In the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1978 SC 47) (supra) a distinction has been made between an order which is purely interlocutory which could be corrected in exercise of revisional power and an order though interlocutory which results in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or calls for interference to secure the ends of justice.
If the order is purely interlocutory it cannot be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. but if the order though interlocutory results in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or calls for interference to secure the ends of justice it can be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. as Section 397(2), Cr. P.C. is a bar to the Exercise of revisional power by the High Court and the Sessions Judge in respect of interlocutory orders but does not bar the High Court from the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. In our opinion the aforesaid principle is also applicable to cases covered by Section 397(3), Cr. P.C. and Section 399(3), Cr. P.C. in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of V. C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. (AIR 1980 SC 962) .
If the application in revision is made under Section 397(1), Cr. P.C. to the Sessions Judge by any person the order of the Sessions Judge is final in relation to such a person and no revision at the instance of such person can be entertained by the High Court and revisional power cannot also be exercised suo motu by the High Court in view of Sections 397(3) and 399(3), Cr. P.C. The order of the Sessions Judge in revision can also not be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. except in cases where it has resulted in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or interference is called for to secure the ends of justice. If the order of the Sessions Judge in revision has determined the dispute between the parties, it cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. for to do so would make the bar under Sections 397(3) and 399(3), Cr. P.C. inoperative in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajan Kumar Manchanda v. State of Karnataka (1988 All Cri C 54) (supra).
Thus in cases of conviction by the Magistrate which are not appealable the order of the Sessions Judge in revision is final and cannot be interfered with by the High Court in revision either at the instance of the same party or suo motu or in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. Similarly the order of the Sessions Judge in revision in cases under Sections 125, 133/138 and 145, Cr. P.C. and against an order of discharge by the Magistrate cannot be interfered with by the High Court-either in exercise of its revisional powers at the instance of the same party or suo motu or in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. for these are also some of the orders of the Sessions Judge which determined the dispute between the parties. The order of the Sessions Judge in revision against a summoning order or an order framing charge is, however, different as it does not determine the dispute between the parties. If it results in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or calls for interference to secure the ends of justice it can be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. as this is not barred under Section 397(3), Cr. P.C. and Section 399(3), Cr. P.C.
In this view of the matter there is no conflict between the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajan Kumar Manchanda v. State of Karnataka (1988 All WC 54) (supra) and in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1978 SC 47), Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration) (AIR 1980 SC 258) and V. C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. (AIR 1980 SC 962) (supra). In the case of Rajan Kumar Manchanda v. State of Karnataka (supra) the Magistrate directed the release of truck in favour of the appellant. The order of the Sessions Judge dismissing the revision filed by the State determined the dispute between the parties regarding the possession of the truck and did not result in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or call for interference to secure the ends of justice. It could not thus be interfered with by the High Court either in revision at the instance of the State or suo motu or in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. In the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (supra) the order of the trial Court issuing process against the accused was challenged. In the case of Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration) (supra) the order summoning the accused was challenged.
In the case of V. C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. (supra) the order framing charge against the accused was challenged. The orders of the trial Court in all these cases could result in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or call for interference to secure the ends of justice. In such cases neither Section 397(2), Cr. P.C. nor Section 397(3), Cr. P.C. could bar the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/ or secure the ends of justice. It may be mentioned that in the case of R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 the scope of the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. in the matter of quashing criminal proceeding in Court after the submission of the charge-sheet or complaint has been dealt with.
In case of H. K. Rawal v. Nidhi Prakash reported in 1989 All WC 632 : (1990 Cri LJ 961)) the Full Bench has observed as follows :-
…that where an application Under Section 397, Cr.P.C. filed by any party in the Court of Session is decided against him it is open to that party to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court Under Section 482, Cr. P.C. only if the order of the Sessions judge has resulted in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or calls for interference to secure the ends of justice as the bar Under Sections 397(3) and 399(3), Cr. P.C. is not applicable to the exercise of the inherent powers by the High Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. in such a case. If on the other hand, the order of the Sessions Judge has determined the dispute between the parties as indicated in our judgment, it cannot be interferred with by the High Court in revision at the instance of the same party or suo moto or in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. in view of the bar under Sub-section 397(3) and 399(3), Cr. P.C.
