SPECIAL LEAVE-If at the hearing of the appeal the Supreme Court is satisfied that the material statements made by the appellant in his application for special leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is, entitled to contend that the appellant may have obtained special leave from the Supreme Court on the strength of what he characterizes as misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for special leave, the Supreme Court may come to the conclusion that in such a case special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIAIndia Bharat Varsha (Jambu Dvipa) is the name of this land mass. The people of this land are Sanatan Dharmin and they always defeated invaders. Indra (10000 yrs) was the oldest deified King of this land. Manu's jurisprudence enlitened this land. Vedas have been the civilizational literature of this land. Guiding principles of this land are : सत्यं वद । धर्मं चर । स्वाध्यायान्मा प्रमदः । Read more
Hari Narain
Versus
Badri Das
(Before : P. B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah And J. C. Shah, JJ.)
Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1963,
Decided on : 04-03-1963.
ConstitutionConstitution The Constitution encompasses the global system of rules governing constitutional authority. Simply reading selected provisions of the written text may be misleading. Understanding the underlying principles, such as federalism, democracy, constitutionalism, the rule of law, and respect for minorities, is crucial. Democratic institutions must allow for ongoing discussion and evolution, reflected in the right of participants to initiate constitutional change. This right entails a reciprocal duty to engage in discussions. Democracy involves more than majority rule, existing within the context of other constitutional values. Therefore, a profound understanding of these principles informs our appreciation of constitutional rights and obligations. Read more of India, 1950—Article 136—Revocation of Special leave.
Counsel for the Parties:
M/s. M.C. Setalvad and S.T. Desai, Senior Advocates, (Mr. Naunitlal, Advocate, with them) for Appellant
Mr. G. S. Pathak, Senior Advocate, Mr. S. N. Andley, Advocate of M/s. Rajinder Narain and Co., with him) for Respondent.
JudgmentJudgment The statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order - CPC 2(9). It contains a concise statement of the case, points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision - Order 20 Rule 4(2). Section 354 of CrPC requires that every judgment shall contain points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. Indian Supreme Court Decisions > Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts (Art 141 Indian Constitution) Civil and judicial authorities to act in aid of the Supreme Court (Art 144) Supreme Court Network On Judiciary – Portal > Denning: “Judges do not speak, as do actors, to please. They do not speak, as do advocates, to persuade. They do not speak, as do historians, to recount the past. They speak to give Judgment. And in their judgments, you will find passages, which are worthy to rank with the greatest literature….” Law Points on Judgment Writing > The judge must write to provide an easy-to-understand analysis of the issues of law and fact which arise for decision. Judgments are primarily meant for those whose cases are decided by judges (State Bank of India and Another Vs Ajay Kumar Sood SC 2022)
Gajendragadkar, J—It is not necessary to deal with the meritsMerits Strict legal rights of the parties; a decision “on the merits” is one that reaches the right(s) of a party as distinguished from a disposition of the case on a ground not reaching the rights raised in the action; for example, in a criminal case double jeopardy does not apply if charges are nolle prossed before trial commences, and in a civil action res judicata does not apply if a previous action was dismissed on a preliminary motion raising a technicality such as improper service of process. of the points which the appellant wanted to raise before us in this appeal, because we are satisfied that the respondent’s prayer that the special leave granted to the appellant should be revoked, is well founded. The appellant is a tenant of the premises in suit which are owned by the respondent. These premises were let out to the appellant by the respondent under a rent note executed on the 8th December, 1953. The appellant was permitted to use the said premises for his Oil Mill. The terms of the lease provided that the appellant was to pay to the respondent the agreed rent every month and in case of default for three months the respondent was entitled to evict the appellant before the expiry of the stipulated period which was five years, and in that case he was entitled also to claimA Claim A claim is “factually unsustainable” where it could be said with confidence before trial that the factual basis for the claim is entirely without substance, which can be the case if it were clear beyond question that the facts pleaded are contradicted by all the documents or other material on which it is based. the rent for the remaining period.
