Of the NATURE of LAWS in general
LAW,ย in it’s most general and comprehensiveย sense,ย signifies a rule of action; and is applied indiscriminately to all kinds of action, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational. Thus weย say, the laws of motion, of gravitation, of optics, or mechanics, as well as the laws of nature and of nations. And it is that rule of action, which is prescribed byย someย superior, and which the inferior is bound to obey.
Thusย when theย supreme being formed the universe, and created matter out of nothing, he impressed certain principles upon that matter, from which it can never depart, and without which it would cease to be. When he put that matter into motion, he established certain laws of motion, to which all moveable bodies must conform. And, to descend from the greatest operations to theย smallest, when a workman forms a clock, or other piece of mechanism, he establishes at his own pleasure certain arbitrary laws for it’s direction; as that the handย shall describe a givenย space in a given time; to which law as long as the work conforms,ย so long it continues in perfection, and answers the end of it’s formation.
Ifย we farther advance, from mere inactive matter to vegetable and animal life, weย shall find themย still governed by laws; more numerous indeed, but equally fixed and invariable. The whole progress of plants, from theย seed to the root, and from thence to theย seed again; the method of animal nutrition, digestion,ย secretion, and all other branches of vital oeconomy;โare not left to chance, or the will of the creature itself, but are performed in a wondrous involuntary manner, and guided by unerring rules laid down by the great creator.
Thisย then is the generalย signification of law, a rule of action dictated byย someย superior being; and in those creatures that have neither the power to think, nor to will,ย such laws must be invariably obeyed,ย so long as the creature itselfย subsists, for itโs existence depends on that obedience. But laws, in their more confinedย sense, and in which it is our present business to consider them, denote the rules, not of action in general, but of human action or conduct: that is, the precepts by which man, the noblest of allย sublunary beings, a creature endowed with both reason and freewill, is commanded to make use of those faculties in the general regulation of his behaviour.
Man,ย considered as a creature, must necessarily beย subject to the laws of his creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being, independent of any other, has no rule to pursue, butย such as he prescribes to himself; but aย state of dependance will inevitably oblige the inferior to take the will of him, on whom he depends, as the rule of his conduct: not indeed in every particular, but in all those points wherein his dependance consists. This principle therefore has more or less extent and effect, in proportion as theย superiority of the one and the dependance of the other is greater or less, absolute or limited. And consequently, as man depends absolutely upon his maker for every thing, it is necessary that heย should in all points conform to his makerโs will.
Thisย will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion;ย so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid downย certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is inย some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws.
Consideringย the creator only as a being of infiniteย power, he was able unquestionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, however unjust orย severe. But as he is also a being of infiniteย wisdom, he has laid down onlyย such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover,ย so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are these principles: that weย should live honestly,ย should hurt nobody, andย should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian, has reduced the whole doctrine of law.
Butย if the discovery of these first principles of the law of nature depended only upon the due exertion of right reason, and could not otherwise be attained than by a chain of metaphysical disquisitions, mankind would have wantedย some inducement to have quickened their inquiries, and the greater part of the world would have rested content in mental indolence, and ignorance itโs inseparable companion. As therefore the creator is a being, not only of infiniteย power, andย wisdom, but also of infiniteย goodness, he has been pleasedย so to contrive the constitution and frame of humanity, that weย should want no other prompter to enquire after and pursue the rule of right, but only our ownย self-love, that universal principle of action. For he hasย so intimately connected,ย so inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In consequence of which mutual connection of justice and human felicity, he has notย perplexed the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of things, asย some have vainlyย surmised; but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal precept, โthat man mould pursue his own happiness.โ This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law. For theย several articles, into which it is branched in ourย systems, amount to no more than demonstrating, that this or that action tends to manโs real happiness, and therefore very justly concluding that the performance of it is a part of the law of nature; or, on the other hand, that this or that action is destructive of manโs real happiness, and therefore that the law of nature forbids it.
Thisย law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of courseย superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; andย such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.
Butย in order to apply this to the particular exigencies of each individual, it isย still necessary to have recourse to reason: whose office it is to discover, as was before observed, what the law of nature directs in every circumstance of life; by considering, what method will tend the most effectually to our ownย substantial happiness. And if our reason were always, as in our first ancestor before his transgression, clear and perfect, unruffled by passions, unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by disease or intemperance, the talk would be pleasant and easy; weย should need no other guide but this. But every man now finds the contrary in his own experience; that his reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of ignorance and error.
