Legal protection of databases: EU Law 1996


of 11 March 1996

on the legal protection of databases


Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 57 (2), 66 and 100a thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission ,

Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee ,

Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 189b of the Treaty ,

(1) Whereas databases are at present not sufficiently protected in all Member States by existing legislation; whereas such protection, where it exists, has different attributes;

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Preserving Court Records in the UK

United Kingdom

Court records under Public Records Act 1958

(1)The Lord Chancellor shall be responsible for the public records of every court of record or magistrates’ court which are not in the Public Record Office or a place of deposit appointed by the Secretary of State under this Act and shall have power to determine in the case of any such records other than records of the Supreme Court, the officer in whose custody they are for the time being to be:

(1A)Records of the Supreme Court for which the Lord Chancellor is responsible under subsection (1) shall be in the custody of the chief executive of that court.

(2)The power of the President of the Probate Division of the High Court under section one hundred and seventy of the M1Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, to direct where the wills and other documents mentioned in that section are to be deposited and preserved (exercisable with the consent of the Lord Chancellor) shall be transferred to the Lord Chancellor.

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Rick Brigs NASA Ames Research Center: Knowledge Representation in Sanskrit and Artificial Intelligence


Knowledge Representation in Sanskrit
and Artificial Intelligence

Rick Brigs
RIACS, NASA Ames Research Centeu, Moffet Field, California 94305


In the past twenty years, much time, effort, and money has been expended on designing an unambiguous representation of natural languages to make them accessible to computer processing. These efforts have centered around creating schemata designed to parallel logical relations with relations expressed by the syntax and semantics of natural languages, which are clearly cumbersome and ambiguous in their function as vehicles for the transmission of logical data. Understandably, there is a widespread belief that natural languages are unsuitable for the transmission of many ideas that artificial languages can render with great precision and mathematical rigor.

But this dichotomy, which has served as a premise underlying much work in the areas of linguistics and artificial intelligence, is a false one. There is at least one language, Sanskrit, which for the duration of almost 1,000 years was a living spoken language with a considerable literature of its own. Besides works of literary value, there was a long philosophical and grammatical tradition that has continued to exist with undiminished vigor until the present century. Among the accomplishments of the grammarians can be reckoned a method for paraphrasing Sanskrit in a manner that is identical not only in essence but in form with current work in Artificial Intelligence. This article demonstrates that a natural language can serve as an artificial language also, and that much work in AI has been reinventing a wheel millenia old.

Read the whole article here Knowledge Representation in Sanskrit and Artificial Intelligence

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Right to privacy and tortious action

The right to privacy as an independent and distinctive concept originated in the field to Tort Law, under which a new cause of action for damages resulting from unlawful invasion of privacy was recognised. This right has two aspects which are but two faces of the same coin:

(1) the general law of privacy which affords a tort action for damages resulting from an unlawful invasion of privacy and (2) the constitutional recognition given to the right to privacy against unlawful governmental invasion. The first aspect of this right must be said to have been violated where, for example, a person’s name or likeness is used, without his consent, for advertising – or non-advertising – purpose or for that matter, his life-story is written – whether laudatory or otherwise – and published without his consent as explained hereinafter. In recent times, however, this right has acquired a constitutional status.

Right to privacy is not enumerated as a fundamental right in our Constitution but has been inferred from Article 21. The first decision of this court dealing with this aspect is Kharak Singh. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964) 1 SCR 332). A more elaborate appraisal of this right took place in a later decision in Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh(1975) 2 SCC 148) wherein Mathew, J., speaking for himself, Krishna Iyer and Goswami, JJ. traced the origins of this right and also pointed out how the said right has been dealt with by the United States Supreme Court in two of its well-known decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut ((1965) 381 US 479:14 L Ed 2d 510) and Roe v. Wade ((1973) 410 US 113). After referring to Kharak Singh and the said American decisions, the learned Judge stated the law in the following words:

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PUNJAB STATE MEDIATION RULES-2019: Punjab State Legal Services Authority


In exercise of the Rule making power under Part X of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) and clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 89 of the said Code, the Punjab State Legal Services Authority hereby makes the following rules for court annexed mediation and for pre litigative matters referred to mediation.:-

Rule-1: Short title, commencement and interpretation

These Rules shall be called as the “Punjab State Mediation Rules, 2019”. These Rules shall come into force with effect from the date of approval by the Executive Chairman of Punjab State Legal Service Authority.

If any of these Rules are in conflict with any mandatory provision of the applicable law of Mediation from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision shall prevail.

Rule-2: Definitions

2.01 In these Rules, unless the context otherwise requires-“Advocate” means advocate as defined under Section 2(a) of the Advocates Act, 1961.

“Attorney” means a person duly appointed as such in accordance with the Powers-of-Attorney Act, 1882 and the Rules framed there under. “Chairperson” means the District Judge mentioned under Section 9 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.

