SENTENCING POLICY-Many factors which may not be relevant to determine the guilt, must be seen with a human approach, at the stage of sentencing. While imposing the sentence, all relevant factors are to be considered, keeping in mind the facts and circumstances of each case.
The Court in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution cannot curtail the fundamental rights of the citizens conferred under the Constitution and pass orders in violation of substantive provisions which are based on fundamental policy principles, yet when a case of the present nature arises, it may issue appropriate directions so that criminal trial is conducted in accordance with law. It is the obligation and duty of this Court to ensure free and fair trial.
Discrimination against women -The pattern of evaluation in Indian Army in case of women, by excluding subsequent achievements of the petitioners and failing to account for the inherent patterns of discrimination that were produced as a consequence of casual grading and skewed incentive structures, has resulted in indirect and systemic discrimination. This discrimination has caused an economic and psychological harm and an affront to their dignity.
A dying declaration is admissible in evidence under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It alone can also form the basis for conviction if it has been made voluntarily and inspires confidence. If there are contradictions, variations, creating doubts about its truthfulness, affecting its veracity and credibility or if the dying declaration is suspect, or the accused is able to create a doubt not only with regard to the dying declaration but also with regard to the nature and manner of death, the benefit of doubt shall have to be given to the accused. Therefore much shall depend on the facts of a case. There can be no rigid standard or yardstick for acceptance or rejection of a dying declaration.
Disapprobation of governmental inaction cannot be branded as an attempt to promote hatred between different communities. Free speech of the citizens of this country cannot be stifled by implicating them in criminal cases, unless such speech has the tendency to affect public order. The sequitur of above analysis of the Facebook post made by the Appellant is that no case is made out against the Appellant for an offence under Section 153 A and 505 (1) (c) IPC.
Whether a benefit of doubt resulting in acquittal of the accused in a case charged under Sections 302,323,341/34 of the Indian Penal Code can create an opportunity for the accused to join as a constable in the Rajasthan Police service-NO- Any Govt circular favouring acquitted accused for job has to be read in the context of the judicial pronouncements that giving benefit of doubt would not entitle candidate for appointment.
A cryptic phone call without complete information or containing part-information about the commission of a cognizable offence cannot always be treated as an FIR. This proposition has been accepted by this Court in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala-5 and Damodar v. State of Rajasthan-6. A mere message or a telephonic message which does not clearly specify the offence, cannot be treated as an FIR.
A GD entry recording the information by the informant disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence can be treated as FIR in a given case and the police has the power and jurisdiction to investigate the same. The appellant has been summoned for a preliminary enquiry only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. If the preliminary enquiry discloses the cognizable offence, then a first information report will be registered against the appellant.
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955—Section 13(i)(4)—Virulent and incurable leprosy—Disease found to be malignant and contagious—Known treatment not providing complete treatment nor could correct deformity and mutilations produced by disease—Petitioner is entitled to decree of divorce.
In England until 1858 the only remedy for desertion was a suit for restitution of conjugal rights. But by the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, desertion without cause for two years upwards was made a ground for a suit for judicial separation. It was not till 1937 that by the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, desertion without cause for a period of three years immediately preceding the institutions of proceedings was made a ground for divorce. The law has now been consolidated in the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 (14 Geo. VI, C. 25). It would thus appear that desertion as affording a cause of action for a suit for dissolution of marriage is a recent growth even in England.
It is well known and recognized legal position that customary Hindu Law like Mohammedan Law permitted bigamous marriages which were prevalent in all Hindu families and more so in royal Hindu families. It is only after the Hindu Law was codified by enactments including the present Act that bar against bigamous marriages was created by Section 5(i) of the Act. Keeping into consideration the present state of the statutory Hindu Law, a bigamous marriage may be declared illegal being in contravention of the provisions of the Act but it cannot be said to be immoral so as to deny even the right of alimony or maintenance to a spouse financially weak and economically dependant.
Acts of the English Parliament (1267 – 2020)
1164 1215 1267 1275 1285 1290 1297 1313 1322 1337 1350 1351 1354 1361 1368 1382 1405 1416 1423 1424 1429 1449 1469 1474 1487 1491 1495 1503 1512 1514 1532 1533 1534 1535 1536 1539 1540 1542 1547 1551 1554 1555 1558 1560 1567 1571 1572 1575 1578 1579 1581 1584 1585 1587 1588 1589 1592 1594 1597 1600 1603 1606 1607 1617 1621 1623 1627 1633 1639 1660 1661 1662 1663 1666 1669 1672 1677 1679 1681 1685 1686 1688 1689 1690 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1698 1700
1701 1702 1703 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1714 1715 1716 1721 1727 1730 1737 1738 1743 1744 1746 1750 1751 1765 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1779 1780 1781 1782 1786 1787 1790 1792 1793 1795 1797 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1808 1809 1811 1812 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900
1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