Thisย has given manifold occasion for the benign interposition of divine providence; which, in companion to the frailty, the imperfection, and the blindness of human reason, hath beenย pleased, atย sundry times and in divers manners, to discover and enforce itโs laws by an immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the holyย scriptures. These precepts, when revealed, are found upon companion to be really a part of the original law of nature, as they tend in all their consequences to manโs felicity. But we are not from thence to conclude that the knowlege of these truths was attainable by reason, in itโs present corruptedย state;ย since we find that, until they were revealed, they were hid from the wisdom of ages. As then the moral precepts of this law are indeed of theย same original with those of the law of nature,ย so their intrinsic obligation is of equalย strength and perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the revealed law is of infinitely more authenticity than that moralย system, which is framed by ethical writers, and denominated the natural law. Because one is the law of nature, expressly declaredย so to be by God himself; the other is only what, by the assistance of human reason, we imagine to be that law. If we could be as certain of the latter as we are of the former, both would have an equal authority: but, till then, they can never be put in any competition together.
Uponย these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is toย say, no human lawsย should beย suffered to contradict these. There is, it is true, a great number of indifferent points, in which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty; but which are found necessary for the benefit ofย society to be restrained within certain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy; for, with regard toย such points as are not indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of, and act inย subordination to, the former. To instance in the case of murder: this is expressly forbidden by the divine, and demonstrably by the natural law; and from these prohibitions arises the true unlawfulness of this crime. Those human laws, that annex a punishment to it, do not at all increase itโs moral guilt, orย superadd any fresh obligationย in foro conscientiaeย to abstain from itโs perpetration. Nay, if any human lawย should allow or injoin us to commit it, we are bound to transgress that human law, or else we must offend both the natural and the divine. But with regard to matters that are in themselves indifferent, and are not commanded or forbidden by thoseย superior laws;ย such, for instance, as exporting of wool into foreign countries; here the inferior legislature hasย scope and opportunity to interpose, and to make that action unlawful which before was notย so.
Ifย man were to live in aย state of nature, unconnected with other individuals, there would be no occasion for any other laws, than the law of nature, and the law of God. Neither could any other law possibly exist; for a law alwaysย supposesย someย superior who is to make it; and in aย state of nature we are all equal, without any otherย superior but him who is the author of our being. But man was formed forย society; and, as is demonstrated by the writers on thisย subject, is neither capable of living alone, nor indeed has the courage to do it. However, as it is impossible for the whole race of mankind to be united in one greatย society, they must necessarily divide into many; and formย separateย states, commonwealths, and nations; entirely independent of each other, and yet liable to a mutual intercourse. Hence arises a third kind of law to regulate this mutual intercourse, called โthe law of nations;โ which, as none of theseย states will acknowlege aย superiority in the other, cannot be dictated by either; but depends entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual compacts, treaties, leagues, and agreements between theseย several communities: in the construction also of which compacts we have no other rule to resort to, but the law of nature; being the only one to which both communities are equallyย subject: and therefore the civil lawย very justly observes, thatย quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines costituit, vocatur jus gentium.
Thusย much I thought it necessary to premise concerning the law of nature, the revealed law, and the law of nations, before I proceeded to treat more fully of the principalย subject of thisย section, municipal or civil law; that is, the rule by which particular districts, communities, or nations are governed; being thus defined by Justinian[4], โjus civile est quod quisqueย sibi populus constituit.โ I call itย municipalย law, in compliance with commonย speech; for, thoughย strictly that expression denotes the particular customs of oneย singleย municipiumย or free town, yet it may withย sufficient propriety be applied to any oneย state or nation, which is governed by theย same laws and customs.
Municipalย law, thus understood, is properly defined to be โa rule of civil conduct prescribed by theย supreme power in aย state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.โ Let us endeavour to explain itโsย several properties, as they arise out of this definition.
And,ย first, it is aย rule; not a transientย sudden order from aย superior to or concerning a particular person; butย something permanent, uniform, and universal. Therefore a particular act of the legislature to confiscate the goods of Titius, or to attaint him of high treason, does not enter into the idea of a municipal law: for the operation of this act isย spent upon Titius only, and has no relation to the community in general; it is rather aย sentence than a law. But an act to declare that the crime of which Titius is accusedย shall be deemed high treason; this has permanency, uniformity, and universality, and therefore is properly a rule. It is also called a rule, to distinguish it from advice or counsel, which we are at liberty to follow or not, as weย see proper; and to judge upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the thing advised. Whereas our obedience to the law depends not upon our approbation, but upon the makerโs will. Counsel is only matter of persuasion, law is matter of injunction; counsel acts only upon the willing, law upon the unwilling also.
