Religious Viewpoint of the Communist Party of China (2026)

Encyclopedia of Religion, Faith, and Beliefs

Religion in the People’s Republic of China: The Communist Party’s Official Viewpoint (2026)

Part I: Marxist Theory of Religion, Historical Origins, and the 1982 Religious Policy

Philosophical and historical foundations; Marxism, the historical nature of religion, and Document No. 19 (1982).

Part I

The religious viewpoint of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2026 continues to be fundamentally rooted in the ideological framework first articulated in the landmark Party document issued on 31 March 1982, titled “The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period.” Although numerous regulations, legal reforms, constitutional interpretations, and administrative measures have been introduced during the decades that followed, the conceptual foundation established by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China remains the intellectual core of contemporary Chinese religious policy. Rather than viewing religion exclusively through the language of theology or individual conscience, the Party interprets religion primarily as a historical, social, political, and civilizational phenomenon whose existence must be understood through the principles of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and subsequently Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. (Read More Encyclopedia of the Communist Party of China)

The publication of the 1982 Central Committee Document No. 19 represented one of the most significant ideological corrections undertaken after the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). During the decade following the death of Mao Zedong on 9 September 1976 in Beijing, and particularly after the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee held in December 1978, China’s leadership under Deng Xiaoping began reassessing numerous ideological campaigns that had produced social disruption. Religion became one of the important areas requiring reassessment because previous policies had alternated between cautious accommodation and radical suppression.

The Party’s interpretation begins from the proposition that religion is neither eternal nor supernatural, but rather a historically conditioned institution. Drawing directly from Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Vladimir Lenin, the Party defines religion as a product of specific stages in the evolution of human civilization. According to this interpretation, the earliest religious beliefs emerged during prehistoric societies because early human communities lacked sufficient scientific knowledge to explain natural forces such as thunder, floods, droughts, earthquakes, disease, and death. Primitive religious consciousness therefore arose from humanity’s encounter with uncertainty and the limitations of material production. (Read More Constitution of the Communist Party of China (2022)

The Party further argues that as societies evolved into slave societies, feudal kingdoms, and later capitalist economies, religion acquired additional political functions. It no longer merely explained nature but increasingly served as an institutional instrument through which ruling elites legitimized authority. In this interpretation, religious institutions often became intertwined with land ownership, political hierarchy, imperial administration, and systems of social control. Consequently, religion acquired both a psychological and institutional dimension, influencing education, morality, law, taxation, and political legitimacy.

Within the Marxist framework adopted by the CPC, the deepest roots of religion are identified not in divine revelation but in economic conditions, social inequality, and human alienation. Religion survives because people continue to experience insecurity, suffering, poverty, natural disasters, illness, and uncertainty. Thus, according to the Party, religious belief cannot simply be abolished by legal decree because its existence reflects underlying historical and material conditions rather than mere personal preference.

This conclusion became especially important after the failures experienced during the Cultural Revolution, when attempts were made throughout China to eliminate religious institutions through administrative coercion. Between 1966 and 1976, numerous Buddhist monasteries, Daoist temples, Catholic churches, Protestant churches, Islamic mosques, and Tibetan monasteries were closed, damaged, or converted into secular facilities. Religious scriptures were destroyed, clergy were publicly denounced, and organized worship largely disappeared from public life. (Read More Living World Religions)

The 1982 policy explicitly acknowledged that these approaches had violated both historical reality and Marxist theory. According to the document, religion possesses a long historical life cycle consisting of emergence, development, and eventual disappearance. However, that disappearance cannot be artificially accelerated through coercive state power. Instead, religion is expected to decline only after society reaches an advanced stage of socialist and eventually communist development characterized by material abundance, universal education, scientific knowledge, social equality, and cultural maturity.

This historical interpretation remains visible in China’s religious policy in 2026. The Party continues to reject the assumption that modernization automatically eliminates religion in the short term. Instead, it recognizes religion as a phenomenon capable of persisting throughout the entire socialist period. Consequently, religious policy has gradually shifted from campaigns aimed at eradication toward systems emphasizing management, guidance, regulation, and supervision.

