A VISION TO IMPROVE THE LIVES OF THE PALESTINEAN AND ISRAELI PEOPLE: TRUMP PEACE INITIATIVE 2020

PART A

POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

CONTENTS

GLOSSARY | 1

SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION | 2

Background

Oslo

Realistic Two-State Solution

SECTION TWO: THE APPROACH | 5

Overview of United Nations Efforts

Current Realities

Legitimate Aspirations of the Parties

The Primacy of Security

The Question of Territory, Self-Determination and Sovereignty

Refugees

Jerusalem

The Problem of Gaza

International Assistance

SECTION THREE: A VISION FOR PEACE BETWEEN THE STATE OF ISRAEL, THE PALESTINIANS AND THE REGION | 10

SECTION FOUR: BORDERS | 11

SECTION FIVE: JERUSALEM | 14

Religious Aspects of the Jerusalem Issue

Jerusalem’s Holy Sites

Political Status of Jerusalem

Tourism matters relating to the Old City of Jerusalem

SECTION SIX: THE TRUMP ECONOMIC PLAN | 19

SECTION SEVEN: SECURITY | 21

SECTION EIGHT: CROSSINGS | 24

SECTION NINE: GAZA CRITERIA | 25

SECTION TEN: FREE TRADE ZONE | 26

SECTION ELEVEN: TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES | 27

SECTION TWELVE: PORT FACILITIES | 27

Israel

Jordan

SECTION THIRTEEN: DEAD SEA RESORT AREA | 29

SECTION FOURTEEN: WATER AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT | 29

SECTION FIFTEEN: PRISONERS | 30

SECTION SIXTEEN: REFUGEES | 31

General Framework

Compensation and Assistance Framework

SECTION SEVENTEEN: FOUNDATIONS OF A PALESTINIAN STATE | 33

SECTION EIGHTEEN: EDUCATION AND CULTURE OF PEACE | 35

SECTION NINTEEN: ISRAELI-ARAB RELATIONSHIPS; REGIONAL ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIPS | 36
New Opportunities for Regional Security Initiatives

SECTION TWENTY: MUTUAL RECOGNITION BETWEEN NATION STATES | 37

SECTION TWENTY-ONE: END OF CLAIMS / END OF CONFLICT | 38 SECTION TWENTY-TWO:CONDUCT DURING NEGOTIATIONS | 38

APPENDIX 1

Conceptual Maps

APPENDIX 2A

Security Considerations

APPENDIX 2B

Security Criteria

APPENDIX 2C

Demilitarization Criteria and other Security Arrangements

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INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Israelis and Palestinians have both suffered greatly from their long-standing and seemingly interminable conflict. For nearly a century, international leaders, diplomats, and scholars have debated the issues and attempted to resolve this conflict. The world has changed greatly during this period, as have the security challenges facing the Middle East. Many of the disputed issues have remained largely the same, and stubbornly intractable. The time has come to end the conflict, and unlock the vast human potential and economic opportunity that peace will bring to Israelis, Palestinians and the region as a whole. Over the decades, many proposals and ideas have been put forward, but elements of those plans were unachievable given the realities on the ground and in the broader Middle East. While no plan will give either side all of what it wants, what follows is our view of the best, most realistic and most achievable outcome for the parties.

Palestinians have aspirations that have not been realized, including self-determination, improvement of their standard of living, social betterment, and a respected place in the region, as well as among the nations of the world. Many Palestinians desire peace and recognize the enormous economic opportunities and social benefits that await them if relations with the State of Israel can be normalized. Gaza is a very complicated situation. It is under the control of Hamas, a terrorist organization, and, as a result of Hamas’ policies, is approaching a humanitarian crisis. It is time to help the Palestinians achieve a hopeful and prosperous future and enable them to join the community of nations.

The State of Israel has made peace with two of its neighbors. It made peace with the Arab Republic of Egypt in 1979 and it made peace with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1994, two countries with which the State of Israel had fought multiple wars and numerous border skirmishes. The State of Israel has also exchanged sizeable territories for the sake of peace, as it did when it withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for peace with the Arab Republic of Egypt. While Israeli citizens have suffered greatly as a result of violence and terrorism, Israelis still desire peace. These two peace agreements, now 40 and 25 years old, have endured and bettered the lives of citizens in Israel, Jordan and Egypt.

The conflict between the State of Israel and the Palestinians has kept other Arab countries from normalizing their relationships and jointly pursuing a stable, secure, and prosperous region. One reason for the intractability of this problem is the conflation of two separate conflicts: a territorial, security and refugee dispute between Israel and the Palestinians and a religious dispute between Israel and the Muslim world regarding control over places of religious significance. The absence of formal relations between Israel and most Muslim and Arab countries has only exacerbated the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. We believe that if more Muslim and Arab countries normalize relations with Israel it will help advance a just and fair resolution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, and prevent radicals from using this conflict to destabilize the region.


1 Capitalized terms used herein shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Glossary.


OSLO

In 1993, the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization reached the first of several interim agreements, known collectively as the Oslo Accords.

Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin, who signed the Oslo Accords and who in 1995 gave his life to the cause of peace, outlined in his last speech to the Israeli Knesset his vision regarding the ultimate resolution of the conflict. He envisioned Jerusalem remaining united under Israeli rule, the portions of the West Bank with large Jewish populations and the Jordan Valley being incorporated into Israel, and the remainder of the West Bank, along with Gaza, becoming subject to Palestinian civil autonomy in what he said would be something “less than a state.” Rabin’s vision was the basis upon which the Knesset approved the Oslo Accords, and it was not rejected by the Palestinian leadership at the time.

One of the most significant understandings within those agreements provided for security cooperation between the Israel Defense Forces (the “IDF ”) and the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (the “PA SF ”). While not perfect, and subject to periodic disputes and even suspension, the security cooperation in recent years has greatly enhanced the stability of the West Bank for both Palestinian and Israeli residents. The ability of the IDF and the PASF to work cooperatively together provides hope that security challenges can be bridged in a final Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement.

The Oslo Accords, however, left numerous key issues unresolved pending the completion of permanent status negotiations, including, among other items, borders, security, refugees and Jerusalem. Those agreements did not create an effective path for neutralizing the kinds of crises that emerged during the implementation of Oslo, including waves of terror and violence.

Many intelligent and dedicated people have devoted lifetimes in search of the “ultimate deal,” but what is required, a comprehensive agreement has been elusive, and waves of terror and violence have set back the process significantly. Only a comprehensive agreement, coupled with a strong economic plan for the Palestinians and others, has the capacity to bring lasting peace to the parties.

REALISTIC TWO-STATE SOLUTION

The principles set forth in this Vision for Peace, Prosperity and a Brighter Future (collectively, this “VISION”), are designed for the benefit of Palestinians, Israelis and the region as a whole. This Vision addresses today’s realities, and provides the Palestinians, who do not yet have a state, with a path to a dignified national life, respect, security and economic opportunity and, at the same time, safeguards Israel’s security.

A realistic solution would give the Palestinians all the power to govern themselves but not the powers to threaten Israel. This necessarily entails the limitations of certain sovereign powers in the Palestinian areas (henceforth referred to as the “Palestinian State”) such as maintenance of Israeli security responsibility and Israeli control of the airspace west of the Jordan River. This Vision creates a realistic Two-State solution in which a secure and prosperous State of Palestine is living peacefully alongside a secure and prosperous State of Israel in a secure and prosperous region.

Today, that concept seems so far from reality. Gaza and the West Bank are politically divided. Gaza is run by Hamas, a terror organization that has fired thousands of rockets at Israel and murdered hundreds of Israelis. In the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority is plagued by failed institutions and endemic corruption. Its laws incentivize terrorism and Palestinian Authority controlled media and schools promote a culture of incitement. It is because of the lack of accountability and bad governance that billions of dollars have been squandered and investment is unable to flow into these areas to allow the Palestinians to thrive.

The Palestinians deserve a better future and this Vision can help them achieve that future. Palestinian leaders must embrace peace by recognizing Israel as the Jewish state, rejecting terrorism in all its forms, allowing for special arrangements that address Israel’s and the region’s vital security needs, building effective institutions and choosing pragmatic solutions. If these steps are taken and the criteria set forth in this Vision are satisfied, then the United States will support the establishment of a Palestinian State.

This Vision is security-focused, and provides both self-determination and significant economic opportunity for Palestinians. We believe that this design will enable this Vision to be successfully implemented. This Vision also provides positive benefits to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Arab Republic of Egypt and countries throughout the region.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

The Middle East has gone through dramatic shifts since the beginning of this conflict. In confronting common threats and in pursuing common interests, previously unimaginable opportunities and alliances are emerging. The threats posed by Iran’s radical regime for example, have led to a new reality, where the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors now share increasingly similar perceptions of the threats to their security. If peace can be achieved, the economic and security cooperation between the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors can create a prosperous Middle East that is connected by a common desire for security and economic opportunity. If implemented, this Vision can lead to direct flights between the State of Israel and its neighbors, the transport of people and commerce and the unlocking of opportunities for millions of people to visit religious sites sacred to their faiths.

ECONOMIC VISION FOR A PROSPEROUS FUTURE

We developed a detailed economic vision for what the future for the Palestinians could be if there were peace. There has been a false notion that the lack of opportunity for the Palestinian people is Israel’s sole responsibility. Solving the final status issues, in the manner described in this Vision, would create the necessary conditions for investment to start flowing into the region. We estimate that combining this political solution with the economic vision for investments and government reforms that we have laid out will lead to historic economic growth. We estimate that the Palestinian GDP, which has been stagnant, could double in 10 years, create over 1 million new jobs, reduce the unemployment rate below 10 percent, and reduce the poverty rate by 50 percent. This plan is ready to be implemented in the event that peace can be made on terms consistent with this Vision.

SECTION TWO

THE APPROACH

We do not believe that the parties in the region are fated to live in eternal conflict because of their different ethnicities and faiths. There have been many examples in history of Jews and Arabs, and Jews and Muslims and Christians, living in relative harmony in this region. Our hope is that this Vision inspires a future in which all the peoples in the region live together in peace and prosperity.

We have developed this Vision based on the belief that a peaceful and prosperous future can exist for Palestinians and Israelis alike. This Vision is intended for people to read, understand and imagine how its concepts will actually and dramatically improve their lives. We believe that both sides gain more than they give. Based on this approach, we encourage all to be intellectually honest, open to new ideas, willing to engage on this Vision and take courageous steps toward a better future for themselves and for future generations.

Learning from past efforts, and driven by pragmatic principles, we approach this conflict guided by the following points:

OVERVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS

Since 1946, there have been close to 700 United Nations General Assembly resolutions and over 100 United Nations Security Council resolutions in connection with this conflict. United Nations resolutions are sometimes inconsistent and sometimes time-bound. These resolutions have not brought about peace. Furthermore, different parties have offered conflicting interpretations of some of the most significant United Nations resolutions, including United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. Indeed, legal scholars who have worked directly on critical United Nations resolutions have differed on their meaning and legal effect.

While we are respectful of the historic role of the United Nations in the peace process, this Vision is not a recitation of General Assembly, Security Council and other international resolutions on this topic because such resolutions have not and will not resolve the conflict. For too long these resolutions have enabled political leaders to avoid addressing the complexities of this conflict rather than enabling a realistic path to peace.

CURRENT REALITIES

Both Israelis and Palestinians have long-standing negotiating positions but also must recognize that compromise is necessary to move forward. It is inevitable that each side will support and oppose aspects of this Vision. It is essential that this Vision be assessed holistically. This Vision presents a package of compromises that both sides should consider, in order to move forward and pursue a better future that will benefit both of them and others in the region.

