights; – implementation; – contemporary challenge; and – the situation in specific countries.

Law

TABLE OF CONTENT

INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4
I. General issues …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..6
II. Types of conflicts ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………8
III. Armed forces / Non-state armed groups ……………………………………………………………………………11
IV. Multinational forces ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 12
V. Private actors …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 13
VI. Protection of persons ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 13
VII. Protection of objects……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 15
VIII. Detention, internment, treatment and judicial guarantees ………………………………………………… 17
IX. Law of occupation…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 18
X. Conduct of hostilities ………………………………………………………………………………………………………20
XI. Weapons…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………22
XII. Implementation………………………………………………………………………………………………………………24
XIII. International human rights law………………………………………………………………………………………..29
XIV. International criminal law ……………………………………………………………………………………………….32
XV. Contemporary challenges ………………………………………………………………………………………………..34
XVI. Countries/Regions ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….38


 

Bibliography-of-international-humanitarian-law-2021-by-international-committee-of-the-red-cross

 





The Rule Of Law At The National And International Levels – Archbishop Bernardito Auza – 16/10/2015

While law regulates conduct, it does not build the moral fiber of citizens, which can only result from moral and civic education. The rule of law flourishes when the moral fiber of society is strong. The greater our commitment to respecting fundamental human freedoms, the less need we have for the coercive exercise of law.

H.E. Archbishop Bernardito Auza

Statement of H.E. Archbishop Bernardito Auza Apostolic Nuncio and Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations Sixth Committee of the 70th Session of the General Assembly on Agenda Item 85: The rule of law at the national and international levels

By H.E. Archbishop Bernardito Auza

Apostolic Nuncio and Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations
Statement of H.E. Archbishop Bernardito Auza
Apostolic Nuncio and Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations
Sixth Committee of the 70th Session of the General Assembly

Agenda Item 85: The rule of law at the national and international levels

New York, 16 October 2015

Law

Mr. Chair,

Pope Francis, in his Address to the General Assembly on September 25, recalled some principles that are fundamental to our deliberations concerning the rule of law at the national and international levels.

First, the Pope recalled that “the limitation of power is an idea implicit in the concept of law itself.” This implies, inter alia, that respecting rights requires States to respect the autonomy of social, cultural, civic and religious institutions operating within their own proper spheres of authority.

Second, Pope Francis recalled that justice is the constant and perpetual will to give to each one his or her due. In order to pursue justice through the rule of law, those who make, enforce, and interpret the law must possess a genuine and unwavering commitment to transcendent human dignity and the common good. Such a commitment is a matter of moral judgment, not institutional structure. The cultivation of human values is at least as important to creating a rule of law culture as creating legal codes and systems.

While law regulates conduct, it does not build the moral fiber of citizens, which can only result from moral and civic education. The rule of law flourishes when the moral fiber of society is strong. The greater our commitment to respecting fundamental human freedoms, the less need we have for the coercive exercise of law. Such commitment is not the product of formal agreements or positive law, but of a healthy society with a strong moral culture. This is the spirit of the law, without which legal structures can be too easily manipulated for ideological ends.

Mr. Chair,

The interdependence of development and the rule of law was a recurrent theme during the Post-2015 Development Summit and the General Debate of the Seventieth Session of the General Assembly. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development “recognizes the need to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies that provide equal access to justice and that are based on respect for human rights (including the right to development), on effective rule of law and good governance at all levels and on transparent, effective and accountable institutions.”[1] These commitments are encapsulated in Sustainable Development Goal 16 and in its twelve associated targets, including the promotion of the rule of law at the national and international levels to ensure equal access to justice for all, a substantial reduction of corruption and bribery in all their forms, as well as the promotion and enforcement of non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development.

We cannot achieve poverty eradication and sustainable development without tackling conflict and insecurity.

Development can only thrive in the context of peaceful societies. The evaluations on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) clearly demonstrate the direct relation between the two: countries in conflict have lagged far behind in the realization of the MDGs; indeed, many have suffered regressions. All seven of the countries unlikely to meet a single MDG by the end of 2015 have been affected by high levels of violence in recent years. It will not differ for them when it comes to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It is most likely that they will not only be left behind; they will lag even farther behind.

However, violence and insecurity are issues undermining people’s well-being in all nations, not just conflict-affected ones. In both developing and developed countries, those most affected by violence are very often those living in the most marginalized sectors of society, reducing further opportunities for their economic emancipation.

Moreover, my delegation believes that rule of law, peaceful societies and inclusive institutions should not be seen only as development enablers, but also as fruits of development itself.

Mr. Chair,

My delegation thanks the Secretary General for the Report on Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations rule of law activities (A/70/206). This Report reminds us that our consideration of the rule of law in this session also focuses on the role of multilateral treaty processes in promoting and advancing the rule of law.

The principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) is one of the bedrock principles of natural justice, which protects against the temptation to appeal to the law of force rather than to the force of law. However, illegitimate force can be found not only in periods of conflict; it can also be found in aggressive practices of applying and interpreting international agreements to serve a political agenda never ratified by the parties. This issue is raised in paragraph 7 of the Secretary General’s Report, where he refers to the increased complexity of multilateral treaty processes through the proliferation of institutional structures created by multilateral treaties and their growing role in treaty making.

This is a potentially worrisome development, not only in the interpretation and application of treaties, but also in the instrumental use of certain resolutions and decisions to advance specific agendas through the action of implementing agencies and institutions.

Looking forward to further constructive dialogue on this issue, my delegation believes that the proliferation of legal bodies and institutional structures does not always mean an advancement of the rule of law.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.


[1] Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.





Notes for parties concerning preparation of pleading before ICJ

NOTE FOR THE PARTIES CONCERNING THE PREPARATION OF PLEADINGS

STATUS: 2022/MARCH

The original of every pleading shall be signed by the agent and filed in the Registry, preferably in two copies, or accompanied by a certified copy, for communication to the other party; it must include the documents annexed and any translations (Art. 52, para. 1, of the Rules of Court). A signed list of all documents annexed must also be furnished at the time the pleading is filed (Art. 50, para. 3, of the Rules of Court). Lastly, the original of the pleading shall be accompanied by the number of additional copies required by the Registry (Art. 52, para. 1, of the Rules of Court).

The documents annexed to the pleading must be certified by the agent as true copies of the originals (Art. 50, para. 1, of the Rules of Court). It should be remembered that it may well not be necessary to annex to a pleading the complete text of a document produced in support of the contentions advanced and that it may be possible to annex only the relevant extracts (Art. 50, para. 2, of the Rules of Court). In that event, however, at least two certified copies of the whole document must be deposited with the pleading, unless it has been published and is readily available (ibid.), one of which will be transmitted to the other party. Further, if the reproduction in large numbers of a particular annex (e.g., a large map) presents technical problems, the matter should be raised with the Registrar at the earliest opportunity, so that other arrangements can be made.

Documents which are not in English or French must be translated into one of those languages and the translation certified as accurate by the agent (Art. 51, para. 3, of the Rules of Court). For practical convenience, it is acceptable for such a translation to constitute the relevant annex to a pleading; but if this is done, at least two certified copies of the original-language text of the document must be filed with the pleading, one of which will be transmitted to the other party.

In the present case, the number of copies of the pleadings to be filed in the first instance, including annexes, is 125. The parties may choose to file all 125 copies of the pleadings in paper form, or 75 copies in paper form and 50 electronic copies (using PDF-text as well as providing a copy in MS-Word, for use by the Registry). If a party chooses to file all 125 copies of a pleading in paper form, it should nevertheless provide the Registry with an electronic version of that pleading.

In a footnote to Article 52 of the Rules of Court, the agents of the parties are requested to ascertain from the Registry the usual format of the pleadings. The format to be respected, irrespective of whether the document is printed or not, is 19 cm x 26 cm, so as to ensure some degree of uniformity in the presentation of the pleadings. These must in addition be readily legible and easy to handle.

SOURCE: ICJ





Ukraine v. Russian Federation-ICJ-16/03/2022

Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)
The Court indicates provisional measures

THE HAGUE, 16 March 2022. The International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, has today delivered its Order on the Request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Ukraine in the case concerning Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation).

