K. M. Nanavati Versus State of Maharashtra [ALL SC 1961 NOVEMBER]

KEYWORDS:-MURDER-ACQUITTAL-

DATE:-24-11-1961

AIR 1962 SC 605 : (1962) 1 Suppl. SCR 567 : (1962) 1 CriLJ SC 521

(SUPREME COURT OF INDIA)

K. M. Nanavati	Appellant
Versus
State of Maharashtra	Respondent

(Before : S. K. Das, K. Subba Rao And Raghubar Dayal, JJ.)

Criminal Appeal No. 195 of 1960, Decided on : 24-11-1961.

Penal Code, 1860—Section 300—Exception I—Grave and sudden provocation—Application of principle—Test for determination.

The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus: (1) The test of “grave and sudden’ provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the first Exception to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. (4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and sope for premeditation and calculation.

When Sylvia confessed to her husband that she had illicit intimacy with Ahuja, the latter was not present. We will assume that he had momentarily lost his self control. But, if his version is true—for the purpose of this argument we shall accept that what he has said is true—it shows that he was only thinking of the future of his wife and children and also of asking for an explanation from Ahuja for his conduct. This attitude of the accused clearly indicates that he had not only regained his self control, but, on the other hand, was planning for the future. Then he drove his wife and children to a cinema, left them there, went to his ship, took a revolver on a false pretext, loaded it with six rounds, did some official business there, and drove his car to the office of Ahuja and then to his flat went straight to the bed room of Ahuja and shot him dead. Between 1.30 p.m., when he left his house, and 4.20 p.m. when the murder took place, three hours had elapsed, and therefore there was sufficient time for him to regain his self control, even if he had not regained it earlier. On the other hand, his conduct clearly shows that the murder was a deliberate and calculated one.

The mere fact that before the shooting the accused abused the deceased and the abuse provoked an equally abusive reply could not conceivably be a provocation for the murder. We, therefore, hold that the facts of the case do not attract the provisions of Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code.

Jury trial—Misdirection—Inadmissible evidence—Failure of Judge to tell the Jury that such evidence was not admissible—It amounts to clear misdirection affecting the verdict of Jury.

Jury trial—Misdirection—Existence of direct evidence—Direction by judge to apply rule of circumstantial evidence—Grave miscarriage of justice affecting the correctness of verdict.

Jury trial—Misdirection—Failure to refer to important document which were read to the Jury at different stages of trial—Failure to put the contents of documents before Jury amounts to clear misdirection affecting the verdict of Jury.

Counsel for the Parties:

M/s. G. S. Pathak and S. G. Patwardhan, Senior Advocates (M/s. Rajni Patel and Porus A. Mehta, Advocates and M/s. J. B. Dadachanji Ravindra Narain and O. C. Mathur, Advocates of M/s. Dadachanji and Co. with them), for Appellant

Mr. M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (M/s. C. M. Trivedi, vs. H. Gumeshte, B. R. G. K. Achar and R. H. Dhebar, Advocates, with him), for Respondent.

Judgment

Subba Rao, J—This appeal by special leave arises out of the judgment of the Bombay High Court sentencing Nanavati, the appellant, to life imprisonment for the murder of Prem Bhagwandas Ahuja, a businessman of Bombay.

2. This appeal presents the common place problem of an alleged murder by an enraged husband of a paramour of his wife:but it aroused considerable interest in the public mind by reason of the publicity it received and the important constitutional point it had given rise to at the time of its admission.

3. The appellant, was charged under S. 302 as well as under S. 304, Part I, of the Indian Penal Code and was tried by the Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, with the aid of a special Jury. The jury brought in a verdict of “not guilty” by 8:1 under both the sections ; but the Sessions Judge did not agree with the verdict of the jury, as in his view the majority verdict of the jury was such that no reasonable body of men could, having regard to the evidence, bring in such a verdict. The learned Sessions Judge submitted the case under S. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Bombay High Court after recording the grounds for his opinion. The said reference was heard by a division bench of the said High Court consisting of Shelat and Naik, JJ.) – The two learned Judges gave separate judgments, but agreed in holding that the accused was guilty of the offence of murder under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. Shelat, J., having held that there were misdirections to the jury, reviewed the entire evidence and came to the conclusion that the accused was clearly guilty of the offence of murder ; alternatively, he expressed the view that the verdict of the jury was perverse, unreasonable and, in any event, contrary to the weight of evidence. Naik J., preferred to base his conclusion on the alternative ground, namely, that no reasonable body of persons could have come to the conclusion arrived at by the jury. Both the learned Judges agreed that no case had been made out to reduce the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The present appeal has been preferred against the said conviction and sentence.

4. The case of the prosecution may be stated thus:The accused, at the time of the alleged murder, was second in command of the Indian Naval Ship “Mysore”. ‘He married Sylvia in 1949 in the registry office at Portsmouth, England. They have three children by the marriage, a boy aged 9 1/2 years, a girl aged 5 1/2 years and another boy aged 3 years. Since the time of marriage, the couple were living at different places having regard to the exigencies of service of Nanavati. Finally, they shifted to Bombay. In the same city the deceased Ahuja was doing business in automobiles and was residing along with his sister, in a building called ‘Shreyas” till 1957 and thereafter in another building called “Jivan Jyot” in Setalvad Road. In the year 1956, Agniks, who were common friends of Nanavatis and Ahujas, introduced Ahuja and his sister to Nanavatis. Ahuja was unmarried and was about 34 years of age at the time of his death. Nanavati, as a Naval Officer, was frequently going away from Bombay in his ship leaving his wife and children in Bombay. Gradually, friendship developed between Ahuja and Sylvia, which ‘culminated in illicit intimacy between them. On April 27,1959, Sylvia confessed to Nanavati of her illicit intimacy with Ahuja. Enraged at the conduct of Ahuja, Nanavati went to his ship, took from the stores of the ship a semi-automatic revolver and six cartridges on a false pretext, loaded the same, went to the flat of Ahuja entered his bed room and shot him dead. Thereafter, the accused surrendered himself to the police. He was put under arrest and in due course he was committed to the Sessions for facing a charge under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

5. The defence version, as disclosed in the statement made by the accused before the Sessions Court under S. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and his deposition in the said Court, may be briefly, stated:The accused was away with his ship from April 6, 1959, to April 18, 1959. Immediately after returning to Bombay, he and his wife went to Ahmednagar for about three days in the company of his younger brother and his wife. Thereafter, they returned to Bombay and after a few days his brother and his wife left them. After they had left, the accused noticed that his wife was behaving strangely and was not responsive or affectionate to him. When questioned, she used to evade the issue. At noon on April 27,1959, when they were sitting in the sitting-room for the lunch to be served, the accused put his arm round his wife affectionately, when she seemed to go tense and unresponsive. After lunch, when he questioned her about her fidelity, she shook her head to indicate that she was unfaithful to him. He guessed that her paramour was Ahuja. As she did not even indicate clearly whether Ahuja would marry her and look after the children, he decided to settle the matter with him. Sylvia pleaded with him not to go to Ahuja’s house as he might shoot him. Thereafter, he drove his wife, two of his children and a neighbour’s child in his car to a cinema, dropped them there and promised to come and pick them up at 6 p. m. when the show ended, He then drove his car to his ship, as he wanted to get medicine for his sick dog ; he represented to the authorities in the ship that he wanted to draw a revolver and six rounds from the stores of the ship as he was going to drive alone to Ahmednagar by night, though the real purpose was to shoot himself. On receiving the revolver and six cartridges, and (sic) put it inside a brown envelope. Then he drove his car to Ahuja’s office, and not finding him there, he drove to Ahuja’s flat, rang the door bell, and when it was opened by a servant, walked to Ahuja’s bed-room, went into the bed-room and shut the door behind him. He also carried with him the envelope containing the revolver. The accused saw the deceased inside the bed-room, called him a filthy swine and asked him whether he would marry Sylvia and look after the children. The deceased retorted, “Am I to marry every woman I sleep with?” The accused became enraged, put the envelope containing the revolver on a cabinet nearby, and threatened to thrash the deceased. The deceased made a sudden move to grasp at the envelope, when the accused whipped out his revolver and told him to get back. A struggle ensued between the two and during that struggle two shots went off accidentally and hit Ahuja resulting in his death. After the shooting the accused went back to his car and drove it to the police station where he surrendered himself. This is broadly, omitting the details, the case of the defence.

6. It would be convenient to dispose of at the outset the questions of law raised in this case.

7. Mr. G. S. Pathak, learned counsel for the accused, raised before us the following points ; (1) Under S. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court should decide whether a reference made by a sessions Judge was competent only on a perusal of the order of reference made to it and it had no jurisdiction to consider the evidence and come to a conclusion whether the reference was competent or not. (2) Under S. 307 (3) of the said Code, the High Court had no power to set aside the verdict of a jury on the ground that there were misdirections in the charge made by the Sessions Judge. (3) There were no misdirections at all in the charge made by the Sessions Judge, and indeed his charge was fair to the prosecution as well as to the accused. (4) The verdict of the jury was not perverse and it was such that a reasonable body of persons could arrive at it on the evidence placed before them. (5) In any view, the accused shot at the deceased under grave and sudden provocation, and therefore even if he had committed an offence, it would not be murder but only culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

8. Mr. Pathak elaborates his point under the first heading thus:Under S. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High court deals with the reference in two stages. In the first stage, the High Court has to consider, on the basis of the referring order whether a reasonable body of persons could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the jury ; and, if it is of the view that such a only could have come to that opinion, the reference shall be rejected as incompetent. At this stage, the High Court cannot travel beyond the order of reference, but shall confine itself only to the reasons given by the Sessions Judge. If, on a consideration of the said reasons, it is of the view that no reasonable body of persons could have come to that conclusion, it will then have to consider the entire evidence to ascertain whether the verdict of the jury is unreasonable. If the High Court holds that the verdict of the jury is not unreasonable, in the case of a verdict of “not guilty”, the High Court acquits the accused, and in the case where the verdict is one of “guilty” it convicts the accused. In case the High Court holds that the verdict of “not guilty”, is unreasonable it refers back the case to the Sessions Judge, who convicts the accused ; thereafter the accused will have a right of appeal wherein he can attack the validity of his conviction on the ground that there were misdirections in the charge to the jury. So too, in the case of a verdict of guilty by the jury, the High Court, if it holds that the verdict is unreasonable, remits the matter to the Sessions Judge, who acquits the accused, and the State, in an appeal against that acquittal, may question the correctness of the said acquittal on the ground that the charge to the jury was vitiated by misdirections. In short, the argument may be put in three propositions, namely, (i) the High Court rejects the reference as incompetent, if on the face of the reference the verdict of the jury does not appear to be unreasonable, (ii) if the reference is competent, the High Court can consider the evidence to come to a definite conclusion whether the verdict is unreasonable or not, and (iii) the High Court has no power under S. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to set aside the verdict of the jury on the ground that it is vitiated by misdirections in the charge to the jury.

