When sections 92, 94 and 95 of the Evidence Act are applied to a string of correspondence between parties, it is important to remember that each document must be taken to be part of a coherent whole, which happens only when the “plain” language of the document is first applied accurately to existing facts.
In the passing, we may also refer to the observations of a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Smt. Kamala Devi vs. Seth Takhatmal & Anr.: (1964) 2 SCR 152, in which the court observed as follows:- “8. … Sections 94 to 98 of the Indian Evidence. Act afford guidance in the construction of documents; they also indicate when […]
A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish. (See Inder Singh and another vs. State (Delhi Admn.) (AIR 1978 SC 1091). Vague hunches cannot take place of judicial evaluation. “A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial, merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man, does not escape.
One of the pleas is that the prosecution has not explained the injuries on the accused. Issue is if there is no such explanation what would be its effect? We are not prepared to agree with the learned counsel for the defence that in each and every case where prosecution fails to explain the injuries found on some of the accused, the prosecution case should automatically be rejected, without any further probe.
In Maqsoodan and Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 SC 126, this Court dealt with an issue wherein a person who had made a statement in expectation of death did not die. The court held that it cannot be treated as a dying declaration as his statement was not admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called the Act 1872), but it was to be dealt with under Section 157 of the Act 1872, which provides that the former statement of a witness may be proved to corroborate later testimony as to the same fact.
Trustworthy evidence This question has been definitively dealt with by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 202, wherein the Court observed as under: … under the Indian Evidence Act, trustworthy evidence given by a single witness would be enough to convict an accused person, whereas evidence given by half a […]
Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus: In Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 1962, this Court observed as under: It is true that, as laid down by this Court in Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 15, and other cases which have followed that case, the Court must make an attempt to separate […]
It is a settled legal proposition that FIR is not an encyclopedia of the entire case. It may not and need not contain all the details. Naming of the accused therein may be important but not naming of the accused in FIR may not be a ground to doubt the contents thereof in case the statement of the witness is […]