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    • #112593 Reply
      Rinku Das (Hazra)
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      Whether compensation exceeding the amount claimed in the claim petition can be awarded ?

      ACCIDENTAL CLAIM

      Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

      In the judgment of R.K. Malik (below), 29 children going in a school bus died by drowning in Yamuna River while the offending vehicle fell down, breaking the railings of the bridge in a road accident, took place in November, 1997. In the said case this Court held that the principle for determination of the compensation may be observed applying the IInd Schedule of M.V. Act and the appropriate multiplier considering the age of parents. It has also been said that the claim with regard to the future prospects should have been addressed by the Courts based on the performance and the reputation of the school. In the said case, the principles laid down by this Court in the case of Lata Wadhwa and others v. State of Bihar and others [2001 (8) SCC 197] and M.S. Grewal & another v. Deep Chand Sood & others [2001 (8) SCC 151] have been followed and enhancement was made. In the case of Lata Wadhwa (supra), it was clarified that the compensation may be awarded dividing the children in the age groups of 5 to 10 and 10 to 15 years. It is held that such grant of compensation will not necessarily bar the parents to claim prospective loss and it will be valid. This Court also relied upon the principles as laid down by the House of Lords in the famous case of Taff Vale Rly. v. Jankins [1913 AC 1], wherein Lord Atkinson observed as thus:

       “…all that is necessary is that a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit should be entertained by the person who sues. It is quite true that the existence of this expectation is an inference of fact – there must be a basis of fact from which the inference can reasonably be drawn; but I wish to express my emphatic dissent from the proposition that it is necessary that two of the facts without which the inference cannot be drawn are, first, that the deceased earned money in the past and, second, that he or she contributed to the support of the plaintiff. These are, no doubt, pregnant pieces of evidence, but they are only pieces of evidence; and the necessary inference can, I think, be drawn from circumstances other than and different from them.”
      
      1. Thus relying upon the observation, it is said that in place of issuing any guidelines for determination of compensation in case of death of a child, it may be left open to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case. In the case of M.S. Grewal (supra), 14 school students died due to drowning in a river. This Court noticing that the students were belonging to upper middle class background, however awarded the compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,00,000/-. Thereafter in the case of Kishan Gopal (supra), a child aged about 10 years died in a road accident took place on 19.7.1992, this Court made departure from the IInd Schedule of M.V. Act and accepted the notional income of Rs. 30,000/- in place of Rs. 15,000/- applying the analogy that the value of rupee has come down drastically since 1994 when the notional income of Rs. 15000/- was fixed in IInd Schedule of the MV Act. However accepting the notional income as Rs. 30,000/- and as per the age of the parents i.e. 36 years, the loss of dependency was calculated applying the multiplier of 15 at Rs. 4,50,000/- and a sum of Rs. 50,000/- was awarded under conventional heads awarding a total sum of compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/-.
      2. Recently in the case of Kurvan Ansari @ Kurvan Ali & another v. Shyam Kishore Murmu and another [2022 (1) SCC 317], wherein a child aged about 7 years died in a road accident took place on 6.9.2004, this Court taking notional income as Rs. 25,000/-, applying the multiplier of 15, calculated the loss of dependency as Rs. 3,75,000/- and adding Rs. 55,000/- in conventional heads, awarded Rs. 4,70,000/-.

      3. In view of the foregoing decisions, it is apparent that in the cases of child death, the notional income of Rs. 15,000/- as specified in the IInd Schedule of M.V. Act has been enhanced on account of devaluation of money and value of rupee coming down from the date on which the IInd Schedule of M.V. Act was introduced and the said notional income was treated as Rs. 30,000/- in the case of Kishan Gopal (supra) and Rs. 25,000/- in Kurvan Ansari (supra) in age group of 10 and 7 years respectively.