9. The question raised turns upon the construction of the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said Code contains two fascicule of sections dealing with two different situations. Under S. 268 of the Code, “All trials before a Court of Session shall be either by jury, or by the Judge himself.” Under S. 297 thereof:

“In cases tried by jury, when the case for the defence and the prosecutor’s reply, if any, are concluded, the Court shall proceed to charge the jury, summing up the evidence for the prosecution and defence, and laying down the law by which the jury are to be guided …………….,..”

Section 298, among others, imposes a duty on a judge to decide all questions of law arising in the course of the trial, and especially all questions as to the relevancy of facts which it is proposed to be proved, and the admissibility of evidence or the propriety of questions asked by or on behalf of the parties. and to decide upon all matters of fact which it is necessary to prove in order to enable evidence of particular matters to be given. It is the duty of the jury,

“to decide which view of the facts is true and then to return the verdict which under such view ought, according to the directions of the Judge, to be returned.”

After the charge to the jury, the jury retire to consider their verdict and, after due consideration, the foreman of the jury informs the Judge what is their verdict or what is the verdict of the majority of the jurors. Where the Judge does not think it necessary to disagree with the verdict of the jurors or of the majority of them he gives judgment accordingly. If the accused is acquitted, the Judge shall record a verdict of acquittal ; if the accused is convicted, the Judge shall pass sentence on him according to law. In the case of conviction, there is a right of appeal under S. 410 of the Code, and in a case of acquittal, under S. 417 of the Code, to the High Court. But S. 418 of the Code provides:

“ (1) An appeal may lie on a matter of fact as well as a matter of law except where the trial was by jury, in which case the appeal shall lie on a matter of law only.”

Sub-section (2) thereof provides for a case of a person sentenced to death, with which we are not now concerned. Section 423 confers certain powers on an appellate Court in the matter of disposing of an appeal, such as calling for the record, hearing of the pleaders, and passing appropriate orders therein. But sub-s. (2) of S. 423 says:

“Nothing herein contained shall authorise the Court to alter or reverse the verdict of the jury, unless it is of opinion that such verdict is erroneous owing to a misdirection by the Judge, or to a misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the law as laid down by him.”

It may be noticed at this stage, as it will be relevant in considering one of the arguments raised in this case, that sub-sec. (2) does not confer any power on an appellate court, but only saves the limitation on the jurisdiction of an appellate court imposed under S. 418 of the Code. It is, therefore, clear that in an appeal against conviction or acquittal in a jury trial, the said appeal is confined only to a matter of law.

10. The Code of Criminal Procedure also provides for a different situation. The Sessions Judge may not agree with the verdict of the jurors or the majority of them ; and in that event S. 307 provides for a machinery to meet that situation. As the argument mainly turns upon the interpretation of the provisions of this section, it will be convenient to read the relevant clauses thereof. Section 307: (1) If in any such case the Judge disagrees with the verdict of the jurors, or of a majority of the jurors, on all or any of the charges on which any accused person has been tried, and is clearly of opinion that it is necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case in respect of such accused person to the High Court, he shall submit the case accordingly, recording the grounds of his opinion, and, when the verdict is one of acquittal, stating the offence which he considers to have been committed, and in such case, if the accused is further charged under the provisions of Section 310, shall proceed to try him on such charge as if such verdict had been one of conviction.

(3) In dealing with the case so submitted the High Court may exercise any of the powers which it may exercise on an appeal, and subject thereto it shall, after considering the entire evidence and after giving due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and the jury, acquit or convict such accused of any offence which the jury could have convicted him upon the charge framed and placed before it; and, if it convicts him, may pass such sentence as might have been passed by the Court of Session.

This section is a clear departure from the English law. There are good reasons for its enactment. Trial by jury outside the Presidency Towns was first introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861, and the verdict of the jury was, subject to re-trial on certain events, final and conclusive. This led to miscarriage of justice through jurors returning erroneous verdicts due to ignorance and inexperience. The working of the system was reviewed in 1872, by a Committee appointed for that purpose and on the basis of the report of the said Committee, S. 262 was introduced in the Code of 1872. Under that section, where there was difference of view between the jurors and the judge, the Judge was empowered to refer the case to the High Court in the ends of justice, and the High Court dealt with the matter as an appeal. But in 1882 the section was amended and under the amended section the condition for reference was that the Court should differ from the jury completely; but in the Code of 1893 (sic) the section was amended practically in terms as it now appears in the code, the history of the legislation shows that the section was intended as a safeguard against erroneous verdicts of inexperienced jurors and also indicates the clear intention of the Legislature to confer on a High Court a separate jurisdiction, which for convenience may be described as “reference jurisdiction”. Section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while continuing the benefits of the jury system to persons tried by a Court of Session, also guards against any possible injustice, having regard to the conditions obtaining in India. It is, therefore clear that there is an essential difference between the scope of the jurisdiction of the High Court in disposing of an appeal against a conviction or acquittal, as the case may be, in a jury trial, and that in a case submitted by the Sessions Judge when he differs from the verdict of the jury:in the former the acceptance of the verdict of the jury by the Sessions Judge is considered to be sufficient guarantee against its perversity and therefore an appeal is provided only on questions of law , whereas in the latter the absence of such agreement necessitated the conferment of a larger power on the High Court in the matter; of interfering with the verdict of the jury.

11. Under S. 307 (1) of the Code, the obligation cast upon the Sessions Judge to submit the case to the High Court is made subject to two conditions, namely, (1) the Judge shall disagree with the verdict of the jurors, and (2) he is clearly of the opinion that it is necessary in the ends of justice to submit the case to the High Court. If the two conditions are complied with, he shall submit the case, recording the grounds of his opinion. The words “for the ends of justice” are comprehensive, and coupled with the words “is clearly of opinion”, they give the Judge a discretion to enable him to exercise his power under different situations, the only criterion being his clear opinion that the reference is in the ends of justice. But the judicial Committee, in Ramanugrah Singh vs. Emperor, 73 Ind App 174 at pp. 182, 186 construed the words “necessary for the ends of justice” and laid down that the words mean that the Judge shall be of the opinion that the verdict of the jury is one which no reasonable body of men could have reached on the evidence. Having regard to that interpretation, it may be held that the second condition for reference is that the Judge shall be clearly of the opinion that the verdict is one which no reasonable body of men could have reached on the evidence. It follows that if a Judge differs from the jury and is clearly of such an opinion, he shall submit the case to the High Court recording the grounds of his opinion. In that event, the said reference is clearly competent. If, on the other hand, the case submitted to the High Court does not ex facie show that the said two conditions have been complied with by the Judge, it is incompetent. The question of competency of the reference does not depend upon the question whether the Judge is justified in differing from the jury or forming such an opinion on the verdict of the jury. The argument that though the sessions Judge has complied with the conditions necessary for making a reference, the High Court shall reject the reference as incompetent without going into the evidence if the reasons given do not sustain the view expressed by the Sessions Judge, is not supported by the provisions of sub-see. (1) of S. 307 of the Code. But it is said that it is borne out by the decision of the Judicial committee in Ramanugrah Singh’s case (supra). In that cases the judicial Committee relied upon the words “ends of justice” and held that the verdict was one which no reasonable body of men could have reached on the evidence and further laid down that the requirements of the ends of justice must be the determining factor both for the Sessions Judge in making the reference and for the High Court in disposing of it. The Judicial Committee observed:

“In general, if the evidence is such that it can properly support a verdict either of guilty or not guilty, according to the view taken of it by the trial court, and if the jury taken one view of the evidence and the judge thinks that they should have taken the other, the view of the jury must prevail, since they are the judges of fact. In such a case a reference is not justified, and it is only by accepting their view that the High Court can give due weight to the opinion of the jury. If however the High Court considers that on the evidence no reasonable body of men could have reached the conclusion arrived at by and the jury, then the reference was justified and the ends of justice require that the verdict be disregarded.”

The judicial committee proceeded to state:

“In their Lordships opinion had the High Court approached the reference on the right lines and given due weight to the opinion of the jury they would have been bound to hold than the reference was not justified and that the ends of justice did not require any interference with the verdict of the jury” Emphasis is laid on the word “justified’, and it is argued that the High Court should reject the reference as incompetent if the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in the statement of case do not support his view that it is necessary in the ends of justice to refer the case to the High Court. The Judicial Committee does not lay down any such proposition. There, the jury brought in a verdict of “guilty” under S. 302, Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Judge differed from the jury and made a reference to the High Court. The High Court accepted the reference and convicted the accused and sentenced him to transportation for life. The Judicial Committee held, on the facts of that case, that the High Court was not justified in the ends of justice to interfere with the verdict of the jury. They were not dealing with the question of competency of a reference but only with that of the justification of the Sessions Judge in making the reference, and the High Court in accepting it. It was also not considering a case of any disposal of the reference by the High Court on the basis of the reasons given in the reference, but were dealing with a case where the High Court on a consideration of the entire evidence accepted the reference, and the Judicial Committee held on the evidence that there was no justification for the ends of justice to accept it. This decision, therefore, has no bearing on the competency of a reference under S. 307 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

12. Now, coming to sub-sec. (3) of S. 307 of the Code, it is in two parts. The first part says that the High Court may exercise any of the powers which it may exercise in an appeal. Under the second part, after considering the entire evidence and after giving due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and the jury, the High Court shall acquit or convict the accused. These parts are combined by the expression” and subject thereto”. The words “subject thereto” were added to the section by an amendment in 1896. This expression gave rise to conflict of opinion and it is conceded that it lacks clarity. That may be due to the fact that piecemeal amendments have been made to the section from time to time to meet certain difficulties. But we cannot ignore the expression, but we must give it a reasonable construction consistent with the intention of the Legislature in enacting the said section. Under the second part of the section, special jurisdiction to decide a case referred to it is conferred on the High Court. It also defines the scope of its jurisdiction and its limitations. The High Court can acquit or convict an accused of an offence of which the jury could have convicted him, and also pass such sentence as might have been passed by the Court of Session. But before doing so, it shall consider the entire evidence and give due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and the jury. The second part does not confer on the High Court any incidental procedural powers necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction in a case submitted to it, for it is neither an appeal nor a revision. The procedural powers are conferred on the High Court under the first part. The first part enables the High Court to exercise any of the powers which it may exercise in an appeal, for without such powers it cannot exercise its jurisdiction effectively. But the expression “subject to” indicates that in exercise of its jurisdiction in the manner indicated by the second part, it can call in aid only any of the powers of an appellate court, but cannot invoke a power other than that conferred on an appellate court. The limitation on the second part implied in the expression “subject thereto” must be confined to the area of the procedural powers conferred on an appellate court. If that be the construction, the question arises, how to reconcile the provisions of S. 423 (2) with those of S. 307 of the Code ? Under sub-sec. (2) of S. 423:

“Nothing herein contained shall authorise the Court to alter or reverse the verdict of a jury, unless it is of opinion that such verdict is erroneous owing to a misdirection by the Judge, or to a misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the law as laid down by him.”