The Party’s analysis also distinguishes carefully between religion and superstition. While officially recognized religions are treated as legitimate social institutions operating within constitutional and legal frameworks, practices categorized as superstition—including fortune telling, sorcery, spirit possession, fraudulent healing, and secret societies—are regarded as socially harmful activities subject to legal restriction. This distinction reflects the Party’s effort to maintain ideological consistency while permitting regulated religious practice.

An important historical component of the Party’s religious viewpoint concerns China’s own religious development. The Party recognizes Buddhism as having entered China during the Han Dynasty, approximately in the first century CE, gradually becoming integrated into Chinese civilization through centuries of translation, monastic development, and philosophical adaptation. Daoism, emerging during the Eastern Han period around the second century CE, is viewed as China’s indigenous organized religion, closely connected with traditional cosmology, philosophy, ritual, medicine, and local religious practice.

The Party similarly recognizes the arrival of Islam during the Tang Dynasty in the seventh century, largely through trade routes linking Chang’an, Guangzhou, and Central Asia, while Roman Catholicism and Protestant Christianity are understood primarily through their expansion following the Opium Wars (1839–1842) and subsequent unequal treaties imposed upon the Qing Empire. This historical narrative places particular emphasis upon the association of Christianity with nineteenth-century foreign imperialism, missionary expansion, and extraterritorial privileges.

According to the Party’s interpretation, China’s religious landscape before 1949 reflected broader political inequalities. Buddhist institutions, Daoist establishments, Islamic organizations, and Christian churches each existed within structures heavily influenced by feudal authority, warlord politics, colonial intervention, or foreign missionary organizations. Consequently, the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949 in Beijing is presented as marking not merely political revolution but also the beginning of a profound restructuring of religious institutions.

From the Party’s perspective, the transformation after 1949 fundamentally altered the nature of China’s religious question. Religion was no longer considered an instrument of exploitative ruling classes but became primarily an issue involving relations among the people themselves. This conceptual shift remains one of the defining principles of contemporary Chinese religious administration. Instead of interpreting all religious activity as inherently hostile, the Party differentiates between ordinary believers, patriotic religious organizations, and activities regarded as politically subversive.

By 2026, the CPC’s religious viewpoint combines several interconnected propositions: religion is historically conditioned rather than eternal; its persistence reflects continuing social realities rather than ideological failure; its eventual disappearance is expected through long-term socialist development rather than coercion; and state policy should distinguish carefully between lawful religious practice and activities considered politically destabilizing or socially harmful. These principles, first systematized in 1982, continue to shape China’s evolving relationship between state authority, Marxist ideology, and the country’s diverse religious communities.

Part II: Religious Freedom, State Administration, and the Evolution of CPC Religious Policy (1949–2026)

Historical evolution of policy from 1949 through the reform era, including religious freedom, patriotic religious organizations, and state administration.

Part II

The practical application of the Communist Party of China’s religious viewpoint developed through a long historical process that the Party itself divides into distinct political phases. Rather than presenting its religious policy as static, the 1982 Central Committee document interpreted the experience of the People’s Republic of China as a succession of successes, errors, corrections, and institutional reforms. By 2026, this historical narrative remains central to the Party’s official understanding of religion, emphasizing that the management of religious affairs must continuously adapt while remaining anchored in Marxist theory, Party leadership, and national sovereignty.

According to the Party’s historical interpretation, the period immediately following the founding of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949 marked the beginning of a comprehensive restructuring of China’s religious institutions. Unlike the revolutionary campaigns directed against landlords, bureaucratic capitalists, and counter-revolutionary organizations, the Party officially distinguished between religious belief itself and the political structures that had historically exercised authority through religion. The objective was not formally described as the destruction of religion but as the elimination of those political, economic, and foreign influences that the Party believed had subordinated religion to feudalism, colonialism, and imperialism.