      4. Thus applying the ratio of the said judgments, looking to the age of the child in the present case i.e. 12 years, the principles laid down in the case of Kishan Gopal (supra) are aptly applicable to the facts of the present case. As per the ocular statement of the mother of the deceased, it is clear that deceased was a brilliant student and studying in a private school. Therefore, accepting the notional earning Rs. 30,000/- including future prospect and applying the multiplier of 15 in view of the decision of this Court in Sarla Verma (supra), the loss of dependency comes to Rs. 4,50,000/- and if we add Rs. 50,000/- in conventional heads, then the total sum of compensation comes to Rs. 5,00,000/-. As per the judgment of MACT, lump sum compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- has been awarded, while the High Court enhanced it to Rs. 2,00,000/- up to the value of the Claim Petition. In our view, the said amount of compensation is not just and reasonable looking to the computation made hereinabove. Hence, we determine the total compensation as Rs. 5,00,000/- and on reducing the amount as awarded by the High Court i.e. Rs. 2,00,000/-, the enhanced amount comes to Rs. 3,00,000/-.

      5. At this stage, it is necessary to clarify that as per the decision of a Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Nagappa v. Gurdayal Singh and others [2003 (2) SCC 274], it was observed that under the MV Act, there is no restriction that the Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation exceeding the amount so claimed. The Tribunal/Court ought to award ‘just’ compensation which is reasonable in the facts relying upon the evidence produced on record. Therefore, less valuation, if any, made in the Claim Petition would not be impediment to award just compensation exceeding the claimed amount.

      Reference:

      1. Kurvan Ansari @ Kurvan Ali & another v. Shyam Kishore Murmu and another [2022 (1) SCC 317]

      2. Kishan Gopal and another v. Lala and others [2014 (1) SCC 244]

      3. R.K. Malik and another v. Kiran Pal and others [2009 (14) SCC 1]

      4. Sarla Verma & Others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another [2009 (6) SCC 121]

      5. Nagappa v. Gurdayal Singh and others [2003 (2) SCC 274]

      6. Lata Wadhwa and others v. State of Bihar and others [2001 (8) SCC 197]

      7. M.S. Grewal & another v. Deep Chand Sood & others [2001 (8) SCC 151]


    • #112594 Reply
      Rinku Das (Hazra)
      Guest

      NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

      EXISTENCE OF LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE DEBT

      Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

      Section 138 – Dishonour of post dated cheque issued as security

      (i) Where the borrower agrees to repay the loan within a specified timeline and issues a cheque for security but defaults in repaying the loan within the timeline, the cheque matures for presentation. When the cheque is sought to be encashed by the debtor and is dishonoured, Section 138 of the Act will be attracted;

      (ii) However, the cardinal rule when a cheque is issued for security is that between the date on which the cheque is drawn to the date on which the cheque matures, the loan could be repaid through any other mode. It is only where the loan is not repaid through any other mode within the due date that the cheque would mature for presentation; and

      (iii) If the loan has been discharged before the due date or if there is an ‘altered situation’, then the cheque shall not be presented for encashment.

      1. In Sunil Todi v. State of Gujarat [Criminal Appeal No. 1446 of 2021], a two judge Bench of this Court expounded the meaning of the phrase ‘debt or other liability’. It was observed that the phrase takes within its meaning a ‘sum of money promised to be paid on a future day by reason of a present obligation’. The court observed that a post-dated cheque issued after the debt was incurred would be covered within the meaning of ‘debt’. The court held that Section 138 would also include cases where the debt is incurred after the cheque is drawn but before it is presented for encashment. In this context, it was observed:

        “26. The object of the NI Act is to enhance the acceptability of cheques and inculcate faith in the efficiency of negotiable instruments for transaction of business. The purpose of the provision would become otiose if the provision is interpreted to exclude cases where debt is incurred after the drawing of the cheque but before its encashment. In Indus Airways, advance payments were made but since the purchase agreement was cancelled, there was no occasion of incurring any debt. The true purpose of Section 138 would not be fulfilled, if ‘debt or other liability’ is interpreted to include only a debt that exists as on the date of drawing of the cheque. Moreover, Parliament has used the expression ‘debt or other liability’. The expression “or other liability’ must have a meaning of its own, the legislature having used two distinct phrases. The expression ‘or other liability’ has a content which is broader than ‘a debt’ and cannot be equated with the latter. In the present case, the cheque was issued in close proximity with the commencement of power supply. The issuance of the cheque in the context of a commercial transaction must be understood in the context of the business dealings. The issuance of the cheque was followed close on its heels by the supply of power. To hold that the cheque was not issued in the context of a liability which was being assumed by the company to pay for the dues towards power supplied would be to produce an outcome at odds with the business dealings. If the company were to fail to provide a satisfactory LC and yet consume power, the cheques were capable of being presented for the purpose of meeting the outstanding dues.”

      2. The judgments from Indus Airways (supra) to Sunil Todi (supra) indicate that much of the analysis on whether post-dated cheques issued as security would fall within the purview of Section 138 of the Act hinges on the relevance of time. In Indus Airways (supra), this Court held that for the commission of the offence under Section 138, there must have been a debt on the date of issuance of the cheque. However, later judgments adopt a more nuanced position while discussing the validity of proceedings under Section 138 on the dishonour of post-dated cheques. This Court since Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao (supra) has consistently held that there must be a legally enforceable debt on the date mentioned in the cheque, which is the date of maturity.

      3. This Court in NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magna Leasing Ltd. [AIR 1995 SC 1952] held that the Courts must interpret Section 138 with reference to the legislative intent to supress the mischief and advance the remedy. The objective of the Act in general and Section 138 specifically is to enhance the acceptability of cheques and to inculcate faith in the efficacy of negotiable instruments for the transaction of business [Sunil Sodhi v. State of Gujarat (supra). Section 138 criminalises the dishonour of cheques. This is in addition to the civil remedy that is available. Through the criminalisation of the dishonour of cheques, the legislature intended to prevent dishonesty on the part of the drawer of a negotiable instrument [M/s Electronics Trade and Technology Development Corporation Ltd. [1996 (3) Crimes 82 (SC)]]. The interpretation of Section 138 must not permit dishonesty of the drawee of the cheque as well. A cheque is issued as security to provide the drawee of the cheque with a leverage of using the cheque in case the drawer fails to pay the debt in the future. Therefore, cheques are issued and received as security with the contemplation that a part or the full sum that is addressed in the cheque may be paid before the cheque is encashed.

      4. The judgments of this Court on post-dated cheques when read with the purpose of Section 138 indicate that an offence under the provision arises if the cheque represents a legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity. The offence under Section 138 is tipped by the dishonour of the cheque when it is sought to be encashed. Though a post- dated cheque might be drawn to represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of its drawing, for the offence to be attracted, the cheque must represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment. If there has been a material change in the circumstance such that the sum in the cheque does not represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of maturity or encashment, then the offence under Section 138 is not made out.

      5. The appellant contended that the cheque was issued by the first respondent on 17 March 2014. However, the payment of rupees 4,09,3015 received from the first respondent was between 8 April 2012 and 30 December 2013. It was contended that since the payments were made before the issuance of cheque, it cannot be considered as part-payment for the discharge of liability.

      6. The appellant in his cross- examination conducted on 17 March 2016 has categorically mentioned that he did not take any receipt on lending rupees twenty lakhs to the first respondent. The appellant stated that a ‘cheque against the cheque’ was given. The relevant portion of the cross-examination is extracted below:

        “[…] I have paid the Income Tax Return for the accounting year 2012-13. It is true that I have shown the transaction of Rupees Twenty Lakhs in the said return. I am ready to present the Income Tax Return for the Accounting Year of Rupees Twenty Lakhs to the Accused; I have not acknowledged the receipt. It is true that I have given the cheque against the said cheque and not taken the receipt.”