It may be argued that, as an appellate court cannot alter or reverse the verdict of a jury unless such a verdict is erroneous owing to a misdirection by the Judge, or to a misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the law as laid down by him, the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under S. 307 of the Code, likewise could not do so except for the said reasons. Sub-section (1) of S. 423 of the Code does not confer any power on the High Court; it only restates the scope of the limited jurisdiction conferred on the court under S. 418 of the Code, and that could not have any application to the special jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S. 307. That apart, a perusal of the provisions of S. 423 (1) indicates that there are powers conferred on an appellate court which cannot possibly be exercised by courts disposing of a reference under S. 307 of the Code, namely, the power to order commitment etc. Further S. 423 (1) (a) and (b) speak of conviction, acquittal, finding and sentence which are wholly inappropriate to verdict of a jury. Therefore, a reasonable construction will be that the High Court can exercise any of the powers conferred on an appellate court under S. 423 or under other sections of the Code which are appropriate to the disposal of a reference under S. 307. The object is to prevent miscarriage of justice by the jurors returning erroneous or perverse verdict. The opposite construction defeats this purpose, for it equates the jurisdiction conferred under S. 307 with that of an appellate court in a jury trial. That construction would enable the High Court to correct an erroneous verdict of a jury, only in a case of misdirection by the Judge but not in a case of fair and good charge. This result effaces the distinction between the two types of jurisdiction. Indeed, learned counsel for the appellant has taken a contrary position. He would say that the High Court under S. 307 (3) could not interfere with the verdict of the jury on the ground that there were misdirections in the charge to the jury. This argument is built upon the hypothesis that under the Code of Criminal Procedure there is a clear demarcation of the functions of the jury and the judge, the jury dealing with facts and the judge with law, and therefore the High Court could set aside a verdict on the ground of misdirection only when an appeal comes to it under S. 418 and could only interfere with the verdict of the jury for the ends of justice, as interpreted by the Privy Council, when the matter comes to it under S. 307 (3). If this interpretation be accepted, we would be attributing to the Legislature an intention to introduce a circuitous method and confusion in the disposal of criminal cases. The following illustration will demonstrate the illogical result of the argument. The jury brings in a verdict of “not guilty” on the basis of a charge replete with misdirections; the Judge disagrees with that verdict and states the case to the High Court; the High Court holds that the said verdict is not erroneous on the basis of the charge, but is of the opinion that the verdict is erroneous because of the misdirections in the charge; even so, it shall hold that the verdict of the jury is good and reject the reference; thereafter, the Judge has to accept the verdict and acquit the accused; the prosecution then will have to prefer an appeal under S. 417 of the Code on the ground that the verdict was induced by the misdirections in the charge. This could not have been the intention of the Legislature. Take the converse case. On similar facts, the jury brings in a verdict of “guilty”; the Judge disagrees with the jury and makes a reference to the High Court; even though it finds misdirections in the charge to the jury, the High Court cannot set aside the conviction but must reject the reference; and after the conviction, the accused may prefer an appeal to the High Court. This procedure will introduce confusion in jury trials, introduce multiplicity of proceedings, and attribute ineptitude to the Legislature. What is more, this construction is not supported by the express provisions of S. 307 (3) of the Code. The said sub-section enables the High Court to consider the entire evidence, to give due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and the jury, and to acquit or convict the accused. The key words in the sub-section are “giving due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and the jury”. The High Court shall give weight to the verdict of the jury; but the weight to be given to a verdict depends upon many circumstances—it may be one that no reasonable body of persons could come to; it may be a perverse verdict; it may be a divided verdict and may not carry the same weight as the united one does; it may be vitiated by misdirections or non-directions. How can a Judge give any weight to a verdict if it is induced and vitiated by grave misdirections in the charge? That apart the High Court has to give due weight to the opinion of the Sessions Judge. The reasons for the opinion of the Sessions Judge are disclosed in the case submitted by him to the High Court. If the case stated by the Sessions Judge discloses that there must have been misdirections in the charge, how can the High Court ignore them in giving due weight to his opinion? What is more, the jurisdiction of the High Court is couched in very wide terms in sub-sec. (3) of S. 307 of the Code:it can acquit or convict an accused. It shall take into consideration the entire evidence in the case; it shall give due weight to the opinions of the Judge and the jury; it combines in itself the functions of the Judge and jury; and it is entitled to come to its independent opinion. The phraseology used does not admit of an expressed or implied limitation on the jurisdiction of the High Court.

13. It appears to us that the Legislature designedly conferred a larger power on the High Court under S. 307 (3) of the Code than that conferred under S. 418 thereof, as in the former case the Sessions Judge differs from the jury while in the latter he agrees with the jury.

14. The decisions cited at the Bar do not in any way sustain the narrow construction sought to be placed by learned counsel on S. 307 of the Code. In Ramanugrah Singh’s case (supra) which has been referred to earlier, the Judicial Committee described the wide amplitude of the power of the High Court in the following terms:

“The Court must consider the whole case and give true weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and jury, and then acquit or convict the accused”.

The Judicial Committee took care to observe:

“. . . . . .. the test of reasonableness on the part of the jury may not be conclusive in every case. It is possible to suppose a case in which the verdict was justified on the evidence placed before the jury, but in the light of further evidence placed before the High Court the verdict is shown to be wrong. In such a case the ends of justice would require the verdict to be set aside though the jury had not acted unreasonably.”

This passage indicates that the Judicial Committee did not purport to lay down exhaustively the circumstances under which the High Court could interfere under the said sub-section with the verdict of the jury. This Court in Akhlakali Hayatalli vs. State of Bombay, (1954) SCR 435 at p. 438 accepted the view of the Judicial Committee on the construction of S. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and applied it to the facts of that case. But the following passage of this Court indicates that it also does not consider the test of reasonableness as the only guide in interfering with the verdict of the jury:

“The charge was not attacked before the High Court nor before us as containing any misdirections or non-directions to the jury such as to vitiate the verdict.”

This passage recognizes the possibility of interference by the High Court with the verdict of the jury under the said sub-section if the verdict is vitiated by misdirections or non-directions. So too, the decision of this Court in Ramyed Rai vs. State of Bihar, (1957) SCR 273; ( (S) AIR 1957 SC 373) assumes that such an interference is permissible if the verdict of the jury was vitiated by misdirections. In that case, the appellants were charged under Ss. 435 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code and were tried by a jury, who returned a majority verdict of “guilty”. The Assistant Sessions Judge disagreed with the said verdict and made a reference to the High Court. At the hearing of the reference the counsel for the appellants contended that the charge to the jury was defective, and did not place the entire evidence before the Judges. The learned Judges of the High Court considered the objections as such and nothing more, and found the appellants guilty and convicted them. This Court, observing that it was incumbent on the High Court to consider the entire evidence and the charge as framed and placed before the jury and to come to its own conclusion whether the evidence was such that it could properly support the verdict of guilty against the appellants, allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the High Court for disposal in accordance with the provisions of S, 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This decision also assumes that a High Court could under S. 307 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure interfere with the verdict of the jury, if there are misdirections in the charge and holds that in such a case it is incumbent on the court to consider the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, after giving due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge, and the verdict of the jury. This Court again in Sashi Mohan Debnath vs. State of West Bengal, (1958) SCR 960 held that where the Sessions Judge disagreed with the verdict of the jury and was of the opinion that the case should be submitted to the High Court, he should submit the whole case and not a part of it, There, the jury returned a verdict of “guilty” in respect of some charges and “not guilty” in respect of others. But the Sessions Judge recorded his judgment of acquittal in respect of the latter charges in agreement with the jury and referred the case to the High Court only in respect of the former. This Court held that the said procedure violated subsec. (2) of S. 307 the Code of Criminal Procedure and also had the effect of preventing the High Court from considering the entire evidence against the accused and exercising its jurisdiction under sub-see, (3) of S, 307 of the said Code. Imam, J., observed that the reference in that case was incompetent and that the High Court could not proceed to exercise any of the powers conferred upon it under sub-see. (3) of S. 307 of the Code, because the very foundation of the exercise of that power was lacking, the reference being incompetent. This Court held that the reference was incompetent because the Sessions Judge contravened the express. provisions of sub -sec. (2) of S. 307 of the Code, for under that sub-section whenever a Judge submits a case under that section, he shall not record judgment of acquittal or of conviction on any of the charges on which such accused has been tried, but he may either remand such accused to custody or admit him to bail. As in that case the reference was made in contravention of the express provisions of sub-see. (2) of S. 307 of the Code and therefore the use of the word ‘incompetent’ may not be inappropriate. The decision of a division bench of the Patna High Court in Emperor vs. Ramadhar Kurmi AIR 1948 Pat 79 at p. 84 may usefully be referred to as it throws some light on the question whether the High Court can interfere with the verdict of the jury when it is vitiated by serious misdirections and non-directions. Das, J., observed:

“Where, however, there is misdirection the principle embodied in S. 587 would apply and if the verdict is erroneous owing to the misdirection, it can have no weight on a reference under S, 307 as on an appeal.” It is not necessary to multiply decisions. The’ foregoing discussion may be summarised in the form of the following propositions: (1) The competency of a reference made by a Sessions Judge depends upon the existence of two conditions, namely, (i) that he disagrees with the verdict of the jurors, and (ii) that he is clearly of the opinion that the verdict is one which no reasonable body of men could have reached on the evidence; after reaching that opinion, in the case submitted by him he shall record the grounds of his opinion. (2) If the case submitted shows that the conditions have not-been complied with or that the reasons for the opinion are not recorded, the High Court may reject the reference as incompetent:the High Court can also reject it if the Sessions Judge, has contravened sub-s. (2) of S. 307. (3) If the case submitted shows that the Sessions Judge has disagreed with the verdict of the jury and that he is clearly of the opinion that no reasonable body of men could have reached the conclusion arrived at by the jury, and he discloses his reasons for the opinion, sub-sec. (3) of S. 307 of the Code comes into play, and thereafter the High Court has an obligation to discharge its duty imposed thereunder. (4) Under sub-see. (3) of S. 307 of the Code the High Court has to consider the entire evidence and, after giving due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and the jury, acquit or convict the accused. (5) The High Court may deal with the reference in two ways, namely, (i) if there are mis-directions vitiating the verdict, it may, after going into the entire evidence, disregard the verdict of the jury and come to its own conclusion, and (ii) even if there are no misdirections, the High Court can interfere with the verdict of the jury if it finds the verdict “perverse in the sense of being unreasonable”, “manifestly wrong”, or “against the weight of evidence’, or, in other words, if the verdict is such that no reasonable body of men could have reached on the evidence (6) In the disposal of the said reference, the High Court can exercise any of the procedural powers appropriate to the occasion, such as issuing of notice, calling for records, remanding the case, ordering a retrial, etc. We, therefore, reject the first contention of learned counsel for the appellant. 15. The next question is whether the High Court was right in holding that there were misdirections in the charge to the jury. Misdirection is something which a judge in his charge tells the jury and is wrong or in a wrong manner tending to mislead them. Even an omission to mention matters which are essential to the prosecution or the defence case in order to help the jury to come to a correct verdict may also in certain circumstances amount to a misdirection. But, in either case, every misdirection or non-direction is not in itself sufficient to set aside a verdict, but it must be such that it has occasioned a failure of justice.