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Peace Palace, Carnegieplein 2, 2517 KJ The Hague, Netherlands
Tel.: +31 (0)70 302 2323 Fax: +31 (0)70 364 9928

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Ukraine v. Russian Federation

16 MARCH 2022

ORDER

ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE

(UKRAINE v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)

ALLÉGATIONS DE GÉNOCIDE AU TITRE DE LA CONVENTION POUR LA PRÉVENTION ET LA RÉPRESSION DU CRIME DE GÉNOCIDE

(UKRAINE c. FÉDÉRATION DE RUSSIE)

16 MARS 2022

ORDONNANCE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Paragraphs
CHRONOLOGY OF THE PROCEDURE
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. PRIMA FACIE JURISDICTION 
1. General observations 

2. Existence of a dispute relating to the interpretation, application or
fulfilment of the Genocide Convention 28-47
3. Conclusion as to prima facie jurisdiction 48-49

III. THE RIGHTS WHOSE PROTECTION IS SOUGHT AND THE LINK BETWEEN
SUCH RIGHTS AND THE MEASURES REQUESTED 50-64
IV. RISK OF IRREPARABLE PREJUDICE AND URGENCY 65-77
V. CONCLUSION AND MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED 78-85
OPERATIVE CLAUSE 86
___________

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 2022
2022
16 March General List
No. 182
16 March 2022

ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE
PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE

(UKRAINE v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES

ORDER

Present: President DONOGHUE; Vice-President GEVORGIAN; Judges TOMKA, ABRAHAM,
BENNOUNA, YUSUF, XUE, SEBUTINDE, BHANDARI, ROBINSON, SALAM, IWASAWA, NOLTE, CHARLESWORTH; Judge ad hoc DAUDET; Registrar GAUTIER.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,

After deliberation,

Having regard to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court and Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court,

Makes the following Order:

1. On 26 February 2022, at 9.30 p.m., Ukraine filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the Russian Federation concerning “a dispute . . . relating to the interpretation, application and fulfilment of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” (hereinafter the “Genocide Convention” or the “Convention”).

2. At the end of its Application, Ukraine

“respectfully requests the Court to:

(a) Adjudge and declare that, contrary to what the Russian Federation claims, no acts of genocide, as defined by Article III of the Genocide Convention, have been committed in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts of Ukraine.

(b) Adjudge and declare that the Russian Federation cannot lawfully take any action under the Genocide Convention in or against Ukraine aimed at preventing or punishing an alleged genocide, on the basis of its false claims of genocide in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts of Ukraine.

(c) Adjudge and declare that the Russian Federation’s recognition of the independence of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ on 22 February 2022 is based on a false claim of genocide and therefore has no basis in the Genocide Convention.

(d) Adjudge and declare that the ‘special military operation’ declared and carried out by the Russian Federation on and after 24 February 2022 is based on a false claim of genocide and therefore has no basis in the Genocide Convention.

(e) Require that the Russian Federation provide assurances and guarantees of non-repetition that it will not take any unlawful measures in and against Ukraine, including the use of force, on the basis of its false claim of genocide.

(f) Order full reparation for all damage caused by the Russian Federation as a consequence of any actions taken on the basis of Russia’s false claim of genocide.”

3. In its Application, Ukraine seeks to found the Court’s jurisdiction on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and on Article IX of the Genocide Convention.

4. Together with the Application, Ukraine submitted a Request for the indication of provisional measures with reference to Article 41 of the Statute and to Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court.

5. At the end of its Request, Ukraine asked the Court to indicate the following provisional measures:

“(a) The Russian Federation shall immediately suspend the military operations commenced on 24 February 2022 that have as their stated purpose and objective the prevention and punishment of a claimed genocide in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts of Ukraine.

(b) The Russian Federation shall immediately ensure that any military or irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons which may be subject to its control, direction or influence, take no steps in furtherance of the military operations which have as their stated purpose and objective preventing or punishing Ukraine for committing genocide.

(c) The Russian Federation shall refrain from any action and shall provide assurances that no action is taken that may aggravate or extend the dispute that is the subject of this Application, or render this dispute more difficult to resolve.

(d) The Russian Federation shall provide a report to the Court on measures taken to implement the Court’s Order on Provisional Measures one week after such Order and then on a regular basis to be fixed by the Court.”

6. Ukraine also requested the President of the Court

“pursuant to Article 74 (4) of the Rules of Court . . . to call upon the Russian Federation to immediately halt all military actions in Ukraine pending the holding of a hearing, to enable any order the Court may make on the request for provisional measures to have its appropriate effects”.

7. In the morning of 27 February 2022, the Registrar communicated by email to the Russian Federation an advance copy of the Application and Request for the indication of provisional measures. These documents were formally communicated to the Russian Federation on 28 February 2022, pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court in respect of the Application, and pursuant to Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court in respect of the Request for the indication of provisional measures. The Registrar also notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the filing of the Application and the Request by Ukraine.

8. Pending the notification provided for by Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute, the Registrar informed all States entitled to appear before the Court of the filing of the Application and the Request for the indication of provisional measures by a letter dated 2 March 2022.

9. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of Ukrainian nationality, Ukraine proceeded to exercise the right conferred upon it by Article 31 of the Statute to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case; it chose Mr. Yves Daudet.

10. By a letter dated 1 March 2022, the President of the Court, exercising the powers conferred upon her under Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, called the attention of the Russian Federation to the need to act in such a way as would enable any order the Court may make on the request for provisional measures to have its appropriate effects.

11. By letters dated 1 March 2022, the Registrar informed the Parties that, pursuant to Article 74, paragraph 3, of the Rules, the Court had fixed 7 and 8 March 2022 as the dates for the oral proceedings on the Request for the indication of provisional measures. The Registrar indicated that the hearings would be held in a hybrid format, pursuant to which each Party could choose to have a certain number of representatives present in the Great Hall of Justice, with other members of the delegation participating by video-link.

12. By a letter dated 5 March 2022, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of the Netherlands indicated that his Government had decided not to participate in the oral proceedings due to open on 7 March 2022.

13. At the public hearing held in a hybrid format on 7 March 2022, oral observations on the Request for the indication of provisional measures were presented by:

On behalf of Ukraine:

Mr. Anton Korynevych,
Mr. Jean-Marc Thouvenin,
Mr. David M. Zionts,
Ms Marney L. Cheek,
Mr. Jonathan Gimblett,
Mr. Harold Hongju Koh,
Ms Oksana Zolotaryova.

14. At the end of its oral observations, Ukraine asked the Court to indicate the following provisional measures:

“(a) The Russian Federation shall immediately suspend the military operations commenced on 24 February 2022 that have as their stated purpose and objective the prevention and punishment of a claimed genocide in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts of Ukraine.

(b) The Russian Federation shall immediately ensure that any military or irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons which may be subject to its control, direction or influence, take no steps in furtherance of the military operations which have as their stated purpose and objective preventing or punishing Ukraine for committing genocide.

(c) The Russian Federation shall refrain from any action and shall provide assurances that no action is taken that may aggravate or extend the dispute that is the subject of this Application, or render this dispute more difficult to resolve.

(d) The Russian Federation shall provide a report to the Court on measures taken to implement the Court’s Order on Provisional Measures one week after such order and then on a regular basis to be fixed by the Court.”

15. Under cover of a letter dated 7 March 2022 received in the Registry shortly after the closure of the hearing, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of the Netherlands communicated to the Court a document setting out “the position of the Russian Federation regarding the lack of jurisdiction of the Court in t[he] case”.

16. Since the Government of the Russian Federation did not appear at the oral proceedings, no formal request was presented by that Government. However, in the document communicated to the Court on 7 March 2022, the Russian Federation contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the case and “requests the Court to refrain from indicating provisional measures and to remove the case from its list”.

*

* *

I. INTRODUCTION

17. The context in which the present case comes before the Court is well-known. On 24 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Vladimir Putin, declared that he had decided to conduct a “special military operation” against Ukraine. Since then, there has been intense fighting on Ukrainian territory, which has claimed many lives, has caused extensive displacement and has resulted in widespread damage. The Court is acutely aware of the extent of the human tragedy that is taking place in Ukraine and is deeply concerned about the continuing loss of life and human suffering.

18. The Court is profoundly concerned about the use of force by the Russian Federation in Ukraine, which raises very serious issues of international law. The Court is mindful of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and of its own responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security as well as in the peaceful settlement of disputes under the Charter and the Statute of the Court. It deems it necessary to emphasize that all States must act in conformity with their obligations under the United Nations Charter and other rules of international law, including international humanitarian law.

19. The ongoing conflict between the Parties has been addressed in the framework of several international institutions. The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution referring to many aspects of the conflict on 2 March 2022 (doc. A/RES/ES-11/1). The present case before the Court, however, is limited in scope, as Ukraine has instituted these proceedings only under the Genocide Convention.