One of the earliest priorities was the establishment of the principle of independence in Chinese religious affairs. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many Roman Catholic and Protestant institutions had maintained direct administrative, financial, educational, or missionary connections with organizations headquartered in Europe and North America. The Party interpreted these relationships not merely as ecclesiastical links but as extensions of foreign political influence established after the Treaty of Nanjing (1842) and the unequal treaty system that followed the Opium Wars. Consequently, after 1949, the Party promoted the doctrine that religious organizations operating within China should be administered independently of foreign control.

This policy found institutional expression through the creation of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, formally organized during the early 1950s. Its principles—self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation—were intended to create Protestant churches that would function entirely under Chinese administration without dependence upon foreign missionary societies. Similar policies were gradually extended to other religious communities through patriotic organizations designed to align religious administration with national sovereignty and socialist governance.

The Party also pursued extensive reforms concerning the economic foundations of religious institutions. Before 1949, many monasteries, temples, and religious establishments possessed substantial landed property, tenant systems, and other economic privileges accumulated over centuries. These holdings were fundamentally altered during the nationwide Land Reform Movement (1950–1953) and subsequent socialist transformation campaigns. Religious institutions lost most of their traditional economic base, becoming dependent instead upon voluntary donations, regulated religious activities, and approved administrative arrangements.

Within the Party’s historical narrative, these reforms represented the removal of feudal privileges rather than an attack upon religion itself. The distinction became important because the CPC consistently argued that religion should no longer function as an independent political or economic power capable of exercising authority parallel to the socialist state. Religious organizations would continue to exist, but only as social institutions operating under the constitutional framework of the People’s Republic.

The Party’s own assessment identifies the years between 1949 and approximately 1965 as a period during which its religious policy achieved “significant results,” despite acknowledging the presence of various leftist errors. According to the 1982 document, patriotic religious associations were established, foreign missionary control was dismantled, freedom of religious belief was constitutionally recognized, and many religious leaders accepted cooperation with the socialist government. Religious figures were encouraged to participate in patriotic activities, international exchanges, educational work, preservation of historical monuments, and national reconstruction.

However, the Party simultaneously recognizes that ideological radicalization gradually intensified during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Political campaigns increasingly emphasized revolutionary transformation in every sphere of social life, and religion came to be viewed by many local officials as an obstacle requiring immediate elimination. Although the Central Committee later argued that these tendencies represented deviations from official policy, their practical consequences became most visible during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, launched in May 1966.

The Cultural Revolution occupies a unique place within the Party’s understanding of religion because it is presented as the principal historical example of how coercive anti-religious policies produced outcomes contrary to Marxist theory itself. Throughout the decade from 1966 until 1976, virtually every officially recognized religion experienced severe institutional disruption. Thousands of temples, monasteries, churches, shrines, mosques, and religious schools throughout Beijing, Shanghai, Tibet, Xinjiang, Sichuan, Henan, Hebei, Guangdong, and other provinces were closed or repurposed.

Religious ceremonies largely disappeared from public life. Clergy frequently underwent political criticism sessions, many religious publications ceased circulation, seminaries were closed, and the public expression of religious belief became extremely limited. Ancient manuscripts, sculptures, paintings, ritual objects, genealogical records, and historical monuments suffered extensive destruction during campaigns directed against the “Four Olds“—old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits.

The 1982 Central Committee document attributes these developments primarily to the influence of the Lin Biao–Jiang Qing faction, describing their actions as distortions of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought rather than legitimate applications of Party policy. According to the official interpretation, violent suppression neither eliminated religion nor solved the religious question. Instead, it forced many religious activities underground, weakened trust between religious communities and government institutions, complicated ethnic relations, and unintentionally created opportunities for illegal organizations to operate outside official supervision.

The turning point came after the arrest of the Gang of Four in October 1976 and the gradual emergence of the Reform and Opening-up period under Deng Xiaoping. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, convened in Beijing between 18–22 December 1978, redirected national priorities toward economic modernization, institutional reconstruction, and legal normalization. Religious policy became part of this broader national reassessment.