A peace agreement will be forged only when each side recognizes that it is better off with a peace agreement than without one, even one that requires difficult compromises. Peace between Israelis and Palestinians will lead to significant social and economic improvements, stability, and security for Israelis and Palestinians alike.

There are those who benefit from the status quo and, accordingly, seek to prevent change that would benefit both parties.

Reciting past narratives about the conflict is unproductive. In order to resolve this conflict, the solution must be forward-looking and dedicated to the improvement of security and quality of life, while being respectful of the historic and religious significance of the region to its peoples.

Limited framework agreements and vague proposals, which are heavily wordsmithed and include only high-level concepts, but leave the disagreements to be resolved later, have not worked. This Vision directly addresses all major issues in an attempt to genuinely resolve the conflict.

Solving this conflict will not solve all the other conflicts in the region. However, resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will remove a pretext used to stoke emotion and justify radical behavior by bad actors and have a positive impact that will increase stability, security and prosperity in the region.

The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement will deeply and profoundly impact Israelis and Palestinians. It is the Israelis and Palestinians who will have to live with the consequences of a peace agreement. Therefore, it is Israelis and Palestinians themselves, who must be satisfied with the benefits and compromises that a peace agreement entails. Israelis and Palestinians must weigh those benefits and compromises, which can create a far better future for themselves and future generations, against the continuation of the conflict for perhaps generations to come.

The role of the United States as facilitator in this process has been to collect ideas from around the world, compile them, and propose a detailed set of recommendations that can realistically and appropriately solve the conflict. The role of the United States is also to work together with other well-meaning countries and organizations to assist the parties in reaching a resolution to the conflict. But only the Israelis and Palestinians themselves can make the decision to forge a lasting peace together. The final, specific details of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, must be worked out directly between the parties.

A main fault line in the Middle East today is between leaders who want to create economic opportunity and a better life for their peoples, and those who manipulate religion and ideology in order to foment conflict and excuse their failures. This Vision aims to be respectful of ideology, religious beliefs and historical claims, but is focused primarily on putting the interests and aspirations of the people first.

We have entered a new chapter in the Middle East’s history, in which courageous leaders understand that new and shared threats have created the need for greater regional cooperation. The Trump Administration has strongly encouraged this.

Arab countries in the region have been held hostage to this conflict and recognize that it represents an uncapped financial liability to them if it remains unresolved. Many Arab countries are ready to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and want to partner with Israel and focus on the serious issues facing the region.

LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PARTIES

While the Palestinians have never had a state, they have a legitimate desire to rule themselves and chart their own destiny. Any workable peace agreement must address the Palestinians’ legitimate desire for self-determination. This Vision addresses these legitimate concerns through, among other things, the designation of territory for a future Palestinian state, strengthening Palestinian institutions of self-government, providing Palestinians with the legal status and international standing of a state, ensuring solid security arrangements, and building an innovative network of roads, bridges and tunnels that enables freedom of movement for the Palestinians.

The State of Israel has a legitimate desire to be the nation-state of the Jewish people and for that status to be recognized throughout the world.

This Vision aims to achieve mutual recognition of the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people, and the State of Palestine as the nation-state of the Palestinian people, in each case with equal civil rights for all citizens within each state.

This Vision aims to achieve the recognition by, and normalization with, those countries who do not currently recognize the State of Israel or have a relationship with the State of Israel.

This Vision aims to achieve the recognition by, and normalization with, those countries that do not currently recognize the State of Palestine or have a relationship with the Palestinians.

THE PRIMACY OF SECURITY

Even if a comprehensive peace agreement is achieved between the State of Israel, the State of Palestine and additional Arab states, the reality is that there will always exist those who desire to undermine security and stability. This Vision always keeps this reality in mind.

No government should be asked to compromise the safety and security of its citizens. This is especially true for the State of Israel, a country that since its establishment has faced, and continues to face, enemies that call for its annihilation. Israel has also had the bitter experience of withdrawing from territories that were then used to launch attacks against it.

The State of Israel suffers from extraordinary geographic and geostrategic challenges. Simply put, the State of Israel has no margin for error. As dangerous as Gaza, run by Hamas, is to the State of Israel’s safety, a similar regime controlling the West Bank would pose an existential threat to the State of Israel.

It is essential that a Palestinian state created under a peace deal be a state that has the tools to succeed and that it is peaceful and secure, rather than a platform for instability and conflict.

The United States cannot ask any country, let alone the State of Israel, a close ally, to make compromises that would exacerbate an already precarious security situation. The United States would only ask Israel to make compromises that we believe will make the State of Israel and the people of Israel more secure in the short and long term. This Vision was designed in that spirit. All other countries should take the same approach.

The threat of terrorism has spread worldwide. Today, governments closely coordinate with one another to leverage their intelligence expertise to fight terrorism. It is important that governments unambiguously condemn all forms of terrorism, and that governments work together to fight against global terrorism.

Both Israelis and Palestinians (as well as the surrounding region) benefit greatly from enhanced security. The protection of Palestinians also protects Israelis, and similarly the protection of Israelis also protects Palestinians.

Counterterrorism cooperation between the State of Israel, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Arab Republic of Egypt and others in the region has enhanced the security of each of these states. This Vision is based upon the belief that cooperation between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine will also benefit both states. Existing coordination between the Israelis and Palestinians provides hope that this can be achieved.

This Vision has been developed in a manner that takes into account the security needs of, and future strategic threats to, Israelis, Palestinians and the region.

THE QUESTION OF TERRITORY, SELF-DETERMINATION AND SOVEREIGNTY

Any realistic peace proposal requires the State of Israel to make a significant territorial compromise that will enable the Palestinians to have a viable state, respect their dignity and address their legitimate national aspirations.

Withdrawing from territory captured in a defensive war is a historical rarity. It must be recognized that the State of Israel has already withdrawn from at least 88% of the territory it captured in 1967. This Vision provides for the transfer of sizeable territory by the State of Israel — territory to which Israel has asserted valid legal and historical claims, and which are part of the ancestral homeland of the Jewish people — which must be considered a significant concession.

Peace should not demand the uprooting of people – Arab or Jew – from their homes. Such a construct, which is more likely to lead to civil unrest, runs counter to the idea of co-existence.

Transportation corridors included in this Vision create transportation contiguity that greatly reduces the need for checkpoints and greatly enhances the mobility and quality of life and commerce for the Palestinian people.

Self-determination is the hallmark of a nation. This Vision is intended to maximize self-determination, while taking all relevant factors into account.

Sovereignty is an amorphous concept that has evolved over time. With growing interdependence, each nation chooses to interact with other nations by entering into agreements that set parameters essential to each nation. The notion that sovereignty is a static and consistently defined term has been an unnecessary stumbling block in past negotiations. Pragmatic and operational concerns that effect security and prosperity are what is most important.

REFUGEES

The international community is struggling to find sufficient funds to address the needs of the over 70 million refugees and displaced persons in the world today. In 2020 alone, the United Nations has asked for over $8.5 billion in new funding to help the millions of Syrian refugees and others around the world. Most of those refugees were expelled or fled from their homes in the recent past and face dire circumstances.

The Arab-Israeli conflict created both a Palestinian and Jewish refugee problem.

Palestinian refugees, who have suffered over the past 70 years, have been treated as pawns on the broader Middle East chessboard, and empty promises have been made to them and to their host countries. A just, fair and realistic solution to the Palestinian refugee issue is necessary to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

A similar number of Jewish refugees were expelled from Arab lands shortly after the creation of the State of Israel, and have also suffered. A just solution for these Jewish refugees should be implemented through an appropriate international mechanism separate from the Israel-Palestinian Peace Agreement.

JERUSALEM

Jerusalem is holy to multiple faiths and has religious significance for much of humanity.

The issue of Jerusalem’s holy sites, particularly the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif should be treated with the utmost sensitivity.

The State of Israel has been a good custodian of Jerusalem. During Israel’s stewardship, it has kept Jerusalem open and secure.

Jerusalem should be a city that unites people and should always remain open to worshippers of all religions.

THE PROBLEM OF GAZA

Gaza has tremendous potential but is currently held hostage by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other terrorist organizations committed to Israel’s destruction. The terrorist organizations running Gaza have not improved the lives of the people living there. As these groups have gained power and increased their malign activity, the suffering of the people of Gaza has only increased.

Israel has tightened security over Gaza in order to prevent weapons, and materials that are used to make weapons, from entering. Any acceptable solution must allow goods to pass through so that the Gaza economy can thrive while making sure Israel’s legitimate security concerns are addressed.

The United States does not expect the State of Israel to negotiate with any Palestinian government that includes any members of Hamas, PIJ or surrogates thereof, unless that Palestinian government (including its members from Hamas or PIJ) unambiguously and explicitly commit to nonviolence, recognize the State of Israel, and fully satisfy the other Gaza Criteria, set forth in Section 9.

Should negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians result in a peace agreement, the State of Israel will be expected to implement its obligations under the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement only if the Palestinian Authority, or another body acceptable to Israel, has full control of Gaza, terror organizations in Gaza are disarmed, and Gaza is fully demilitarized.

For comprehensive peace to be achieved, it is up to the Palestinian people to make clear that they reject the ideologies of destruction, terror and conflict, and unite for a better future for all Palestinians.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

Countries that have donated funds to the Palestinians over the course of the conflict all have other significant challenges and needs and want to ensure that aid to the Palestinians will be spent wisely and significantly reduced over time. This Vision has been developed to reduce over time the Palestinians’ dependence on aid from the international community. The goal of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement is a thriving Palestinian economy and a viable state.

SECTION THREE

A VISION FOR PEACE BETWEEN THE STATE

OF ISRAEL, THE PALESTINIANS AND THE REGION

The conflict has grown old, the arguments have become worn, and the parties have failed to achieve peace. At this point, only a comprehensive answer to the critical issues has the potential to galvanize the parties to end this seemingly intractable conflict. Both parties must make significant and difficult compromises to achieve greater gains.

The peace agreement that will hopefully be negotiated on the basis of this Vision should be implemented through legally binding contracts and agreements (the “ISR AELI – PALESTINIAN PE ACE AGREEMENT ”).

It is also the hope of the United States that Arab nations within the region that have yet to achieve peace with the State of Israel will immediately begin to normalize relations with Israel and eventually negotiate peace agreements with Israel.

Each appendix attached to this Vision is an integral part of this Vision.

SECTION FOUR

BORDERS

A conceptual map (the “CONCEPTUAL MAP ”) is attached hereto based on the guiding principles set forward in this Vision.

The Conceptual Map has been designed to demonstrate the feasibility for a redrawing of boundaries in the spirit of UNSCR 242, and in a manner that:

1. Meets the security requirements of the State of Israel;

2. Delivers significant territorial expansion to the Palestinians;

3. Takes into account the State of Israel’s valid legal and historical claims;

4. Avoids forced population transfers of either Arab or Jews;

5. Enhances mobility for both Israelis and Palestinians within their respective states;

6. Provides pragmatic transportation solutions to address the needs of the Israeli and Palestinian enclaves that are described below;

7. Enhances the commercial viability and economic independence of the State of Palestine,

8. Provides for a potentially significant expansion of Gaza to enhance its development and success; and

9. Facilitates the integration of the State of Palestine into the regional and global economy.

The State of Israel and the United States do not believe the State of Israel is legally bound to provide the Palestinians with

100 percent of pre-1967 territory (a belief that is consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 242). This Vision is a fair compromise, and contemplates a Palestinian state that encompasses territory reasonably comparable in size to the territory of the West Bank and Gaza pre-1967.