“Decree” means decree as defined under Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

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Report of the International Law Commission- 71 Session 2019

The International Law Commission held the first part of its seventy-first session from 29 April to 7 June 2019 and the second part from 8 July to 9 August 2019 at its seat at the United Nations Office at Geneva. The session was opened by Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Chair of the seventieth session of the Commission.

Summary of the work of the Commission at its seventy-first session

With respect to the topic “Crimes against humanity”, the Commission had before it the fourth report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/725 and Add.1), as well as comments and observations received from Governments, international organizations and others (A/CN.4/726, Add.1 and Add.2). The fourth report addressed the comments and observations made by Governments, international organizations and others on the draft articles and commentaries adopted on first reading and made recommendations for each draft article.

With regard to the topic “Peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens)”, the Commission had before it the fourth report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/727), which discussed the question of the existence of regional jus cogens and the inclusion of an illustrative list, based on norms previously recognized by the Commission as possessing a peremptory character. Following the plenary debate, the Commission decided to refer the draft conclusion proposed in the fourth report to the Drafting Committee.

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Acquisition Of Citizenship in India

Citizenship Under the Constitution of India 1950

Part 2

5. Citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution

At the commencement of this Constitution every person who has his domicile in the territory of India and-

(a) who was born in the territory of India; or

(b) either of whose parents was born in the territory of India; or

(c) who has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years immediately preceding such commencement, shall be a citizen of India.

6. Rights of citizenship of certain persons who have migrated to India from Pakistan

Notwithstanding anything in article 5, a person who has migrated to the territory of India from the territory now included in Pakistan shall be deemed to be a citizen of India at the commencement of this Constitution if-
(a) he or either of his parents or any of his grand-parents was born in India as defined in the Government of India Act, 1935 (as originally enacted); and

(b)(i) in the case where such person has so migrated before the nineteenth day of July, 1948, he has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India since the date of his migration, or

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Possession and Occupy means

In Ram Dass v. Davinder, (2004) 3 SCC 684, this Court interpreted Section 13(2)(v) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 in terms of which an order of eviction could be passed against the tenant if he is shown to have ceased to occupy the premises continuously for a period of 4 months without reasonable cause. Respondent Davinder was tenant in the shop belonging to Appellant-Ram Dass. The Appellant filed a petition for eviction of the Respondent on the ground that he had ceased to occupy the shop for a continuous period of 4 months without any reasonable cause. The Rent Controller analyzed the pleadings of the parties and evidence produced by them and held that the Appellant has been able to prove that the Respondent had ceased to occupy the premises for a continuous period of more than 4 months and there was no reasonable cause for doing so. The plea of the Respondent that he had kept the shop closed intermittently due to sickness was not accepted by the Rent Controller. The Appellate Authority, on an independent evaluation of the evidence, confirmed the finding of the Rent Controller. The High Court allowed the revision filed by the Respondent and set aside the orders of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority. This Court reversed the order of the High Court and restored the one passed by the Rent Controller. The Court highlighted the distinction between the terms “possession” and “occupy” in the context of Rent Control Legislation in the following words:

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Right of pre-emption

Pre-emption: the concept of

The right of pre-emption is not a right to the thing sold but a right to the offer of a thing about to be sold. This right is called the primary or inherent right.

In Suresh Chand and Anr. Vs. Suresh Chander (D) through LRS. and Ors- 19/02/2020 the Supreme Court has explained the following Law:-

10. In assessing the rival submissions, it is necessary to analyse the provisions of the Act. Section 4 is in the following terms:

“4 Cases in which right of pre-emption accrues. Subject to the provisions contained in section 5, the right of preemption shall, upon the transfer of any immovable property, accrue to the persons mentioned in section 6.”

The right of pre-emption accrues on the transfer of any immovable property to the classes of persons mentioned in Section 6. But the opening words of Section 4 indicate that the right of pre-emption which accrues under Section 6 is subject to Section 5.

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Vested rights in service matters

Supreme Court in a range of decisions including TR Kapur v. State of Haryana3, K Ravindranath Pai v. State of Karnataka4 and K Narayanan v. State of Karnataka5, has opined that vested rights cannot be impaired by enacting law with retrospective effect and that such statutory rules ought not to result in any discrimination or violation of constitutional rights.[Gelus Ram Sahu and others Vs. Dr. Surendra Kumar Singh and others-18/02/2020]

The law on vested rights in service matters has exhaustively been elaborated in Railway Board v. Rangadhamiah6, wherein it has been stated:

“20. It can, therefore, be said that a rule which operates in futuro so as to govern future rights of those already in service cannot be assailed on the ground of retroactivity as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, but a rule which seeks to reverse from an anterior date a benefit which has been granted or availed of, e.g., promotion or pay scale, can be assailed as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution to the extent it operates retrospectively.

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