*

20. The Court regrets the decision taken by the Russian Federation not to participate in the oral proceedings on the request for the indication of provisional measures, as set out in the above-mentioned letter of 5 March 2022 (see paragraph 12 above).

21. The non-appearance of a party has a negative impact on the sound administration of justice, as it deprives the Court of assistance that a party could have provided to it. Nevertheless, the Court must proceed in the discharge of its judicial function at any phase of the case (Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899 (Guyana v. Venezuela), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2020, p. 464, para. 25; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 23, para. 27).

22. Though formally absent from the proceedings, non-appearing parties sometimes submit to the Court letters and documents in ways and by means not contemplated by its Rules (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 25, para. 31). It is valuable for the Court to know the views of both parties in whatever form those views may have been expressed (ibid.). The Court will therefore take account of the document communicated by the Russian Federation on 7 March 2022 to the extent that it finds this appropriate in discharging its duties.

23. The Court recalls that the non-appearance of one of the States concerned cannot by itself constitute an obstacle to the indication of provisional measures (United States Diplomatic and

Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 December 1979, I.C.J. Reports 1979, p. 13, para. 13). It emphasizes that the non-participation of a party in the proceedings at any stage of the case cannot, in any circumstances, affect the validity of its decision (cf. Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899 (Guyana v. Venezuela), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2020, p. 464, para. 26; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 23, para. 27). Should the present case extend beyond the current phase, the Russian Federation, which remains a Party to the case, will be able, if it so wishes, to appear before the Court to present its arguments (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 142-143, para. 284).

II. PRIMA FACIE JURISDICTION

1. General observations

24. The Court may indicate provisional measures only if the provisions relied on by the applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which its jurisdiction could be founded, but it need not satisfy itself in a definitive manner that it has jurisdiction as regards the merits of the case (see, for example, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar), Provisional Measures, Order of 23 January 2020, I.C.J. Reports 2020, p. 9, para. 16).

25. In the present case, Ukraine seeks to found the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and on Article IX of the Genocide Convention (see paragraph 3 above). The Court must therefore first determine whether those provisions prima facie confer upon it jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the case, enabling it if the other necessary conditions are fulfilled to indicate provisional measures.

26. Article IX of the Genocide Convention reads as follows:

“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.”

27. Ukraine and the Russian Federation are both parties to the Genocide Convention. Ukraine deposited its instrument of ratification on 15 November 1954 with a reservation to Article IX of the Convention; on 20 April 1989, the depositary received notification that this reservation had been withdrawn. The Russian Federation is a party to the Genocide Convention as the State continuing the legal personality of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which deposited its instrument of ratification on 3 May 1954 with a reservation to Article IX of the Convention; on 8 March 1989, the depositary received notification that this reservation had been withdrawn.

2. Existence of a dispute relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention

28. Article IX of the Genocide Convention makes the Court’s jurisdiction conditional on the existence of a dispute relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention. According to the established case law of the Court, a dispute is “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests” between parties (Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 11). In order for a dispute to exist, “[i]t must be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other” (South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328). The two sides must “‘hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non-performance of certain’ international obligations” (Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 26, para. 50, citing Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74). To determine whether a dispute exists in the present case, the Court cannot limit itself to noting that one of the Parties maintains that the Convention applies, while the other denies it (see Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order of 23 July 2018, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (II), p. 414, para. 18).

29. Since Ukraine has invoked as the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction the compromissory clause in an international convention, the Court must ascertain, at the present stage of the proceedings, whether it appears that the acts complained of by the Applicant are capable of falling within the scope of that convention ratione materiae (cf. Jadhav (India v. Pakistan), Provisional Measures, Order of 18 May 2017, I.C.J. Reports 2017, p. 239, para. 30).

* *

30. Ukraine contends that a dispute exists between it and the Russian Federation relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention. It maintains that the Parties disagree on whether genocide, as defined in Article II of the Convention, has occurred or is occurring in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts of Ukraine and whether Ukraine has committed genocide. In this regard, the Applicant submits that it profoundly disagrees with the unsubstantiated allegation of the Russian Federation that genocide has taken place in Ukraine and that it has made this known to the Russian Federation on multiple occasions since September 2014, including through a statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine before the General Assembly of the United Nations on 23 February 2022.

31. Ukraine further argues that the dispute between the Parties concerns the question whether, as a consequence of the Russian Federation’s unilateral assertion that genocide is occurring, the Russian Federation has a lawful basis to take military action in and against Ukraine to prevent and punish genocide pursuant to Article I of the Genocide Convention. Ukraine considers that the Russian Federation “has turned the Genocide Convention on its head”, making a false claim of genocide as a basis for actions on its part that constitute grave violations of the human rights of millions of people across Ukraine. It asserts that, rather than taking military action to prevent and punish genocide, the Russian Federation should have seised the organs of the United Nations under Article VIII of the Convention or seised the Court under Article IX thereof. Ukraine states that it vehemently disagrees with the Russian Federation’s interpretation, application and fulfilment of the Convention. Referring, inter alia, to a statement by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 26 February 2022, Ukraine asserts that the Russian Federation “could not have been unaware, that its views were ‘positively opposed’” by Ukraine.

*

32. In the document communicated to the Court on 7 March 2022, the Russian Federation states that the only basis for jurisdiction referred to by Ukraine is the dispute resolution clause contained in Article IX of the Genocide Convention. However, according to the Respondent, it is clear from the plain language of the Convention that it does not regulate the use of force between States. The Respondent submits that, in order to “glue” the Convention to the use of force for the purposes of invoking its dispute resolution clause, Ukraine has claimed that the Russian Federation commenced its “special military operation” on the basis of allegations of genocide committed by Ukraine. The Russian Federation asserts that, in reality, its “special military operation” on the territory of Ukraine is based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and customary international law and that the Convention cannot provide a legal basis for a military operation, which is beyond the scope of the Convention.

33. The Respondent further states that the legal basis for the “special military operation” was communicated on 24 February 2022 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations in the form of a notification under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (circulated as document S/2022/154 of the Security Council). The Russian Federation contends that,

while the address of President Putin “to the citizens of Russia” that was appended to the notification may in certain contexts have referred to genocide, this reference is not the same as the invocation of the Convention as a legal justification for its operation, nor does it indicate that the Russian Federation recognizes the existence of a dispute under the Convention. The Russian Federation emphasizes that there are no references to the Genocide Convention in the address made by its President on 24 February 2022.

34. The Russian Federation therefore concludes that Ukraine’s “Application and Request manifestly fall beyond the scope of the Convention and thus the jurisdiction of the Court”; it asks the Court to remove the case from its List.

* *

35. The Court recalls that, for the purposes of deciding whether there was a dispute between the Parties at the time of the filing of the Application, it takes into account in particular any statements or documents exchanged between the Parties, as well as any exchanges made in multilateral settings. In so doing, it pays special attention to the author of the statement or document, their intended or actual addressee, and their content. The existence of a dispute is a matter for objective determination by the Court; it is a matter of substance, and not a question of form or procedure (see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar), Provisional Measures, Order of 23 January 2020, I.C.J. Reports 2020, p. 12, para. 26).

36. The Court notes that the Applicant disputes the Russian Federation’s allegation that Ukraine has committed or is committing genocide in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine. Ukraine also asserts that nothing in the Convention authorizes the Russian Federation to use force against Ukraine as a means to fulfil its obligation under Article I thereof to prevent and punish genocide.

37. In this regard the Court observes that, since 2014, various State organs and senior representatives of the Russian Federation have referred, in official statements, to the commission of acts of genocide by Ukraine in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. The Court observes, in particular, that the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation an official State organ has, since 2014, instituted criminal proceedings against high-ranking Ukrainian officials regarding the alleged commission of acts of genocide against the Russian-speaking population living in the above-mentioned regions “in violation of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”.

38. The Court recalls that, in an address made on 21 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Vladimir Putin, described the situation in Donbass as a “horror and genocide, which almost 4 million people are facing”.

39. By a letter dated 24 February 2022 (see paragraph 33 above), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations requested the Secretary-General to circulate, as a document of the Security Council, the “text of the address of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, to the citizens of Russia, informing them of the measures taken in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations in exercise of the right of self-defence”. In his address, pronounced on 24 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation explained that he had decided, “in accordance with Article 51 (chapter VII) of the Charter of the United Nations . . . to conduct a special military operation with the approval of the Federation Council of Russia and pursuant to the treaties on friendship and mutual assistance with the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic”. He specified that the “purpose” of the special operation was “to protect people who have been subjected to abuse and genocide by the Kiev regime for eight years”. He stated that the Russian Federation had to stop “a genocide” against millions of people and that it would seek the prosecution of those who had committed numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including citizens of the Russian Federation.

