In The Board of High School and Intermediate Education U.P. Vs. Bagleshwar Prasad and Others, the Supreme Court has indicated how High Court should view disciplinary proceedings taken by a University against a student in the matter of malpractice in examination. The Court observed:
“In dealing with petitions of this type, it is necessary to bear in mind that educational institutions like the Universities or appellant No. 1 set up Enquiry Committees to deal with the problem posed by the adoption of unfair means by candidates, and normally it is within the jurisdiction of such domestic Tribunals to decide all relevant questions in the light of the evidence adduced before them. In the matter of the adoption of unfair means, direct evidence may sometimes be available, but oases may arise where direct evidence is not available and the question will have to be considered in the light of probabilities and circumstantial evidence. This problem which educational institutions have to face from time to time is a serious problem and unless there is justification to do so, Courts should be slow to interfere with the decisions of domestic Tribunals appointed by educational bodies like the Universities. In dealing with the validity of the impugned orders passed by Universities under Articles 226, the High Court is not sitting in appeal over the decision in question; its jurisdiction is limited and though it is true that if the impugned order is not supported by any evidence at all, the High Court would be justified to quash that order. But the conclusion that the impugned order is not supported by any evidence must be reached after considering the question as to whether probabilities and circumstantial evidence do not justify the said conclusion. Enquiries held by domestic Tribunals in such cases must, no doubt, be fair and students against whom charges are framed must be given adequate opportunities to defend themselves, and in holding such enquiries, the Tribunals must scrupulously follow rules of natural justice; but H would, we think, not be reasonable to import into these enquiries all considerations which govern criminal trials in ordinary Courts of law. In the present case, no animus is suggested and no mala fides have been pleaded. The enquiry has been fair and the respondent has had an opportunity of making his defence. That be- ing so, we think the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order passed against the respondent,”
Two things are clear from the above observations:
(1) that the University must observe the principles of natural justice, and (2) that if there is the slightest evidence to support a finding of guilt High Court should not interfere. The question whether the non-supply of a copy of the report was against the principles of natural justice has to be decided with reference to the nature and the character of the enquiry, and the rules under which the disciplinary proceedings were purported to be conducted. The rules did not provide for supply of a copy of the report of the enquiring officer to the student. We are not saying that that is conclusive. If the failure to give a copy of the report violated natural justice, the fact that the rules did not provide for it may be immaterial. The question then is whether there is any principle of natural justice which required that the writ petitioner should have been given a copy of the report of the enquiring officer. It has been held (whether rightly or not) that the requirements of natural justice are not immutable, but vary according to the nature of the enquiry, the tribunal, and other circumstances This question was considered in a judgment of this Court in Nandakumaran v. Principal. Government Victoria College, Palghat. 1965 Ker LT 27. There the following observations of Tucker L.J. in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk 1949 1 All ER 199 were quoted:
“There are in my view no words which are of universal application to every kind of enquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting; the subject-matter that is being dealt with am” so forth “
In Board of Education v. Rice. 1911 AC 179 Lord Loreburn L. C observed;
“Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not originated the practice of imposing upon departments or officers of State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds.
It will, I suppose, usually be of an administrative kind: but sometimes it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts T need not add that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. … .The Board is in the nature of the arbitral tribunal, and a court of law has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from the determination either upon law or upon fact. But if the court is satisfied either that the board have not acted judicially in the way I have described, or have not determined the question which they were required by the Act to determine, then there is a remedy by mandamus and certiorari.”
In Local Government Board v. Alridge 1915 AC 120 these observations were quoted and applied. That case raised the issue whether the respondent there had had a fair hearing. In a public enquiry, which had been held in accordance with the statute, he and his witnesses had been heard orally, but after the enquiry the board’s inspector submitted his report to the board who decided the matter after considering the facts and the evidence given at the inquiry and the inspector’s report. The respondent claimed that he should have seen the report and been heard orally by the officer of the board who actually decided it. He had been offered the opportunity of submitting a further written statement but had not availed himself of it. The House of Lords reversing the majority decision of the Court of Appeal held that the work of decision had been done judicially and fairly in the sense indicated by Lord Loreburn, and that failure to disclose the contents of the report was not of any consequence.
In Leeson v. General Medical Council 43 Ch. D. 366 (384) Bowen L. J. said:
“There must be due inquiry. The accused person must have notice of what he is accused. He must have an opportunity of being heard, and the decision must be honestly arrived at after he has had a full opportunity of being heard. With respect to the charge made, the charge of which he has notice, it is a charge of infamous conduct in some professional respect, and the particulars which should be brought to his attention in order to enable him to meet that charge ought to be particulars of conduct which, if established, is capable of being viewed by honest persons as conduct which is infamous. That is all. We have seen that these conditions have been fulfilled by the inquiry and by the tribunal which institutes it. The functions of the court of law are at an end.”
What is meant by opportunity of being heard was considered by Lord Denning in Kanda v. Government of Malaya 1962 A.C. 322 (337). His Lordship said:
“If the right to be heard is to be a real right. . . it must carry with it a right to know the case against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him; and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them.”