This Vision also contemplates a Palestinian state that maximizes ease of travel within the State of Palestine through state-of-the-art infrastructure solutions comprised of bridges, roads and tunnels, and provides significant benefits well beyond the borders of the State of Palestine. For example, the State of Palestine will benefit from a high-speed transportation link that will enable efficient movement between the West Bank and Gaza, crossing over or under the State of Israel’s sovereign territory. This crossing, which didn’t exist before 1967, will greatly enhance the value of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement for the Palestinians, and will be designed to be a part of a new regional infrastructure linking Palestinians and Israelis to the broader Middle East, as described below.

Moreover, until such time as the State of Palestine may develop its own port (as described below), the State of Palestine will benefit from special access to certain designated facilities at the State of Israel’s Haifa and Ashdod ports, with an efficient means of exporting and importing goods into and out of the State of Palestine without compromising Israel’s security.

The State of Israel will benefit from having secure and recognized borders. It will not have to uproot any settlements, and will incorporate the vast majority of Israeli settlements into contiguous Israeli territory. Israeli enclaves located inside contiguous Palestinian territory will become part of the State of Israel and be connected to it through an effective transportation system.

The United States has designed the Conceptual Map to include the following features:

Approximately 97% of Israelis in the West Bank will be incorporated into contiguous Israeli territory, and approximately 97% of Palestinians in the West Bank will be incorporated into contiguous Palestinian territory. Land swaps will provide the State of Palestine with land reasonably comparable in size to the territory of pre-1967 West Bank and Gaza.

The Palestinian population located in enclaves that remain inside contiguous Israeli territory but that are part of the State of Palestine shall become citizens of the State of Palestine and shall have the option to remain in place unless they choose otherwise. They will have access routes connecting them to the State of Palestine. They will be subject to Palestinian civilian administration, including zoning and planning, within the interior of such Palestinian enclaves. They will not be discriminated against and will have appropriate security protection. Such enclaves and access routes will be subject to Israeli security responsibility.

The Israeli population located in enclaves that remain inside contiguous Palestinian territory but that are part of the State of Israel shall have the option to remain in place unless they choose otherwise, and maintain their existing Israeli citizenship. They will have access routes connecting them to the State of Israel. They will be subject to Israeli civilian administration, including zoning and planning, within the interior of such Israeli enclaves. They will not be discriminated against and will have appropriate security protection. Such enclaves and access routes will be subject to Israeli security responsibility.

The Jordan Valley, which is critical for Israel’s national security, will be under Israeli sovereignty. Notwithstanding such sovereignty, Israel should work with the Palestinian government to negotiate an agreement in which existing agricultural enterprises owned or controlled by Palestinians shall continue without interruption or discrimination, pursuant to appropriate licenses or leases granted by the State of Israel.

For over a decade, Gaza has been ruled by Hamas, a terror organization, responsible for the murder and maiming of thousands of Israelis. Rather than dedicate themselves to improving the lives of the people of Gaza, Hamas, PIJ and other terror organizations have been dedicated to the destruction of Israel. At the same time, they have brutally repressed Palestinians and diverted hundreds of millions of dollars meant to improve Palestinian lives to fueling a war machine of thousands of rockets and missiles, dozens of terror tunnels and other lethal capabilities. As a result of Hamas’ terror and misrule, the people of Gaza suffer from massive unemployment, widespread poverty, drastic shortages of electricity and potable water, and other problems that threaten to precipitate a wholesale humanitarian crisis. This Vision is designed to give Palestinians in Gaza a prosperous future. It provides for the possibility of allocating for the Palestinians Israeli territory close to Gaza (as depicted on the conceptual map) within which infrastructure may be rapidly built to address Gaza’s pressing humanitarian needs, and which will eventually enable the building of thriving Palestinian cities and towns that will help the people of Gaza flourish.

Significant improvements for the people in Gaza will not occur until there is a ceasefire with Israel, the full demilitarization of Gaza, and a governance structure that allows the international community to safely and comfortably put new money into investments that will not be destroyed by predictable future conflicts.

The State of Israel will retain sovereignty over territorial waters, which are vital to Israel’s security and which provides stability to the region.

Land swaps provided by the State of Israel could include both populated and unpopulated areas.

The Triangle Communities consist of Kafr Qara, Ar’ara, Baha al-Gharbiyye, Umm al Fahm, Qalansawe, Tayibe, Kafr Qasim, Tira, Kafr Bara and Jaljulia. These communities, which largely self-identify as Palestinian, were originally designated to fall under Jordanian control during the negotiations of the Armistice Line of 1949, but ultimately were retained by Israel for military reasons that have since been mitigated. The Vision contemplates the possibility, subject to agreement of the parties that the borders of Israel will be redrawn such that the Triangle Communities become part of the State of Palestine. In this agreement, the civil rights of the residents of the triangle communities would be subject to the applicable laws and judicial rulings of the relevant authorities.

Beyond its borders, the State of Palestine will have high-speed transportation links (such as the West Bank/Gaza connection), and until such time as the State of Palestine may develop its own port, access to two designated port facilities in the State of Israel.

Two access roads will be built for the benefit of the State of Palestine that will be subject to Israeli security requirements. These roads will enable Palestinians to cross the Jordan Valley to the border crossing with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, thereby facilitating Palestinian travel to and from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and beyond, and subject to the immigration rules of the State of Palestine, allow Jordanians and others from the region to enter the State of Palestine.

First-rate infrastructure solutions (including tunnels and overpasses) will be built to maximize unimpeded movement throughout both states and in between states and their respective enclaves.

The security barrier will be realigned to match the new borders. New, modern and efficient border crossings will be constructed.

The drawing of borders pursuant to the Conceptual Map shall be without prejudice to individual claims of title or rights of possession traditionally litigated within the Israeli judicial system.

Freedom of access to all religious sites of all faiths in both states should be agreed to and respected by the parties. The State of Israel and the State of Palestine should enter into an access agreement to ensure freedom of access to and prayer rights at all religious sites within the State of Palestine and the State of Israel. A list of such holy sites should be compiled during negotiations between the parties.

This Vision contemplates the establishment of an international fund (the “INTERNATIONAL FUND”) for the development of the land swap areas designated for the State of Palestine, as well as all infrastructure improvements and all security measures contemplated by the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, including port facilities, roads, bridges, tunnels, fences, overpasses, rail links, border crossings and the like. The cost of these improvements and measures is not expected to be absorbed by the State of Israel or the State of Palestine.

SECTION FIVE

JERUSALEM

The United States recognizes the heightened sensitivity surrounding Jerusalem, a city that means so much to so many.

Jerusalem is a city unique in the history of civilization. No other place on earth can claim significance to three major religions. Each day, Jews pray at the Western Wall, Muslims bow in prayer at the al-Aqsa Mosque and Christians worship at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

Throughout history, Jerusalem has been subject to war and conquest. It has been used to divide people and to instigate conflict by those with evil intentions. But it does not have to be this way.

Jerusalem must remain a city that brings people of all faiths together to visit, to worship, to respect each other and to appreciate the majesty of history and the glory of God’s creation.

The approach of this Vision is to keep Jerusalem united, make it accessible to all and to acknowledge its holiness to all in a manner that is respectful to all.

RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE JERUSALEM ISSUE

We understand that theological interpretations differ within each religion. The descriptions below of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are not intended to be definitive theological interpretations. It is nevertheless clear that each of these three great faiths has its own connection to Jerusalem.

For Judaism, Jerusalem is where Mount Moriah is located. According to Jewish tradition, it was there that Abraham nearly sacrificed his son, Isaac, until God intervened. Centuries later, Jerusalem became the political center of the Jewish people when King David united the twelve tribes of Israel, making the city the capital and spiritual center of the Jewish people, which it has remained for nearly 3,000 years. King David’s son, King Solomon, built the First Temple on Mount Moriah. According to Jewish tradition, inside the Temple, within the Holy of Holies, were stored the original Ten Commandments, revealed by God to Moses at Mount Sinai. The First Temple was destroyed by the Babylonians in 586 B.C. The Second Temple was built atop the same mountain and stood until it was destroyed by the Romans in 70 A.D. However, Jerusalem never lost its holiness to the Jewish People: It remains the direction to which Jews throughout the world turn in prayer and the destination of Jewish pilgrimage. Every year, on the 9th day of the Jewish month of Av, Jews fast, mourn and commemorate the destruction of the two Temples. Although Jews pray today at the Western Wall, which was a retaining wall of the Second Temple, the Temple Mount itself is the holiest site in Judaism. There are nearly 700 separate references to Jerusalem in the Hebrew Bible. For 100 generations the hopes and dreams of the Jewish people have been encapsulated by the words “Next Year in Jerusalem.”

For Christianity, Jerusalem is where Jesus of Nazareth preached, was tried, crucified, resurrected, and ascended to Heaven. Immediately after the recognition of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire by Constantine in the early 4th century, religious institutions were established at important sites such as the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Mount of Olives. After the Islamic conquest of Jerusalem in 637, Christians longed to recover the holy city, which they finally achieved in 1099, although it was lost to them again in 1187. During the medieval period, Jerusalem remained the premier Christian pilgrimage site, and a steady stream of visitors followed the footsteps of Jesus through Jerusalem, despite the dangers and challenges inherent in such travel. Under the Ottoman Empire, Christians were granted legal rights to their holy sites by successive firmans in the 18th and 19th centuries, establishing the Christian “Status Quo,” which was re-affirmed in the 1993 Vatican-Israel Fundamental Agreement. Today, Jerusalem is home to more than a dozen Christian sects and a thriving Christian population.

For Islam, Jerusalem acquires prominence as stated in the Holy Koran: “Glory to Him who made His Servant go by night from the Sacred Mosque (al-Masjid al-Haram) to the Farthest Mosque (al-Masjid al-Aqsa) whose surroundings We have blessed, that We might show him some of Our signs.” According to Islamic tradition, the verse refers to the Prophet Muhammad’s nocturnal journey from Mecca to Jerusalem (al-Isra’); he arrives at the area of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, where he ascends to Heaven (al-Mi’raj), to meet the earlier prophets and receive the commandment of prayer. In early Islam, when Muhammad had taken his followers from Mecca to Medina, he established Jerusalem as the direction of Islamic prayer (the first Qiblah) before later changing the direction of prayer to Mecca. There have been Muslim rulers who also emphasized the religious importance of Jerusalem. The Ummayad Caliphate, based in Damascus, offered Jerusalem as an alternative place of pilgrimage when Mecca was controlled by a rival caliphate. The victory of Saladin over the Crusaders in 1187 led to a revival of Islamic interest in Jerusalem, and in 1517, Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent rebuilt its walls and religious sites. Today, it is widely considered the third holiest site in Islam.

JERUSALEM’S HOLY SITES

After the Six Day War in 1967, when the State of Israel took control over all of Jerusalem, the State of Israel assumed responsibility for protecting all of the city’s holy sites. Those holy sites include, without limitation, the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, the Western Wall, the Muslim Holy Shrines, Church of St. Anne, Via Dolorosa (Stations of the Cross), Church of the Holy Sepulchre, Church of Viri Galilaei, Church of St. Stephen, Dormition Abbey, Tomb of the Virgin Mary, Room of the Last Supper, Augusta Victoria Church of Ascension, Garden of Gethsemane, Church of Mary Magdalene, Dominus Flevit Church, Pater Noster Church, Church of St. Peter in Gallicantu, Church of the Ascension, The Russian Church, Secours Catholique ‘House of Abraham,’ Mount Scopus, Hurva Synagogue, Tomb of Absalom, Tomb of Zechariah, Second Temple Pilgrimage Road, Tomb of the Prophets Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi, Gihon Spring, City of David, Mount of Olives, Sambuski Jewish Cemetery, and the Pool of Siloam.

