The suit is for eviction of the defendant-appellant from the suit premises and for recovery of mesne profits on the ground that after the defendant-appellant has parted with the possession of the property in favour of the plaintiff-respondent in part performance of the agreement, he has no right to disturb his possession. He is simply a licencee and the licence having been terminated, he has no right to remain in possession but to restore possession to the person having rightful possessory title over it.
The Commission has recommended that where a judicial officer dies while in service, the family pension and death cum retirement gratuity as per the applicable rules is payable to the spouse/dependent, of the deceased officer. The recommendation of the Commission is in terms of Rule 54 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. This recommendation is reasonable and in furtherance of the principle of uniformity across services. Therefore, it merits acceptance by this Court.
Whether an accused is entitled to seek default bail under the provisions of Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the CrPC’) on the ground that although the chargesheet might have been filed within the statutory time period as prescribed in law yet the chargesheet sans a valid order of sanction passed by a competent authority is no chargesheet in the eye of law and therefore, it is as good as saying that no chargesheet was filed by the investigating agency within the statutory time period as prescribed in law?
No notice under Section 16 of the new Act was necessary for instituting any suit or legal proceedings much less counter-claim against the common carrier for recovering the loss other than the loss of or damage to the consignment and, therefore, the courts below manifestly erred in rejecting the counter-claim under Order VII Rule 11 CPC as barred by Section 16 of the new Act.
we find that the present case cannot be considered to be ‘rarest of rare’ case. In any case, the report of the Probation Officer, Nanded as well as the Superintendent, Nashik Road Central Prison would show that the appellant-Digambar has been found to be well-behaved, helping and a person with leadership qualities. He is not a person with criminal mindset and criminal records.
Section 403, 406, 420 and 120B of the IPC-We find that the complaint, taken at its face value, does not disclose that any of the ingredients of the offence complained of have been made out. In the totality of the circumstances, we find that the present complaint is nothing else but an abuse of process of law.
The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution / investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution / investigating agency.
The Electricity Act, 2003 and the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 runs parallel for giving redressal to any person, who falls within the meaning of “consumer” under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 or the Central Government or the State Government or association of consumers but it is limited to the dispute relating to “unfair trade practice” or a “restrictive trade practice adopted by the service provider”; or “if the consumer suffers from deficiency in service”; or “hazardous service”; or “the service provider has charged a price in excess of the price fixed by or under any law”.
The Constitution Bench has given a caution that power under Section 319 of the Code is a discretionary and extraordinary power which should be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant and the crucial test as notice above has to be applied is one which is more that prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction.
The first essential condition as incorporated in Section 364-A is “whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction”. The second condition begins with conjunction “and”. The second condition has also two parts i.e. (a) threatens to cause death or hurt to such person or (b) by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt. Either part of above condition, if fulfilled, shall fulfil the second condition for offence.