SENTENCING POLICY-Many factors which may not be relevant to determine the guilt, must be seen with a human approach, at the stage of sentencing. While imposing the sentence, all relevant factors are to be considered, keeping in mind the facts and circumstances of each case.
The Court in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution cannot curtail the fundamental rights of the citizens conferred under the Constitution and pass orders in violation of substantive provisions which are based on fundamental policy principles, yet when a case of the present nature arises, it may issue appropriate directions so that criminal trial is conducted in accordance with law. It is the obligation and duty of this Court to ensure free and fair trial.
Discrimination against women -The pattern of evaluation in Indian Army in case of women, by excluding subsequent achievements of the petitioners and failing to account for the inherent patterns of discrimination that were produced as a consequence of casual grading and skewed incentive structures, has resulted in indirect and systemic discrimination. This discrimination has caused an economic and psychological harm and an affront to their dignity.
A dying declaration is admissible in evidence under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It alone can also form the basis for conviction if it has been made voluntarily and inspires confidence. If there are contradictions, variations, creating doubts about its truthfulness, affecting its veracity and credibility or if the dying declaration is suspect, or the accused is able to create a doubt not only with regard to the dying declaration but also with regard to the nature and manner of death, the benefit of doubt shall have to be given to the accused. Therefore much shall depend on the facts of a case. There can be no rigid standard or yardstick for acceptance or rejection of a dying declaration.
Disapprobation of governmental inaction cannot be branded as an attempt to promote hatred between different communities. Free speech of the citizens of this country cannot be stifled by implicating them in criminal cases, unless such speech has the tendency to affect public order. The sequitur of above analysis of the Facebook post made by the Appellant is that no case is made out against the Appellant for an offence under Section 153 A and 505 (1) (c) IPC.
Whether a benefit of doubt resulting in acquittal of the accused in a case charged under Sections 302,323,341/34 of the Indian Penal Code can create an opportunity for the accused to join as a constable in the Rajasthan Police service-NO- Any Govt circular favouring acquitted accused for job has to be read in the context of the judicial pronouncements that giving benefit of doubt would not entitle candidate for appointment.
A cryptic phone call without complete information or containing part-information about the commission of a cognizable offence cannot always be treated as an FIR. This proposition has been accepted by this Court in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala-5 and Damodar v. State of Rajasthan-6. A mere message or a telephonic message which does not clearly specify the offence, cannot be treated as an FIR.
A GD entry recording the information by the informant disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence can be treated as FIR in a given case and the police has the power and jurisdiction to investigate the same. The appellant has been summoned for a preliminary enquiry only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. If the preliminary enquiry discloses the cognizable offence, then a first information report will be registered against the appellant.
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955—Section 13(i)(4)—Virulent and incurable leprosy—Disease found to be malignant and contagious—Known treatment not providing complete treatment nor could correct deformity and mutilations produced by disease—Petitioner is entitled to decree of divorce.
In England until 1858 the only remedy for desertion was a suit for restitution of conjugal rights. But by the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, desertion without cause for two years upwards was made a ground for a suit for judicial separation. It was not till 1937 that by the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, desertion without cause for a period of three years immediately preceding the institutions of proceedings was made a ground for divorce. The law has now been consolidated in the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 (14 Geo. VI, C. 25). It would thus appear that desertion as affording a cause of action for a suit for dissolution of marriage is a recent growth even in England.
It is well known and recognized legal position that customary Hindu Law like Mohammedan Law permitted bigamous marriages which were prevalent in all Hindu families and more so in royal Hindu families. It is only after the Hindu Law was codified by enactments including the present Act that bar against bigamous marriages was created by Section 5(i) of the Act. Keeping into consideration the present state of the statutory Hindu Law, a bigamous marriage may be declared illegal being in contravention of the provisions of the Act but it cannot be said to be immoral so as to deny even the right of alimony or maintenance to a spouse financially weak and economically dependant.