Itย is also called aย rule, to distinguish it from aย compactย orย agreement; for a compact is a promise proceedingย fromย us, law is a command directedย toย us. The language of a compact is, โI will, or will not, do this;โ that of a law is, โthouย shalt, orย shalt not, do it.โ It is true there is an obligation which a compact carries with it, equal in point of conscience to that of a law; but then the original of the obligation is different. In compacts, we ourselves determine and promise whatย shall be done, before we are obliged to do it; in laws, we are obliged to act, without ourselves determining or promising any thing at all. Upon these accounts law is defined to be โa rule.โ
Municipalย law is also โa ruleย of civil conduct.โ This distinguishes municipal law from the natural, or revealed; the former of which is the rule ofย moralย conduct, and the latter not only the rule of moral conduct, but also the rule of faith. These regard man as a creature, and point out his duty to God, to himself, and to his neighbour, considered in the light of an individual. But municipal or civil law regards him also as a citizen, and bound to other duties towards his neighbour, than those of mere nature and religion: duties, which he has engaged in by enjoying the benefits of the common union; and which amount to no more, than that he do contribute, on his part, to theย subsistence and peace of theย society.
Itย is likewise โa ruleย prescribed.โ Because a bare resolution, confined in the breast of the legislator, without manifesting itself byย some externalย sign, can never be properly a law. It is requisite that this resolution be notified to the people who are to obey it. But the manner in which this notification is to be made, is matter of very great indifference. It may be notified by universal tradition and long practice, whichย supposes a previous publication, and is the case of the common law of England. It may be notified,ย viva voce, by officers appointed for that purpose, as is done with regard to proclamations, andย such acts of parliamentย as are appointed to be publicly read in churches and other assemblies. It may lastly be notified by writing, printing, or the like; which is the general course taken with all our acts of parliament. Yet, whatever way is made use of, it is incumbent on the promulgators to do it in the most public and perspicuous manner; not like Caligula, who (according to Dio Cassius) wrote his laws in a veryย small character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people. There isย still a more unreasonable method than this, which is called making of lawsย ex post facto; when after an action (indifferent in itself) is committed, the legislator then for the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the perfon who has committed it; here it is impossible that the party could foresee that an action, innocent when it was done,ย should be afterwards converted to guilt by aย subsequent law; he had therefore no cause to abstain from it; and all punishment for not abstaining must, of consequence be cruel and unjust[5]. All lawsย should be therefore made to commenceย in futuro, and be notified before their commencement; which is implied in the term โprescribed.โ But when this rule is in the usual manner notified, or prescribed, it is then theย subject’s business to be thoroughly acquainted therewith; for if ignorance, of what heย mightย know, were admitted as a legitimate excuse, the laws would be of no effect, but might always be eluded with impunity.
Butย farther: municipal law is โa rule of civil conduct prescribedย by theย supreme power in aย state.โ For legislature, as was before observed, is the greatest act ofย superiority that can be exercised by one being over another. Wherefore it is requisite to the very esence of a law, that it be made by theย supreme power. Sovereignty and legislature are indeed convertible terms; one cannotย subsist without the other.
Thisย will naturally lead us into aย short enquiry concerning the nature ofย society and civil government; and the natural, inherent right that belongs to theย sovereignty of aย state, wherever thatย sovereignty be lodged, of making and enforcing laws.
Theย only true and natural foundations ofย society are the wants and the fears of individuals. Not that we can believe, withย some theoretical writers, that there ever was a time when there was noย such thing asย society; and that, from the impulse of reason, and through aย sense of their wants and weaknesses, individuals met together in a large plain, entered into an original contract, and chose the tallest man present to be their governor. This notion, of an actually existing unconnectedย state of nature, is too wild to beย seriously admitted; and besides it is plainly contradictory to the revealed accounts of the primitive origin of mankind, and their preservation two thousand years afterwards; both which were effected by the means ofย single families. These formed the firstย society, among themselves; which every day extended it’s limits, and when it grew too large toย subsist with convenience in that pastoralย state, wherein the patriarchs appear to have lived, it necessarilyย subdivided itself by various migrations into more. Afterwards, as agriculture increased, which employs and can maintain a much greater number of hands, migrations became less frequent; and various tribes, which had formerlyย separated, reunited again;ย sometimes by compulsion and conquest,ย sometimes by accident, andย sometimes perhaps by compact. But thoughย society had not it’s formal beginning from any convention of individuals, actuated by their wants and their fears; yet it is theย senseย of their weakness and imperfection that keeps mankind together; that demonstrates the necessity of this union; and that therefore is theย solid and natural foundation, as well as the cement, ofย society. And this is what we mean by the original contract ofย society; which, though perhaps in no instance it has ever been formally expressed at the first institution of aย state, yet in nature and reason must always be understood and implied,ย in the very act of associating together: namely, that the wholeย should protect all it’s parts, and that every partย should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or, in other words, that the communityย should guard the rights of each individual member, and that (in return for this protection) each individualย shouldย submit to the laws of the community; without whichย submission of all it was impossible that protection could be certainly extended to any.