40. The Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, referring to the address by the President of the Russian Federation of 24 February 2022, explained at a meeting of the Security Council on Ukraine that “the purpose of the special operation [was] to protect people who ha[d] been subjected to abuse and genocide by the Kyiv regime for eight years”.

41. Two days later, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Union stated in an interview that the operation was a “peace enforcement special military operation” carried out in an “effort aimed at de-Nazification”, adding that people had been actually “exterminated” and that “the official term of genocide as coined in international law[, if one] read[s] the definition, . . . fits pretty well”.

42. In response to the Russian Federation’s allegations and its military actions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine issued a statement on 26 February 2022, saying that Ukraine “strongly denies Russia’s allegations of genocide” and disputes “any attempt to use such manipulative allegations as an excuse for Russia’s unlawful aggression”.

43. At the present stage of these proceedings, the Court is not required to ascertain whether any violations of obligations under the Genocide Convention have occurred in the context of the present dispute. Such a finding could be made by the Court only at the stage of the examination of the merits of the present case. At the stage of making an order on a request for the indication of provisional measures, the Court’s task is to establish whether the acts complained of by Ukraine appear to be capable of falling within the provisions of the Genocide Convention.

44. The Court recalls that, while it is not necessary for a State to refer expressly to a specific treaty in its exchanges with the other State to enable it later to invoke the compromissory clause of that instrument to institute proceedings before the Court (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 428-429, para. 83), the exchanges must refer to the subject-matter of the treaty with sufficient clarity to enable the State against which a claim is made to ascertain that there is, or may be, a dispute with regard to that subject-matter (Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 85, para. 30). The Court

considers that, in the present proceedings, the evidence in the case file demonstrates prima facie that statements made by the Parties referred to the subject-matter of the Genocide Convention in a sufficiently clear way to allow Ukraine to invoke the compromissory clause in this instrument as a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction.

45. The statements made by the State organs and senior officials of the Parties indicate a divergence of views as to whether certain acts allegedly committed by Ukraine in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions amount to genocide in violation of its obligations under the Genocide Convention, as well as whether the use of force by the Russian Federation for the stated purpose of preventing and punishing alleged genocide is a measure that can be taken in fulfilment of the obligation to prevent and punish genocide contained in Article I of the Convention. In the Court’s view, the acts complained of by the Applicant appear to be capable of falling within the provisions of the Genocide Convention.

46. The Court recalls the Russian Federation’s assertion that its “special military operation” is based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and customary international law (see paragraphs 32-33). The Court observes in this respect that certain acts or omissions may give rise to a dispute that falls within the ambit of more than one treaty (cf. Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 3 February 2021, para. 56). The above-referenced assertion of the Russian Federation does not therefore preclude a prima facie finding by the Court that the dispute presented in the Application relates to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention.

47. The Court finds therefore that the above-mentioned elements are sufficient at this stage to establish prima facie the existence of a dispute between the Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention.

3. Conclusion as to prima facie jurisdiction

48. In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that, prima facie, it has jurisdiction pursuant to Article IX of the Genocide Convention to entertain the case.

49. Given the above conclusion, the Court considers that it cannot accede to the Russian Federation’s request that the case be removed from the General List for manifest lack of jurisdiction.

III. THE RIGHTS WHOSE PROTECTION IS SOUGHT AND THE LINK BETWEEN SUCH RIGHTS AND THE MEASURES REQUESTED

50. The power of the Court to indicate provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute has as its object the preservation of the respective rights claimed by the parties in a case, pending its decision on the merits thereof. It follows that the Court must be concerned to preserve by such measures the rights which may subsequently be adjudged by it to belong to either party. Therefore, the Court may exercise this power only if it is satisfied that the rights asserted by the party requesting such measures are at least plausible (see, for example, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar), Provisional Measures, Order of 23 January 2020, I.C.J. Reports 2020, p. 18, para. 43).

51. At this stage of the proceedings, however, the Court is not called upon to determine definitively whether the rights which Ukraine wishes to see protected exist; it need only decide whether the rights claimed by Ukraine on the merits, and for which it is seeking protection, are plausible. Moreover, a link must exist between the rights whose protection is sought and the provisional measures being requested (ibid., para. 44).

* *

52. In the present proceedings, Ukraine argues that it seeks provisional measures to protect its rights “not to be subject to a false claim of genocide”, and “not to be subjected to another State’s military operations on its territory based on a brazen abuse of Article I of the Genocide Convention”. It states that the Russian Federation has acted inconsistently with its obligations and duties, as set out in Articles I and IV of the Convention.

53. Ukraine contends that it has a right to demand good faith performance of obligations under the Genocide Convention by the Russian Federation, in accordance with the object and purpose of the Convention. It states that the Russian Federation has abused and misused the rights and duties stipulated in the Convention and that the “special military operation” of the Respondent is an aggression undertaken “under the guise” of the duty to prevent and punish genocide, enshrined in Articles I and IV of the Convention, and that it frustrates the object and purpose of the Convention.

54. The Applicant further submits that it has a right under the Convention not to be harmed by the Russian Federation’s misuse and abuse of the Convention. It considers in particular that it has a right not to suffer grave harm as a result of a military action falsely cloaked as one undertaken to prevent and punish genocide.

55. Ukraine asserts that the above-mentioned rights are grounded in a possible interpretation of the Genocide Convention and are therefore plausible.

* *

56. The Court observes that, in accordance with Article I of the Convention, all States parties thereto have undertaken “to prevent and to punish” the crime of genocide. Article I does not specify the kinds of measures that a Contracting Party may take to fulfil this obligation. However, the Contracting Parties must implement this obligation in good faith, taking into account other parts of the Convention, in particular Articles VIII and IX, as well as its Preamble.

Pursuant to Article VIII of the Convention, a Contracting Party that considers that genocide is taking place in the territory of another Contracting Party “may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III”. In addition, pursuant to Article IX, such a Contracting Party may submit to the Court a dispute relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention.

57. A Contracting Party may resort to other means of fulfilling its obligation to prevent and punish genocide that it believes to have been committed by another Contracting Party, such as bilateral engagement or exchanges within a regional organization. However, the Court emphasizes that, in discharging its duty to prevent genocide, “every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law”, as was stated in a previous case brought under the Convention (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 221, para. 430).

58. The acts undertaken by the Contracting Parties “to prevent and to punish” genocide must be in conformity with the spirit and aims of the United Nations, as set out in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter. In this regard, the Court recalls that, under Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, the purposes of the United Nations are, inter alia,

“[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace”.

59. The Court can only take a decision on the Applicant’s claims if the case proceeds to the merits. At the present stage of the proceedings, it suffices to observe that the Court is not in possession of evidence substantiating the allegation of the Russian Federation that genocide has been committed on Ukrainian territory. Moreover, it is doubtful that the Convention, in light of its object and purpose, authorizes a Contracting Party’s unilateral use of force in the territory of another State for the purpose of preventing or punishing an alleged genocide.

60. Under these circumstances, the Court considers that Ukraine has a plausible right not to be subjected to military operations by the Russian Federation for the purpose of preventing and punishing an alleged genocide in the territory of Ukraine.

* *

61. The Court now turns to the condition of the link between the rights claimed by Ukraine and the provisional measures requested.

* *

62. Ukraine claims that there is a clear link between the plausible rights that it seeks to preserve and the first two provisional measures that it requests. In particular, the first two provisional measures share a direct link to Ukraine’s right under Article I to good faith performance of the Convention by any State party.

* *

63. The Court has already found that Ukraine is asserting a right that is plausible under the Genocide Convention (see paragraphs 50-60 above). The Court considers that, by their very nature, the first two provisional measures sought by Ukraine (see paragraph 14 above) are aimed at preserving the right of Ukraine that the Court has found to be plausible. As to the third and fourth provisional measures requested by Ukraine, the question of their link with that plausible right does not arise, in so far as such measures would be directed at preventing any action which may aggravate or extend the existing dispute or render it more difficult to resolve, and at providing information on the compliance with any specific provisional measure indicated by the Court (cf. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar), Provisional Measures, Order of 23 January 2020, I.C.J. Reports 2020, p. 24, para. 61).

64. The Court concludes, therefore, that a link exists between the right of Ukraine that the Court has found to be plausible and the requested provisional measures.

