Volume 5: Coups, Elite Transitions and Internal Seizures of Power (GERC-5)

Global Encyclopedia of Regime Change (GERC)

Volume 5 — Coups, Elite Transitions and Internal Seizures of Power

Sarvarthapedia | Meta-Civilizational Architecture | Articles 401–500

Central subject: The methods through which political authority changes hands within or around an existing state apparatus when the decisive actors are military commanders, ruling-party factions, intelligence and security institutions, palace circles, bureaucratic elites, or coalitions operating inside the established order.

This volume examines how internal seizures of power are organized, executed, legitimized, institutionalized, resisted, and reversed. It distinguishes military coups from palace coups, party purges, elite defections, succession struggles, emergency transfers of authority, and negotiated changes within authoritarian systems. It also investigates the difference between replacing a ruler and transforming a regime.

The primary object is the mechanism of political transformation, not a general explanation of why a particular government became unpopular or unstable. Historical causes are included where necessary to explain the circumstances in which a method operated.

Part I — The Architecture of Internal Power Transfer

Articles 401–410

1. 401. Internal Regime Change: Definition, Scope and Analytical Boundaries
2. 402. Coup d’État: Historical Meaning and Political Classification
3. 403. The Distinction Between a Coup, Revolution, Rebellion and Constitutional Succession
4. 404. Ruler Replacement Versus Regime Transformation
5. 405. The State Apparatus as the Institutional Setting of Internal Power Seizures
6. 406. Formal Constitutional Authority and Informal Centres of Political Power
7. 407. The Political Role of Military, Bureaucratic and Party Elites
8. 408. Internal Power Transfer: Coercive, Administrative and Negotiated Forms
9. 409. The Relationship Between Personal Rule and Institutional Continuity
10. 410. A Comparative Taxonomy of Coups and Elite Transitions

Part II — Military Coups and Armed-Institutional Intervention

Articles 411–420

11. 411. Military Coups: Historical Evolution and Comparative Forms
12. 412. The Armed Forces as a Political Institution
13. 413. Command Structures, Corporate Interests and Political Authority
14. 414. Military Intervention in Civilian Government
15. 415. The Displacement of Civilian Executive Authority by Military Command
16. 416. Military Juntas and Collective Systems of Ruling Authority
17. 417. The Emergence of Military Guardianship over Civilian Institutions
18. 418. The Difference Between Temporary Military Rule and Permanent Military Regime Formation
19. 419. Military Withdrawal from Government and the Restoration of Civilian Authority
20. 420. Comparative Institutional Outcomes of Military Coups

Part III — Palace Coups, Leadership Removal and Elite Succession

Articles 421–430

21. 421. Palace Coups: Definition, Historical Origins and Institutional Forms
22. 422. Leadership Removal Within Monarchies and Hereditary Political Systems
23. 423. Ruling-Party Factions and Internal Leadership Displacement
24. 424. Elite Coalitions and the Replacement of Incumbent Leaders
25. 425. Leadership Succession Under Authoritarian Governments
26. 426. Retirement, Resignation and Removal as Instruments of Elite Transition
27. 427. The Political Role of Senior Officials in Leadership Replacement
28. 428. Collective Leadership and the Displacement of Personal Rule
29. 429. Factional Settlement and the Redistribution of Executive Authority
30. 430. Comparative Patterns of Palace Coups and Elite Succession

Part IV — Intelligence, Security Institutions and Internal Regime Change

Articles 431–440

31. 431. Intelligence Institutions and the Internal Distribution of Political Power
32. 432. Domestic Security Agencies and the Preservation of Incumbent Authority
33. 433. Intelligence–Military Relations During Leadership Transitions
34. 434. Security Establishments as Institutional Veto Players
35. 435. Intelligence Services, Political Surveillance and Elite Accountability
36. 436. Security-Institutional Loyalty and the Continuity of Government
37. 437. Institutional Defection and the Fragmentation of State Authority
38. 438. Intelligence Institutions Under Military and Emergency Governments
39. 439. Security-Sector Reorganization Following Internal Regime Change
40. 440. Comparative Study of Intelligence and Security Institutions in Coups

Part V — Bureaucratic Elites, Administrative Power and State Continuity

Articles 441–450

41. 441. The Civil Service as an Instrument of Institutional Continuity
42. 442. Bureaucratic Resistance, Compliance and Administrative Neutrality
43. 443. Senior Civil Servants and Changes in Executive Authority
44. 444. Administrative Recognition of Successor Governments
45. 445. Control of Public Administration During Political Transitions
46. 446. The Continuity of Courts, Ministries and Revenue Institutions
47. 447. Technocratic Governments and Non-Electoral Executive Replacement
48. 448. Bureaucratic Reorganization Under Successor Regimes
49. 449. Purges, Personnel Replacement and the Reconstruction of Administrative Loyalty
50. 450. The Bureaucratic State After an Internal Seizure of Power

Part VI — Ruling Parties, Ideological Organizations and Internal Takeovers

Articles 451–460

51. 451. The Ruling Party as a Mechanism of Regime Continuity and Leadership Change
52. 452. Party Congresses, Leadership Votes and Internal Transfers of Authority
53. 453. Ideological Orthodoxy and the Removal of Political Leaders
54. 454. Party Factionalism and the Reconstitution of Governing Coalitions
55. 455. Expulsion, Suspension and Political Marginalization Within Ruling Parties
56. 456. Party–Military Relations in Single-Party and Dominant-Party States
57. 457. The Transformation of Revolutionary Parties Into Governing Institutions
58. 458. Internal Party Succession and the Preservation of Regime Identity
59. 459. Party Splits, Leadership Contests and the Reallocation of State Power
60. 460. Comparative Analysis of Internal Party Regime Transformation