Forย whenย society is once formed, government results of course, as necessary to preserve and to keep thatย society in order. Unlessย someย superior were constituted, whose commands and decisions all the members are bound to obey, they wouldย still remain as in aย state of nature, without any judge upon earth to define theirย several rights, and redress theirย several wrongs. But, as all the members ofย society are naturally equal, it may be asked, in whose hands are the reins of government to be entrusted? To this the general answer is easy; but the application of it to particular cases has occasioned one half of those mischiefs which are apt to proceed from misguided political zeal. In general, all mankind will agree that governmentย should be reposed inย such persons, in whom those qualities are most likely to be found, the perfection of which are among the attributes of him who is emphaticallyย stiled theย supreme being; the three grand requisites, I mean, of wisdom, of goodness, and of power: wisdom, to discern the real interest of the community; goodness, to endeavour always to pursue that real interest; andย strength, or power, to carry this knowlege and intention into action. These are the natural foundations ofย sovereignty, and these are the requisites that ought to be found in every well constituted frame of government.
Howย theย several forms of government we nowย see in the world at first actually began, is matter of great uncertainty, and has occasioned infinite disputes. It is not my business or intention to enter into any of them. However they began, or byย what rightย soever theyย subsist, there is and must be in all of them aย supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which theย juraย summi imperii, or the rights ofย sovereignty, reside. And this authority is placed in those hands, wherein (according to the opinion of the founders ofย such respectiveย states, either expressly given, or collected from their tacit approbation) the qualities requisite forย supremacy, wisdom, goodness, and power, are the most likely to be found.
Theย political writers of antiquity will not allow more than three regular forms of government; the first, when theย sovereign power is lodged in an aggregate assembly consisting of all the members of a community, which is called a democracy; theย second, when it is lodged in a council, composed ofย select members, and then it isย stiled an aristocracy; the last, when it is entrusted in the hands of aย single person, and then it takes the name of a monarchy. All otherย species of government, theyย say, are either corruptions of, or reducible to, these three.
Byย theย sovereign power, as was before observed, is meant the making of laws; for wherever that power resides, all others must conform to, and be directed by it, whatever appearance the outward form and administration of the government may put on. For it is at any time in the option of the legislature to alter that form and administration by a new edict or rule, and to put the execution of the laws into whatever hands it pleases: and all the other powers of theย state must obey the legislative power in the execution of theirย several functions, or else the constitution is at an end.
Inย a democracy, where the right of making laws resides in the people at large, public virtue, or goodness of intention, is more likely to be found, than either of the other qualities of government. Popular assemblies are frequently foolish in their contrivance, and weak in their execution; but generally mean to do the thing that is right and just, and have always a degree ofย patriotism or publicย spirit. In aristocracies there is more wisdom to be found, than in the other frames of government; being composed, or intended to be composed, of the most experienced citizens; but there is less honesty than in a republic, and lessย strength than in a monarchy. A monarchy is indeed the most powerful of any, all theย sinews of government being knit together, and united in the hand of the prince; but then there is imminent danger of his employing thatย strength to improvident or oppressive purposes.
Thusย these threeย species of government have, all of them, theirย several perfections and imperfections. Democracies are usually the best calculated to direct the end of a law; aristocracies to invent the means by which that endย shall be obtained; and monarchies to carry those means into execution. And the antients, as was observed, had in general no idea of any other permanent form of government but these three: for though Cicero declares himself of opinion, โesse optime constitutam rempublicam, quae ex tribus generibus illis, regali, optimo, et populari, fit modice confusa;โ yet Tacitus treats this notion of a mixed government, formed out of them all, and partaking of the advantages of each, as a visionary whim, and one that, if effected, could never be lasting orย secure.