IV. RISK OF IRREPARABLE PREJUDICE AND URGENCY

65. The Court, pursuant to Article 41 of its Statute, has the power to indicate provisional measures when irreparable prejudice could be caused to rights which are the subject of judicial proceedings or when the alleged disregard of such rights may entail irreparable consequences (see, for example, ibid., p. 24, para. 64, referring to Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 October 2018, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (II), p. 645, para. 77).

66. However, the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures will be exercised only if there is urgency, in the sense that there is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice will be caused to the rights claimed before the Court gives its final decision. The condition of urgency is met when the acts susceptible of causing irreparable prejudice can “occur at any moment” before the Court makes a final decision on the case (ibid., para. 65). The Court must therefore consider whether such a risk exists at this stage of the proceedings.

67. The Court is not called upon, for the purposes of its decision on the Request for the indication of provisional measures, to establish the existence of breaches of obligations under the Genocide Convention, but to determine whether the circumstances require the indication of provisional measures for the protection of the right found to be plausible. It cannot at this stage make definitive findings of fact, and the right of each Party to submit arguments in respect of the merits remains unaffected by the Court’s decision on the Request for the indication of provisional measures.

* *

68. Ukraine submits that there is an urgent need to protect its people from the irreparable harm caused by the Russian Federation’s military measures that have been launched on a pretext of genocide. It emphasizes that the invasion by the Russian Federation has resulted in numerous casualties among Ukrainian civilians and military personnel, the bombing of numerous cities across Ukraine, and the displacement of over one and a half million Ukrainian civilians both within Ukraine and across its international borders.

69. Ukraine asserts that, in assessing whether the condition of urgency is satisfied in cases involving ongoing conflict, the Court typically considers whether the population at risk is particularly vulnerable, the fragility of the overall situation, including the likelihood of aggravation of the dispute, and the risk of reoccurrence of harm. Ukraine submits that the Court has frequently stated that loss of life constitutes an irreparable harm.

70. In this regard, Ukraine contends that thousands of people have already been killed in the conflict and that, with every day that passes, more lives will be lost and probably at an accelerating rate. It argues that the refugee crisis is another example of irreparable harm, pointing to the uncertainty that these displaced individuals will ever be able to return to their homes and the lasting psychological trauma the conflict will cause them even if they are resettled. It emphasizes that the population is extremely vulnerable, with many lacking food, electricity and water; that the overall situation is extremely fragile; and that the risk of aggravation of the crisis is acute. Ukraine further asserts that the Russian Federation’s military action poses grave environmental risks, not only to Ukraine but also for the wider region, referring in particular to the dangers posed to Ukraine’s civil nuclear industry and toxic smoke released by attacks on fuel depots.

71. Ukraine submits that the seriousness of the situation unambiguously satisfies the conditions of irreparable harm and urgency necessary for the imposition of provisional measures.

*

72. The Russian Federation, for its part, submits that, contrary to what Ukraine asserts, the urgency must pertain not to the situation in general but to the protection of rights provided for by the Convention.

* *

73. Having previously determined that Ukraine can plausibly assert a right under the Genocide Convention and that there is a link between this right and the provisional measures requested, the Court now considers whether irreparable prejudice could be caused to this right and whether there is urgency, in the sense that there is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice will be caused to this right before the Court gives its final decision.

74. The Court considers that the right of Ukraine that it has found to be plausible (see paragraph 60 above) is of such a nature that prejudice to it is capable of causing irreparable harm. Indeed, any military operation, in particular one on the scale carried out by the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine, inevitably causes loss of life, mental and bodily harm, and damage to property and to the environment.

75. The Court considers that the civilian population affected by the present conflict is extremely vulnerable. The “special military operation” being conducted by the Russian Federation has resulted in numerous civilian deaths and injuries. It has also caused significant material damage, including the destruction of buildings and infrastructure. Attacks are ongoing and are creating increasingly difficult living conditions for the civilian population. Many persons have no access to the most basic foodstuffs, potable water, electricity, essential medicines or heating. A very large number of people are attempting to flee from the most affected cities under extremely insecure conditions.

76. In this regard, the Court takes note of resolution A/RES/ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022, of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which, inter alia, “[e]xpress[es] grave concern at reports of attacks on civilian facilities such as residences, schools and hospitals, and of civilian casualties, including women, older persons, persons with disabilities, and children”, “[r]ecogniz[es] that the military operations of the Russian Federation inside the sovereign territory of Ukraine are on a scale that the international community has not seen in Europe in decades and that urgent action is needed to save this generation from the scourge of war”, “[c]ondemn[s] the decision of the Russian Federation to increase the readiness of its nuclear forces” and “[e]xpress[es] grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation in and around Ukraine, with an increasing number of internally displaced persons and refugees in need of humanitarian assistance”.

77. In light of these circumstances, the Court concludes that disregard of the right deemed plausible by the Court (see paragraph 60 above) could cause irreparable prejudice to this right and that there is urgency, in the sense that there is a real and imminent risk that such prejudice will be caused before the Court makes a final decision in the case.

V. CONCLUSION AND MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED

78. The Court concludes from all of the above considerations that the conditions required by its Statute for it to indicate provisional measures are met. It is therefore necessary, pending its final decision, for the Court to indicate certain measures in order to protect the right of Ukraine that the Court has found to be plausible (see paragraph 60 above).

79. The Court recalls that it has the power, under its Statute, when a request for provisional measures has been made, to indicate measures that are, in whole or in part, other than those requested. Article 75, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court specifically refers to this power of the Court. The Court has already exercised this power on several occasions in the past (see, for example, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar), Provisional Measures, Order of 23 January 2020, I.C.J. Reports 2020, p. 28, para. 77).

80. In the present case, having considered the terms of the provisional measures requested by Ukraine and the circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the measures to be indicated need not be identical to those requested.

81. The Court considers that, with regard to the situation described above, the Russian Federation must, pending the final decision in the case, suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine. In addition, recalling the statement of the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations that the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Lugansk People’s Republic” had turned to the Russian Federation with a request to grant military support, the Court considers that the Russian Federation must also ensure that any military or irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons which may be subject to its control or direction, take no steps in furtherance of these military operations.

82. The Court recalls that Ukraine also requested it to indicate measures aimed at ensuring the non-aggravation of the dispute with the Russian Federation. When it indicates provisional measures for the purpose of preserving specific rights, the Court may also indicate provisional measures with a view to preventing the aggravation or extension of the dispute if it considers that the circumstances so require (see, for example, Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All

Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, para. 94; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, para. 72). In the present case, having considered all the circumstances, in addition to the specific measures it has decided to order, the Court deems it necessary to indicate an additional measure directed to both Parties and aimed at ensuring the non-aggravation of the dispute.

83. The Court further recalls that Ukraine requested it to indicate a provisional measure directing the Russian Federation to “provide a report to the Court on measures taken to implement the Court’s Order on Provisional Measures one week after such Order and then on a regular basis to be fixed by the Court”. In the circumstances of the present case, however, the Court declines to indicate this measure.

*

* *

84. The Court reaffirms that its “orders on provisional measures under Article 41 [of the Statute] have binding effect” (LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 506, para. 109) and thus create international legal obligations for any party to whom the provisional measures are addressed.

*

* *

85. The Court further reaffirms that the decision given in the present proceedings in no way prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits of the case or any questions relating to the admissibility of the Application or to the merits themselves. It leaves unaffected the right of the Governments of Ukraine and of the Russian Federation to submit arguments in respect of those questions.

*

* *

86. For these reasons,

THE COURT,

Indicates the following provisional measures:

(1) By thirteen votes to two,

The Russian Federation shall immediately suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine;

IN FAVOUR: President Donoghue; Judges Tomka, Abraham, Bennouna, Yusuf, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Robinson, Salam, Iwasawa, Nolte, Charlesworth; Judge ad hoc Daudet;

AGAINST: Vice-President Gevorgian; Judge Xue;

(2) By thirteen votes to two,

The Russian Federation shall ensure that any military or irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons which may be subject to its control or direction, take no steps in furtherance of the military operations referred to in point (1) above;

IN FAVOUR: President Donoghue; Judges Tomka, Abraham, Bennouna, Yusuf, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Robinson, Salam, Iwasawa, Nolte, Charlesworth; Judge ad hoc Daudet;

AGAINST: Vice-President Gevorgian; Judge Xue;

(3) Unanimously,

Both Parties shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this sixteenth day of March, two thousand and twenty-two, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation, respectively.