      (emphasis supplied)

      1. In the testimony recorded under Section 145 of the Act, the appellant stated that he lent the first respondent a sum of rupees twenty lakhs on 16 January 2012 and that the respondent gave a cheque of rupees twenty lakhs stating that it may be deposited on the date specified in it:

        “The plaintiff and the Defendant of this case being a Vevai and has a house- like relationship, he has given the amount to the plaintiff as per his requirement on dtd. 16/01/2012 and for the payment of the amount paid by the Plaintiff to the in this case, his bank State Bank of India, AUDa Garden, Prahladnagar Branch, Ahmedabad Cheque Number: 8877828 of Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs Only) and stated that the above cheque was deposited by the plaintiff on the date specified in it giving the plaintiff the firm confidence and assurance that the plaintiff would definitely get the amount due from us.”

      (emphasis supplied)

      Further, in the cross-examination, the appellant stated that the amount that was paid by the first respondent was not paid as a reward or gift:

       “I cannot say whether the accused has also paid me this amount in the count of Rupees Twenty Lakhs. The accused did not even give me that amount as a reward/gift.”
      
      1. It was the contention of the first respondent that the cheque was not dated. On the other hand, it was the contention of the appellant that the cheque was dated 17 March 2014. The Courts below did not record a finding on whether the cheque was un-dated or was dated 17 March 2014. However, it was conclusively held that the cheque was issued by the first respondent for security on the date when the loan was borrowed. It was also categorically recorded by the Courts below that a sum of rupees 4,09,315 that was paid by the first respondent was paid to partly fulfil the debt of rupees twenty lakhs. The appellant in his cross-examination has stated that a ‘cheque against a cheque’ was given when he loaned the sum of rupees twenty lakhs. Thus, it can be concluded that the cheque was given as a security to discharge the loan, either undated or dated as 17 March 2014. Merely because the sum of rupees 4,09,315 was paid between 8 April 2012 and 30 December 2013, which was after 17 March 2014, it cannot be concluded that the sum was not paid in discharge of the loan of rupees twenty lakh. The sum of rupees 4,09,315 was paid after the loan was lent to the first respondent. The appellant in his cross- examination has not denied the receipt of the payments. He has also stated it was not received as a ‘gift or reward’. In view of the above discussion, at the time of the encashment of the cheque, the first respondent did not owe a sum of rupees twenty lakhs as represented in the cheque at the time of encashment of the cheque that was issued for security.
    • The High Court while dismissing the appeal against acquittal held that the notice issued by the appellant is an omnibus notice since it does not represent a legally enforceable debt. Relying on the judgment of this Court in Rahul Builders v. Arihant Fertilizers & Chemicals [2008 (2) SCC 321], it was held that the legal notice was not issued in accordance with proviso (b) to Section 138 since it did not represent the ‘correct amount’. The appellant has contended that the requirement under Section 138 is to send a notice demanding the ‘cheque amount’. It was contended that the offence under Section 138 was made out since the appellant in the statutory notice demanded the payment of rupees twenty lakhs which was the ‘cheque amount’.

    • Section 138 of the Act stipulates that if the cheque is returned unpaid by the bank for the lack of funds, then the drawee shall be deemed to have committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act. However, the offence under Section 138 of the Act is attracted only when the conditions in the provisos have been fulfilled. Proviso (b) to Section 138 states that a notice demanding the payment of the ‘said amount of money’ shall be made by the drawee of the cheque.

    • This Court has interpreted the phrase ‘the said amount of money’ as it finds place in proviso (b) to Section 138. In Suman Sethi v. Ajay K Churiwal [2000 (2) SCC 38], the appellant issued a cheque for rupees twenty lakhs in favour of the first respondent. The cheque was dishonoured. A demand notice for an amount higher than the cheque amount was issued. A two-Judge Bench of this Court held that the demand has to be made for the ‘said amount’, which is the cheque amount. It was also observed that the question of whether the notice demanding an amount higher than the cheque amount is valid would depend on the language of the notice:

      “8. It is a well-settled principle of law that the notice has to be read as a whole. In the notice, demand has to be made for the “said amount” i.e. the cheque amount. If no such demand is made the notice no doubt would fall short of its legal requirement. Where in addition to the “said amount” there is also a claim by way of interest, cost etc. whether the notice is bad would depend on the language of the notice. If in a notice while giving the break-up of the claim the cheque amount, interest, damages etc. are separately specified, other such claims for interest, cost etc. would be superfluous and these additional claims would be severable and will not invalidate the notice. If, however, in the notice an omnibus demand is made without specifying what was due under the dishonoured cheque, the notice might well fail to meet the legal requirement and may be regarded as bad.”