But, happily for us of this island, the British constitution has long remained, and I trust will long continue, aย standing exception to the truth of this observation. For, as with us the executive power of the laws is lodged in aย single person, they have all the advantages ofย strength and dispatch, that are to be found in the most absolute monarchy; and, as the legislature of the kingdom is entrusted to three distinct powers, entirely independent of each other; first, the king;ย secondly, the lordsย spiritual and temporal, which is an aristocratical assembly of personsย seleded for their piety, their birth, their wisdom, their valour, or their property; and, thirdly, the house of commons, freely chosen by the people from among themselves, which makes it a kind of democracy; as this aggregate body, actuated by differentย springs, and attentive to different interests, composes the British parliament, and has theย supreme disposal of every thing; there can no inconvenience be attempted by either of the three branches, but will be withstood by one of the other two; each branch being armed with a negative power,ย sufficient to repel any innovation which itย shall think inexpedient or dangerous.
Hereย then is lodged theย sovereignty of the British constitution; and lodged as beneficially as is possible forย society. For in no otherย shape could we beย so certain of finding the three great qualities of governmentย so well andย so happily united. If theย supreme power were lodged in any one of the three branchesย separately, we must be exposed to the inconveniences of either absolute monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy; andย so want two of the three principal ingredients of good polity, either virtue, wisdom, or power. If it were lodged in any two of the branches; for instance, in the king and house of lords, our laws might be providently made, and well executed, but they might not always have the good of the people in view: if lodged in the king and commons, weย should want that circumspection and mediatory caution, which the wisdom of the peers is to afford: if theย supreme rights of legislature were lodged in the two houses only, and the king had no negative upon their proceedings, they might be tempted to encroach upon the royal prerogative, or perhaps to abolish the kingly office, and thereby weaken (if not totally destroy) theย strength of the executive power. But the constitutional government of this island isย so admirably tempered and compounded, that nothing can endanger or hurt it, but destroying the equilibrium of power between one branch of the legislature and the rest. For if ever itย should happen that the independence of any one of the threeย should be lost, or that itย should becomeย subservient to the views of either of the other two, there wouldย soon be an end of our constitution. The legislature would be changed from that, which was originallyย set up by the general consent and fundamental act of theย society; andย such a change, however effected, is according to Mr Lockeย (who perhaps carries his theory too far) at once an entire dissolution of the bands of government; and the people would be reduced to aย state of anarchy, with liberty to constitute to themselves a new legislative power.
Havingย thus cursorily considered the three usualย species of government, and our ownย singular constitution,ย selected and compounded from them all, I proceed to observe, that, as the power of making laws constitutes theย supreme authority,ย so wherever theย supreme authority in anyย state resides, it is the right of that authority to make laws; that is, in the words of our definition,ย to prescribe the rule of civil action. And this may be discovered from the very end and institution of civilย states. For aย state is a collective body, composed of a multitude of individuals, united for theirย safety and convenience, and intending to act together as one man. If it therefore is to act as one man, it ought to act by one uniform will. But, inasmuch as political communities are made up of many natural persons, each of whom has his particular will and inclination, theseย several wills cannot by anyย naturalย union be joined together, or tempered and dispofed into a lasting harmony,ย so as to constitute and produce that one uniform will of the whole. It can therefore be no otherwise produced than by aย politicalย union; by the consent of all persons toย submit their own private wills to the will of one man, or of one or more assemblies of men, to whom theย supreme authority is entrusted: and this will of that one man, or assemblage of men, is in differentย states, according to their different constitutions, understood to beย law.
Thusย far as to theย rightย of theย supreme power to make laws; but farther, it is it’sย dutyย likewise. Forย since theย respective members are bound to conform themselves to the will of theย state, it is expedient that they receive directions from theย state declaratory of that it’s will. Butย since it is impossible, inย so great a multitude, to give injunctions to every particular man, relative to each particular action, therefore theย state establishes general rules, for the perpetual information and direction of all persons in all points, whether of positive or negative duty. And this, in order that every man may know what to look upon as his own, what as another’s; what absolute and what relative duties are required at his hands; what is to be esteemed honest, dishonest, or indifferent; what degree every man retains of his natural liberty; what he has given up as the price of the benefits ofย society; and after what manner each person is to moderate the use and exercise of those rights which theย state assigns him, in order to promote andย secure the public tranquillity.
Fromย what has been advanced, the truth of the former branch of our definition, is (I trust)ย sufficiently evident; that โmunicipal law is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by theย supreme power in aย state.โ I proceed now to the latter branch of it; that it is a ruleย so prescribed, โcommanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong.โ
Nowย in order to do this completely, it is first of all necessary that the boundaries of right and wrong be established and ascertained by law. And when this is once done, it will follow of course that it is likewise the business of the law, considered as a rule of civil conduct, to enforce these rights and to restrain or redress these wrongs. It remains therefore only to consider in what manner the law isย said to ascertain the boundaries of right and wrong; and the methods which it takes to command the one and prohibit the other.