2. On the 2nd of May, 1959, the respondent sued the appellant for ejectment in the Court of Munsif, East Jaipur City. He alleged that he had received the rent from the appellant up to the 31st October, 1957 and that thereafter the appellant had defaulted in the payment of rent in spite of repeated demands, and that even at the date of the suit he was in arrears of rent and had failed to pay the house tax according to the agreementContract An agreement enforceable by law is a contract. All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void. Indian Contract Act.. His case was that the appellant’s tenancy had expired on the 1st of December 1958 by efflux of timeTime Where any expression of it occurs in any Rules, or any judgment, order or direction, and whenever the doing or not doing of anything at a certain time of the day or night or during a certain part of the day or night has an effect in law, that time is, unless it is otherwise specifically stated, held to be standard time as used in a particular country or state. (In Physics, time and Space never exist actually-“quantum entanglement”), but the appellant never the less failed to deliver over possession of the premises to the respondent. He, however, purported to deposit a lump sum of ` l053/- to cover the period from 1st November, 1957 to 30th November, 1958 which was due from him. The respondent pleaded that the appellant had committed more than three defaults in the payment of rent of two months each during the period of 18 months and that even at the date of the suit, the rent or mesne profits for 5 months and 2 days still remained to be paid. That is the basis on which a decree for ejectment was claimed by the respondent against the appellant.
3. The appellant denied the respondent’s claim and alleged that the respondent was not entitled to claim ejectment against him by virtue of the provisions of S. 13 (I) (a) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act 17 of 1950) hereinafter called the Act). He also pleaded that by virtue of the fact that the respondent had accepted rent paid by the appellant he had waved his right to evict him. In other words, he denied that there was any default, and resisted the respondent’s prayer for his ejectment. At the date of the first hearing of the suit in the trial Court, the appellant deposited ` 648/- on account of rent due up to the said date and the said payment was accepted by the respondent without prejudice.
4. On those pleading, the learned trial Judge framed four issues, the principal issue being whether the appellant had committed three defaults of two months within the period of 18 months in the payment of rent? The finding of the trial Court on the said issue as well as on the other issues framed by it was in favour of the appellant. In the result, the respondent’s suit was dismissed.
5. The respondent then preferred an appeal in the Court of the Additional Session Judge, Jaipur City, the appellate Court held that on the facts proved by the respondents, the three defaults had been committed by the appellant, and so, he was entitled to a decree for ejectment. On these findings, the decree passed by the trial Court was set aside and the respondent’s claim for ejectment was allowed.
6. The appellant challenged this decision by preferring a second appeal before the Rajasthan High CourtHigh Court High Court Judges in England and Wales handle complex and tough cases, sitting in London and traveling to court centers around the country. They preside over serious criminal and important civil cases, and support the Lord and Lady Justices in hearing appeals. High Court Judges are commonly referred to as ‘Mr/Mrs/Ms Justice surname’ and are given the prefix ‘The Honourable’. They are assigned to the King’s Bench Division, the Family Division, or the Chancery Division. The King’s Bench Division focuses on civil wrongs and judicial review, the Family Division deals with family law, and the Chancery Division handles various cases including company law and probate. Judges are appointed through a rigorous process overseen by the Judicial Appointments Commission.. The appeal was heard by a learned single Judge of the said High Court and was dismissed. The appellant’s request for leave to prefer an appeal under Letters Patent was rejected by the learned Judge. It is against the decision of the learned single Judge in the second appeal that the appellant applied for and obtained special leave to appeal to this Court.
7. The main point which the appellant wanted to urge before this Court was in regard to the construction of S. 13 (1) (a) of the Act read with S. 13 (4), but as we have already indicated, we do not reach the stage of dealing with the merits of this point, because we are satisfied that the material statements made by the appellant in his application for special leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is entitled to contend that the appellant may have obtained special leave from this Court on the strength of what he characterises as misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for special leave. In the said petition, the appellant has taken six grounds of appeal against the decision of the High Court. The last ground is that the respondent had claimed eviction in the trial Court on the basis of alleged non-payment and non-tender of payment of rent from the 2nd December, 1958, but the First Appellate Court and the High Court set up a new case for the landlord by taking into consideration the alleged defaults prior to 2nd December, 1958 and not relied upon by the landlord himself. This ground was presumably taken in support of the main argument that the High Court had not correctly interpreted the provisions of S. 13(l)(a) of the Act. The respondent contends that this is a complete mm statement of the true position and in support of his argument he has referred us to paragraph 3 in the plaint. It appears that the rent due from the appellant for the period between 1st November, 1957 to 30th November, 1958, which had fallen in default was deposited by him by cheque on the 2nd December, l958. Paragraph 3 of the plaint specifically refers to these defaults and in fact, takes into account the said defaults for the purpose of setting up the respondent’s case that the appellant had committed more than three defaults in the payment of rent of two months each during the period of 18 months. Therefore, there is no doubt that the unambiguous and categorical statement made in the last ground of the appellant’s petition for special leave is wholly untrue.