The 1982 document therefore presented the restoration of religious policy as an essential component of rebuilding socialist legality. Places of worship that had been closed during previous campaigns gradually reopened. Religious associations resumed operation. Seminaries restarted educational programs. Clergy were permitted to resume religious duties following administrative approval. Historical religious monuments began receiving restoration funds, particularly those possessing cultural, architectural, archaeological, or tourist significance.

An equally important dimension of the Party’s policy involved defining freedom of religious belief. The Party interpreted this freedom not as an unlimited religious liberty independent of the socialist state but as a constitutional right exercised within the framework of national law. Every citizen, according to this interpretation, possesses the freedom to believe, not believe, change religious affiliation, or abandon religion altogether. The state therefore officially rejects both compulsory belief and compulsory atheism.

This principle contains an important ideological balance. While affirming that Communists are atheists who should actively promote scientific materialism, the Party simultaneously argues that persuasion rather than coercion must govern ideological questions. Religious belief is categorized as an issue of personal conviction that cannot be transformed through administrative force. Consequently, the Party maintains that campaigns seeking to eradicate religion by police action or political pressure ultimately contradict Marxist principles because they ignore the historical roots of religious consciousness.

Nevertheless, the Party carefully limits the scope of religious autonomy. Religion is recognized as a private matter concerning individual belief, but it is not regarded as independent from state regulation. Religious organizations are prohibited from exercising governmental authority, intervening in judicial administration, controlling public education, or restoring historical systems of political privilege. Religion must function within the constitutional order established by the socialist state rather than alongside or above it.

The Party also establishes age-related restrictions reflecting its educational priorities. The 1982 policy states that religion should not compel persons under eighteen years of age to become monks, nuns, clergy, or active members of religious institutions. Education remains the responsibility of the socialist state, and religious organizations are expected not to interfere with compulsory public education. This principle reflects the Party’s conviction that scientific education and socialist citizenship should form the primary basis of intellectual development before individuals make personal decisions concerning religious belief.

The management of religious professionals constitutes another major component of the Party’s religious policy. According to statistics cited in the 1982 document, China then possessed approximately 59,000 professional religious personnel, including about 27,000 Buddhist monks and nuns, more than 2,600 Daoist clergy, approximately 20,000 Muslim religious personnel, around 3,400 Catholic clergy, and nearly 5,900 Protestant ministers. Although these figures have changed considerably by 2026, the underlying policy remains similar: clergy are expected to perform religious functions while simultaneously demonstrating patriotism, constitutional loyalty, and support for national unity.

Rather than treating religious leaders exclusively as theological authorities, the Party views them as participants in broader social development. Clergy are encouraged to preserve historical monuments, protect cultural heritage, contribute to scholarship, engage in afforestation and environmental conservation, support charitable activities, promote patriotic education, and participate in international exchanges consistent with China’s diplomatic interests. Through these expectations, religious professionals become integrated into the broader objectives of socialist modernization rather than existing outside the political framework of the state.

The Party’s religious policy reflects a synthesis developed over nearly eight decades of political experience. It acknowledges religion as a continuing historical reality, rejects coercive eradication, protects regulated religious practice, insists upon Party leadership and constitutional supervision, and seeks to integrate religious communities into the larger project of national development, social stability, ethnic unity, and the long-term construction of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.

Part III: Religion, National Security, Ethnic Policy, Sinicization, and Contemporary Governance

The contemporary 2026 framework, covering Xi Jinping-era governance, Sinicization of religion, national security, ethnic relations, and the future direction of CPC religious policy.

Part III

By 2026, the Communist Party of China (CPC) presents its religious policy not merely as an administrative framework but as an integral component of state governance, national security, ethnic policy, social stability, and civilizational modernization. While the theoretical foundations continue to rest upon the 1982 Central Committee document, the Party increasingly interprets religion through the broader political concepts developed during the administrations of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and particularly Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party since 15 November 2012 and President of the People’s Republic of China since 14 March 2013. The religious question is therefore no longer understood solely as an ideological issue but also as one involving governance capacity, legal administration, cultural confidence, territorial integrity, and national rejuvenation.