16. In Mushak Hussein vs. State of Bombay, (1953) SCR 809 this Court laid down ;

“Unless therefore it is established in a case that there has been a serious misdirection by the judge, in charging the jury which has occasioned a failure of justice and has misled the jury in giving its verdict, the verdict of the jury cannot be set aside.” This view has been restated by this Court in a recent decision viz., Nagindra Bala Mitra. vs. Sunil Chandra Roy, (1960) 3 SCR 1.

17. The High Court in its judgment referred to as many as six misdirections in the charge to the jury, which in its view vitiated the verdict, and it also stated that there were many others. Learned counsel for the appellant had taken each of the said alleged misdirections and attempted to demonstrate that they were either no misdirections at all, or, even if they were, they did not in any way affect the correctness of the verdict.

18. We shall now take the first and the third misdirections pointed out by Shelat, J. as they are intimately connected with each other. They are really omissions. The first omission is that throughout the entire charge there is no reference to S. 105 of the Evidence Act or to the statutory presumption laid down in that section. The second omission is that the Sessions Judge failed to explain to the jury the legal ingredients of S. 80 of the I.P.C:, and also failed to direct them that in law the said section was not applicable to the facts of the case. To appreciate the scope of the alleged omissions, it is necessary to read the relevant provisions. Section 80 of the Indian Penal Code.

“Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune, and without any Criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution.”

Evidence Act.

Section 103:The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person,”

Section 105:”When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code (XLV of1860) or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the same Code or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.”

Section 3:”In this Act the following words and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears from the context ;-

A fact is said to be disproved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist,”

Section 4:, . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . … ….. “Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved,”

The legal impact of the said provisions on the question of burden of proof may be stated thus:In India, as it is in England, there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused as a general rule, and it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused; to put it in other words, the accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established by the prosecution. But when an accused relies upon the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code or on any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the Penal Code, or in any law defining an offence, S. 105 of the Evidence Act raises a presumption against the accused and also throws a burden on him to rebut the said presumption. Under that section the Court shall presume the absence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the exceptions, that is, the Court shall regard the non-existence of such circumstances as proved till they are disproved. An illustration based on the facts of the present case may bring out the meaning of the said provision. The prosecution alleges that the accused intentionally shot the deceased ; but the accused pleads that, though the shots emanated from his revolver and hit the deceased, it was by accident, that is, the shots went off the revolver in the course of a struggle in the circumstances mentioned in S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code and hit the deceased resulting in his death. The Court then shall presume the absence of circumstances bringing the case within the provisions of S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code, that is, it shall presume that the shooting was not by accident, and that the other circumstances bringing the case within the exception did not exist; but this presumption may be rebutted by the accused by adducing evidence to support his plea of accident in the circumstances mentioned therein, This presumption may also be rebutted by admissions made or circumstances elicited by the evidence led by the prosecution or by the combined effect of such circumstances and the evidence adduced by the accused. But the section does not in any way affect the burden that lies on the prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offence with which the accused is charged:that burden never shifts. The alleged conflict between the general burden which lies on the prosecution and the special burden imposed on the accused under S.105 of the Evidence Act is more imaginary than real. Indeed, there is no conflict at all. There may arise three different situations ; (I) A statute may throw the burden of proof of all or some of the ingredients of an offence on the accused: (see Ss. 4 and 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act). (2) The special burden may not touch the ingredients of the offence, but only the protection given on the assumption of the proof of the said ingredients: (see Ss. 77, 78, 79, 81 and 88 of the Indian Penal Code). (3) It may relate to an exception, some of the many circumstances required to attract the exception if proved affecting the proof of all or some of the ingredients of the offence ; (see S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code), In the first case the burden of the proving the ingredients or some of the ingredients of the offence, as the case may be, lies on the accused. In the second case, the burden of bringing the case under the exception lies on the accused, In the third case, though the burden lies on the accused to bring his case within the exception the facts proved may not discharge the said burden, but may affect the proof of the ingredients of the offence. An illustration may bring out the meaning. The prosecution has to prove that the accused shot dead the deceased intentionally and thereby committed the offence of murder within the meaning of S, 300 of the Indian Penal Code; the prosecution has to prove the ingredients of murder, and one of the ingredients of that offence is that the accused intentionally shot the deceased; the accused pleads that he shot at the deceased by accident without any intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means with proper care and caution:the accused against whom a presumption is drawn under S. 105 of the Evidence Act that the shooting was not by accident in the circumstances mentioned in S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code, may adduce evidence to rebut that presumption. That evidence may not be sufficient to prove all the ingredients of S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code, but may prove that the shooting was by accident or inadvertence, i.e., it was done without any intention or requisite state of mind, which is the essence of the offence, within the meaning of S. 300, Indian Penal Code or at any rate may throw a reasonable doubt on the essential ingredients of the offence of murder. In that event, though the accused failed to establish to bring his case within the terms of S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code, the Court may hold that the ingredients of the offence have not been established or that the prosecution has not made out the case against the accused. In this view it might be said that the general burden to prove the ingredients of the offence, unless there is a specific statute to the contrary, is always on the prosecution, but the burden to prove the circumstances coming under the exceptions lies upon the accused. The failure on the part of the accused to establish all the circumstances bringing his case under the exception does not absolve the prosecution to prove the ingredients of the offence:indeed, the evidence, though insufficient to establish the exception, may be sufficient to negative one or more of the ingredients of the offence.

19. The English decisions relied upon by Mr. Pathak, learned counsel for the accused, may not be of much help in construing the provisions of S. 105 of the Indian Evidence Act. We would, therefore, prefer not to refer to them, except to one of the leading decisions on the subject, namely, Wolmington vs. Diretor of Public Prosecutions 1935 AC 462 at p. 481. The headnote in that decision gives its gist, and it reads:

“In a trial for murder the Crown must prove death as the result of a voluntary act of the prisoner and malice of the prisoner. When evidence of death and malice has been given, the prisoner is entitled to show by evidence or by examination of the circumstances adduced by the Crown that the act on his part which caused death was either unintentional or provoked. If the jury are either satisfied with his explanation or, upon a review of all the evidence, are left in reasonable doubt whether, even if his explanation be not accepted, the act was unintentional or provoked, the prisoner is entitled to be acquitted.”

In the course of the judgment Viscount Sankey. L. C., speaking for the House, made the following observations:

“But while the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner, there is no such burden laid on the prisoner to prove his innocence and it is sufficient for him to raise a doubt as to his guilt ; he is not bound to satisfy the jury of his innocence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt subject to what I have already said as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory exception. If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious intention, the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal.”

These passages are not in conflict with the opinion expressed by us earlier. As in England so in India, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused, i.e. it must establish all the ingredients of the offence with which he is charged. As in England so also in India, the general burden of proof is upon the prosecution; and if, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution or by the accused, there is a reasonable doubt whether the accused committed the offence, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. In India if an accused pleads an exception within the meaning of S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code, there is a presumption against him and the burden to rebut that presumption lies on him. In England there is no provision similar to S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code, but Viscount Sankey, L.C., makes it clear that such a burden lies upon the accused if his defence is one of insanity and in a case where there is a statutory exception to the general rule of burden of proof. Such an exception we find in S. 105 of the Indian Evidence Act. Reliance is placed by learned counsel for the accused on the decision of the Privy Council in Attygalle vs. The King, AIR 1936 PC 169 at p. 170 in support of the contention that notwithstanding S. 105 of the Evidence Act, the burden of establishing the absence of accident within the meaning of S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code is on the prosecution. In that case, two persons were prosecuted, one for performing an illegal operation and the other for abetting him in that crime. Under S. 106 of the Ordinance 14 of 1895 in the Ceylon Code, which corresponds to S. 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, it was enacted that when any fact was especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact was upon him. Relying upon that section, the Judge in his charge to the jury said:.

“Miss Maye – that is the person upon whom the operation was alleged to have been performed -was unconscious and what took place in that room that three-quarters of an hour that she was under chloroform is a fact specially within the knowledge of these two accused who were there. The burden of proving that fact, the law says, is upon him, namely that no criminal operation look place but what took place was this and this speculum examination.”

The Judicial Committee pointed out:

“It is not the law of Ceylon that the burden is cast upon an accused person of proving that no crime has been committed. The jury might well have thought from the passage just quoted that that was in fact a burden which the accused person had to discharge. The summing-up goes on to explain the presumption of innocence in favour of accused persons, but it again reiterates that the burden of proving that no criminal operation took place is on the two accused who were there.”

The said observations do not support the contention of learned counsel. Section 106 of Ordinance 14 of 1895 of the Ceylon Code did not cast upon the accused a burden to prove that he had not committed any crime ; nor did it deal with any exception similar to that provided under S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code. It has no bearing on the construction of S. 105 of the Indian Evidence Act. The decisions of this Court in State of Madras vs. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer (1958) SCR 580, which deals with S. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and C. S. D. Swamy vs. The State (1960) 1 SCR 461, which considers the scope of S. 5 (3) of the said Act are examples of a statute throwing the burden of proving and even of establishing some of the ingredients of the offence on the accused; and this Court held that notwithstanding the general burden on the prosecution to prove the offence, the burden of proving the absence of the ingredients of the offence under certain circumstances was on the accused. Further citations are unnecessary as, in our view, the terms of S. 105 of the Evidence Act are clear and unambiguous.