Forย this purpose every law may beย said to consist ofย several parts: one,ย declaratory; whereby the rights to be observed, and the wrongs to be eschewed, are clearly defined and laid down:ย another,ย directory; whereby theย subject is instructed and enjoined to observe those rights, and to abstain from the commission of those wrongs: a third,ย remedial; whereby a method is pointed out to recover a man’s private rights, or redress his private wrongs: to which may be added a fourth, usually termed theย sanction, orย vindicatoryย branch of the law; whereby it isย signified what evil or penaltyย shall be incurred byย such as commit any public wrongs, and transgress or neglect their duty.
Withย regard to the first of these, theย declaratoryย part of the municipal law, this depends notย so much upon the law of revelation or of nature, as upon the wisdom and will of the legislator. This doctrine, which before wasย slightly touched, deserves a more particular explication. Those rights then which God and nature have established, and are therefore called natural rights,ย such as are life and liberty, need not the aid of human laws to be more effectually inverted in every man than they are; neither do they receive any additionalย strength when declared by the municipal laws to be inviolable. On the contrary, no human legislature has power to abridge or destroy them, unless the ownerย shall himself commitย some act that amounts to a forfeiture. Neither do divine or naturalย dutiesย (such as, for instance, the worship of God, the maintenance of children, and the like) receive anyย strongerย sanction from being also declared to be duties by the law of the land. The case is theย same as to crimes and misdemesnors, that are forbidden by theย superior laws, and thereforeย stiledย mala inย se,ย such as murder, theft, and perjury; which contract no additional turpitude from being declared unlawful by the inferior legislature. For that legislature in all these cases acts only, as was before observed, inย subordination to the great lawgiver, transcribing and publishing his precepts. So that, upon the whole, the declaratory part of the municipal law has no force or operation at all, with regard to actions that are naturally and intrinsically right or wrong.
But, with regard to things in themselves indifferent, the case is entirely altered. These become either right or wrong, just or unjust, duties or misdemesnors, according as the municipal legislatorย sees proper, for promoting the welfare of theย society, and more effectually carrying on the purposes of civil life. Thus our own common law has declared, that the goods of the wife do instantly upon marriage become the property and right of the husband; and ourย statute law has declared all monopolies a public offence: yet that right, and this offence, have no foundation in nature; but are merely created by the law, for the purposes of civilย society. Andย sometimes, where the thing itself has it’s rise from the law of nature, the particular circumstances and mode of doing it become right or wrong, as the laws of the landย shall direct. Thus, for instance, in civil duties; obedience toย superiors is the doctrine of revealed as well as natural religion: but who thoseย superiorsย shall be, and in what circumstances, or to what degrees theyย shall be obeyed, is the province of human laws to determine. Andย so, as to injuries or crimes, it must be left to our own legislature to decide, in what cases theย seising another’s cattleย shall amount to the crime of robbery; and where itย shall be a justifiable action, as when a landlord takes them by way of distress for rent.
Thusย much for theย declaratoryย part of the municipal law: and theย directoryย stands much upon theย same footing; for this virtually includes the former, the declaration being usually collected from the direction. The law thatย says, โthouย shalt notย steal,โ implies a declaration thatย stealing is a crime. And we haveย seenย that, in things naturally indifferent, the very essence of right and wrong depends upon the direction of the laws to do or to omit them.
Theย remedialย part of a law isย so necessary a consequence of the former two, that laws must be very vague and imperfectย without it. For in vain would rights be declared, in vain directed to be observed, if there were no method of recovering and asserting those rights, when wrongfully withheld or invaded. This is what we mean properly, when weย speak of the protection of the law. When, for instance, theย declaratoryย part of the law hasย said โthat the field or inheritance, which belonged to Titius’s father, is vested by his death in Titius;โ and theย directoryย part has โforbidden any one to enter on another’s property without the leave of the owner;โ if Gaius after this will presume to take possession of the land, the remedial part of the law will then interpose it’s office; will make Gaius restore the possession to Titius, and also pay him damages for the invasion.
