What would constitute material facts and material particulars

While dealing with the question of material facts and material particulars, we also considered it appropriate to take into account the ratio of the decision delivered in the case of Mahadeorao Sukaji Shivankar v. Ramaratan Bapu and Ors. reported in, (2004) 7 SCC 181 wherein the three Judge Bench of this Court had been pleased to consider the question as to what would constitute material facts and material particulars and also discussed its concept and the distinction between the two. In this authority too, it was emphasized and held that what particulars would amount to ‘material facts’ would depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down. It was also held that material particulars, on the other hand, are details in support of material facts and the expression material facts although have not been defined in the Act nor in Code of Civil Procedure, it will have to be inferred that material facts are those facts upon which the party relies for his claimA Claim A claim is “factually unsustainable” where it could be said with confidence before trial that the factual basis for the claim is entirely without substance, which can be the case if it were clear beyond question that the facts pleaded are contradicted by all the documents or other material on which it is based. or defence. In other words, material facts are facts upon which the plaintiff’s cause of action or the defendant’s defence depend. But what particulars ultimately will be said to be ‘material facts’ would depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down. Particulars, on the other hand, are details in support of material facts pleaded by the party. This amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving finishing touch to the basic contours of a picture already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and more informative. Thus, material particulars ensure conduct of fair trial which would not take the opposite party by surprise.

The ratio that can be deduced from the aforesaid three authorities of the Supreme Court has further been reiterated in the case of Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez and latter on in Mahadeorao Sukaji Shivankar v. Ramaratan Bapu and Ors., (2004) 7 SCC 181 as also in Ram Sukh (supra) wherein it has been once again held that although, it is the legal requirement under Section 83 of the Act of 1951 to clearly set out material facts and material particulars in the election petition, ultimately it has been unequivocally held that there can be no rule of universal application which can be laid down as to what would constitute ‘material facts’ and ‘material particulars’ and ultimately it is the facts of each case which will be relevant for determination as to whether the election petition was fit to be rejected on the plea of lack of material facts and material particulars or it was fit to be entertained if the same disclosed a cause of action for consideration by the Court.