A defining characteristic of the Party’s contemporary religious viewpoint is its insistence that religious freedom exists within the framework of socialist law rather than outside it. The Party repeatedly emphasizes that the Constitution guarantees freedom of religious belief, but simultaneously maintains that all religious activity must operate under the authority of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, national legislation, and administrative regulations governing religious affairs. This constitutional interpretation distinguishes sharply between protected religious belief and activities considered to threaten public order, national unity, ethnic harmony, or state sovereignty.

The Party therefore identifies religion as both a protected social phenomenon and a potential channel through which hostile political forces may seek influence. This dual understanding has become increasingly prominent since the beginning of the twenty-first century, particularly following concerns regarding international terrorism, religious extremism, foreign ideological influence, and cross-border political organizations. Consequently, the CPC consistently argues that religious affairs cannot be separated from questions of national security.

The principle of independence occupies a central position in this framework. Since the early 1950s, the Party has maintained that Chinese religious organizations must administer their own affairs independently of external ecclesiastical authority. By 2026, this principle extends beyond financial independence to include organizational governance, appointment of clergy, theological education, publication of religious literature, management of seminaries, charitable activity, and overseas exchanges. Religious communities are encouraged to maintain international contacts, academic cooperation, and cultural dialogue, but these relationships are expected to occur without permitting foreign institutions to direct religious affairs within China.

The Party’s concern regarding foreign influence reflects a historical interpretation extending back to the nineteenth century, when Roman Catholic and Protestant missionary organizations expanded rapidly after the First Opium War (1839–1842) and the Second Opium War (1856–1860). Within the official historical narrative, missionary expansion is frequently associated with unequal treaties, extraterritorial privileges, and the broader penetration of Western imperial powers into Qing China. As a result, contemporary policy portrays religious independence not simply as an administrative arrangement but as an expression of Chinese sovereignty and national dignity restored after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.

Another defining feature of the Party’s religious viewpoint concerns the relationship between religion and ethnicity. China officially recognizes 56 ethnic groups, many of which possess long-standing religious traditions. Among the Tibetans, Mongols, and several Himalayan communities, Tibetan Buddhism has historically shaped education, art, philosophy, architecture, and social organization. Among the Hui, Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Dongxiang, Salar, Tajiks, Bonan, Uzbeks, and Tatars, Islam has played an equally significant historical role. The Party therefore acknowledges that in several regions, religion cannot be understood separately from local history, cultural identity, and ethnic tradition.

At the same time, the Party consistently distinguishes between ethnic customs and religious doctrine. The 1982 document recognized that numerous marriage ceremonies, funeral rituals, seasonal festivals, dietary practices, and traditional observances had acquired religious symbolism while simultaneously becoming expressions of local cultural identity. Consequently, Party members working in minority regions are instructed to differentiate carefully between participation in customary social life and adherence to religious belief. This distinction seeks to preserve ethnic harmony while maintaining the Party’s commitment to Marxist atheism.

The position of Communist Party members remains one of the most distinctive aspects of the CPC’s religious doctrine. The Party continues to maintain that Party membership is incompatible with religious belief. Because the Communist Party defines itself as a Marxist political organization, its members are expected to uphold dialectical materialism, historical materialism, and scientific atheism. The policy therefore states that Party members should neither profess religious belief nor participate as religious adherents in organized worship. This requirement has remained substantially unchanged since the establishment of the People’s Republic and continues to distinguish Party membership from the constitutional rights enjoyed by ordinary citizens.

Nevertheless, the Party also recognizes the practical realities of governing a country with deep religious diversity. In areas where nearly the entire population historically belongs to one religious tradition, Party organizations are instructed to proceed cautiously and patiently rather than through mechanical enforcement. Ideological education, political participation, and gradual persuasion are emphasized over abrupt disciplinary measures, particularly where religious practice forms an integral part of community life.