20. Mr. Pathak contends that the accused did not rely upon any exception within the meaning of S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code and that his plea all through has been only that the prosecution has failed to establish intentional killing on his part. Alternatively, he argues that as the entire evidence has been adduced both by the prosecution and by the accused, the burden of proof became only academic and the jury was in a position to come to one conclusion or other on the evidence irrespective of the burden of proof. Before the Sessions Judge the accused certainly relied upon S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code, and the Sessions Judge dealt with the defence case in his charge to the jury. In paragraph 6 of the charge, the learned Sessions Judge stated:

“Before I proceed further I have to point out another section which is S. 80. You know by now that the defence of the accused is that the firing of the revolver was a matter of accident during a struggle for possession of the revolver. A struggle or a fight by itself does not exempt a person. It is the accident which exempts a person from criminal liability because there may be a fight, there may be a struggle and in the fight and in the struggle the assailant may overpower the victim and kill the deceased so that a struggle or a fight by itself does not exempt an assailant. It is only an accident, whether it is in struggle or a fight or otherwise which can exempt an assailant. It is only an accident, whether it is in a struggle or a fight or otherwise which can exempt a prisoner from criminal liability. I shall draw your attention to S. 80 which says:. . . . . . . . . (S. 80 read). You know that there are several provisions which are to be satisfied before the benefit of this exception can be claimed by an accused person and it should be that the act itself must be an accident or misfortune, there should be no criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of that act, that act itself must be done in a lawful manner and it must be done by lawful means and further in doing of it, you must do it with proper care and caution. In this connection, therefore, even while considering the case of accident, you will have to consider all the factors, which might emerge from the evidence before you, whether it was proper care and caution to take a loaded revolver without a safety catch to the residence of the person with whom you were going to talk and if you do not get an honourable answer you were prepared to thrash him. You have also to consider this further circumstance whether it is an act with proper care and caution to keep that loaded revolver in the hand and thereafter put it aside, whether that is taking proper care and caution. This is again a question of fact and you have to determine as judges of fact, whether the act of the accused in this case can be said to be an act which was lawfully done in a lawful manner and with proper care and caution. If it is so, then and only then can you call it accident or misfortune. This is a section which you will bear in mind when you consider the evidence in this case.”

In this paragraph the learned Sessions Judge mixed up the ingredients of the offence with those of the exception. He did not place before the jury the distinction in the matter of burden of proof between the ingredients of the offence and those of the exception. He did not tell the jury that where the accused relied upon the exception embodied in S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code, there was a statutory presumption against him and the burden of proof was on him to rebut that presumption. What is more, he told the jury that it was for them to decide whether the act of the accused in the case could be said to be an act which was lawfully done in a lawful manner with proper care and caution. This was in effect abdicating his functions in favour of the jury. He should have explained to them the implications of the terms “lawful act”, “lawful manner”, “lawful means” and “with proper care and caution” and pointed out to them the application of the said legal terminology to the acts of the case. On such a charge as in the present case, it was not possible for the jury, who were laymen, to know the exact scope of the defence and also the circumstances under which the plea under S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code was made out. They would not have also known that if S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code applied, there was a presumption against the accused and the burden of proof to rebut the presumption was on him. In such circumstances, we cannot predicate that the jury understood the legal implications of S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code and the scope of the burden of proof under S. 105 of the Evidence Act, and gave their verdict correctly. Nor can we say that the jury understood the distinction between the ingredients of the offence and the circumstances that attract S.80 of the Indian Penal Code and the impact of the proof of some of the said circumstances on the proof of the ingredients of the offence. The said omissions therefore are very grave omissions which certainly vitiated the verdict of the jury.

21. The next misdirection relates to the question of grave and sudden provocation. On this question, Shelat, J., made the following remarks:

“Thus the question whether a confession of adultery by the wife of the accused to him amounts to grave and sudden provocation or not was a question of law. In my view, the learned Sessions Judge was in error in telling the jury that the entire question was one of fact for them to decide. It was for the learned Judge to decide as a question of law whether the sudden confession by the wife of the accused amounted to grave and sudden provocation as against the deceased Ahuja which on the authorities referred to hereinabove it was not. He was therefore in error in placing this alternative case to the jury for their determination instead of deciding it himself.” The misdirection according to the learned Judge was that the Sessions Judge in his charge did not tell the jury that the sudden confession of the wife to the accused did not in law amount to sudden and grave provocation by the deceased, and instead he left the entire question to be decided by the jury. The learned judge relied upon certain English decisions and textbooks in support of his conclusion that the said question was one of law and that it was for the Judge to express his view thereon. Mr. Pathak contends that there is an essential difference between the law of England and that of India in the matter of the charge to the jury in respect of grave and sudden provocation. The House of Lords in Holmes vs. Director of Public Prosecution, 1946 AC 588 at p. 597 laid down the law in England thus:

“If there is no sufficient material, even on a view of the evidence most favourable to the accused, for a jury (which means a reasonable jury) to form the view that a reasonable person so provoked could be driven, through transport of passion and loss of selfcontrol, to the degree and method and continuance of violence which produces the death it is the duty of the judge as matter of law to direct the jury that the evidence does not support a verdict of manslaughter. If, on the other hand, the case is one in which the view might fairly be taken (a) that a reasonable person, in consequence of the provocation received, might be so rendered subject to passion or loss of control as to be led to use the violence with fatal results, and (b) that the accused was in fact acting under the stress of such provocation, then it is for the jury to determine whether on its view of the facts manslaughter or murder is the appropriate verdict.”

Viscount Simon brought out the distinction between the respective duties of the judge and the jury succinctly by formulating the following questions:

“The distinction, therefore, is between asking ‘Could the evidence support the view that the provocation was sufficient to lead a reasonable person to do what the accused did ?’ (which is for the judge to rule), and, assuming that the judges ruling is in the affirmative, asking the jury:’Do you consider that, on the facts as you find them from the evidence, the provocation was in fact enough to lead a reasonable person to do what the accused did ?’ and, if so, ‘Did the accused act under the stress of such provocation ?”

So far as England is concerned the judgment of the House of Lords is the last word on the subject till it is statutorily changed or modified by the House of Lords. It is not, therefore, necessary to consider the opinions of learned authors on the subject cited before us to show that the said observations did not receive their approval.

22. But Mr. Pathak contends that whatever might be the law in England, in India we are governed by the statutory provisions, and that under the explanation to Exception I to S. 300 of the I. P. C., the question whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is one of fact, and therefore, unlike in England, in India both the aforesaid questions fall entirely within the scope of the jury and they are for them to decide. To put it in other words, whether a reasonable person in the circumstances of a particular case committed the offence under provocation which was grave and sudden is a question of fact for the jury to decide. There is force in this argument, but it is not necessary to express our final opinion thereon, as the learned Attorney-General has conceded that there was no misdirection in regard to this matter.

23. The fourth misdirection found by the High Court is that the learned Sessions Judge told the jury that the prosecution relied on the circumstantial evidence and asked them to apply the stringent rule of burden of proof applicable to such cases, whereas in fact there was direct evidence of Puransingh in the shape of extra-judicial confession. In paragraph 8 of the charge the Sessions Judge said:

“In this case the prosecution relies on what is called circumstantial evidence that is to say there is no witness who can say that he saw the accused actually shooting and killing deceased. There are no direct witnesses, direct witnesses as they are called, of the event in question. Prosecution relies on certain circumstances from which they ask you to deduce an inference that it must be the accused and only the accused who must have committed this crime. That is called circumstantial evidence. It is not that prosecution cannot rely on circumstantial evidence because it is not always the case or generally the case that people who go out to commit crime will also take witnesses with them. So that it may be that in some cases the prosecution may have to rely on circumstantial evidence. Now when you are dealing with circumstantial evidence you will, bear in mind certain principles, namely, that the facts on which the prosecution relies must be fully established. They must be fully and firmly established. These facts must lead to one conclusion and one only namely the guilt of the accused and lastly it must exclude all reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused, all reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused should be excluded. In other words you must come to the conclusion by all the human probability, it must be the accused and the accused only who must have committed this crime. That is the standard of proof in a case resting on circumstantial evidence.”

Again in paragraph 11 the learned Sessions Judge observed that the jury were dealing with circumstantial evidence and graphically stated ;

“It is like this, take a word, split it up into letters, the letters may individually mean nothing but when they are combined they will form a word pregnant with meaning. That is the way how you have to consider the circumstantial evidence. You have to take all the circumstances together and judge for yourself whether the prosecution have established their case.”

In paragraph 18 of the charge, the learned Sessions Judge dealt with the evidence of Puransingh separately and told the jury that if his evidence was believed, it was one of the best forms of evidence against the man who made the admission and that if they accepted that evidence, then the story of the defence that it was an accident would become untenable. Finally he summarized all the circumstances on which the prosecution relied in paragraph 34 and one of the circumstances mentioned was the extra-judicial confession made to Puransingh. In that paragraph the learned Sessions Judge observed as follows:

“I will now summarize the circumstances on which the prosecution relies in this case. Consider whether the circumstances are established beyond all reasonable doubt. In this case you are dealing with circumstantial evidence and therefore consider whether they are fully and firmly established and consider whether they lead to one conclusion and only one conclusion that it is the accused alone who must have shot the deceased and further consider that it leaves no room for any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused regard being had to all the circumstances in the case and the conclusion that you have to come to should be of this nature and by all human probability it must be the accused and the accused alone who must have committed this crime.”

Finally the learned Sessions Judge told them:

“If on the other hand you think that the circumstances on which the prosecution relies are fully and firmly established, that they lead to one and the only conclusion and one only, of the guilt of the accused and that they exclude all reasonable hypothesis of the innocence of the accused then and in that case it will be your duty which you are bound by the oath to bring verdict accordingly without any fear or any favour and without regard being had to any consequence that this verdict might lead to.”