    • In KR Indira v. G. Adinarayana [2003 (8) SCC 300], it was held that the notice did not demand the payment of the cheque amount but the loan amount. It was observed that for the purposes of proviso (b), the amount covered in the dishonoured cheque must be demanded. In Rahul Builders (supra), the drawee demanded the payment of rupees 8,72,409 which was higher than the sum of rupees 1,00,000 represented in the cheque. It was reiterated that the phrase ‘payment of the said amount’ in proviso (b) would mean the cheque amount. Since the demand in the notice was not severable as the cheque amount could not be severed from the demand for the additional amount, it was held that it was an omnibus notice. Justice SB Sinha writing for a two-Judge Bench of this Court observed:

      “10. […] One of the conditions was service of a notice making demand of the payment of the amount of cheque as is evident from the use of the phraseology “payment of the said amount of money”. […] It is one thing to say that the demand may not only represent the unpaid amount under cheque but also other incidental expenses like costs and interests, but the same would not mean that the notice would be vague and capable of two interpretations. An omnibus notice without specifying as to what was the amount due under the dishonoured cheque would not subserve the requirement of law. Respondent 1 was not called upon to pay the amount which was payable under the cheque issued by it. The amount which it was called upon to pay was the outstanding amounts of bills i.e. Rs 8,72,409. The noticee was to respond to the said demand. Pursuant thereto, it was to offer the entire sum of Rs 8,72,409. No demand was made upon it to pay the said sum of Rs 1,00,000 which was tendered to the complainant by cheque dated 30-4-2000. What was, therefore, demanded was the entire sum and not a part of it.”

    • Section 138 creates a deeming offence. The provisos prescribe stipulations to safeguard the drawer of the cheque by providing them the opportunity of responding to the notice and an opportunity to repay the cheque amount. The conditions stipulated in the provisos need to be fulfilled in addition to the ingredients in the main provision of Section 138. It has already been concluded above that the offence under Section 138 arises only when a cheque that represents a part or whole of the legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment is returned by the bank unpaid. Since the cheque did not represent the legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment, the offence under Section 138 is not made out.

    • The appellant contends that the purpose of Section 138 of the Act would be defeated if the dishonour of the cheque issued for security is not included within the purview of Section 138 where the payment of a part of the cheque amount is made. It was contended that it would lead to a possibility where the drawer of the cheque could evade prosecution under Section 138 by paying a small amount of the debt while defaulting on the remaining payment. Section 56 stipulates that if there is an endorsement on a negotiable instrument that a part of the sum mentioned in the cheque has been paid, then the instrument may be negotiated for the balance. Section 56 reads as follows:

      “56. Indorsement for part of sum due.- No writing on a negotiable instrument is valid for the purpose of negotiation if such writing purports to transfer only a part of the amount appearing to be due on the instrument; but where such amount has been partly paid a note to that effect may be indorsed on the instrument, which may then be negotiated for the balance.”

    • Section 15 defines the phrase ‘indorsement’ as follows:

      “15. Indorsement.- When a maker or holder of a negotiable instrument signs the same, otherwise than as such maker, for the purpose of negotiation, on the back or face thereof or on a slip of paper annexed thereto, or so signs for the same purpose a stamped paper intended to be completed as a negotiable instrument, he is said to indorse the same, and is called the “indorse”.”

