Protracted incarceration

Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India (1996) 2 SCC 616. and Hussain v. Union of India, (2017) 5 SCC 702 it was argued that such protracted incarceration violates the respondent’s right to speedy trial and access to justice; in which case, Constitutional Courts could exercise their powers to grant bail, regardless of limitations specified under special enactments.

It must be emphasised at the outset that there is a vivid distinction between the parameters to be applied while considering a bail application, vis­-à­-vis those applicable while deciding a petition for its(bail) cancellation. In Puran v. Rambilas(2001) 6 SCC 338, , it was re­iterated that at the time of deciding an application for bail, it would be necessary to record reasons, albeit without evaluating the evidence on merits. In turn, Puran (supra) cited Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)(1978) 1 SCC 118 , wherein this Court observed that bail once granted by the trial Court, could be cancelled by the same Court only in case of new circumstances/evidence, failing which, it would be necessary to approach the Higher Court exercising appellate jurisdiction.

In State of Bihar v. Rajballav Prasad(2017) 2 SCC 178 , this Court ruled that deference must be given to the discretion exercised by Superior Courts in matters of bail, save for exceptional circumstances. The afore­cited decision holds as follows:

“14. We may observe at the outset that we are conscious of the limitations which bind us while entertaining a plea against grant of bail by the lower court, that too, which is a superior court like High Court. It is expected that once the discretion is exercised by the High Court on relevant considerations and bail is granted, this Court would normally not interfere with such a discretion, unless it is found that the discretion itself is exercised on extraneous considerations and/or the relevant factors which need to be taken into account while exercising such a discretion are ignored or bypassed. … There have to be very cogent and overwhelming circumstances that are necessary to interfere with the discretion in granting the bail. These material considerations are also spelled out in the aforesaid judgments viz. whether the accused would be readily available for his trial and whether he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with the evidence. …”

(emphasis supplied)

in Shaheen Welfare Association (supra), laying down that gross delay in disposal of such cases would justify
the invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution and consequential necessity to release the undertrial on bail. It would be useful to quote the following observations from the cited case:

“10. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the need to protect the society and the nation, TADA has prescribed in Section 20(8) stringent provisions for granting bail. Such stringent provisions can be justified looking to the nature of the crime, as was held in Kartar Singh case [(1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] , on the presumption that the trial of the accused will take place without undue delay. No one can justify gross delay in disposal of cases when undertrials perforce remain in jail, giving rise to possible situations that may justify invocation of Article 21.”

Even in the case of special legislations like the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 or the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“NDPS”) which too have somewhat rigorous conditions for grant of bail, this Court in Paramjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (1999) 9 SCC 252 , Babba alias Shankar Raghuman Rohida v. State of Maharashtra(2005) 11 SCC 569 and Umarmia alias Mamumia v. State of Gujarat (2017) 2 SCC 731 enlarged the accused on bail when they had been in jail for an extended period of time with little possibility of early completion of trial. The constitutionality of harsh conditions for bail in such special enactments, has thus been primarily justified on the touchstone of speedy trials to ensure the protection of innocent civilians. Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 731 , it was held that undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his acts unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. However, owing to the practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal is left at large pending trial, Courts are tasked with deciding whether an individual ought to be released pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, Courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail.

Refer: Union of India VS K.A. Najeeb Supreme Court( 1st Feb 2021) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 98 of 2021