NEERAJ KUMAR @ NEERAJ YADAV VS. STATE OF U.P. – Crl.A. No. 5229/2025 – Diary Number 21716 / 2025 – 04-Dec-2025
The expansive scope of judicial power to ensure that all perpetrators of a crime are brought before the law, the Supreme Court of India allowed an appeal, thereby setting aside the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Allahabad High Court. The lower courts had erroneously dismissed an application filed by the prosecution under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which sought to summon three relatives of the main accused as additional offenders in a sessions trial pertaining to a murder case. The apex court, in a judgment delivered by Justice Sanjay Karol, firmly reiterated the fundamental principle embedded in Section 319 CrPC: that courts possess a sacrosanct duty to prevent the guilty from escaping justice, thereby giving true meaning to the concept of a fair and complete trial. This provision, the Court emphasized, is a vital instrument to correct investigative omissions and is triggered when evidence emerges during the trial indicating the involvement of persons not originally arraigned.
The case originated from a tragic incident on March 25, 2021, wherein Smt. Nishi was shot by her husband, Rahul Yadav, at their matrimonial home. The First Information Report (FIR), lodged by her brother Neeraj Kumar (the appellant), initially named only the husband. However, during her treatment, the deceased gave two detailed statements to the police under Section 161 CrPC. In her first statement, she implicated her husband. In a subsequent, more detailed statement recorded on April 18, 2021, she explicitly named her mother-in-law (Rajo @ Rajwati), brother-in-law (Satan @ Vineet), and another relative (Gabbar), alleging they had instigated and conspired in the attack. Despite this, the investigating agency filed a chargesheet solely against the husband, exonerating these three relatives. After the trial commenced, the prosecution moved an application under Section 319 CrPC based on trial evidence, primarily the testimonies of the appellant (PW-1) and the deceased’s nine-year-old daughter, Shristi (PW-2). Both witnesses, in their court depositions, corroborated the deceased’s second statement, attributing specific roles of instigation and active participation to the relatives. The Trial Court and, in revision, the High Court, dismissed the application, holding the evidence insufficient to meet the “strong and cogent” threshold required for invoking Section 319.
The Supreme Court, in its analysis, found the approach of the courts below to be legally flawed and unduly restrictive. It systematically dismantled the reasoning of the High Court. Firstly, the Court addressed the treatment of the deceased’s Section 161 statements. The High Court had erroneously held they could not be treated as dying declarations under Section 32 of the Evidence Act because death occurred nearly two months later. The Supreme Court corrected this, affirming that the law does not require imminent death; any statement relating to the cause of death or its circumstances is admissible. Furthermore, the Court cited precedent to establish that a statement to police under Section 161 CrPC transforms into a valid dying declaration upon the death of the declarant, and the lack of a Magistrate’s presence or a doctor’s fitness certificate does not ipso facto invalidate it. These statements, particularly the second one detailing a conspiracy and threats, were prima facie relevant evidence of the respondents’ involvement.
Secondly, the Court examined the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The High Court had discounted PW-1’s (the brother’s) evidence as he was not an eyewitness. The Supreme Court countered that an FIR is not an encyclopedia, and his deposition about the instigation, consistent with his subsequent written complaint, had evidentiary value at this stage. Most critically, the Court took strong exception to the High Court’s analysis of PW-2’s (the child eyewitness’s) testimony. The High Court had conducted a “mini-trial” by dissecting her cross-examination, where she mentioned hearing gunshots, to conclude she was not a direct witness. The Supreme Court held this was impermissible at the Section 319 stage. The Court’s role is not to weigh evidence for ultimate credibility but to see if, on the face of it, the evidence discloses involvement. The minor’s clear, unwavering testimony in her examination-in-chief, naming the respondents and describing their acts of provocation and provision of the weapon, constituted strong prima facie evidence. Her Section 161 statement, used for corroboration, further solidified the allegation.
The judgment serves as a comprehensive restatement of the law on Section 319 CrPC. It reaffirms that the power is extraordinary but must be exercised to serve the ends of justice. The standard of satisfaction is higher than for framing charges but lower than for conviction. The evidence must be more than mere probability but need not be tested through cross-examination at this juncture. The Court powerfully reiterated that persons not named in the FIR or chargesheet, or even those discharged earlier, can be summoned if trial evidence so warrants. The “evidence” under Section 319 is that which is adduced before the trial court, though investigation material can be used for corroboration. By applying these principles, the Supreme Court found a prima facie case made out. The inconsistencies in statements, the child witness’s residence with the appellant’s family, and the absence of names in the initial FIR were all deemed matters for trial, not for stifling the summoning process.
The Court allowed the appeal, directed the respondents to be summoned, and expedited the trial, concluding that the courts below had failed in their duty to prevent the alleged conspirators from evading trial. This ruling reinforces the judiciary’s role as a bulwark against incomplete justice, ensuring that all those who appear complicity from evidence face the full rigor of a trial.