    • A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court has held in Joseph Sartho v. Gopinathan [2008 (3) KLJ 784] that since the representation in the cheque was for a sum higher than the amount that was due on the date that it was presented for encashment, the drawer of the cheque cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. The High Court of Delhi addressed the same issue in Alliance Infrastructure Project Ltd. v. Vinay Mittal [ILR (2010) III Delhi 459]. The High Court observed that when part payment is made after the cheque is drawn, the payee has the option of either taking a new cheque for the reduced amount or by making an endorsement on the cheque acknowledging that a part payment was made according to the provisions of Section 56 of the Act. It was also held that the notice of demand which requires the drawer of the cheque to make payment of the whole amount represented in the cheque despite receiving part repayment against the sum, before the issue of notice, cannot be valid under Section 138(b) of the Act. A similar view was taken by the High Court of Gujarat in Shree Corporation v. Anilbhai Puranbhai Bansal [2018 (2) GLH 105].

    • Under Section 56 read with Section 15 of the Act, an endorsement may be made by recording the part-payment of the debt in the cheque or in a note appended to the cheque. When such an endorsement is made, the instrument could still be used to negotiate the balance amount. If the endorsed cheque when presented for encashment of the balance amount is dishonoured, then the drawee can take recourse to the provisions of Section 138. Thus, when a part- payment of the debt is made after the cheque was drawn but before the cheque is encashed, such payment must be endorsed on the cheque under Section 56 of the Act. The cheque cannot be presented for encashment without recording the part payment. If the unendorsed cheque is dishonoured on presentation, the offence under Section 138 would not be attracted since the cheque does not represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment.

    • In view of the discussion above, we summarise our findings below:

    • (i) For the commission of an offence under Section 138, the cheque that is dishonoured must represent a legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity or presentation;

      (ii) If the drawer of the cheque pays a part or whole of the sum between the period when the cheque is drawn and when it is encashed upon maturity, then the legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity would not be the sum represented on the cheque;

      (iii) When a part or whole of the sum represented on the cheque is paid by the drawer of the cheque, it must be endorsed on the cheque as prescribed in Section 56 of the Act. The cheque endorsed with the payment made may be used to negotiate the balance, if any. If the cheque that is endorsed is dishonoured when it is sought to be encashed upon maturity, then the offence under Section 138 will stand attracted;

      (iv) The first respondent has made part-payments after the debt was incurred and before the cheque was encashed upon maturity. The sum of rupees twenty lakhs represented on the cheque was not the ‘legally enforceable debt’ on the date of maturity. Thus, the first respondent cannot be deemed to have committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act when the cheque was dishonoured for insufficient funds; and

      (v) The notice demanding the payment of the ‘said amount of money’ has been interpreted by judgments of this Court to mean the cheque amount. The conditions stipulated in the provisos to Section 138 need to be fulfilled in addition to the ingredients in the substantive part of Section 138. Since in this case, the first respondent has not committed an offence under Section 138, the validity of the form of the notice need not be decided.

      Reference :

      1. Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkand [2021 SCC OnLine SC 1002]

      2. Sunil Todi v. State of Gujarat [Criminal Appeal No. 1446 of 2021]

      3. Shree Corporation v. Anilbhai Puranbhai Bansal [2018 (2) GLH 105]

      4. Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited [2016 (10) SCC 458]

      5. Indus Airways Private Limited v. Magnum Aviation Private Limited [2014 (12) SCC 539]

      6. Alliance Infrastructure Project Ltd. v. Vinay Mittal [ILR (2010) III Delhi 459]

      7. Joseph Sartho v. Gopinathan [2008 (3) KLJ 784]

      8. Rahul Builders v. Arihant Fertilizers & Chemicals [2008 (2) SCC 321]

      9. KR Indira v. G. Adinarayana [2003 (8) SCC 300]

      10. Suman Sethi v. Ajay K Churiwal [2000 (2) SCC 38] (Para 23)

      11. M/s Electronics Trade and Technology Development Corporation Ltd. [1996 (3) Crimes 82 (SC)]

      12. NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magna Leasing Ltd. [AIR 1995 SC 1952]


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