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NUISANCE-The common law of nuisance has co-existed with statutory controls, albeit less sophisticated, since the 19th century. There is no principle that the common law should ‘march with’ a statutory scheme covering similar subject matter. Short of express or implied statutory authority to commit a nuisance…, there is no basis, in principle or authority, for using such a statutory scheme to cut down private law rights

The common law originally developed under the auspices of theĀ adversarial systemĀ in historicalĀ EnglandĀ from judicial decisions that were based inĀ tradition,Ā custom, andĀ precedent. The form of reasoning used in common law is known asĀ casuistryĀ orĀ case-based reasoning. Common law may be unwritten or written inĀ statutesĀ or codes. The common law, as applied in civil cases (as distinct fromĀ criminalĀ cases), was devised as a means ofĀ compensatingĀ someone for wrongful acts known asĀ torts, including both intentional torts and torts caused byĀ negligenceĀ and as developing the body of law recognizing and regulatingĀ contracts.

JUDICIAL COMMITTE OF PRIVY COUNCIL Rajunder Narain Rae, and Cower Mohainder Narain Rae (the two surviving Sons and representatives of Rajah Sree Narain Rae),-Appellants; Bijai Govind Sing (Son and representative of Bhyajha, deceased),-Respondent 1 ON APPEAL FROM THE SUDDER DEWANNY ADAWLUT OF BENGAL (REPORTED 2 SUD. DEW.AD. REPS. 23). Original Citation: (1836-39) 2 Moo Ind App 181 English Reports Citation: […]

The Laws of England may aptly enough be divided into two Kinds, viz. Lex Scripta, the written Law: and Lex non Scripta, the unwritten Law: For although (as shall be shewn hereafter) all the Laws of this Kingdom have some Monuments or Memorials thereof in Writing, yet all of them have not their Original in Writing; for some of those Laws have obtain’d their Force by immemorial Usage or Custom, and such Laws are properly call’d Leges non Scriptae, or unwritten Laws or Customs.

Possession is to be protected because a man by taking possession of an object has brought it within the sphere of his will. He has extended his personality into or over that object. As Hegel would have said, possession is the objective realization of free will. And by Kant’s postulate, the will of any individual thus manifested is entitled to absolute respect from every other individual, and can only be overcome or set aside by the universal will, that is, by the state, acting through its organs, the courts.

In the sense and for the causes I have now shortly set forth, I propose as the general subject of these lectures the Genius of the Common Law. For reasons which seem imperative, I do not propose to handle the matter as a chronicler. A concise history of the Common Law might be a very good thing; I have thought once and again of its possibilities; but if ever the time comes when it can be brought within the compass of eight, ten or twelve lectures, it will be after much more searching and sifting have been done.

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