Withย regard to theย sanctionย of laws, or the evil that may attend the breach of public duties; it is observed, that human legislators have for the most part chosen to make theย sanction of their laws ratherย vindicatoryย thanย remuneratory, or to consist rather in punishments, than in actual particular rewards. Because, in the first place, the quiet enjoyment and protection of all our civil rights and liberties, which are theย sure and general consequence of obedience to the municipal law, are in themselves the best and most valuable of all rewards. Because also, were the exercise of every virtue to be enforced by the proposal of particular rewards, it were impossible for anyย state to furnishย stock enough forย so profuse a bounty. And farther, because the dread of evil is a much more forcible principle of human actions than the prospect of good. For which reasons, though a prudent bestowing of rewards isย sometimes of exquisite use, yet we find that those civil laws, which enforce and enjoin our duty, doย seldom, if ever, propose any privilege or gift toย such as obey the law; but do constantly come armed with a penalty denounced against transgressors, either expressly defining the nature and quantity of the punishment, or else leaving it to the discretion of the judges, and those who are entrusted with the care of putting the laws in execution.
Ofย all the parts of a law the most effectual is the vindicatory. For it is but lost labour toย say, โdo this, or avoid that,โ unless we also declare, โthisย shall be the consequence of your non-compliance.โ We must therefore observe, that the mainย strength and force of a law consists in the penalty annexed to it. Herein is to be found the principal obligation of human laws.
Legislatorsย and their laws areย said toย compelย andย oblige; not that by any natural violence theyย so constrain a man, as to render it impossible for him to act otherwise than as they direct, which is theย strictย sense of obligation: but because, by declaring and exhibiting a penalty against offenders, they bring it to pass that no man can easily choose to transgress the law;ย since, by reason of the impending correction, compliance is in a high degree preferable to disobedience. And, even where rewards are proposed as well as punishments threatened, the obligation of the lawย seems chiefly to consist in the penalty: for rewards, in their nature, can onlyย persuadeย andย allure; nothing isย compulsoryย but punishment.
Itย is held, it is true, and very justly, by the principal of our ethical writers, that human laws are binding upon mens consciences. But if that were the only, or most forcible obligation, the good only would regard the laws, and the bad wouldย set them at defiance. And, true as this principle is, it mustย still be understood withย some restriction. It holds, I apprehend, as toย rights; and that, when the law has determined the field to belong to Titius, it is matter of conscience no longer to withhold or to invade it. So also in regard toย natural duties, andย such offences as areย mala inย se: here we are bound in conscience, because we are bound byย superior laws, before those human laws were in being, to perform the one and abstain from the other. But in relation to those laws which enjoin onlyย positive duties, and forbid onlyย such things as are notย mala inย seย butย mala prohibitaย merely,ย annexing a penalty to non-compliance, here I apprehend conscience is no farther concerned, than by directing aย submission to the penalty, in case of our breach of those laws: for otherwise the multitude of penal laws in aย state would not only be looked upon as an impolitic, but would also be a very wicked thing; if everyย such law were aย snare for the conscience of theย subject. But in these cases the alternative is offered to every man; โeither abstain from this, orย submit toย such a penalty;โ and his conscience will be clear, whicheverย side of the alternative he thinks proper to embrace. Thus, by theย statutes for preserving the game, a penalty is denounced against every unqualified person that kills a hare. Now this prohibitory law does not make the transgression a moral offence: the only obligation in conscience is toย submit to the penalty if levied.
I haveย now gone through the definition laid down of a municipal law; and haveย shewn that it is โa rule—of civil conduct—prescribed—by theย supreme power in aย state—commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong:โ in the explication of which I have endeavoured to interweave a few useful principles, concerning the nature of civil government, and the obligation of human laws. Before I conclude thisย section, it may not be amiss to add a few observations concerning theย interpretationย of laws.
Whenย any doubt arose upon the construction of the Roman laws, the usage was toย state the case to the emperor in writing, and take his opinion upon it. This was certainly a bad method of interpretation. To interrogate the legislature to decide particular disputes, is not only endless, but affords great room for partiality and oppression. The answers of the emperor were called his rescripts, and these had inย succeeding cases the force of perpetual laws; though they ought to be carefully distinguished, by every rational civilian, from those general constitutions, which had only the nature of things for their guide. The emperor Macrinus, as his historian Capitolinus informs us, had once resolvedย to abolish these rescripts, and retain only the general edicts; he could not bear that the hasty and crude answers ofย such princes as Commodus and Caracallaย should be reverenced as laws. But Justinian thought otherwise, and he has preserved them all. In like manner the canon laws, or decretal epistles of the popes, are all of them rescripts in theย strictestย sense. Contrary to all true forms of reasoning, they argue from particulars to generals.
Theย fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, byย signsย the most natural and probable. And theseย signs are either the words, the context, theย subject matter, the effects and consequence, or theย spirit and reason of the law. Let us take aย short view of them all.