(Signed)

Joan E. DONOGHUE,
President.

(Signed)

Philippe GAUTIER,
Registrar.

Vice-President GEVORGIAN appends a declaration to the Order of the Court; Judges BENNOUNA and XUE append declarations to the Order of the Court; Judge ROBINSON appends a separate opinion to the Order of the Court; Judge NOLTE appends a declaration to the Order of the Court; Judge ad hoc DAUDET appends a declaration to the Order of the Court.

(Initialled) J.E.D.

(Initialled) Ph.G.


The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It was established by the United Nations Charter in June 1945 and began its activities in April 1946. The Court is composed of 15 judges elected for a nine-year term by the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations. The seat of the Court is at the Peace Palace in The Hague (Netherlands). The Court has a twofold role: first, to settle, in accordance with international law, through judgments which have binding force and are without appeal for the parties concerned, legal disputes submitted to it by States; and, second, to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly authorized United Nations organs and agencies of the system.





India’s bilateral trade turnover with Ukraine was US$ 2.52 billion in 2019-20

India’s bilateral trade turnover was US$ 2.52 billion in 2019-20 (India’s exports were USD 463.81 million and imports were USD 2060.79 million). In 2019-20, Indian exports increased by 18.68% compared to 2018-19.

Major exports from India are Pharmaceutical products, reactors/Boiler machinery, mechanical appliances, oil seeds, fruits, coffee, tea, spices, iron and steel etc. From Ukraine, the major export to India is sunflower oil, followed by inorganic chemicals, iron and steel, plastics, chemicals, etc. India is Ukraine’s largest export destination in the Asia Pacific and the fifth largest overall export destination.

Pharmaceuticals account for majority of Indian exports to Ukraine. India is the third largest exporter of pharmaceutical products to Ukraine, after Germany and France, in value terms. A number of Indian companies like Ranbaxy, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Sun Group etc. have their representative offices in Ukraine. Representatives of major pharmaceutical companies have set up an Indian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association (IPMA) in Ukraine.

Bilateral trade figures for the last 5 years are as follows:

Values in US $ Millions

S.No. Year 2015-2016 2016-2017 2017-2018 2018-2019 2019-2020
1 EXPORT 259.11 310.16 330.10 390.80 463.81
2 Growth 19.70 6.43 18.39 18.68
3 India’s Total Export 262,291.09 275,852.43 303,526.16 330,078.09 313,361.04
4 %Growth 5.17 10.03 8.75 -5.06
5 %Share 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.15
6 IMPORT 1,751.10 2,481.47 2,355.97 2,341.03 2,060.79
7 %Growth 41.71 -5.06 -0.63 -11.97
8 India’s Total Import 381,007.76 384,357.03 465,580.99 514,078.42 474,709.28
9 %Growth 0.88 21.13 10.42 -7.66
10 %Share 0.46 0.65 0.71 0.46 0.43
11 TOTAL TRADE 2,010.21 2,791.63 2,686.07 2,731.82 2,524.60
12 %Growth 38.87 -3.78 1.70 -7.59
13 India’s Total Trade 643,298.84 660,209.46 769,107.15 844,156.51 788,070.32
14 %Growth 2.63 16.49 9.76 -6.64
15 %Share 0.31 0.42 0.35 0.32 0.32
16 TRADE BALANCE
17 India’s Trade Balance -118,716.67 -108,504.60 -162,054.83 -184,000.3 -161,348.24

Source: Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi





Hague Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters-2019

The Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention)

CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS

(Concluded 2 July 2019) 

 

The Contracting Parties to the present Convention

Desiring to promote effective access to justice for all and to facilitate rule-based multilateral trade and investment, and mobility, through judicial co-operation, 

Believing that such co-operation can be enhanced through the creation of a uniform set of core rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters, to facilitate the effective recognition and enforcement of such judgments, 

Convinced that such enhanced judicial co-operation requires, in particular, an international legal regime that provides greater predictability and certainty in relation to the global circulation of foreign judgments, and that is complementary to the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, 

Have resolved to conclude this Convention to this effect and have agreed upon the following provisions –

 

CHAPTER I – SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS 

Article 1
Scope

1. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil or commercial matters. It shall not extend in particular to revenue, customs or administrative matters. 

2. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement in one Contracting State of a judgment given by a court of another Contracting State. 

Article 2
Exclusions from scope 

1. This Convention shall not apply to the following matters – 

(a) the status and legal capacity of natural persons;

(b) maintenance obligations;

(c) other family law matters, including matrimonial property regimes and other rights or obligations arising out of marriage or similar relationships;

(d) wills and succession;

(e) insolvency, composition, resolution of financial institutions, and analogous matters;

(f) the carriage of passengers and goods;

(g) transboundary marine pollution, marine pollution in areas beyond national jurisdiction, ship-source marine pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims, and general average;

(h) liability for nuclear damage;

(i) the validity, nullity, or dissolution of legal persons or associations of natural or legal persons, and the validity of decisions of their organs;

(j) the validity of entries in public registers;

(k) defamation;

(l) privacy;

(m) intellectual property;

(n) activities of armed forces, including the activities of their personnel in the exercise of their official duties;

(o) law enforcement activities, including the activities of law enforcement personnel in the exercise of their official duties;

(p) anti-trust (competition) matters, except where the judgment is based on conduct that constitutes an anti-competitive agreement or concerted practice among actual or potential competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids, establish output restrictions or quotas, or divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories or lines of commerce, and where such conduct and its effect both occurred in the State of origin;

(q) sovereign debt restructuring through unilateral State measures. 

2. A judgment is not excluded from the scope of this Convention where a matter to which this Convention does not apply arose merely as a preliminary question in the proceedings in which the judgment was given, and not as an object of the proceedings. In particular, the mere fact that such a matter arose by way of defence does not exclude a judgment from the Convention, if that matter was not an object of the proceedings. 

3. This Convention shall not apply to arbitration and related proceedings. 

4. A judgment is not excluded from the scope of this Convention by the mere fact that a State, including a government, a governmental agency or any person acting for a State, was a party to the proceedings. 

5. Nothing in this Convention shall affect privileges and immunities of States or of international organisations, in respect of themselves and of their property.

Article 3
Definitions

1. In this Convention – 

(a) “defendant” means a person against whom the claim or counterclaim was brought in the State of origin;

(b) “judgment” means any decision on the merits given by a court, whatever that decision may be called, including a decree or order, and a determination of costs or expenses of the proceedings by the court (including an officer of the court), provided that the determination relates to a decision on the merits which may be recognised or enforced under this Convention. An interim measure of protection is not a judgment.

2. An entity or person other than a natural person shall be considered to be habitually resident in the State – 

(a) where it has its statutory seat;

(b) under the law of which it was incorporated or formed;

(c) where it has its central administration; or

(d) where it has its principal place of business.

 

CHAPTER II – RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT

Article 4
General provisions 

1. A judgment given by a court of a Contracting State (State of origin) shall be recognised and enforced in another Contracting State (requested State) in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. Recognition or enforcement may be refused only on the grounds specified in this Convention. 

2. There shall be no review of the merits of the judgment in the requested State. There may only be such consideration as is necessary for the application of this Convention. 

3. A judgment shall be recognised only if it has effect in the State of origin, and shall be enforced only if it is enforceable in the State of origin. 

4. Recognition or enforcement may be postponed or refused if the judgment referred to under paragraph 3 is the subject of review in the State of origin or if the time limit for seeking ordinary review has not expired. A refusal does not prevent a subsequent application for recognition or enforcement of the judgment.