Unlike many previous powers that had ruled Jerusalem, and had destroyed the holy sites of other faiths, the State of Israel is to be commended for safeguarding the religious sites of all and maintaining a religious status quo.

Given this commendable record for more than half a century, as well as the extreme sensitivity regarding some of Jerusalem’s holy sites, we believe that this practice should remain, and that all of Jerusalem’s holy sites should be subject to the same governance regimes that exist today. In particular the status quo at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif should continue uninterrupted.

Jerusalem’s holy sites should remain open and available for peaceful worshippers and tourists of all faiths. People of every faith should be permitted to pray on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, in a manner that is fully respectful to their religion, taking into account the times of each religion’s prayers and holidays, as well as other religious factors.

POLITICAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM

One of the most complicated issues in achieving peace is resolving the question of the political status of Jerusalem.

Prior to 1967, a divided Jerusalem was a source of great tension in the region, with Jordanian and Israeli forces separated by barbed wire and Israeli residents of Jerusalem endangered by sniper fire.

A division of Jerusalem would be inconsistent with the policy statements of the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 of the United States. All former presidents who have been involved in the peace process have agreed that Jerusalem should not be physically divided again.

On December 6, 2017, on behalf of the United States of America, President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. The President also made clear that the specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem would be subject to final status negotiations between the parties.

We believe that returning to a divided Jerusalem, and in particular having two separate security forces in one of the most sensitive areas on earth, would be a grave mistake.

While a physical division of the city must be avoided, a security barrier currently exists that does not follow the municipal boundary and that already separates Arab neighborhoods (i.e., Kafr Aqab, and the eastern part of Shuafat) in Jerusalem from the rest of the neighborhoods in the city.

This physical barrier should remain in place and should serve as a border between the capitals of the two parties.

Jerusalem will remain the sovereign capital of the State of Israel, and it should remain an undivided city. The sovereign capital of the State of Palestine should be in the section of East Jerusalem located in all areas east and north of the existing security barrier, including Kafr Aqab, the eastern part of Shuafat and Abu Dis, and could be named Al Quds or another name as determined by the State of Palestine.

This Vision would allow the Arab residents of Israel’s capital, Jerusalem, beyond the 1949 armistice lines but inside the existing security barrier to choose one of three options:

1. Become citizens of the State of Israel

2. Become citizens of the State of Palestine

3. Retain their status as permanent residents in Israel.

Over the years, some Arab residents of these areas (approximately 6%) have chosen to become Israeli citizens, and that option should remain available to Arab residents of these areas in the future.

Other Arab residents of these areas may want to embrace a Palestinian political identity by choosing to become citizens of the State of Palestine, and that option should be available to them as well.

Many of the Arab residents of these areas may want to maintain a political identity that is separate from either Israel or Palestine, and which allows them to take pride in their unique identity and history. That option should remain available to them.

PRIVILEGES, BENEFITS AND OBLIGATIONS

The privileges, benefits and obligations of Arab residents of these areas who choose to keep their status as permanent residents of Israel should remain the same.

The privileges, benefits and obligations of Arab residents of these areas who choose to become citizens of Palestine will be determined by the laws of the State of Palestine and the State of Israel, as applicable.

The residents of these areas who choose to become citizens of the State of Israel will have all the privileges, benefits and obligations of being citizens of the State of Israel. Residents of these areas, who today are citizens of Israel, will maintain the same privileges, benefits and obligations that they have today.

SPECIAL TOURIST AREA

The State of Israel should allow for the development by the State of Palestine of a special tourism zone in Atarot, in a specific area to be agreed upon by the parties. We envision that this area should be a world class tourist zone that should support Muslim tourism to Jerusalem and its holy sites. We envision that this zone will become a thriving and vibrant tourism center that includes state-of-the-art public transportation that provides easy access to and from the holy sites.

To support this new development, the economic development program will identify financing for the construction of restaurants, shops, hotels, cultural centers, and other tourism facilities within this zone. Fast-track accessibility to the Muslim Holy Shrines should be developed and maintained. The specific details of this area, including, without limitation, taxation, and zoning should be negotiated between the parties.

TOURISM MATTERS RELATING TO THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM

Without derogating the State of Israel’s sovereignty, during the negotiation of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, and subject to the State of Israel’s security requirements, the parties shall:

1. Negotiate a mechanism by which licenses shall be provided to Palestinian tour guides to operate tours in the Old City of Jerusalem as well as at sites sacred to Christianity and Islam in other areas of Jerusalem;

2. Establish a Jerusalem-Al Quds Joint Tourism Development Authority (the “JTDA”). The JTDA will work to promote Jewish, Muslim and Christian tourism in both the State of Israel and the State of Palestine. Israel will establish a mechanism whereby part of the tax revenues from the increased tourism in the Old City of Jerusalem will be allocated to the JTDA for further reinvestment for tourism in the Old City of Jerusalem. The JTDA will also work with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to promote regional tourism.

RECOGNITION OF CAPITALS

Jerusalem should be internationally recognized as the capital of the State of Israel. Al Quds (or another name selected by the State of Palestine) should be internationally recognized as the capital of the State of Palestine.

Neither party shall encourage or support efforts by other countries or persons to deny the legitimacy of the other party’s capital or its sovereignty. The mayors for each capital city will establish mechanisms for regular consultation and voluntary cooperation on matters of significance to the two capitals.

The embassy of the United States to the State of Israel will remain in Jerusalem. Following the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, the embassy of the United States to the State of Palestine will be in Al Quds at a location to be chosen by the United States, in agreement with the State of Palestine. The United States will recognize the State of Israel and the State of Palestine in their respective capitals and encourage other nations to relocate their embassies to Jerusalem and Al Quds, as applicable.

SECTION SIX

THE TRUMP ECONOMIC PLAN

At the invitation of the Kingdom of Bahrain, this past June in Manama, the United States presented the administration’s Middle East Peace Economic Plan titled Peace to Prosperity: A New Vision for the Palestinian People.

The United States recognizes that the successful signing and implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement will have a significant impact on the economic prospects of the region. In Bahrain, the international community stressed its commitment to the economic plan and its necessity, as well as its viability following the signing of a peace agreement.

The economic plan will empower the Palestinian people to build a prosperous and vibrant Palestinian society. It consists of three initiatives that will support distinct pillars of the Palestinian society: the economy, the people, and the government. With the potential to facilitate more than $50 billion in new investment over ten years, Peace to Prosperity represents the most ambitious and comprehensive international effort for the Palestinian people to date. It has the ability to fundamentally transform the West Bank and Gaza and to open a new chapter in Palestinian history, one defined, not by adversity and loss, but by opportunity and dignity.

The first initiative will unleash the economic potential of the Palestinian people. By developing property and contract rights, the rule of law, anti-corruption measures, capital markets, a pro-growth tax structure, and a low-tariff scheme with reduced trade barriers, this initiative envisions policy reforms coupled with strategic infrastructure investments that will improve the business environment and stimulate private-sector growth. Hospitals, schools, homes, and businesses will secure reliable access to affordable electricity, clean water, and digital services. Billions of dollars of new investment will flow into various sectors of the Palestinian economy. Businesses will have increased access to capital, and the markets of the West Bank and Gaza will be connected with key trading partners, including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon. The resulting economic growth has the potential to end the current unemployment crisis and transform the West Bank and Gaza into a center of opportunity.

The second initiative will empower the Palestinian people to realize their ambitions. Through new data-driven, outcomes-based education options at home, expanded online education platforms, increased vocational and technical training, and the prospect of international exchanges, this initiative will enhance and expand a variety of programs that directly improve the well-being of the Palestinian people. It will strengthen the Palestinian educational system and ensure that students can fulfill their academic goals and be prepared for the workforce.

Equally important, access to quality healthcare will be dramatically improved, as Palestinian hospitals and clinics will be outfitted with the latest healthcare technology and equipment. In addition, new opportunities for cultural and recreational activities will improve the quality of life of the Palestinian people. From parks and cultural institutions to athletic facilities and libraries, this initiative’s projects will enrich public life throughout the West Bank and Gaza.

The third initiative will enhance Palestinian governance, improving the public sector’s ability to serve its citizens and enable private-sector growth. This initiative will support the public sector in undertaking the improvements and reforms necessary to achieve long-term economic success. A commitment to upholding property rights, improving the legal and regulatory framework for businesses, adopting a growth-oriented, enforceable tax structure, and developing robust capital markets will increase exports and foreign direct investment. A fair and independent judicial branch will ensure this pro-growth environment is protected and that civil society flourishes. New systems and policies will help bolster government transparency and accountability. International partners will work to eliminate the Palestinian public sector’s donor dependency and put the Palestinians on a trajectory to achieve long-term fiscal sustainability. Institutions will be modernized and made more efficient to facilitate the most effective delivery of essential services for the citizens. With the support of the Palestinian leadership, this initiative can usher in a new era of prosperity and opportunity for the Palestinian people and institutionalize the policies required for successful economic transformation.

These three initiatives are more than just a vision of a promising future for the Palestinian people. They are also the foundation for an implementable plan. Capital raised through this international effort will be placed into a new fund administered by an established multilateral development bank. Accountability, transparency, anti-corruption, and conditionality safeguards will protect investments and ensure that capital is allocated efficiently and effectively. The fund’s leadership will work with beneficiaries to outline annual investment guidelines, development goals, and governance reforms that will support project implementation in the areas identified within Peace to Prosperity. Grants, concessional loans, and other support will be distributed to projects that meet the defined criteria through a streamlined process that will enable both flexibility and accountability.

In addition to the requirement that the State of Palestine comply in all respects with the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, Peace to Prosperity will be conditioned upon (i) the establishment by the State of Palestine of transparent, independent, and credit-worthy financial institutions capable of engaging in international market transactions in the same manner as financial institutions of western democracies, (ii) the establishment of appropriate governance to ensure the proper use of funds, and (iii) the establishment of a legal system that protects investments and addresses commercial expectations.

The United States will work with the Palestinian Authority to identify economic projects for Al Quds and incorporate such projects into Peace to Prosperity.

The economic plan will empower the Palestinian people to build the society that they have aspired to establish for generations. It will allow Palestinians to realize a better future and pursue their dreams. We are confident that the international community will support this plan. Ultimately, however, the power to implement it lies in the hands of the Palestinian people.

SECTION SEVEN

SECURITY

This Vision is designed to enable Israelis and Palestinians to live in peace and to reduce the risk of terrorism.

It is unrealistic to ask the State of Israel to make security compromises that could endanger the lives of its citizens.

Appendix 2A provides a broad outline of some the acute security challenges facing the State of Israel. The goal of this Vision is to enable the parties to meet those security challenges and to enable the State of Palestine to assume as much of its security responsibilities as possible, as quickly as possible, throughout the State of Palestine.

This Vision contemplates facilitating close security coordination between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine, together with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt. This section sets forth the best path to realistically achieve this goal. If the proper level of security coordination cannot be achieved, then the security of the State of Israel is nevertheless protected under this Vision.