Part VII — Emergency Powers, Constitutional Suspension and Exceptional Transfers

Articles 461–470

61. 461. Emergency Powers as a Mechanism of Executive Reconfiguration
62. 462. Constitutional Suspension and the Displacement of Ordinary Government
63. 463. Martial Law and the Transfer of Civilian Functions to Military Authorities
64. 464. States of Exception and the Reorganization of Political Authority
65. 465. Emergency Government, Executive Concentration and Institutional Discontinuity
66. 466. Constitutional Succession During Incapacity, Removal or Political Crisis
67. 467. Interim Governments and Temporary Transfers of Executive Power
68. 468. Judicial Review of Emergency Measures and Exceptional Government
69. 469. The Restoration of Constitutional Government After Emergency Rule
70. 470. Distinguishing Lawful Emergency Succession From Unconstitutional Seizure of Power

Part VIII — Legitimacy, Public Administration and Consolidation After a Coup

Articles 471–480

71. 471. The Problem of Legitimacy After an Unconstitutional Change of Government
72. 472. Proclamations, Declarations and Claims to Political Authority
73. 473. The Formation of Interim Councils, Juntas and Successor Executives
74. 474. Continuity of Public Services Under a New Political Authority
75. 475. Control, Reorganization and Civilian Oversight of the Security Sector
76. 476. The Legal Status of Acts Issued by De Facto Governments
77. 477. Recognition of New Authorities by Courts and Domestic Institutions
78. 478. International Recognition and Diplomatic Relations After a Coup
79. 479. Transitional Justice, Accountability and the Legacy of Internal Power Seizures
80. 480. The Institutional Consolidation or Failure of Coup-Origin Governments

Part IX — Comparative Historical Studies of Coups and Elite Transitions

Articles 481–490

81. 481. The Roman Praetorian Guard and the Politics of Imperial Succession
82. 482. The English Glorious Revolution of 1688: Elite Displacement and Constitutional Reordering
83. 483. Napoleon’s Coup of 18 Brumaire, 1799: Executive Replacement and Regime Reconstruction
84. 484. The Ottoman Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the Reconfiguration of Imperial Authority
85. 485. The Turkish Military Intervention of 1960 and the Reconstruction of State Institutions
86. 486. The Egyptian Free Officers’ Movement of 1952 and the End of the Monarchy
87. 487. The Indonesian Transition of 1965–1967: Military Power and Executive Succession
88. 488. Chile in 1973: Military Seizure of Power and the Dismantling of Constitutional Government
89. 489. The Soviet Union in 1991: Failed Coup, Elite Fragmentation and State Dissolution
90. 490. Comparative Analysis of Successful, Failed and Reversed Internal Power Seizures

Part X — Toward a General Theory of Coups and Elite Regime Transformation

Articles 491–500

91. 491. The Institutional Preconditions of Internal Power Transfer
92. 492. Elite Cohesion, Defection and the Fragmentation of Political Authority
93. 493. The Temporal Sequence of Leadership Displacement and Successor Formation
94. 494. The Role of Institutional Recognition in Determining Political Outcomes
95. 495. Coup Failure, Counter-Seizure and Restoration of the Previous Order
96. 496. The Relationship Between Coercive Power and Administrative Compliance
97. 497. Regime Survival, Elite Circulation and the Reproduction of Political Authority
98. 498. Measuring the Depth of Institutional Change After Leadership Replacement
99. 499. Comparative Models of Coup Outcomes: Consolidation, Negotiation, Reversal and Collapse
100. 500. Toward a General Theory of Coups, Elite Transitions and Internal Regime Change

The analytical framework of Volume 5

The volume uses five distinctions to prevent unlike political events from being treated as identical.

These distinctions are essential because a successful seizure of executive power does not automatically produce a new political regime. A military council may replace a president while preserving much of the existing administration. A ruling party may remove its leader without changing the constitutional structure. Conversely, a leadership struggle can lead to a profound reorganization of the state even when the formal institutions initially remain intact.

Historical scope and comparative method

The case studies span imperial succession, constitutional monarchy, military intervention, revolutionary-party politics, postcolonial state formation and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Their inclusion permits comparison across different institutional settings rather than treating the modern military coup as the sole model of internal regime change.

Each historical study should examine:

1. The political institutions in place before the transition.
2. The actors who acquired, transferred or lost effective authority.
3. The method by which the incumbent leadership was displaced.
4. The continuity or interruption of constitutional and administrative institutions.
5. The formation of successor authority and its claims to legitimacy.
6. The treatment of the military, intelligence services, judiciary and civil service.
7. The eventual outcome: consolidation, negotiated transition, reversal, renewed authoritarianism or state dissolution.

The framework is historical and comparative. It studies institutional mechanisms and political outcomes rather than providing operational instructions for organizing an unlawful seizure of power.

Position within the 12-volume encyclopedia

01 The Methodology of Regime Change

Articles 001–100 — Classification and general analytical framework.

02 Electoral, Parliamentary and Constitutional Transformation

Articles 101–200 — Institutional and constitutional transfers of power.

03 Mass Movements, Civil Resistance and Popular Mobilization

Articles 201–300 — Popular participation and mass political action.

04 Revolutionary Transformation and Counterrevolution

Articles 301–400 — Displacement and reconstruction of political orders.

05 Coups, Elite Transitions and Internal Seizures of Power

Articles 401–500 — Leadership displacement and transfers of authority within the state.

Next volume: Volume 6 — Foreign Intervention, Proxy Power and Externally Induced Regime Change (Articles 501–600). It will examine the methods through which external states, coalitions and international actors influence, impose or facilitate changes in political authority, while distinguishing direct intervention from indirect pressure, negotiated transition and domestic political agency.