1.ย Wordsย are generally to be understood in their usual and most knownย signification; notย so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general and popular use. Thus the law mentioned by Puffendorf, which forbad a layman toย lay handsย on a priest, was adjudged to extend to him, who had hurt a priest with a weapon. Again; terms of art, or technical terms, must be taken according to the acceptation of the learned in each art, trade, andย science. So in the act ofย settlement, where the crown of England is limited โto the princess Sophia, and the heirs of her body, being protestants,โ it becomes necessary to call in the assistance of lawyers, to ascertain the precise idea of the words โheirs of her body;โ which in a legalย sense comprize only certain of her lineal descendants. Lastly, where words are clearlyย repugnantย in two laws, the latter law takes place of the elder:ย leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogantย is a maxim of universal law, as well as of our own constitutions. And accordingly it was laid down by a law of the twelve tables at Rome,ย quod populus postremum jussit, id jus ratum esto.ย 2.ย Ifย words happen to beย still dubious, we may establish their meaning from the context; with which it may be ofย singular use to compare a word, or aย sentence, whenever they are ambiguous, equivocal, or intricate. Thus the proeme, or preamble, is often called in to help the construction of an act of parliament. Of theย same nature and use is the comparison of a law with other laws, that are made by theย same legislator, that haveย some affinity with theย subject, or that expressly relate to theย same point. Thus, when the law of England declares murder to be felony without benefit of clergy, we must resort to theย same law of England to learn what the benefit of clergy is: and, when the common law censuresย simoniacal contracts, it affords great light to theย subject to consider what the canon law has adjudged to beย simony.
3.ย Asย to theย subject matter, words are always to be understood as having a regard thereto; for that is alwaysย supposed to be in the eye of the legislator, and all his expresions directed to that end. Thus, when a law of our Edward III forbids all ecclesiastical persons to purchaseย provisionsย at Rome, it mightย seem to prohibit the buying of grain and other victual; but when we consider that theย statute was made to repress the usurpations of the papalย see, and that the nominations to benefices by the pope were calledย provisions, weย shallย see that the restraint is intended to be laid uponย such provisions only.
4.ย Asย to the effects and consequence, the rule is, where words bear either none, or a very absurdย signification, if literally understood, we must a little deviate from the receivedย sense of them. Therefore the Bolognian law, mentioned by Puffendorf, which enacted โthat whoever drew blood in theย streetsย should be punished with the utmoftย severity,โ was held after long debate not to extend to theย surgeon, who opened the vein of a person that fell down in theย street with a fit.
5.ย But, lastly, the most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason andย spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it. For when this reason ceases, the law itself ought likewise to cease with it. An instance of this is given in a case put by Cicero, or whoever was the author of the rhetorical treatise inscribed to Herennius. There was a law, that those who in aย storm forsook theย shipย should forfeit all property therein; and theย ship and ladingย should belong entirely to those whoย staid in it. In a dangerous tempest all the mariners forsook theย ship, except only oneย sick passenger, who by reason of his disease was unable to get out and escape. By chance theย ship cameย safe to port. Theย sick man kept possession and claimed the benefit of the law. Now here all the learned agree, that theย sick man is not within the reason of the law; for the reason of making it was, to give encouragement toย such asย should venture their lives toย save the vessel: but this is a merit, which he could never pretend to, who neitherย staid in theย ship upon that account, nor contributed any thing to it’s preservation.
Fromย this method of interpreting laws, by the reason of them, arises what we callย equity; which is thus defined by Grotiusย , โthe correction of that, wherein the law (by reason of it’s universality) is deficient.โ Forย since in laws all cases cannot be foreseen or expressed, it is necessary, that when the general decrees of the law come to be applied to particular cases, thereย should beย somewhere a power vested of defining those circumstances, which (had they been foreseen) the legislator himself would have expressed. And these are the cases, which, according to Grotius, โlex non exacte definit,ย sed arbitrio boni viri permittit.โ
Equityย thus depending, essentially, upon the particular circumstances of each individual case, there can be no establishedย rules and fixed precepts of equity laid down, without destroying it’s very essence, and reducing it to a positive law. And, on the other hand, the liberty of considering all cases in an equitable light must not be indulged too far, left thereby we destroy all law, and leave the decision of every question entirely in the breast of the judge. And law, without equity, though hard and disagreeable, is much more desirable for the public good, than equity without law; which would make every judge a legislator, and introduce most infinite confusion; as there would then be almost as many different rules of action laid down in our courts, as there are differences of capacity andย sentiment in the human mind.
SOURCE: Commentaries on the Laws of England by William Blackstone


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