Mr. Pathak contends that the learned Sessions Judge dealt with the evidence in two parts, in one part he explained to the jury the well settled rule of approach to circumstantial evidence, whereas in another part he clearly and definitely pointed to the jury the great evidentiary value of the extra-judicial confession of guilt by the accused made to Puransingh, if that was believed by them. He, therefore, argues that there was no scope for any confusion in the minds of the jurors in regard to their approach to the evidence or in regard to the evidentiary value of the extra-judicial confession. The argument proceeds that even if there was a misdirection it was not such as to vitiate the verdict of the jury. It is not possible to accept this argument. We have got to look at the question from the standpoint of the possible effect of the said misdirection in the charge on the jury, who are laymen. In more than one place the learned Sessions Judge pointed out that the case depended upon circumstantial evidence and that the jury should apply the rule of circumstantial evidence settled by decisions. Though at one place he emphasized upon the evidentiary value of a confession, he later on included that confession also as one of the circumstances and again directed the jury to apply the rule of circumstantial evidence. It is not disputed that the extrajudicial confession made to Puransingh is direct piece of evidence and that the stringent rule of approach to circumstantial evidence does not apply to it. If that confession was true, it cannot be disputed that the approach of the jury to the evidence would be different from that if that was excluded. It is not possible to predicate that the jury did not accept that confession and therefore applied the rule of circumstantial evidence. It may well have been that the jury accepted it and still were guided by the rule of circumstantial evidence as pointed out by the learned Sessions judge. In these circumstances we must hold agreeing with the High Court, that this is a grave misdirection affecting the correctness of the verdict.

24. The next misdirection relied upon by the High Court is the circumstance that the three letters written by Sylvia were not read to the jury by the learned Sessions Judge in his charge, and that the jury were not told of their effect on the credibility of the evidence of Sylvia and Nanavati. Shelat, J., observed in regard to this circumstance thus ;

“It cannot be gainsaid that these letters were important documents disclosing the state of mind of Mrs. Nanavati and the deceased to a certain extent. If these letters had been read in juxtaposition of Mrs. Nanavati’s evidence they would have shown that her statement that she felt that Ahuja had asked her not to see him for a month or the purpose of backing out of the intended marriage was not correct and that they had agreed not to see each other for the purpose giving her and also to him an opportunity to coolly think out the implications of such a marriage and then to make up her own mind on her own. The letters would also show that when the accused asked her, as he said in his evidence, whether Ahuja would marry her, it was not probable that she would fence that question. On the other hand, she would, in all probability, have told him that they had already decided to many. In my view, the omission to refer even once to these letters in the charge especially in view of Mrs. Nanavati’s evidence was a non-direction amounting to misdirection.”

Mr. Pathak contends that these letters were read to the jury by counsel on both sides and a reference was also made to them in the evidence of Sylvia and, therefore, the jury clearly knew the contents of the letters, and that in the circumstances the non-mention of the contents of the letters by the Sessions Judge was not a misdirection and even if it was it did not affect the verdict of the jury. In this context reliance is placed upon two English decisions, namely, R. vs. Roberts, 1942-1 All ER 187 at p. 190 and R. vs. Attfield, 1961-3 All ER 243. In the former case the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of a girl by shooting her with a service rifle and he pleaded accident as his defence. The judge in his summing-up, among other defects, omitted to refer to the evidence of certain witnesses; the jury returned a verdict of “guilty” on the charge of murder and it was accepted by the judge; it was contended that the omission to refer to the evidence of certain witnesses was a misdirection. Rejecting that plea, Humphreys, J., observed:

“The jury had the statements before them. They had the whole of the evidence before them, and they had, just before the summing up, comments upon those matters from counsel for the defence, and from counsel for the prosecution, it is incredible that they could have forgotten them or that they could have misunderstood the matter in any way, or thought, by reason of the fact that the judge did not think it necessary to refer to them, that they were not to pay attention to them. We do not think there is anything in that point at all. A judge, in summing-up, is not obliged to refer to every witness in the case, unless he thinks it necessary to do so. In saying this, the court is by no means saying that it might not have been more satisfactory if the judge had referred to the evidence of the two witnesses, seeing that he did not think it necessary to refer to some of the statements made by the accused after the occurrence. No doubt it would have been more satisfactory from the point of view of the accused. All we are saying is that we are satisfied that there was no misdirection in law on the part of the judge in omitting those statements, and it was within his discretion.”

This passage does not lay down as a proposition of law that however important certain documents or pieces of evidence may be from the standpoint of the accused or the prosecution, the judge need not refer to or explain them in his summing-up to the jury, and, if he did not, it would not amount to misdirection under any circumstances. In that case some statements made by witnesses were not specifically brought to the notice of the jury and the court held in the circumstances of that case that there was no misdirection. In the latter case the facts were simple and the evidence was short; the judge summed up the case directing the jury as to the law but did not deal with the evidence except in regard to the appellant’s character. The jury convicted the appellant. The court held that, “although in a complicated and lengthy case it was incumbent on the court to deal with the evidence in summing-up, yet where, as in the present case, the issues could be simply and clearly stated, it was not fatal defect for the evidence not to be reviewed in the summing-up.” This is also a decision on the facts of that case. That apart, we are not concerned with a simple case here but with a complicated one. This decision does not help us in deciding the point raised. Whether a particular omission by a judge to place before the jury certain evidence amounts to a misdirection or not falls to be decided on the facts of each case.

25. These letters show the exact position of Sylvia in the context of her intended marriage with Ahuja, and help to test the truthfulness or otherwise of some of the assertions made by her to Nanavati. A perusal of these letters indicates that Sylvia and Ahuja were on intimate terms, that Ahuja was willing to marry her, that they had made up their minds to marry, but agreed to keep apart for a month to consider coolly whether they really wanted to marry in view of the serious consequences involved in taking such a step. Both Nanavati and Sylvia gave evidence giving an impression that Ahuja was backing out of his promise to marry Sylvia and that was the main reason for Nanavati going to Ahuja’s flat for an explanation. If the Judge had read these letters in his charge and explained the implication of the contents thereof in relation to the evidence given by Nanavati and Sylvia, it would not have been possible to predicate whether the jury would have believed the evidence of Nanavati and Sylvia. If the marriage between them was a settled affair and if the only obstruction in the way was Nanavati, and if Nanavati had expressed his willingness to be out of the way and even to help them to marry, their evidence that Sylvia did not answer the direct question about the intentions of Ahuja to marry her, and the evidence of Nanavati that it became necessary for him to go to Ahuja’s flat to ascertain the latter’s intentions might not have been believed by the jury. It is no answer to say that the letters were read to the jury at different stages of the trial or that they might have read the letters themselves, for in a jury trial, especially where innumerable documents are filed, it is difficult for a lay jury, unless property directed, to realise the relative importance of specified documents in the context of different aspects of a case. That is why the Code of Criminal Procedure, under S. 297 thereof, imposes a duty on the Sessions Judge to charge the jury after the entire evidence is given and after counsel appearing for the accused and counsel appearing for the prosecution have addressed them. The object of the charge to the jury by the Judge is clearly to enable him to explain the law and also to place before them the facts and circumstances of the case both for and against the prosecution in order to help them in arriving at a right decision. The fact that the letters were read to the jury by the prosecution or by the counsel for the defence is not of much relevance, for they would place the evidence before the jury from different angles to induce them to accept their respective versions. That fact in itself cannot absolve the judge from his clear duty to put the contents of the letters before the jury from the correct perspective. We are in agreement with the High Court that this was a clear misdirection which might have affected the verdict of the jury.

26. The next defect pointed out by the High Court is that the Sessions Judge allowed the counsel for the accused to elicit from, the police officer, Phansalkar, what Puransingh is alleged to have stated to him orally, in order to contradict the evidence of Puransingh in the court, and the judge also dealt with the evidence so elicited in paragraph 18 of his charge to the jury. This contention cannot be fully appreciated unless some relevant facts are stated. Puransingh was examined for the prosecution as P. W. 12. He was a watchman of “Jivan Jyot”. He deposed that when the accused was leaving the compound of the said building, he asked him why he had killed Ahuja, and the accused told him that he had a quarrel with Ahuja as the latter had “connections” with his wife and therefore he killed him. At about 5-5 p.m. on April 27, 1959, this witness reported this incident to Gamdevi Police Station. On that day Phansalkar (P.W. 13) was the Station House Duty Officer of that station from 2 to 8. p.m. On the basis of the statement of Puransingh, Phansalkar went in a jeep with Puransingh to the place of the alleged offence. Puransingh said in his evidence that he told Phansalkar in the jeep what the accused had told him when he was leaving the compound of “Jivan Jyot”. After reaching the place of the alleged offence, Phansalkar learnt from a doctor that Ahuja was dead and he also made enquiries from Miss Mammie, the sister of the deceased. He did not record the statement made by Puransingh. But later on between 10 and 10-30 p.m. on the same day, Phansalkar made a statement to Inspector Mokashi what Puransingh had told him and that statement was recorded by Mokashi. In the statement taken by Mokashi it was not recorded that Puransingh told Phansalkar that the accused told him why he had killed Ahuja. When Phansalkar was in the witness-box, to a question put to him in cross-examination he answered that Puransingh did not tell him that he had asked Nanavati why he killed Ahuja and that the accused replied that he had a quarrel with the deceased as the latter had “connections” with his wife and that he had killed him. The learned Sessions Judge not only allowed the evidence to go in but also, in paragraph 18 of his charge to the jury, referred to that statement. After giving the summary of the evidence given by Puransingh, the learned Sessions Judge proceeded to state in his charge to the jury:

“Now the conversation between him and Phansalkar (Sub-Inspector) was brought on record in which what the chowkidar told Sub-Inspector Phansalkar was, the servants of the flat of Miss Ahuja had informed him that a Naval Officer was going away in the car. He and the servants had tried to stop him but the said officer drove away in the car saying that he was going to the Police Station and to Sub-Inspector Phansalkar he did not state about his admission made by Mr. Nanavati to him that he killed the deceased as the deceased had connections with his wife. The chowkidar said that he had told this also to sub-Inspector Phansalkar. Sub-Inspector Phansalkar said that Puransingh had not made this statement to him. You will remember that this chowkidar went to the police station at Gamdevi to give information about this crime and while coming back he was with Sub-Inspector Phansalkar and Sub-Inspector Phansalkar in his own statement to Mr, Mokashi has referred to the conversation which he had between him and this witness Puransingh and that had been brought on record as a contradiction.”