Article 5
Bases for recognition and enforcement

1. A judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if one of the following requirements is met – 

(a) the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought was habitually resident in the State of origin at the time that person became a party to the proceedings in the court of origin;

(b) the natural person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought had their principal place of business in the State of origin at the time that person became a party to the proceedings in the court of origin and the claim on which the judgment is based arose out of the activities of that business;

(c) the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought is the person that brought the claim, other than a counterclaim, on which the judgment is based;

(d) the defendant maintained a branch, agency, or other establishment without separate legal personality in the State of origin at the time that person became a party to the proceedings in the court of origin, and the claim on which the judgment is based arose out of the activities of that branch, agency, or establishment;

(e) the defendant expressly consented to the jurisdiction of the court of origin in the course of the proceedings in which the judgment was given;

(f) the defendant argued on the merits before the court of origin without contesting jurisdiction within the timeframe provided in the law of the State of origin, unless it is evident that an objection to jurisdiction or to the exercise of jurisdiction would not have succeeded under that law;

(g) the judgment ruled on a contractual obligation and it was given by a court of the State in which performance of that obligation took place, or should have taken place, in accordance with

(i) the agreement of the parties, or

(ii) the law applicable to the contract, in the absence of an agreed place of performance,

unless the activities of the defendant in relation to the transaction clearly did not constitute a purposeful and substantial connection to that State;

(h) the judgment ruled on a lease of immovable property (tenancy) and it was given by a court of the State in which the property is situated;

(i) the judgment ruled against the defendant on a contractual obligation secured by a right in rem in immovable property located in the State of origin, if the contractual claim was brought together with a claim against the same defendant relating to that right in rem;

(j) the judgment ruled on a non-contractual obligation arising from death, physical injury, damage to or loss of tangible property, and the act or omission directly causing such harm occurred in the State of origin, irrespective of where that harm occurred;

(k) the judgment concerns the validity, construction, effects, administration or variation of a trust created voluntarily and evidenced in writing, and –

(i) at the time the proceedings were instituted, the State of origin was designated in the trust instrument as a State in the courts of which disputes about such matters are to be determined; or

(ii) at the time the proceedings were instituted, the State of origin was expressly or impliedly designated in the trust instrument as the State in which the principal place of administration of the trust is situated.

This sub-paragraph only applies to judgments regarding internal aspects of a trust between persons who are or were within the trust relationship;

(l) the judgment ruled on a counterclaim –

(i) to the extent that it was in favour of the counterclaimant, provided that the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim; or

(ii) to the extent that it was against the counterclaimant, unless the law of the State of origin required the counterclaim to be filed in order to avoid preclusion;

(m) the judgment was given by a court designated in an agreement concluded or documented in writing or by any other means of communication which renders information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference, other than an exclusive choice of court agreement.

For the purposes of this sub-paragraph, an “exclusive choice of court agreement” means an agreement concluded by two or more parties that designates, for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, the courts of one State or one or more specific courts of one State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts.

2. If recognition or enforcement is sought against a natural person acting primarily for personal, family or household purposes (a consumer) in matters relating to a consumer contract, or against an employee in matters relating to the employee’s contract of employment –

(a) paragraph 1(e) applies only if the consent was addressed to the court, orally or in writing;

(b) paragraph 1(f), (g) and (m) do not apply.

3. Paragraph 1 does not apply to a judgment that ruled on a residential lease of immovable property (tenancy) or ruled on the registration of immovable property. Such a judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement only if it was given by a court of the State where the property is situated.

Article 6
Exclusive basis for recognition and enforcement

Notwithstanding Article 5, a judgment that ruled on rights in rem in immovable property shall be recognised and enforced if and only if the property is situated in the State of origin. 

Article 7
Refusal of recognition and enforcement 

1. Recognition or enforcement may be refused if – 

(a) the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document, including a statement of the essential elements of the claim –

(i) was not notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable them to arrange for their defence, unless the defendant entered an appearance and presented their case without contesting notification in the court of origin, provided that the law of the State of origin permitted notification to be contested; or

(ii) was notified to the defendant in the requested State in a manner that is incompatible with fundamental principles of the requested State concerning service of documents;

(b) the judgment was obtained by fraud;

(c) recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the requested State, including situations where the specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State and situations involving infringements of security or sovereignty of that State;

(d) the proceedings in the court of origin were contrary to an agreement, or a designation in a trust instrument, under which the dispute in question was to be determined in a court of a State other than the State of origin;

(e) the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment given by a court of the requested State in a dispute between the same parties; or

(f) the judgment is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given by a court of another State between the same parties on the same subject matter, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the requested State. 

2. Recognition or enforcement may be postponed or refused if proceedings between the same parties on the same subject matter are pending before a court of the requested State, where – 

(a) the court of the requested State was seised before the court of origin; and

(b) there is a close connection between the dispute and the requested State. 

A refusal under this paragraph does not prevent a subsequent application for recognition or enforcement of the judgment.

Article 8
Preliminary questions 

1. A ruling on a preliminary question shall not be recognised or enforced under this Convention if the ruling is on a matter to which this Convention does not apply or on a matter referred to in Article 6 on which a court of a State other than the State referred to in that Article ruled.

2. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to the extent that, the judgment was based on a ruling on a matter to which this Convention does not apply, or on a matter referred to in Article 6 on which a court of a State other than the State referred to in that Article ruled.

Article 9
Severability 

Recognition or enforcement of a severable part of a judgment shall be granted where recognition or enforcement of that part is applied for, or only part of the judgment is capable of being recognised or enforced under this Convention.

Article 10
Damages 

1. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to the extent that, the judgment awards damages, including exemplary or punitive damages, that do not compensate a party for actual loss or harm suffered.

2. The court addressed shall take into account whether and to what extent the damages awarded by the court of origin serve to cover costs and expenses relating to the proceedings.

Article 11
Judicial settlements (transactions judiciaires)

Judicial settlements (transactions judiciaires) which a court of a Contracting State has approved, or which have been concluded in the course of proceedings before a court of a Contracting State, and which are enforceable in the same manner as a judgment in the State of origin, shall be enforced under this Convention in the same manner as a judgment.

Article 12
Documents to be produced 

1. The party seeking recognition or applying for enforcement shall produce – 

(a) a complete and certified copy of the judgment;

(b) if the judgment was given by default, the original or a certified copy of a document establishing that the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document was notified to the defaulting party;

(c) any documents necessary to establish that the judgment has effect or, where applicable, is enforceable in the State of origin;

(d) in the case referred to in Article 11, a certificate of a court (including an officer of the court) of the State of origin stating that the judicial settlement or a part of it is enforceable in the same manner as a judgment in the State of origin.

2. If the terms of the judgment do not permit the court addressed to verify whether the conditions of this Chapter have been complied with, that court may require any necessary documents.

3. An application for recognition or enforcement may be accompanied by a document relating to the judgment, issued by a court (including an officer of the court) of the State of origin, in the form recommended and published by the Hague Conference on Private International Law. 

4. If the documents referred to in this Article are not in an official language of the requested State, they shall be accompanied by a certified translation into an official language, unless the law of the requested State provides otherwise.

Article 13
Procedure 

1. The procedure for recognition, declaration of enforceability or registration for enforcement, and the enforcement of the judgment, are governed by the law of the requested State unless this Convention provides otherwise. The court of the requested State shall act expeditiously.

2. The court of the requested State shall not refuse the recognition or enforcement of a judgment under this Convention on the ground that recognition or enforcement should be sought in another State.

Article 14
Costs of proceedings 

1. No security, bond or deposit, however described, shall be required from a party who in one Contracting State applies for enforcement of a judgment given by a court of another Contracting State on the sole ground that such party is a foreign national or is not domiciled or resident in the State in which enforcement is sought. 

2. An order for payment of costs or expenses of proceedings, made in a Contracting State against any person exempt from requirements as to security, bond, or deposit by virtue of paragraph 1 or of the law of the State where proceedings have been instituted, shall, on the application of the person entitled to the benefit of the order, be rendered enforceable in any other Contracting State. 

3. A State may declare that it shall not apply paragraph 1 or designate by a declaration which of its courts shall not apply paragraph 1.

Article 15
Recognition and enforcement under national law 

Subject to Article 6, this Convention does not prevent the recognition or enforcement of judgments under national law.

 

CHAPTER III – GENERAL CLAUSES 

Article 16
Transitional provision 

This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of judgments if, at the time the proceedings were instituted in the State of origin, the Convention had effect between that State and the requested State. 

Article 17
Declarations limiting recognition and enforcement
 

A State may declare that its courts may refuse to recognise or enforce a judgment given by a court of another Contracting State if the parties were resident in the requested State, and the relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant to the dispute, other than the location of the court of origin, were connected only with the requested State.

Article 18
Declarations with respect to specific matters

1. Where a State has a strong interest in not applying this Convention to a specific matter, that State may declare that it will not apply the Convention to that matter. The State making such a declaration shall ensure that the declaration is no broader than necessary and that the specific matter excluded is clearly and precisely defined.

2. With regard to that matter, the Convention shall not apply – 

(a) in the Contracting State that made the declaration;

(b) in other Contracting States, where recognition or enforcement of a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State that made the declaration is sought.

Article 19
Declarations with respect to judgments pertaining to a State 

1. A State may declare that it shall not apply this Convention to judgments arising from proceedings to which any of the following is a party –

(a) that State, or a natural person acting for that State; or

(b) a government agency of that State, or a natural person acting for such a government agency.