Every country spends a very significant sum of money on its defense from external threats. The State of Palestine will not be burdened with such costs, because it will be shouldered by the State of Israel. This is a significant benefit for the economy of the State of Palestine since funds that would otherwise be spent on defense can instead be directed towards healthcare, education, infrastructure and other matters to improve Palestinians’ well-being.

Upon signing the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, the State of Israel will maintain overriding security responsibility for the State of Palestine, with the aspiration that the Palestinians will be responsible for as much of their internal security as possible, subject to the provisions of this Vision. The State of Israel will work diligently to minimize its security footprint in the State of Palestine according to the principle that the more the State of Palestine does, the less the State of Israel will have to do. The State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will discuss to what extent, if any, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan can assist the State of Israel and the State of Palestine in connection with security in the State of Palestine.

The criteria for Palestinian security performance (the “SECURIT Y CRITERIA”) are generally outlined in Appendix 2B.

As the State of Palestine meets and maintains the Security Criteria, the State of Israel’s involvement in security within the State of Palestine will be reduced. Both the Israelis and Palestinians have a common interest in maximizing Palestinian capability as quickly as possible. The United States and Israel will continue their work to strengthen the capabilities of the PASF.

The State of Israel will work to increase joint-cooperation with the PASF to help build its terrorism prevention capabilities.

Achieving that goal in a manner that enhances the security of both countries will necessitate the following:

1. The State of Palestine shall be fully demilitarized and remain so, as outlined in Appendix 2C.

2. The State of Palestine will have security forces capable of maintaining internal security and preventing terror attacks within the State of Palestine and against the State of Israel, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt. The mission of the State of Palestine’s security forces will be public order, law enforcement, counterterrorism (working with the State of Israel, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt as described below), border security (working with the State of Israel, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt, as applicable, and as described below), protection of government officials and foreign dignitaries, and disaster response. These specific capabilities (i) may not (A) violate the principle that the State of Palestine in all its territory, including Gaza, shall be, and shall remain, fully demilitarized or (B) derogate the State of Israel’s overriding security responsibility, and (ii) will be agreed upon by the State of Palestine and the State of Israel.

3. This security protocol is intended to continue unless and until there is a different agreement by both the State of Israel and the State of Palestine.

Over many years, the United States has supported the Palestinian Authority’s efforts to counter terrorism. This partnership has established a foundation of trust that this Vision hopes to build upon. This Vision is based on the belief and expectation that the State of Palestine will continue such efforts and work towards enhancing such efforts. Once the State of Israel determines that the State of Palestine has demonstrated both a clear intention and a sustained capacity to fight terrorism, a pilot program will be initiated in an area of the West Bank portion of the State of Palestine, designated by the State of Israel, to determine if the State of Palestine is able to meet the Security Criteria. If the State of Palestine succeeds in maintaining the Security Criteria in the designated pilot area, then the pilot program will be expanded to other areas within the State of Palestine as well.

The United States will help support the State of Palestine to meet and maintain the Security Criteria. During the negotiations, the parties, in consultation with the United States, shall attempt to create acceptable initial non-binding metrics with respect to the initial pilot area which shall be acceptable to the State of Israel, and in no event less than the metrics used by either the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or the Arab Republic of Egypt (whichever is stricter) with respect to the Security Criteria. Because security threats evolve, the metrics are intended to be used as a guide, and will not be binding. However, the establishment of such non-binding metrics takes into account regional minimum benchmarks and allows the State of Palestine to better understand the minimum goals it is expected to achieve.

Should the State of Palestine fail to meet all or any of the Security Criteria at any time, the State of Israel will have the right to reverse the process outlined above. The State of Israel’s security footprint in all or parts of the State of Palestine will then increase as a result of the State of Israel’s determination of its expanded security needs and the time needed to address them.

Under the new reality of peace, the parties will enhance their bilateral security coordination in order to maintain peace, stability and a smooth implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement.

As a complementary measure to the bilateral security coordination, a security review committee (the “REVIEW COMMIT TEE”) will be established that will consist of security representatives appointed by the State of Israel, the State of Palestine and the United States. The United States representative will be agreed to by the State of Israel and the State of Palestine. The Review Committee, which shall meet every 6 months, will serve as a forum to support the buildup and maintenance of the security capabilities of the State of Palestine toward meeting and maintaining the Security Criteria (see Appendix 2B), to review policy matters related to progress in implementing and maintaining the Security Criteria, and to facilitate necessary infrastructure changes and related investments (by the International Fund) on the ground.

The State of Israel, the State of Palestine, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt share a common interest in preventing all forms of militant, extremist, terrorist or criminal activity from gaining a base of operations or in any way from destabilizing the State of Palestine or its neighbors. A secure, demilitarized and peaceful State of Palestine will contribute to the security needs of both parties and to regional security, as well as to economic prosperity. In furtherance of their internal security and to advance their common interests, the State of Palestine, the State of Israel, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt will engage in comprehensive and enduring state-to-state cooperation.

The United States recommends the establishment of a regional security committee (“RSC”). The RSC’s task would be to review regional counterterrorism policies and coordination. Ideally, the RSC would include security representatives from the United States, the State of Israel, the State of Palestine, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

The State of Israel will maintain at least one early-warning stations in the State of Palestine as designated on the Conceptual Map, which will be run by Israeli security forces. Uninterrupted Israeli security access to and from any early-warning station will be ensured.

To the extent reasonably possible, solely as determined by the State of Israel, the State of Israel will rely on blimps, drones and similar aerial equipment for security purposes in order to reduce the Israeli security footprint within the State of Palestine.

Although each party will be in charge of setting zoning rules and issuing building permits in their own countries, zoning and planning of the State of Palestine in the areas adjacent to the border between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine, including without limitation, the border between Jerusalem and Al Quds, will be subject to the State of Israel’s overriding security responsibility.

The security plan outlined in this section results in billions of dollars in savings for international donors in lieu of creating a new multi-national security force composed of forces from the United States and/or other countries.

The parties will work together, in good faith, on security matters, to protect Israelis and Palestinians alike.

SECTION EIGHT

CROSSINGS

The threat of terrorism has reduced trust and slowed the movement of goods and people throughout the region. The goal of this vision is to have a rapid flow of goods and people through the borders in a dignified, extremely efficient system of crossings that does not compromise security.

The State of Israel will work closely with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Palestine to continue to improve the system for all border crossings. The system of border crossings will be implemented in a manner that keeps the visibility of the State of Israel’s security role to a minimum. As permitted by law, security personnel at these crossings shall wear civilian uniforms with no state designation.

A board of overseers (the “CROSSINGS BOARD”) comprised of three Israelis, three Palestinians and a United States representative shall meet quarterly to address concerns regarding the crossings. The United States representative will be agreed to by both the State of Palestine and the State of Israel. The purpose of the Crossings Board is not to interfere with the security measures at the crossings but rather to constructively find ways to improve the flow and treatment of people using the crossings. During the negotiations, the parties will develop a protocol pursuant to which people who have grievances with their treatment at the crossings that are not resolved between the parties will be addressed by the Crossings Board. The Crossings Board will develop goals and metrics by which to measure whether they are achieving its goals. Every year, the Crossings Board will provide, directly to the governments of each of the State of Palestine, the State of Israel the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, a report on performance and non-binding recommendations for improvements, along with goals for the following year.

All persons and goods will cross the borders into the State of Palestine through regulated border crossings, which will be monitored by the State of Israel. Israeli border crossing officials, using state of the art scanning and imaging technology, shall have the right to confirm that no weapons, dual-use or other security-risk related items will be allowed to enter into the State of Palestine. If an item is denied entry, the item will also be prohibited to be exported from the State of Israel into the State of Palestine in order to avoid creating a competitive advantage to Israeli businesses. To the extent any dispute related to whether or not a denial creates a competitive advantage, such dispute shall be referred to the Crossings Board. The State of Palestine will have the authority to set its own independent trade policy in order to deny import into the State of Palestine of any item for economic or legal purposes.

To combat terrorism while allowing maximum economic pursuit in the State of Palestine, all efforts will be made to mitigate the cost of production if a raw material or subcomponent of an end item is deemed dangerous and its import into the State of Palestine needs to be controlled. Rather than banning a dual use item, every effort should be made to develop transportation, storage and end-use monitoring measures to prevent the diversion of dangerous components to illicit use. Only security-vetted individuals and companies will be allowed to transport, store and utilize dual-use items and appropriate measures will be used to ensure that the dual-use raw materials or subcomponents are not used to produce weapons.

With respect to the processing of people at all crossings, during the negotiations, the parties, in consultation with the United States, shall attempt to create initial non-binding metrics acceptable to them and in no event less than the metrics used by either the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or the Arab Republic of Egypt (whichever is stricter). Because security threats evolve, the metrics are intended to be used as a guide, and will not be binding. However, the establishment of such non-binding metrics will allow the parties to achieve a workable, efficient and secure processing of people at all crossings, and take into account regional minimum benchmarks. Nothing in this section shall undermine the principles set forth in Appendix 2C.

SECTION NINE

GAZA CRITERIA

The people of Gaza have suffered for too long under the repressive rule of Hamas. They have been exploited as hostages and human shields, and bullied into submission. Hamas has failed the people of Gaza and has diverted money belonging to the Palestinians of Gaza, including funds provided by international donors, to attack the State of Israel, instead of using these funds to improve the lives of the people of Gaza.

Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza nearly 15 years ago was meant to advance peace. Instead, Hamas, an internationally recognized terrorist group, gained control over the territory, and increased attacks on Israel, including the launching of thousands of rockets. Under the leadership of Hamas, the residents of Gaza have suffered extreme poverty and deprivation. After years of no progress the the donor community is fatigued and reluctant to make additional investments so long as the governance structure in Gaza is run by terrorists who provoke confrontations that lead to more destruction and suffering for the people of Gaza. This cycle can be broken if the international community unites to pursue a new course.

The State of Israel will implement its obligations under the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement only if:

(A)

1. the Palestinian Authority or another national or international body acceptable to the State of Israel is in full control of Gaza, in a manner consistent with paragraph (B)(2) below;

2. Hamas, PIJ, and all other militias and terror organizations in Gaza are disarmed; and

3. Gaza is fully demilitarized.

During the negotiations, the parties will agree to a time frame for the compliance with items (A)(1) through (3) above.

(B)

  1. if efforts to return all Israeli captives and the remains of Israeli soldiers have not have previously been successful, then upon the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, all Israeli captives and remains must be returned.
  2. If Hamas is to play any role in a Palestinian government, it must commit to the path of peace with the State of Israel by adopting the Quartet principles, which include unambiguously and explicitly recognizing the State of Israel, committing to nonviolence, and accepting previous agreements and obligations between the parties, including the disarming of all terrorist groups. The United States expects that the State of Palestine’s government will not include any members of Hamas, PIJ, or surrogates thereof, unless all of the foregoing shall have occurred.

The international community should be willing to provide compensation in the form of major investment for a complete and verifiable demilitarization of Gaza.

Once these criteria are met, the economic vision will be ready to be implemented in a phased approach whereby tranches of investment and state building aid will be released as milestones are achieved.

All of the criteria set forth in this section entitled “Gaza Criteria” are referred to in this Vision as the “GA Z A CRITERIA .”

SECTION TEN

FREE TRADE ZONE

Subject to the agreement of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a free-trade zone between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Palestine will be established to expedite economic cooperation between the two countries.