8. Similarly, it appears that in another ground taken in the special leave petition, the appellant has made an equally inaccurate statement. In this ground the appellant represented that by reason of the payments made by him towards rent due from him to the respondent he had become a statutory tenant and “admittedly did not make any default after 1st December, 1958”. This statement must be read along with and in the light of the material averments contained in paragraph 6 of the petition where the appellant has stated that on the first hearing he deposited Rs.648/- on account of rent due up to that date and the respondent accepted it. Both these statements omit to refer to the material fact that the deposit made in Court was accepted by the respondent without prejudice, and so, the statement in the ground that the appellant admittedly did not make any default after the 1st December, 1958, is equally untrue. Mr. Pathak for the respondent urges that in view of these serious mis-statements contained in the petition for special leave, his client is justified in assuming that special leave may have been granted to the appellant as, result of the argument urged by him on the strength of these mis-statements, and so, he has pressed his petition that the special leave granted to the appellant should be revoked.
9. On the other hand, Mr. Setalvad contended that he had appeared at the time when special leave was granted and to the best of his recollection he had not referred to these grounds, but had merely urged his contention that the High Court had mis-construed S. 13 (1) (a) of the Act. We have no hesitation in accepting Mr. Setalvad’s statement; but, in our opinionOpinion A judge's written explanation of a decision of the court. In an appeal, multiple opinions may be written. The court’s ruling comes from a majority of judges and forms the majority opinion. A dissenting opinion disagrees with the majority because of the reasoning and/or the principles of law on which the decision is based. A concurring opinion agrees with the end result of the court but offers further comment possibly because they disagree with how the court reached its conclusion., in dealing with the respondent’s prayer that special leave granted to the appellant should be revoked, what was actually urged before the Court cannot be decisive of the matter and may not even be very material. It is true that in the present case, special leave was granted on the 26th September, 1962 and it is possible for Mr. Setalvad to recall what he argued before the Court when special leave was granted. But it is necessary to bear in mind that the appeal may come on for hearing long after special leave is granted, that counsel appearing at the stage of admission may not be same as at the stage of final hearing, and the Bench that granted special leave may not necessarily deal with the appeal at the final stage. Therefore, it is no answer to the respondent’s contention that though the material statements in the special leave petition may be substantially inaccurate, though not wholly untrue, those statements may not have influenced the Court in granting special leave. Mr. Setalvad has also invited our attention to the fact that the impugned statements and grounds are substantially copied from the averments made in the appeal before the High Court. That may be so, but the fact still remains that two important statements which, if true, may have been of considerable assistance to the appellant in invoking the protection of S. 13(1) (a) even on the construction placed by the High Court on that section are found to be untrue, and that, in our opinion, is a very serious infirmity in the petition itself. It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. That is why we have come to the conclusion that in the present case special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked. Accordingly, special leave is revoked and the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will pay the costsCosts Subject to any written law, costs are at the discretion of the Court, and the Court has the power to determine all issues relating to the costs of or incidental to all proceedings, including by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid, at any stage of the proceedings or after the conclusion of the proceedings. Generally “Costs” includes charges, disbursements, expenses, fees, and remuneration. Costs in any matter are payable from the date of the order of the Court unless the parties otherwise agree. The costs of a third-party funding contract are not recoverable as part of the costs of, or costs. of the respondent.
10. Mr. Setalvad requested us to give the appellant some time to vacate the premises. He invited our attention to the fact that the appellant has invested large amounts in setting up machinery of the Oil Mill which he is running in the premises in question. Mr. Andley for the respondent has fairly conceded that on condition that the appellant unconditionally undertakes to deliver possession of the premises to the respondent within six months from the date of this judgment he would not execute the decree for ejectment. Mr. Setalvad offered an unconditional undertaking on behalf of the appellant as suggested by Mr. Andley. We accordingly direct that on the appellant’s undertaking the respondent should not execute the decree for six months from today.
AIR 1963 SC 1558 : (1964) 2 SCR 203