The learned Sessions Judge then proceeded to state other circumstances and observed, “Consider whether you will accept the evidence of Puransingh or not.” It is manifest from the summing-up that the learned Sessions Judge not only read to the jury the evidence of Phansalkar wherein he stated that Puransingh did not tell him that the accused told him why he killed Ahuja but also did not tell the jury that the evidence of Phansalkar was not admissible to contradict the evidence of Puransingh. It is not possible to predicate what was the effect of the alleged contradiction on the mind of the jury and whether they had not rejected the evidence of Puransingh because of that contradiction. If the said evidence was not admissible, the placing of that evidence before the jury was certainly a grave misdirection which must have affected their verdict. The question is whether such evidence is legally admissible. The alleged omission was brought on record in the cross-examination of Phansalkar, and, after having brought it in, it was sought to be used to contradict the evidence of Puransingh. Learned Attorney General contends that the statement made by Phansalkar to Inspector Mokashi could be used only to contradict the evidence of Phansalkar and not that of Puransingh under S. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and the statement made by Puransingh to Phansalkar, it not having been recorded, could not be used at all to contradict the evidence of Puransingh under the said section. He further argues that the alleged omission not being a contradiction, it could in no event be used to contradict Puransingh. Learned counsel for the accused, on the other hand, contends that the alleged statement was made to a police officer before the investigation commenced and, therefore, it was not hit by S. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it could be used to contradict the evidence of Puransingh. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads:

“ (1) No statement made by any person to a Police-officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter shall, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose, save as hereinafter provided, at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made:

“Provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused, and with the permission of the Court, by, the prosecution, to contradict such witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1of 1872), and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination.”

The preliminary condition for the application of S. 162 of the Code is that the statement should have been made to a police-officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code. If it was not made in the course of such investigation, the admissibility of such statement would not be governed by S. 162 of the Code. The question, therefore, is whether Puransingh made the statement to Phansalkar in the course of investigation. Section 154 of the Code says that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence if given orally to an officer in charge of a police-station shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction; and S. 156 (1) is to the effect that any officer in charge of a police-station may without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIV relating to the place of inquiry or trial. The evidence in the case clearly estasblishes that Phansalkar, being the Station House Duty Officer at Gamdevi Police-station on April 27, 1959, from 2 to 8 p.m., was an officer in charge of the Police-station within the meaning of the said sections. Puransingh in his evidence says that he went to Gamdevi Police-station and gave the information of the shooting incident to the Gamdevi Police. Phansalkar in his evidence says that on the basis of the information he went along with Puransingh to the place of the alleged offence. His evidence also discloses that he had questioned Puransingh, the doctor and also Miss Mammie in regard to the said incident. On this uncontradicted evidence there cannot be any doubt that the investigation of the offence had commenced and Puransingh made the statement to the police officer in the course of the said investigation. But it is said that, as the information given by Puransingh was not recorded by Police Officer Phansalkar as he should do under S. 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no investigation in law could have commenced within the meaning of S. 156 of the Code. The question whether investigation had committed or not is a question of fact and it does not depend upon any irregularity committee in the matter of recording the first information report by the concerned police officer. If so, S. 162 of the Code is immediately attracted. Under S. 162 (1) of the no statement made by any person to a Police-officer in the course of an investigation be used for any purpose at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made. But the proviso lifts the ban and says that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement has been reduced into writing, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused to contradict such witness. The proviso cannot be invoked to bring in the statement made by Phansalkar to Inspector Mokashi in the cross-examination of Phansalkar, for the statement made by him was not used to contradict the evidence of Phansalkar. The proviso cannot obviously apply to the oral statement made by Puransingh to Phansalkar, for the said statement of Puransingh has not been reduced into writing. The faint argument of learned counsel or the accused that the statement of Phansalkar recorded by Inspector Mokashi can be treated as a recorded statement of Puransingh himself is to be stated only to be rejected, for it is impossible to treat the recorded statement of Phansalkar as the recorded statement of Puransingh by a police-officer. If so, the question whether the alleged omission of what the accused told Puransingh in Puransingh’s oral statement to Phansalkar could be used to contradict Puransingh, in view of the decision of this Court in Tahsildar Singh vs. State of U. P., (1959) 2 Suppl. SCR 875, does not arise for consideration. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that not only the learned Sessions Judge acted illegally in admitting the alleged omission in evidence to contradict the evidence of Puransingh, but also clearly misdirected himself in placing the said evidence before the jury for their consideration.

27. In addition to the misdirections pointed out by the High Court, the learned Attorney-General relied upon another alleged misdirection by the learned Sessions Judge in his charge. In paragraph 28 of the charge, the learned Sessions Judge stated thus:

“No one challenges the marksmanship of the accused but Commodore Nanda had come to tell you that he is a good shot and Mr. Kandalawala said that here was a man and good marksman, would have shot him, riddled him with bullets perpendicularly and not that way and he further said that as it is not done in this case it shows that the accused is a good marksman and a good shot and he would not have done this thing, this is the argument.”

The learned Attorney General points out that the learned Sessions Judge was wrong in saying that no one challenged the marksmanship of the accused, for Commodore Nanda was examined at length on the competency of the accused as a marksman. Though this is a misdirection, we do not think that the said passage, having regard to the other circumstances of the case, could have in any way affected the verdict of the jury. It is, therefore clear that there were grave misdirections in this, case, affecting the verdict of the jury, and the High Court was certainly within its rights to consider the evidence and come to its own conclusion thereon.

28. The learned Attorney-General contends that if he was right in his contention that the High Court could consider the evidence afresh and come to its own conclusion, in view of the said misdirections, this Court should not, in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Art.136 of the Constitution, interfere with the findings of the High Court. There is force in this argument. But as we have heard counsel at great length, we propose to discuss the evidence.

29. We shall now proceed to consider the evidence in the case. The evidence can be divided into three parts, namely, (i) evidence relating to the conduct of the accused before the shooting incident, (ii) evidence in regard to the conduct of the accused after the incident; and (iii) evidence in regard to the actual shooting in the bedroom of Ahuja.

30. From the consideration of the entire evidence, the following facts emerge:The deceased seduced the wife of the accused. She had confessed to him of her illicit intimacy with the deceased. It was natural that the accused was enraged at the conduct of the deceased and had, therefore, sufficient motive to do away with the deceased. He deliberately secured the revolver on a false pretext from the ship, drove to the flat of Ahuja, entered his bed-room unceremoniously with a loaded revolver in hand and in about a few seconds thereafter came out with the revolver in has hand. The deceased was found dead in his bath-room with bullet injuries on his body. It is not disputed that the bullets that caused injuries to Ahuja emanated from the revolver that was in the hand of the accused. After the shooting, till his trial in the Sessions Court, he did not tell anybody that he shot the deceased by accident. Indeed, he confessed his guilt to the chowkidar Puransingh and practically admitted the same to his colleague Samuel. His description of the struggle in the bathroom is highly artificial and is devoid of all necessary particulars. The injuries found on the body of the deceased are consistent with the intentional shooting and the main injuries are wholly inconsistent with accidental shooting when the victim and the assailant were in close grips. The other circumstances brought out in the evidence also establish that there could not have been any fight or struggle between the accused and the deceased.

31. We, therefore, unhesitatingly hold, agreeing with the High Court, that the prosecution has proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused has intentionally shot the deceased and killed him.

32. In this view it is not necessary to consider the question whether the accused had discharged the burden laid on him under S. 80 of the Indian Penal Code, especially as learned counsel appearing for the accused here and in the High Court did not rely upon the defence based upon that section.

That apart, we agree with the High Court that, on the evidence adduced in this case, no reasonable body of persons could have come to the conclusion which the jury reached in this case. For that reason also the verdict of the jury cannot stand.

Even so, it is contended, by Mr. Pathak that the accused shot the deceased while deprived of the power of self-control by sudden and grave provocation and, therefore, the offence would fall under Exception 1 to S. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. The said Exception reads:

“Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.”

Homicide is the killing of a human being by another. Under this exception, culpable homicide is not murder if the following conditions are complied with: (l) The deceased must have given provocation to the accused. (2) The provocation must be grave. (3) The provocation must be sudden. (4) The offender, by reason of the said provocation, shall have been deprived of his power of self-control. (5) He should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control, (6) The offender must have caused the death of the person who gave the provocation or that of any other person by mistake or accident.

33. The First Question Raised Is Whether Ahuja Gave Provocation To Nanavati Within The Meaning Of The Exception And Whether The Provocation, If Given By Him, Was Grave And Sudden.

34. Learned Attorney-General Argues That Though A Confession Of Adultery By A Wife May In Certain Circumstances Be Provocation By The Paramour Himself, under different circumstances it has to be considered from the standpoint of the person who conveys it rather than from the standpoint of the person who gives it. He further contends that even if the provocation was deemed to have been given by Ahuja, and though the said provocation might have been grave, it could not be sudden, for the provocation given by Ahuja was only in the past.

35. On the other hand, Mr. Pathak contends that the act of Ahuja, namely, the seduction of Sylvia, gave provocation though the fact of seduction was communicated to the accused by Sylvia and that for the ascertainment of the suddenness of the provocation it is not the mind of the person who provokes that matters but that of the person provoked that is decisive. It is not necessary to express our opinion on the said question, for we are satisfied that, for other reasons, the case is not covered by Exception 1 to S. 300 of the Indian Penal Code.

The question that the Court has to consider is whether a reasonable person placed in the same position as the accused was, would have reacted to the confession of adultery by his wife in the manner in which the accused did. In Mancini vs. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1942 AC 1 at p. 9, Viscount Simon, L. C., states the scope of the doctrine of provocation thus:

“It is not all provocation that will reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter. Provocation, to have that result, must be such as temporarily deprives the person provoked of the power of self-control, as the result of which he commits the unlawful act which causes death . . . . . . . ….. The test to be applied is that of the effect of the provocation on a reasonable man, as was laid down by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex vs. Lesbini, 1914-3 KB 1116 so that an unusually excitable or pugnacious individual is not entitled to rely on provocation which would not have led an ordinary person to act as he did. In applying the test, it is of particular importance to (a) consider whether a sufficient interval has elapsed since the provocation to allow a reasonable man time to cool, and (b) to take into account the instrument with which the homicide was effected, for to retort, in the heat of passion induced by provocation, by a simple blow, is a very different thing from making use of a deadly instrument like a concealed dagger. In short, the mode of resentment must bear a reasonable relationship to the provocation if the offence is to be reduced to manslaughter.”

Viscount Simon again in 1946 AC 588 at p. 598 elaborates further on this theme. There, the appellant had entertained some suspicions of his wife’s conduct with regard to other men in the village. On a Saturday night there was a quarrel between them when she said, “Well , if it will ease your mind, I have been untrue to you”, and she went on, “I know I have done wrong, but I have no proof that you haven’t – at Mrs. X.’s”. With this the appellant lost his temper and picked up the hammerhead and struck her with the same on the side of the head. As he did not like to see her lie there and suffer, he just put both hands round her neck until she stopped breathing. The question arose in that case whether there was such provocation as to reduce the offence of murder to manslaughter. Viscount Simnon, after referring to Mancini’s case, (supra) proceeded to state thus:

“The whole doctrine relating to provocation depends on the fact that it causes, or may cause, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, whereby malice, which is the formation of an intention to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm, is negatived. Consequently, where the provocation inspires an actual intention to kill (such as Holmes admitted in the present case), or to inflict grievous bodily harm, the doctrine that provocation may reduce murder to manslaughter seldom applies.”