The location and size of the free-trade zone will be agreed upon by the parties so that the free trade zone will not interfere with current land use in the area and necessary security requirements. Goods from the free-trade zone will be exported using an airport located in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

SECTION ELEVEN

TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES

The United States will continue to provide duty-free treatment to goods coming from all areas that enjoy such treatment today, and will negotiate a free trade agreement with the State of Palestine. The United States hopes that countries in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere will also pursue free trade agreements with the State of Palestine.

SECTION TWELVE

PORT FACILITIES

Transportation is critical for economic development, regional integration and integration into the world economic market. Currently, the cost of goods born by the Palestinian people is particularly high due to transportation challenges. The lack of ports has raised the costs of Palestinian economic activity. Though the State of Palestine will include Gaza, security challenges make the building of a port in Gaza problematic for the foreseeable future. This Vision hopes to enhance Palestinian economic activity, protect Israeli security and provide a path for the State of Palestine to have its own port in Gaza in the future.

ISRAEL

The State of Israel will allow the State of Palestine to use and manage earmarked facilities at both the Haifa and Ashdod ports, without prejudice to the State of Israel’s undisputed sovereignty at both of these locations. The purpose of these earmarked port facilities will be for the State of Palestine to benefit economically from access to the Mediterranean Sea, without compromising the State of Israel’s security.

The role of the State of Israel at these earmarked port facilities will be limited to security functions that will ensure that all goods transported into and out of these earmarked port facilities do not pose a threat to the State of Israel. The security arrangements at these earmarked port facilities will be similar to those of other international border crossings managed by the State of Israel.

These earmarked port facilities will be used only by cargo ships. The State of Israel will help the State of Palestine establish a fast-track transportation system that will allow the State of Palestine to transport all cargo from the earmarked port facilities to the State of Palestine, subject to the State of Israel’s security considerations.

The State of Palestine will be responsible for charging and collecting all taxes associated with goods entering these earmarked port facilities. All taxes collected for goods to be transported into the State of Palestine will belong to the State of Palestine.

The State of Israel and the State of Palestine will cooperate in an equitable manner with one another with respect to the traffic into and out of the ports. The parties will also assist one another in connection with joint civilian operations when needed in case of emergencies (e.g., fire, floods, etc.).

The earmarked port facilities and all ships using the earmarked port facilities shall be subject to applicable Israeli laws, including but not limited to, environmental and labor laws, and shall not be in violation of any applicable tariff agreements.

The earmarked port facilities will utilize the existing Israeli harbor, as well as existing Israeli support facilities for refueling and repairing vessels. The State of Israel and the State of Palestine shall enter into an agreement pursuant to which the State of Palestine will be able to utilize these facilities in an equitable manner. The State of Palestine will pay its equitable share of costs to maintain and repair all the shared facilities. However, there will be no rental fees payable by the State of Palestine to the State of Israel for use of, or relating to, these earmarked port facilities.

JORDAN

Subject to the consent of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the State of Palestine may use and manage an earmarked facility at the port of Aqaba, without prejudice to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s undisputed sovereignty at the port of Aqaba. The purpose of the earmarked port facility will be for the State of Palestine to benefit economically from access to the Red Sea, without compromising the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s security.

The role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan at the earmarked port facility will be limited to security functions that will ensure that all goods transported into and out of the earmarked port facility do not pose a threat to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The security arrangements at the earmarked port facility will be similar to those of other international border crossings managed by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

The earmarked port facility will be used only by cargo ships. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will help the State of Palestine establish a fast-track transportation system that will allow the State of Palestine to transport all cargo from the earmarked port facility to the State of Palestine, subject to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s security considerations.

The State of Palestine will be responsible for charging and collecting all taxes associated with goods entering the earmarked port facility. All taxes collected for goods to be transported into the State of Palestine will belong to the State of Palestine.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Palestine will cooperate in an equitable manner with one another with respect to the traffic into and out of the port. The parties will also assist one another in connection with joint civilian operations when needed in case of emergencies (fire, floods, etc.).

The earmarked port facility and all ships using the earmarked port facility shall be subject to applicable Jordanian laws, including but not limited to, environmental and labor laws, and shall not be in violation of any applicable tariff agreements.

The earmarked port facility will utilize the existing Jordanian harbor, as well as existing Jordanian support facilities for refueling and repairing vessels. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Palestine shall enter into an agreement pursuant to which the State of Palestine will be able to utilize these facilities in an equitable manner. The State of Palestine will pay its equitable share of costs to maintain and repair all the shared facilities. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall be entitled to charge an appropriate rental fee, payable by the State of Palestine to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for use of, and relating to, the earmarked port facility.

POTENTIAL GAZA PORT AND POTENTIAL AIRPORT FOR GAZA

Five years following the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement and assuming the full satisfaction of the Gaza Criteria, the State of Palestine shall have the right, subject to the satisfaction of State of Israel’s security and environmental requirements, to create an artificial island off the coast of Gaza to develop a port to serve Gaza (the “GA Z A PORT ”), as well as an airport for small aircraft. The specifics of this (or alternative locations for the Gaza port and small airport) will be determined during the negotiations. At such time, if any, as the Gaza Port is developed, the State of Palestine shall no longer have rights to utilize the earmarked port facilities in (i) Haifa and Ashdod, unless agreed to by the State of Israel, and (ii) Aqaba, unless agreed to by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

SECTION THIRTEEN

DEAD SEA RESORT AREA

The State of Israel will allow the State of Palestine to develop a resort area in the North of the Dead Sea without prejudice to the State of Israel’s sovereignty at such location, including, without limitation, Israel’s sovereignty to the shoreline. The presence of the Palestinian resort area along the coast of the Dead Sea will not alter the distribution arrangements between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel for natural resources in the Dead Sea. The State of Israel and the State of Palestine will establish a road that will allow the Palestinians to travel from the State of Palestine to this resort area, subject to Israeli security considerations.

SECTION FOURTEEN

WATER AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT

The parties recognize mutual water rights and agree to equitably share existing cross border water sources and cooperate in making additional sources available through existing and emerging technologies. Shared aquifers will be managed for sustainable use to prevent impairing the groundwater quality or damaging the aquifers through over-extraction. Hydrological and climatic conditions, among other factors, will be considered when managing extraction. The parties will prioritize investing in desalination and other emerging technologies to produce substantial additional quantities of water for all uses and jointly seek to provide easily available, reasonably priced water to both parties. The parties agree to also focus investment in wastewater treatment and wastewater recycling and reuse to control and minimize pollution of the shared ground-waters. The parties will work together in good faith to manage the details with respect to water and wastewater treatment issues.

SECTION FIFTEEN

PRISONERS

The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement will provide for the release of Palestinian prisoners and administrative detainees held in Israeli prisons, except (i) those convicted of murder or attempted murder, (ii) those convicted of conspiracy to commit murder (in each case murder includes murder by terrorism) and (iii) Israeli citizens. The release of prisoners (other than those described in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii)) will be conducted in two phases to allow for orderly transfer and resettlement. All prisoners who are released will become citizens of the State of Palestine. For the avoidance of doubt, prisoners described under clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) above shall not be released under the terms of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement.

The first phase, to occur immediately after the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, will include minors, women, prisoners over 50 years of age, prisoners in ill health, and those who have served over two-thirds of their sentence.

The parties will agree on the timing of the second phase, which will include the remaining eligible prisoners who have served over half their sentence.

Any additional prisoner releases will be based on Israeli consent.

As part of the agreement on prisoners, the State of Israel will agree to give amnesty to those Palestinians who committed offenses prior to the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, and who reside outside the State of Palestine, whose entry is approved into the State of Palestine pursuant to the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement. Notwithstanding the forgoing, no amnesty will be given to any Palestinian described in clauses (i), (ii) or (iii) above, and such individuals will not be permitted entry into the State of Palestine.

Each prisoner who is released will be required to sign a pledge to promote within their community the benefits of co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians, and to conduct themselves in a manner that models co-existence. Prisoners who refuse to sign this pledge will remain incarcerated.

Each prisoner who is released shall have the right to seek asylum in a third country.

No Palestinian prisoners or administrative detainees will be released in accordance with this section if all Israeli captives and remains are not returned to the State of Israel.

SECTION SIXTEEN

REFUGEES

The Arab-Israeli conflict created both a Palestinian and Jewish refugee problem. Nearly the same number of Jews and Arabs were displaced by the Arab/Israeli conflict. Nearly all of the Jews have since been accepted and permanently resettled in Israel or other countries around the world. The Arabs who were displaced have, in very significant numbers, been isolated and kept from living as citizens in the many Arab countries in the region. For example, after the Kuwaiti government returned, following liberation by the United States and its coalition, it began a systematic clearing of Palestinians from the country through violence and economic pressure. The population of Palestinians in Kuwait dropped from 400,000 before the invasion to about 25,000.

The Palestinians have collectively been cruelly and cynically held in limbo to keep the conflict alive. Their Arab brothers have the moral responsibility to integrate them into their countries as the Jews were integrated into the State of Israel. Keeping the Palestinian people in limbo is a widespread issue. For example, in Lebanon, Palestinians have been discriminated against and prevented from entering the labor market for decades, even those born in Lebanon. They are for the most part barred from owning property or entering desirable occupations, including law, medicine and engineering. To gain employment, Palestinians are required to receive government issued work permits, but remarkably few are ever given to Palestinian refugees.

We must recognize that of all the Arab countries, the Kingdom of Jordan has valiantly attempted to take care of the Palestinian people in Jordan.

Proposals that demand that the State of Israel agree to take in Palestinian refugees, or that promise tens of billions of dollars in compensation for the refugees, have never been realistic and a credible funding source has never been identified. In fact, the world struggles to find sufficient funds to support the over 70 million global refugees and displaced persons. Over the decades the United States has been committed to supporting the needs of Palestinian refugees, who have suffered greatly over the last 70 years. From 1950 until and including 2017, the United States contributed approximately $6.15 billion to United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). In the last 10 years alone, the U.S. contributed approximately $2.99 billion ($3.16 billion in 2017 terms), which accounted for 28% of all contributions to UNRWA. Unfortunately, Palestinian refugees have been treated as pawns in the broader Middle East chessboard, and empty promises have been made to them and to their host countries. A just, fair and realistic solution to the Palestinian refugee issue must be found in order to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Jewish refugees who were forced to flee Arab and Muslim countries also suffered. Most settled in the State of Israel and some settled elsewhere. The Jewish refugee issue, including compensation for lost assets, must also be addressed. Additionally, the State of Israel deserves compensation for the costs of absorbing Jewish refugees from those countries. A just, fair and realistic solution for the issues relating to Jewish refugees must be implemented through an appropriate international mechanism separate from the Israel-Palestinian Peace Agreement.

This Vision contemplates that the Palestinian refugee issue will be resolved along the following lines:

GENERAL FRAMEWORK

The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement shall provide for a complete end and release of any and all claims relating to refugee or immigration status. There shall be no right of return by, or absorption of, any Palestinian refugee into the State of Israel.

To be eligible for any refugee rights under the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, individuals must be in Registered Refugee status by UNRWA, as of the date of release of this Vision. The reference to the UNRWA definition of refugees is being used solely to define the universe of claimants and to provide the Trustees (as defined below) of the Palestinian Refugee Trust (as defined below) the widest flexibility to determine the appropriate distribution methodology, but should not be construed as acceptance by the United States that, in the absence of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, refugee status should be determined by reference to this definition, including on a multi-generational, perpetual manner. UNRWA’s mandate, and its multi-generational definition of who constitutes a refugee, has exacerbated the refugee crisis. Under any circumstance, individuals who have already resettled in a permanent location (to be further defined in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement) will not be eligible for resettlement, and will be eligible only for compensation as described below.