The State making such a declaration shall ensure that the declaration is no broader than necessary and that the exclusion from scope is clearly and precisely defined. The declaration shall not distinguish between judgments where the State, a government agency of that State or a natural person acting for either of them is a defendant or claimant in the proceedings before the court of origin. 

2. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment given by a court of a State that made a declaration pursuant to paragraph 1 may be refused if the judgment arose from proceedings to which either the State that made the declaration or the requested State, one of their government agencies or a natural person acting for either of them is a party, to the same extent as specified in the declaration.

Article 20
Uniform interpretation 

In the interpretation of this Convention, regard shall be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application. 

Article 21
Review of operation of the Convention
 

The Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law shall at regular intervals make arrangements for review of the operation of this Convention, including any declarations, and shall report to the Council on General Affairs and Policy.

Article 22
Non-unified legal systems
 

1. In relation to a Contracting State in which two or more systems of law apply in different territorial units with regard to any matter dealt with in this Convention – 

(a) any reference to the law or procedure of a State shall be construed as referring, where appropriate, to the law or procedure in force in the relevant territorial unit;

(b) any reference to the court or courts of a State shall be construed as referring, where appropriate, to the court or courts in the relevant territorial unit;

(c) any reference to a connection with a State shall be construed as referring, where appropriate, to a connection with the relevant territorial unit;

(d) any reference to a connecting factor in relation to a State shall be construed as referring, where appropriate, to that connecting factor in relation to the relevant territorial unit. 

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, a Contracting State with two or more territorial units in which different systems of law apply shall not be bound to apply this Convention to situations which involve solely such different territorial units. 

3. A court in a territorial unit of a Contracting State with two or more territorial units in which different systems of law apply shall not be bound to recognise or enforce a judgment from another Contracting State solely because the judgment has been recognised or enforced in another territorial unit of the same Contracting State under this Convention. 

4. This Article shall not apply to Regional Economic Integration Organisations.

Article 23
Relationship with other international instruments 

1. This Convention shall be interpreted so far as possible to be compatible with other treaties in force for Contracting States, whether concluded before or after this Convention.  

2. This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting State of a treaty that was concluded before this Convention. 

3. This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting State of a treaty concluded after this Convention as concerns the recognition or enforcement of a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State that is also a Party to that treaty. Nothing in the other treaty shall affect the obligations under Article 6 towards Contracting States that are not Parties to that treaty. 

4. This Convention shall not affect the application of the rules of a Regional Economic Integration Organisation that is a Party to this Convention as concerns the recognition or enforcement of a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State that is also a Member State of the Regional Economic Integration Organisation where – 

(a) the rules were adopted before this Convention was concluded; or 

(b) the rules were adopted after this Convention was concluded, to the extent that they do not affect the obligations under Article 6 towards Contracting States that are not Member States of the Regional Economic Integration Organisation.

 

CHAPTER IV – FINAL CLAUSES 

Article 24
Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 

1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States. 

2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory States. 

3. This Convention shall be open for accession by all States. 

4. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, depositary of the Convention.

Article 25
Declarations with respect to non-unified legal systems 

1. If a State has two or more territorial units in which different systems of law apply in relation to matters dealt with in this Convention, it may declare that the Convention shall extend to all its territorial units or only to one or more of them. Such a declaration shall state expressly the territorial units to which the Convention applies. 

2. If a State makes no declaration under this Article, the Convention shall extend to all territorial units of that State. 

3. This Article shall not apply to Regional Economic Integration Organisations.

Article 26
Regional Economic Integration Organisations

1. A Regional Economic Integration Organisation which is constituted solely by sovereign States and has competence over some or all of the matters governed by this Convention may sign, accept, approve or accede to this Convention. The Regional Economic Integration Organisation shall in that case have the rights and obligations of a Contracting State, to the extent that the Organisation has competence over matters governed by this Convention. 

2. The Regional Economic Integration Organisation shall, at the time of signature, acceptance, approval or accession, notify the depositary in writing of the matters governed by this Convention in respect of which competence has been transferred to that Organisation by its Member States. The Organisation shall promptly notify the depositary in writing of any changes to its competence as specified in the most recent notice given under this paragraph. 

3. For the purposes of the entry into force of this Convention, any instrument deposited by a Regional Economic Integration Organisation shall not be counted unless the Regional Economic Integration Organisation declares in accordance with Article 27(1) that its Member States will not be Parties to this Convention. 

4. Any reference to a “Contracting State” or “State” in this Convention shall apply equally, where appropriate, to a Regional Economic Integration Organisation.

Article 27
Regional Economic Integration Organisation as a Contracting Party without its Member States 

1. At the time of signature, acceptance, approval or accession, a Regional Economic Integration Organisation may declare that it exercises competence over all the matters governed by this Convention and that its Member States will not be Parties to this Convention but shall be bound by virtue of the signature, acceptance, approval or accession of the Organisation. 

2. In the event that a declaration is made by a Regional Economic Integration Organisation in accordance with paragraph 1, any reference to a “Contracting State” or “State” in this Convention shall apply equally, where appropriate, to the Member States of the Organisation.

Article 28
Entry into force 

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of the period during which a notification may be made in accordance with Article 29(2) with respect to the second State that has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession referred to in Article 24.

2. Thereafter this Convention shall enter into force – 

(a) for each State subsequently ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to it, on the first day of the month following the expiration of the period during which notifications may be made in accordance with Article 29(2) with respect to that State;

(b) for a territorial unit to which this Convention has been extended in accordance with Article 25 after the Convention has entered into force for the State making the declaration, on the first day of the month following the expiration of three months after the notification of the declaration referred to in that Article.

Article 29
Establishment of relations pursuant to the Convention 

1. This Convention shall have effect between two Contracting States only if neither of them has notified the depositary regarding the other in accordance with paragraph 2 or 3. In the absence of such a notification, the Convention has effect between two Contracting States from the first day of the month following the expiration of the period during which notifications may be made. 

2. A Contracting State may notify the depositary, within 12 months after the date of the notification by the depositary referred to in Article 32(a), that the ratification, acceptance, approval or accession of another State shall not have the effect of establishing relations between the two States pursuant to this Convention. 

3. A State may notify the depositary, upon the deposit of its instrument pursuant to Article 24(4), that its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall not have the effect of establishing relations with a Contracting State pursuant to this Convention. 

4. A Contracting State may at any time withdraw a notification that it has made under paragraph 2 or 3. Such a withdrawal shall take effect on the first day of the month following the expiration of three months following the date of notification.

Article 30
Declarations 

1. Declarations referred to in Articles 14, 17, 18, 19 and 25 may be made upon signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession or at any time thereafter, and may be modified or withdrawn at any time. 

2. Declarations, modifications and withdrawals shall be notified to the depositary. 

3. A declaration made at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall take effect simultaneously with the entry into force of this Convention for the State concerned. 

4. A declaration made at a subsequent time, and any modification or withdrawal of a declaration, shall take effect on the first day of the month following the expiration of three months following the date on which the notification is received by the depositary. 

5. A declaration made at a subsequent time, and any modification or withdrawal of a declaration, shall not apply to judgments resulting from proceedings that have already been instituted before the court of origin when the declaration takes effect.

Article 31
Denunciation 

1. A Contracting State to this Convention may denounce it by a notification in writing addressed to the depositary. The denunciation may be limited to certain territorial units of a non-unified legal system to which this Convention applies.

2. The denunciation shall take effect on the first day of the month following the expiration of 12 months after the date on which the notification is received by the depositary. Where a longer period for the denunciation to take effect is specified in the notification, the denunciation shall take effect upon the expiration of such longer period after the date on which the notification is received by the depositary.

Article 32
Notifications by the depositary 

The depositary shall notify the Members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, and other States and Regional Economic Integration Organisations which have signed, ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to this Convention in accordance with Articles 24, 26 and 27 of the following – 

(a) the signatures, ratifications, acceptances, approvals and accessions referred to in Articles 24, 26 and 27;

(b) the date on which this Convention enters into force in accordance with Article 28;

(c) the notifications, declarations, modifications and withdrawals referred to in Articles 26, 27, 29 and 30; and

(d) the denunciations referred to in Article 31.

 

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed this Convention. 

Done at The Hague, on the 2nd day of July 2019, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and of which a certified copy shall be sent, through diplomatic channels, to each of the Members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law at the time of its Twenty-Second Session and to each of the other States which have participated in that Session.