Goddard, C. J., in R. vs. Duffy, 1949-1 All ER 932n defines provocation thus:.

“Provocation is some act, or series of acts, done by the dead man to the accused which would cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control’, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his mind. . … . . . .. . . What matters is whether this girl (the accused) had the time to say:’Whatever I have suffered, whatever I have endured, I know that Thou shall not kill’. That is what matters. Similarly. .. .. .circumstances which induce a desire for revenge, or a sudden passion of anger, are not enough. Indeed, circumstances which induce a desire for revenge are inconsistent with provocation, since the conscious formulation of a desire for revenge means that the person has had time to think, to reflect, and that would negative a sudden temporary loss of self-control which is of the essence of provocation. Provocation being. . . . . .. . as I have defined it, there are two things, in considering it, to which the law attaches great importance. The first of them is, whether there was what is sometimes called time for cooling, that is, for passion to cool and for reason to regain dominion over the mind. .. . .. . Secondly, in considering whether provocation has or has not been made out, you must consider the retaliation in provocation-that is to say, whether the mode of resentment bears some proper and reasonable relationship to the sort of provocation that has been given.”

A passage from the address of Baron Parke to the jury in R. vs. Thomas, (1837) 7 C and P. 817 extracted in Russell on Crime, 11th ed., Vol. I at p. 593, may usefully be quoted:

“But the law requires two things:first that there should be that provocation; and secondly that the fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation.”

The passages extracted above lay down the following principles: (1) Except in circumstances of most extreme and exceptional character, a mere confession of adultery is not enough to reduce the offence of murder to manslaughter. (2) The act of provocation which reduced the offence of murder to manslaughter must be such as to cause a sudden and temporary loss of self-control; and it must be distinguished from a provocation which inspires an actual intention to kill. (3) The act should have been done during the continuance of that state of mind, that is, before there was time for passion to cool and for reason to regain dominion over the mind. (4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from the provocation.

36. On the other hand, in India, the first principle has never been followed. That principle has had its origin in the English doctrine that mere words and gestures would not be in point of law sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter. But the authors of the Indian Penal Code did not accept the distinction. They observed:

“It is an indisputable fact, that gross insults by word or gesture have as great a tendency to move many persons to violent passion as dangerous or painful bodily injuries; nor does it appear to us that passion excited by insult is entitled to less indulgence than passion excited by pain. On the contrary, the circumstance that a man resents an insult more than a wound is anything but a proof that he is a man of peculiarly bad heart.”

Indian courts have not maintained the distinction between words and acts in the application of the doctrine of provocation in a given case. The Indian law on the subject may be considered from two aspects, namely, (1) whether words or gestures unaccompanied by acts can amount to provocation, and (2) what is the effect of the time lag between the act of provocation and the commission of the offence. In Empress vs. Khogayi, ILR 2 Mad 122, at p. 123 a division bench of the Madras High Court held, in the circumstances of that case, that abusive language used would be a provocation sufficient to deprive the accused of self-control. The learned Judges observed:

“What is required is that it should be of a character to deprive the offender of his self-control. In determining whether it was so, it is admissible to take into account the condition of mind in which the offender was at the time of the provocation. In the present case the abusive language used was of the foulest kind and was addressed to man already enraged by the conduct of deceased’s son.”

It will be seen in this case that abusive language of the foulest kind was held to be sufficient in the case of man who was already enraged by the conduct of deceased’s son. The same learned Judge in a later decision in Boya Munigadu vs. The Queen, ILR 3 Mad 33 at pp. 34-35 upheld the plea of grave and sudden provocation in the following circumstances:The accused saw the deceased when she had cohabitation with his bitter enemy; that night he had no meals; next morning he went to the ryots to get his wages from them, and at that time he saw his wife eating food along with her paramour; he killed the paramour with a bill-book. The learned judges held that the accused had sufficient provocation to bring the case within the first exception to S. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Judges observed:

“ . …….. . . . . If having witnessed the act of adultery, he connected this subsequent conduct, as he could not fail to connect it, with that act, it would be conduct of a character highly exasperating to him, implying as it must, that all concealment of their criminal relations and all regard for his feelings were abandoned and that they purposed continuing their course of misconduct in his house. This we think, amounted to provocation, grave enough and sudden enough to deprive him of his self control, and reduced the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.”

The case illustrates that the state of mind of the accused, having regard to the earlier conduct of the deceased, may be taken into consideration in considering whether the subsequent act would be a sufficient provocation to bring the case within the exception. Another division bench of the Madras High Court in In re. Murugian ILR (1957) Mad 805: (S.) AIR 1957 Mad 541) held that where the deceased not only committed adultery but later on swore openly in the face of the husband that she would persist in such adultery and also abused the husband for remonstrating against such conduct, the case was covered by the first exception to S. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. The judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in In re, C. Narayan AIR 1958 Andh Pra 235 adopted the same reasoning in a case where the accused, a young man, who had a lurking suspicion of the conduct of his wife, who newly joined him, was confronted with the confession of illicit intimacy with, and consequent pregnancy by, another strangled his wife to death, and held that the case was covered by Exception 1 to S. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. These two decisions indicate that the mental state created by an earlier act may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether a subsequent act was sufficient to make the assailant to lose his self-control.

37. Where the deceased led an immoral life and her husband, the accused, upbraided her and the deceased instead of being repentent said that she would again do such acts, and the accused, being enraged, struck her and, when she struggled and beat him, killed her, the Court held the immediate provocation coming on top of all that had gone before was sufficient to bring the case within the first exception to S. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. So too, where a woman was leading a notoriously immoral life, and on the previous night mysteriously disappeared from the bedside of her husband and the husband protested against her conduct she vulgarly abused him, whereupon the husband lost his self control, picked up a rough stick, which happened to be close by and struck her resulting in her death, the Lahore High Court, in Jan Muhammad vs. Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 861 at pp. 862-863 held that the case was governed by the said exception. The following observations of the court were relied upon in the present case:

“In the present case my view is that, in judging the conduct of the accused, one must not confine himself to the actual moment when the blow which ultimately proved to be fatal, was struck, that is to say, one must not take into consideration only the event which took place immediately before the fatal blow was struck. We must take into consideration the previous conduct of the woman . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . ….. . . . ………………… …….. …….. As stated above, the whole unfortunate affair should be looked at as one prolonged agony on the part of the husband which must have been preying upon his mind and led to the assault upon the woman, resulting in her death.”

A division bench of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor vs. Balku, ILR (1938) All 789 at p. 793 invoked the exception in a case where the accused and the deceased, who was his wife’s sister’s husband, were sleeping on the same cot, and in the night the accused saw the deceased getting up from the cot and going to another room and having sexual intercourse with his (accused’s) wife, and the accused allowed the deceased to return to the cot, but after the deceased fell asleep, he stabbed him to death. The learned judges held:

“When Budhu (the deceased) came into intimate contact with the accused by lying beside him on the charpai this trust have worked further on the mind of the accused and he must have reflected that ‘this man now lying beside me had been dishonouring me a few minutes ago’. Under these circumstances we think that the provocation would be both grave and sudden.”

The Allahabad High Court in a recent decision, viz., Babu Lal vs. State, AIR 1960 All 223 at p. 226 applied the exception to a case where the husband who saw his wife in a compromising position with the deceased killed the latter subsequently when the deceased came, in his absence, to his house in another village to which he had moved. The learned Judges observed:

“The appellant when he came to reside in the Government House Orchard felt that he had removed his wife from the influence of the deceased and there was no more any contact between them. He had lulled himself into a false security. This belief was shattered when he found the deceased at his hut when he was absent. This could certainly give him a mental jolt and as this knowledge will come all of a sudden it should be deemed to have given him a grave and sudden pravocation. The fact that he had suspected this illicit intimacy on an earlier occasion also will not alter the nature of the provocation and make it any the less sudden.”

All the said four decisions dealt with a case of a husband killing his wife when his peace of mind had already been disturbed by an earlier discovery of the wife’s infidelity and the subsequent act of her operated as a grave and sudden provocation on his disturbed mind.

38. Is there any standard of a reasonable man for the application of the doctrine of “grave and sudden” provocation? No abstract standard of reasonableness can be laid down. What a reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values etc. in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an accused belongs. In our vast country there are social groups ranging from the lowest to the highest state of civilization. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any standard with precision:it is for the court to decide in each case, having regard to the relavent circumstances. It is not necessary in this case to ascertain whether a reasonable man placed in the position of the accused would have lost his self-control momentarily or even temporarily when his wife confessed to him of her illicit intimacy with another, for we are satisfied on the evidence that the accused regained his self-control and killed Ahuja deliberately.

39. The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus: (1) The test of “grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the first Exception to S. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence (4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation.

40. Bearing these principles in mind, let us look at the facts of this case. When Sylvia confessed to her husband that she had illicit intimacy with Ahuja, the latter was not present. We will assume that he had momentarily lost his self-control. But, if his version is true-for the purpose of this argument we shall accept that what he has said is true – it shows that he was only thinking of the future of his wife and children and also of asking for an explanation from Ahuja for his conduct. This attitude of the accused clearly indicates that he had not only regained his self-control, but, on the other hand, was planning for the future. Then he drove his wife and children to a cinema, left them there, went to his ship, took a revolver on a false pretext, loaded it with six rounds, did some official business there, and drove his car to the office of Ahuja and then to his flat, went straight to the bed-room of Ahuja and shot him dead. Between 1-30 p.m., when he left his house, and 4-20 p.m. when the murder took place, three hours had elapsed, and therefore there was sufficient time for him to regain his self-control, even if he had not regained it earlier. On the other hand, his conduct clearly shows that the murder was a deliberate and calculated one. Even if any conversation took place between the accused and the deceased in the manner described by the accused-though we do not believe that – it does not affect the question, for the accused entered the bed-room of the deceased to shoot him. The mere fact that before the shooting the accused abused the deceased and the abuse provoked an equally abusive reply could not conceivably be a provocation for the murder. We, therefore, hold that the facts of the case do not attract the provisions of Exception 1 to S. 300 of the Indian Penal Code.

41. In the result, the conviction of the accused under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence of imprisonment for life passed on him by the High Court are correct, and there are absolutely no grounds for interference. The appeal stands dismissed.