This plan envisions three options for Palestinian refugees seeking a permanent place of residence:

1. Absorption into the State of Palestine (subject to the limitations provided below);

2. Local integration in current host countries (subject to those countries consent); or

3. The acceptance of 5,000 refugees each year, for up to ten years (50,000 total refugees), in individual Organization of

Islamic Cooperation member countries who agree to participate in Palestinian refugee resettlement (subject to those individual countries’ agreement).

The United States will work together with other countries to establish a framework for the implementation of such options, including taking into account current host countries’ concerns and limitations.

COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK

It is the view of the United States that while refugee compensation is important and desirable, funds will have a far greater impact on the State of Palestine’s economic and social viability and on the refugees themselves if used to implement the Trump Economic Plan. The State of Palestine will be receiving substantial assistance to develop all key economic and infrastructure sectors. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which has admirably supported Palestinian refugees, will also receive benefits from the Trump Economic Plan. The Palestinian refugees already residing in the State of Palestine and those who relocate to the State of Palestine will be direct beneficiaries of this large-scale aid and investment package.

Nevertheless, we will endeavor to raise a fund to provide some compensation to Palestinian refugees. Such funds will be placed in a trust (the “PALESTINIAN REFUGEE TRUST”) to be administered by two trustees (“TRUSTEES”) to be appointed by the State of Palestine and the United States. The Trustees will administer the Palestinian Refugee Trust in accordance with the principles to be established by the Trustees and approved by the State of Palestine and the United States. The Trustees will work in good faith to adopt a distribution methodology to fairly compensate refugees in accordance with the priorities established by the Trustees and within the total amount of the funds collected for the Palestinian Refugee Trust.

Once the Trustees have received and analyzed refugee claims, they will allocate the funds in the Palestinian Refugee Trust to claimants in a manner that reflects those priorities.

It must be stressed that many Palestinian refugees in the Middle East come from war torn countries, such as Syria and Lebanon that are extremely hostile toward the State of Israel. To address this concern, a committee of Israelis and Palestinians will be formed to address this issue and to resolve outstanding disputes over the entry in the State of Palestine of Palestinian refugees from any location. The rights of Palestinian refugees to immigrate to the State of Palestine shall be limited in accordance with agreed security arrangements.

Furthermore, the rate of movement of refugees from outside Gaza and the West Bank into the State of Palestine shall be agreed to by the parties and regulated by various factors, including economic forces and incentive structures, such that the rate of entry does not outpace or overwhelm the development of infrastructure and the economy of the State of Palestine, or increase security risks to the State of Israel. This rate of movement should be adjusted, as appropriate, with the passage of time.

Upon the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, Palestinian refugee status will cease to exist, and UNWRA will be terminated and its responsibilities transitioned to the relevant governments. Part of the Trump Economic Plan will go toward the replacement of refugee camps in the State of Palestine with new housing developments in the State of Palestine. Thus, the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement will lead to the dismantling of all Palestinian refugee camps and the building of permanent housing.

SECTION SEVENTEEN

FOUNDATIONS OF A PALESTINIAN STATE

The transition to statehood is complex and fraught with peril. The region cannot absorb another failed state, another state not committed to human rights or the rule of law. A Palestinian State, just like any other state, must combat all forms of terrorism and be accountable to its neighbors to be a productive and non-threatening member of the international community. For the sake of its future citizens and neighbors, it is critical that the State of Palestine have the necessary foundational elements to give it a high probability of succeeding.

The following criteria are a predicate to the formation of a Palestinian State and must be determined to have occurred by the State of Israel and the United States, jointly, acting in good faith, after consultation with the Palestinian Authority:

The Palestinians shall have implemented a governing system with a constitution or another system for establishing the rule of law that provides for freedom of press, free and fair elections, respect for human rights for its citizens, protections for religious freedom and for religious minorities to observe their faith, uniform and fair enforcement of law and contractual rights, due process under law, and an independent judiciary with appropriate legal consequences and punishment established for violations of the law.

The Palestinians shall have established transparent, independent, and credit-worthy financial institutions capable of engaging in international market transactions in the same manner as financial institutions of western democracies with appropriate governance to prevent corruption and ensure the proper use of such funds, and a legal system to protect investments and to address market-based commercial expectations. The State of Palestine should meet the independent objective criteria to join the International Monetary Fund.

The Palestinians shall have ended all programs, including school curricula and textbooks, that serve to incite or promote hatred or antagonism towards its neighbors, or which compensate or incentivize criminal or violent activity.

The Palestinians shall have achieved civilian and law enforcement control over all of its territory and demilitarized its population.

The Palestinians shall have complied with all the other terms and conditions of this Vision.

The United States, the State of Israel and all regional neighbors will work productively and in good faith with the Palestinian leadership to provide the necessary assistance to the achievement of the criteria listed above.

As it transitions to an era of state governance, the Palestinian leadership will benefit from international assistance in crafting the political and logistical instrumentalities of statehood.

The international community should mobilize a worldwide effort to assist the Palestinians to achieve proper governance. By virtue of territorial proximity, cultural affinity and family ties, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is well placed to play a distinctive role in providing this assistance in fields such as law, medicine, education, municipal services, historic preservation and institution building. In a manner consistent with the dignity and autonomy of a future State of Palestine, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will offer long-term, on-the-ground assistance in designing relevant institutions and procedures and training of relevant personnel. The objective of such assistance will be to help the Palestinians build strong and well governed institutions.

Other countries will be encouraged to provide assistance to the Palestinians in areas in which they have special experience or expertise. The international community recognizes that the implementation of this Vision will necessitate the expansion of the Palestinian government’s reach and capacity to provide services to additional people across a larger area. The international community will provide technical assistance across the spectrum of services that the Palestinian government will need to provide, including security. Donors will place particular emphasis on upgrading infrastructure, equipment, and mobility and communication capacity to ensure the Palestinian government can professionally police a future State of Palestine.

Once these measures are completed the United States will encourage other countries to welcome the State of Palestine as a full member in international organizations. However, the State of Palestine may not join any international organization if such membership would contradict commitments of the State of Palestine to demilitarization and cessation of political and judicial warfare against the State of Israel. Through such membership in international organizations, other countries will encourage the participation of the State of Palestine as a respected and responsible member of the international community.

The State of Palestine will be able to establish diplomatic relations with other countries.

SECTION EIGHTEEN

EDUCATION AND CULTURE OF PEACE

As President Trump has said: “Peace can never take root in an environment where violence is tolerated, funded and even rewarded.” Therefore, it is very important that education focuses on peace to ensure that future generations are committed to peace and to ensure that the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement can endure. Promoting a culture of peace will be an important element of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement with the goal of creating an environment that embraces the values of coexistence and mutual respect throughout the region.

The creation of a culture of peace should include an end to incitement, including in government-controlled media, as well as an end to the glorification of violence, terrorism and martyrdom. It should also prohibit hostile propaganda, as well as textbooks, curriculum and related materials contrary to the goal of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, including the denial of one another’s right to exist.

A joint Commission on Acceptance and Tolerance will be created to focus on steps that can be taken help the people from both countries heal the wounds that have been created by this conflict and bring the people closer together through dialogue.

SECTION NINETEEN

ISRAELI-ARAB RELATIONSHIPS;

REGIONAL ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIPS

The decisions of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to sign peace treaties with the State of Israel were major historic breakthroughs. Nevertheless, significant and broader cooperation between these countries should be developed for the benefit of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the State of Israel. The involvement of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Arab Peace Initiative increased the number of potential peace partners and introduced important concepts into the peace process. Much appreciation is owed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for its role in the creation of the Arab Peace Initiative, which inspired some of the ideas contemplated by this Vision.

The goal of this Vision is to have the Arab states fully cooperate with the State of Israel for the benefit of all the countries in the region. For example, there should be flights between Arab countries and Israel to promote cross-tourism, and to better enable Arabs to visit Muslim and Christian holy sites in Israel.

The United States will strongly encourage Arab countries to begin to normalize their relations with the State of Israel and negotiate lasting peace agreements.

Economic ties between the State of Israel and its neighbors should be expanded in the interests of all sides, particularly given the interests of the Arab countries to move away from economies based on fossil fuels to economies based on new infrastructure and technology. By integrating their transportation infrastructure, the countries in the region can become a global hub for the movement of goods and services from Asia to Africa and Europe. Such integration between the State of Israel, the State of Palestine and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will allow all three countries to work together to help move goods from Europe to the Persian Gulf and vice versa. The State of Israel and the Arab countries, including the State of Palestine, should establish strong economic partnerships and trade agreements. There should be a particular focus on significantly improving the economic and tourism sectors of the State of Palestine, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt.

The emergence of this new reality of regional integration will require a fundamental change in international politics. In the diplomatic sphere, in particular, the Arab countries, along with the State of Palestine, should cease to support anti-Israel initiatives at the United Nations and in other multilateral bodies. In particular, they should not lend their support to any efforts intended to delegitimize the State of Israel. These countries are expected to end any boycott of the State of Israel and oppose the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (commonly referred to as BDS) movement and any other effort to boycott the State of Israel. The United States views the BDS movement as destructive towards peace, and will oppose any activity that advances BDS or other restrictive trade practices targeting Israel.

Revisionist initiatives that question the Jewish people’s authentic roots in the State of Israel should also cease. Those initiatives fly in the face of not only Jewish and Christian history, but Islamic history as well. An important goal of this Vision is for the State of Israel to be treated by all as a legitimate part of the international community.

NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVES

In confronting common threats and in pursuing common interests, previously unimaginable opportunities and alliances are emerging.

The State of Israel, the State of Palestine and the Arab countries will work together to counter Hezbollah, ISIS, Hamas (if Hamas does not reorient in accordance with the Gaza Criteria), and all other terrorist groups and organizations, as well as other extremist groups.

The threats posed by Iran’s radical regime has led to a new reality where the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors now share increasingly similar perceptions of the threats to their security. Furthermore, Israel and its Arab neighbors increasingly share a vision of stability and economic prosperity for the region. Enhanced strategic cooperation between countries in the region would set the stage for diplomatic breakthroughs and a broader regional security architecture in the future.

The State of Israel is not a threat to the region whatsoever. Economic conditions and Iran’s malign activities, however, pose an existential threat to many of the region’s states. Integrating Israel into the region will allow it to assist across a wide range of economic challenges as well as counter the threats of Iran. The Iranian attack on Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia in 2019, for example, shocked the world’s economy and makes clear the necessity for the countries of the region to work together on security.

The State of Israel and the Arab countries have already discovered their common interests in combating terrorist groups and organizations and the common danger posed by an expansionist Iran. These countries also face similar security challenges in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. They should work together, along with the United States, to protect the freedom of navigation through international straits that are increasingly subject to the threat of Iran, its proxy forces, and terrorist groups.

These shared interest in the region should be expressed in closer ties between the State of Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Moreover, the State of Palestine, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel (and such additional countries in the region who wish to join) should form an Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (the “OSCME”), similar to the model used by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The OSCME mandate should include, among others, issues such as early warning of conflicts, conflict prevention, and crisis management.

SECTION TWENTY

MUTUAL RECOGNITION BETWEEN NATION STATES

The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement will provide that the parties recognize the State of Palestine as the nation state of the Palestinian people and the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.

SECTION TWENTY-ONE

END OF CLAIMS / END OF CONFLICT

The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement will end the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, and end all claims between the parties. The foregoing will be proposed in (i) a new UN Security Council resolution, and (ii) a new UN General Assembly resolution.

