As the written examination assesses knowledge and intellectual abilities of a candidate, the interview is aimed at assessing their overall intellectual and personal qualities which are imperative to hold a judicial post.
Disclosing mark of written Examination before Viva-Voce-As regards the petitioners’ plea that marks of the Main Exam should be disclosed before conducting viva-voce, we are of the considered opinion that such a practice may not insulate the desired transparency, rather will invite criticism of likelihood of bias or favourtism. The broad principles to be laid down in this regard must be viewed keeping in view the selections for various categories of posts by different Selecting Authorities, for such a self-evolved criteria cannot be restricted to Judicial Services only. If the Members of the Interviewing Boards are already aware of the marks of a candidate secured in the Written Examination, they can individually or jointly tilt the final result in favour or against such candidate.The suggested recourse, thus, is likely to form bias affecting the impartial evaluation of a candidate in viva-voce. The acceptance of the plea of the petitioners in this regard will also run contrary to the authoritative pronouncement of this Court in Ashok Kumar Yadav and Others v. State of Haryana((1985) 4 SCC 417).
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Pranav Verma & Others Vs. The Registrar General of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh & anr.
It was evident from the conduct of the parties that they had abandoned their domicile of origin i.e. India, had set up their matrimonial home in the U.S. and raised their daughter in that environment. When the Petitioner – wife decided not to return to the U.S. in January, 2016 she acted in her self-interest, and not in the best interest of her children. The High Court held that the children have the right to be brought up by both parents as a family in the U.S. It is in the best interest of the children that the Petitioner – wife returns to the U.S. The High Court issued directions to the Respondent – husband to ensure that once the Petitioner – wife returns to the U.S., she is not faced with any adversity or hostility by the Respondent – husband, or the American legal system.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Jasmeet Kaur Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 4858-4859/ 2018
Jasmeet Kaur Vs. Navtej Singh
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20022/ 2019
ACTS: U/S. 9 and 7,9, 11, 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 & S. 6 (a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956
Indu Malhotra, J.
1. The present Special Leave Petitions arise out of matrimonial disputes between the parties. SLP (Crl.) No. 4858-4859/ 2018 has been filed by the Petitioner – wife to challenge the Orders dated 06.03.2018 and 21.05.2018 passed by the High Court in a Habeas Corpus Petition (Crl) No. 725 of 2017 filed by the Respondent – husband, seeking issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for production of the children, who have been illegally abducted by the Petitioner – wife from his custody in the USA. SLP (C.) No. 20022/2019 arises out of a Guardianship Petition filed U/S. 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (“GWA”) by the Petitioner – wife praying for permanent and sole custody of the minor daughter – Ishnoor now aged about 7 years, and minor son – Paramvir aged about 2 years. Since both SLPs arise out of common facts, they are being disposed of by this common judgment.
Whether the qualifications, the duties discharged by the surveyors and Amins are same and identical so as to treat the Amins at par with that of the surveyors?
The Technical Rules and Instructions relating to survey work indicate that surveyors use more sophisticated equipment involving superior training and skills than Amins. surveyors use Theodolite for conducting traverse survey requiring knowledge of trigonometry and they are also trained in the use of equipment for the measurement of automatic levels and electronic distance measurement. The surveyors have to undergo a two-year specialized training in different kinds of surveying such as Topographic and Hydrographic surveying and Mine surveying and, are also trained in mechanics and drawing. On the other hand, the Amins are given training in simple survey work and in the use of relatively simple equipment such as Guntur’s chain, plane table, optical square. It is true that both surveyors and Amins undertake the survey work but the nature of duties discharged by both of them are different. The surveyors are technical persons and the Amins are non-technical persons. The surveyors are fully qualified in the engineering surveys whereas the Amins are not supposed to be so qualified. Therefore, looking to the nature of duties which is being discharged and the instructions which have been issued go to show that the Amins and surveyors are not discharging identical duties. Therefore, from the nature of duties and the qualifications required for both the posts, it is absolutely clear that they are separate and it is not wrong when it was submitted that the work of Amins starts after the work of surveyors ends. The Technical Rules and Instructions of the Settlement Department as mentioned above, clearly show that the work and duties which are being discharged by the surveyors are of technical nature by use of sophisticated instruments as against the Amins who do the job with the aid of relatively simple equipment as they are not equated with that of the surveyors. The qualifications prescribed for the surveyors and Amins are also different. The surveyor is supposed to be a technically trained person and as against this, the Amin need not be. The Amins have to undergo related course of a duration of six months or so, as against the surveyors’ two years certificate course. Therefore, from the survey of this discussion we are of opinion that the surveyors stand on superior footing than that of the Amins and they cannot be equated from the functional point of view as well as qualification point of view.