SECTION TWENTY-TWO

CONDUCT DURING NEGOTIATIONS

We hope that the parties will seize the opportunity, embrace this vision and begin negotiations. During the negotiations the parties should conduct themselves in a manner that comports with this Vision, and in a way that prepares their respective peoples for peace.

During the peace negotiations, the parties are expected to do the following:

THE STATE OF ISRAEL

In areas of the West Bank that are not contemplated by this Vision to be part of the State of Israel, Israel will not:

  1. Build any new settlement towns, expand existing settlements or advance plans to build in those areas;
  2. Expand any of the Israeli enclaves referred to in Section 4 or advance plans to expand those enclaves in those areas beyond their current footprint;
  3. Demolish any structure existing as of the date of this Vision and secure the necessary legislative and/or legal decisions to ensure such an outcome. This moratorium does not preclude demolition of any illegal construction, where such construction was initiated following the release of this Vision. This moratorium does not apply to the demolition of any structure that poses a safety risk, as determined by the State of Israel, or punitive demolitions following acts of terrorism.

In Palestinian enclaves referred to in Section 4, the legal status quo will prevail and the State of Israel will enable the development of those Palestinian communities within their current footprint.

PALESTINIANS

The PLO and the Palestinian Authority shall:

1. Refrain from any attempt to join any international organization without the consent of the State of Israel;

2. Take no action, and shall dismiss all pending actions, against the State of Israel, the United States and any of their citizens before the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, and all other tribunals;

3. Take no action against any Israeli or United States citizen before Interpol or any non-Israeli or United States (as applicable) legal system;

4. Take all necessary actions to immediately terminate the paying of salaries to terrorists serving sentences in Israeli prisons, as well as to the families of deceased terrorists (collectively, the “PRISONER & MART YR PAYMENTS”) and to develop humanitarian and welfare programs to provide essential services and support to Palestinians in need that are not based upon the commission of terrorist acts. The goal is to change the applicable laws, in a manner that is consistent with the laws of the United States, and completely cease making Prisoner and Martyr Payments by the time of signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement; and

5. Further the development of institutions necessary for self-governance.

THE UNITED STATES

To the extent permitted by law, the United States shall:

  • Allow the Office of the General Delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization to reopen;
  • Open a liasion mission to the Palestinian Authority at an appropriate location within the territory designated for the State of Palestine, as determined by the United States;
  • Take appropriate steps to resume U.S. assistance to the West Bank and Gaza, to the extent reasonable and appropriate, in consultation with the U.S. Congress; and
  • Work with the international community to support new initiatives for the Palestinian people including, programs to improve the delivery of electricity and water, ease the movement of goods and help create jobs.

APPENDIX 1

CONCEPTUAL MAPS

Israel trump

palestine trump


APPENDIX 2A

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Since the moment of its establishment, the State of Israel has not known a single day of peace with all of its neighbors. It has fought numerous defensive wars, some existential in nature, as well as asymmetric battles with terrorist groups. The State of Israel remains in a state of war with two of its neighbors (Lebanon and Syria) and is exposed to extraordinary risk from the rocket and missile arsenals on its northern border. The State of Israel has repeatedly confronted indiscriminate rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, and the State of Israel faces a grave threat from Iranian ballistic missiles, including missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and belligerent public threats from Iran to wipe the State of Israel off the map.

Since the Six-Day War in 1967, the West Bank and Gaza have figured prominently in the State of Israel’s security, largely because of geo-strategic considerations. Looking at the West Bank alone, the area is adjacent to the State of Israel’s coastal plain, where 70% of the State of Israel’s population is concentrated along with roughly 80% of its industrial capacity.

Prior to 1967, Israel’s coastal plain was only 9 miles wide at its narrowest point. While the Israeli coastal plain is at sea level, the West Bank contains a north-south hill ridge providing any hostile force the ability to topographically dominate the most sensitive parts of Israel’s national infrastructure. This includes, for example, Ben Gurion Airport, Israel’s high tech industries, and its north-south road networks that connect Tel Aviv to Haifa in the north and Jerusalem in the east.

The security portion of this Vision was developed based on our best understanding of the security requirements of the State of Israel, as presented by successive Israeli governments to the United States.

THE STATE OF ISRAEL’S SECURITY NEEDS

THE JORDAN VALLEY

The Jordan River lies approximately 1,300 feet below sea level, but it is situated right next to a north-south hill ridge that reaches approximately 3,318 feet at its highest point. That means that the Jordan Valley provides a steep, approximately 4,600 foot physical barrier against an external attack from the east. Israeli forces deployed along the eastern slopes of the West Bank hill ridge could hold off a numerically superior army until the State of Israel completed its reserve mobilization, which could take 48 hours. The State of Israel does not currently have a security concern with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, with which it has had a peace treaty since 1994, but rather with other Middle Eastern powers that might seek to forcibly use Jordanian territory as a platform of attack against the State of Israel.

The Jordan Valley is not only significant with regard to conventional attacks against the State of Israel, but also with regard to terrorism. Following its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the State of Israel learned the implications of losing control of the external perimeter of contested territory for counterinsurgency warfare. Gaza became a safe haven, not only for Hamas, but also for international Jihadi groups like the PIJ that undermined the security of Egypt in the Sinai. If such groups infiltrated the West Bank, they could create a chaotic security situation for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as well as for the State of Israel.

If the State of Israel withdrew from the Jordan Valley, it would have significant implications for regional security in the Middle East.

SECURE LINES OF SUPPLY TO THE JORDAN VALLEY

The State of Israel must assure for itself secure lines of supply for its forces in the Jordan Valley and the ability to move its military personnel and material into and out of the region.

BEN GURION AIRPORT PERIMETER

Israel’s main international airport, Ben Gurion Airport, is 5.9 miles away from the pre-1967 line. Among the threats to airport security today are shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles used by terrorist organizations. Known as Man-Portable Air Defense Systems or MANPADS, these systems are proliferating across the Middle East.

Special security standards for airport defense are necessary to prevent threats to Ben Gurion Airport and nearby air traffic.

ISRAELI CONTROL OF THE AIRSPACE WEST OF THE JORDAN RIVER

Because of its narrow size, the State of Israel lacks the time and the space many other countries enjoy to address fast approaching threats, especially airborne threats. The distance from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean is approximately 40 miles. A modern combat aircraft can cover that distance in under three minutes. For the Israeli Air Force to scramble fighters takes approximately three minutes. If the State of Israel did not maintain control of the West Bank’s airspace, it would not have adequate time to defend against incoming hostile aircraft or missiles. For that reason, in any peace arrangement, the State of Israel must have operational control over the airspace west of the Jordan River.

THE PROBLEM WITH INTERNATIONAL FORCES
The State of Israel has experienced the failure of international troops in Sinai (before 1967), Lebanon, Gaza, and the Golan. Given its experience, Israel’s first doctrine of security – that it must be able to defend itself by itself – is as salient as ever. It is a critical strategic interest of the United States that the State of Israel remain strong and secure, protected by the IDF, and continue to remain an anchor of stability in the region.

IRAN

In the last few years, Iran has become an influential factor in areas of the Middle East, which could impinge upon Israeli security. Iran’s strategy seeks to encircle Israel, using Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, and encircle the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Iraq, Bahrain and Yemen. Iran hopes to establish a “land bridge” that stretches from the Iran-Iraq border to the Mediterranean Sea. All of Iran’s activity must be taken into account in determining the State of Israel’s security needs.


APPENDIX 2B

SECURITY CRITERIA

Specific Security Criteria shall include the following:

1. The State of Palestine’s counterterrorism system must encompass all elements of counterterrorism, from initial detection of illicit activity to longtime incarceration of perpetrators. Included in the system must be: intelligence officers to detect potential terrorist activity, specially trained counterterrorism forces to raid sites and arrest perpetrators, forensics experts to conduct site exploitation, pretrial detention officers to ensure the retention of prisoners, prosecutors and judges to issue warrants and conduct trials, and post-trial detention officers to ensure prisoners serve their sentences. The system should include stand-alone detention facilities and vetted personnel.

2. The State of Palestine will erect and maintain a legal system that clearly confronts terrorism, including by:

a. Establishing and enforcing laws banning all terror activity and terror organizations and prohibiting all incitement to terrorism, as well as the financing of such activity and organizations;

b. Effectively prosecuting and appropriately sentencing those involved, both directly or indirectly, in terror activity;

c. Ending all payments rewarding terrorism, directly or indirectly, to those involved in terror activity or their families.

3. The breadth and depth of the anti-terror activities of the State of Palestine will be determined by:

a. The extent of arrests and interdictions of suspects, perpetrators and accomplices;

b. The systematic and comprehensive nature of investigations and interrogations to root out all terror networks and infrastructure;

c. Indictments and the extent of punishments;

d. The systematic and comprehensive nature of interdiction efforts to seize weapons and explosives and prevent the manufacturing of weapons and explosives;

e. The success of efforts to prevent infiltration of terrorists and terror organizations into the security forces of the State of Palestine;

4. During the negotiations the parties, in consultation with the United States, shall attempt to create acceptable initial non-binding metrics with respect to the Security Criteria that are acceptable to the State of Israel, and in no event less stringent than the metrics used by either the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or the Arab Republic of Egypt (whichever is stricter) with respect to the Security Criteria. Because security threats evolve, the metrics are intended to be used as a guide, and will not be binding. However, the establishment of such non-binding metrics will allow the State of Palestine to better understand the minimum goals they are expected to achieve, and take into account regional minimum benchmarks.


APPENDIX 2C

DEMILITARIZATION CRITERIA AND OTHER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

In addition to the overriding security responsibility over the State of Palestine, the State of Israel will be responsible for security at all international crossings into the State of Palestine. With respect to the Rafah crossing, specific arrangements will be agreed upon between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel to accomplish the security needs contemplated by this Vision.

The State of Israel will continue to maintain control over the airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum west of the Jordan river. During the negotiation period, the parties should negotiate in good faith relevant financial issues.

The Israeli Navy will have the right to block prohibited weapons and weapon-making materials from entering the State of Palestine, including Gaza.

The State of Palestine will not have the right to forge military, intelligence or security agreements with any state or organization that adversely affect the State of Israel’s security, as determined by the State of Israel. The State of Palestine will not be able to develop military or paramilitary capabilities inside or outside of the State of Palestine.

A demilitarized State of Palestine will be prohibited from possessing capabilities that can threaten the State of Israel including: weapons systems such as combat aircraft (manned and unmanned); heavy armored vehicles; mines; missiles; rockets; heavy machine guns; laser/radiating weapons; anti-air; anti-armor; anti-ship; military intelligence; offensive cyber and electronic warfare capabilities; production facilities and procurement mechanisms for weapons systems; military infrastructure and training facilities; or any weapons of mass destruction.

Any expansion of Palestinian security capabilities beyond the capabilities existing on the date this Vision is released shall be subject to agreement with the State of Israel.

The State of Israel will maintain the right to dismantle and destroy any facility in the State of Palestine that is used for the production of prohibited weapons or for other hostile purposes. While the State of Israel will use its best efforts to minimize incursions into the State of Palestine, the State of Israel will retain the right to engage in necessary security measures to ensure that the State of Palestine remains demilitarized and non-threatening to the State of Israel, including from terrorist threats.


PART B

ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK

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A VISION TO IMPROVE THE LIVES OF THE PALESTINEAN AND ISRAELI PEOPLE- JANUARY 2020