The First Appellate Court, on scrutiny of the oral and documentary evidence, recorded clear and positive finding that none of the pleading has been proved by the plaintiffs in their evidence.
On examination of the reasonings recorded by the First Appellate Court, which are affirmed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Second Appeal, we are of the view that the judgments of the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court are well-reasoned based upon proper appreciation of the entire evidence on record. No question of law much less a substantial question of law was involved in this case before the High Court. We do not find any perversity or infirmity in the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court and affirmed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court to warrant interference in this appeal. None of the contentions of the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs- appellants can be sustained.
(SUPREME COURT OF INDIA)
Bandhu Mahto (dead) by L.Rs. AND ANOTHER
Bhukhli Mahatain AND OTHERS
Whether the learned Single Judge exercised his discretion in such an arbitrary or perverse manner that the Appellate Court ought to have interfered with it.
Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case.
The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are:
(1) The Plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction.
(2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money.
(3) The balance of convenience is in favor of the one seeking such relief.
Prior to 1976, conflicting views were expressed by the different High Courts in the country as to the purport and meaning of subrule (1) of Rule 17 of Order 41 CPC. Some High Courts had taken the view that it was open to the appellate court to consider the appeal on merits, even though there was no appearance on behalf of the appellant at the time of hearing. Some High Courts had taken the view that the High Court cannot decide the matter on merits, but could only dismiss the appeal for the appellant’s default. Conflicting views raised by the various High Courts gave rise to more litigation.
The legislature, therefore, in its wisdom, felt that it should clarify the position beyond doubt. Consequently, the Explanation to subrule (1) of Rule 17 of Order 41 CPC was added by Act 104 of 1976, making it explicit that nothing in subrule (1) of Rule 17 of Order 41 CPC should be construed as empowering the appellate court to dismiss the appeal on merits where the appellant remained absent or left unrepresented on the day fixed for hearing the appeal. The reason for introduction of such an Explanation is due to the fact that it gives an opportunity to the appellant to convince the appellate court that there was sufficient cause for nonappearance. Such an opportunity is lost, if the courts decide the appeal on merits in absence of the counsel for the appellant.
DEFAMATION: It is while considering a challenge to Section 79 of the Act, after it was substituted with effect from 27.10.2009 and considering the Rules made in the year 2011 also, and a challenge to the same also, that in Shreya Singhal (supra), the provisions were read down to mean that Section 79(3)(b) of the Act and Rule 3(4) of the Rules, would require an internet service operator to takedown third-party information not on mere knowledge of objection to its continuance but after there has been an impartial adjudication as it were by a court. To focus more on the problem, it must be pointed out that in the facts of this case, the acts constituting the alleged offence under Section 499 of the IPC, were done not when Section 79, after its substitution, was in place. The Rules were enacted in the year 2011.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Google India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s. Visakha Industries and Another
[Criminal Appeal No. 1987 of 2014]
ACTS: Section 482 The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 AND Sections 120B, 500 and 501 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 AND Section 79 of The Information Technology Act, 2000.
SEAR FOR ARBITRATION: The fact that in all the three appeals before us the proceedings were finally held at New Delhi, and the awards were signed in New Delhi, and not at Faridabad, would lead to the conclusion that both parties have chosen New Delhi as the “seat” of arbitration under Section 20(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. This being the case, both parties have, therefore, chosen that the Courts at New Delhi alone would have exclusive jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings. Therefore, the fact that a part of the cause of action may have arisen at Faridabad would not be relevant once the “seat” has been chosen, which would then amount to an exclusive jurisdiction clause so far as Courts of the “seat” are concerned.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
BGS SGS SOMA JV Vs. NHPC Ltd.
[Civil Appeal No. 9307 of 2019 arising out SLP (Civil) No. 25618 of 2018]
[Civil Appeal No. 9308 of 2019 arising out SLP (Civil) No. 25848 of 2018]
[Civil Appeal No. 9309 of 2019 arising out SLP (Civil) No. 28062 of 2018]
ACT: Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
State Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act. We, therefore, declare Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act ultra vires the Constitution of India, null and void and of no effect.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Rajendra Diwan Vs. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala & Anr.
[Civil Appeal No. 3613 of 2016]
[C.A. No. 10214 of 2016 and C.A. No. 3051 of 2017]
ACT: Section 13(2) of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011
FROM:Rent Control Tribunal at Raipur
IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED: It has been accepted by this Court that what is substantive piece of evidence of identification of an accused, is the evidence given during the trial. However, by the time the witnesses normally step into the box to depose, there would be substantial time gap between the date of the incident and the actual examination of the witnesses. If the accused or the suspects were known to the witnesses from before and their identity was never in doubt, the lapse of time may not qualitatively affect the evidence about identification of such accused, but the difficulty may arise if the accused were unknown.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Raja Vs. State by the Inspector of Police