The administration of religious institutions likewise reflects a combination of protection and regulation. Temples, monasteries, churches, mosques, shrines, and other recognized places of worship are expected to conduct normal religious activities under the supervision of legally registered religious organizations. Such activities include worship services, scripture study, prayer meetings, religious festivals, pilgrimages, funerals, marriages, charitable work, and other ceremonies traditionally associated with each faith. At the same time, the Party insists that religious venues should not become centers of political mobilization, unauthorized education, separatist activity, financial exploitation, or foreign organizational influence.

An important dimension of the Party’s policy concerns the preservation of religious cultural heritage. China possesses thousands of historically significant religious monuments, including the Shaolin Temple in Henan, the White Horse Temple at Luoyang, the Labrang Monastery in Gansu, the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa, the Temple of Heaven in Beijing, the Hanging Temple in Shanxi, numerous ancient mosques in Xi’an, Kashgar, and Guangzhou, and historic churches dating from the Ming and Qing Dynasties. The Party increasingly treats many of these sites as components of China’s national historical heritage, archaeological legacy, architectural achievement, and tourism economy, even while maintaining administrative oversight of their religious functions.

The education of religious professionals occupies another important place in the Party’s long-term strategy. Seminaries, Buddhist institutes, Daoist academies, Islamic schools, Catholic institutions, and Protestant theological colleges are expected not only to teach religious doctrine but also to cultivate patriotism, constitutional awareness, legal compliance, and support for socialist modernization. The objective is to produce clergy capable of leading religious communities while simultaneously supporting the broader political objectives of the state. This reflects the Party’s longstanding belief that religious leadership should contribute positively to social stability rather than exist in opposition to it.

The Party also places considerable emphasis upon combating activities conducted under the cover of religion. The 1982 document repeatedly distinguished normal religious practice from criminal activity, arguing that fraudulent organizations, secret societies, violent extremism, financial deception, sorcery, and other illegal enterprises should not receive protection merely because they employ religious language or symbolism. This distinction continues to inform Chinese policy in 2026, where counter-extremism measures are officially presented as law-enforcement actions directed against criminal conduct rather than against religion itself.

Internationally, the CPC maintains that China’s religions should participate in dialogue, academic exchange, cultural cooperation, and friendly international relations. Buddhist organizations maintain contacts throughout South Asia, Southeast Asia, Japan, and East Asia; Islamic organizations engage with countries across Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa; while Catholic and Protestant institutions participate in selected global exchanges. However, all such contacts are expected to conform to the principles of independence, mutual respect, and non-interference in internal affairs. Foreign organizations are not permitted to direct religious administration within China or establish structures operating outside Chinese law.

Ultimately, the Party’s religious viewpoint culminates in a distinctly Marxist philosophy of historical development. Religion is not regarded as humanity’s permanent condition but as one stage in the evolution of civilization. The Party argues that the gradual expansion of scientific knowledge, economic prosperity, technological innovation, social equality, public education, healthcare, material security, and cultural development will progressively reduce the objective conditions that historically gave rise to religious belief. In this interpretation, religion will not disappear because governments suppress it, but because future generations living in an advanced socialist and eventually communist society will no longer experience the social circumstances that originally sustained religious consciousness.

From the perspective of the Communist Party of China in 2026, religion occupies a paradoxical yet carefully defined position. It is recognized as a historically enduring social reality, constitutionally protected when practiced within the law, culturally significant as part of China’s civilizational heritage, politically subordinate to the socialist state, administratively subject to Party leadership, and philosophically regarded as a temporary phenomenon whose eventual decline is expected through the long historical development of Socialism, Communism, and the continuing modernization of Chinese society. This synthesis of Marxist theory, historical experience, constitutional governance, and national sovereignty remains the defining characteristic of the CPC’s official religious worldview in the first quarter of the twenty-first century.

Read More

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First Amendment – Religion (Volume 5): Encyclopedia of American Law
Glossary of Religious Terms
Philosophy and Religion of Rigveda
Constitution of China
Marxism and Religion
Document No. 19 (1982): The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question
Religious Policy of the People’s Republic of China (1949–2026)
Sinicization of Religion (宗教中国化)
United Front Work and Religious Affairs
National Religious Affairs Administration (NRRA)
State Administration for Religious Affairs (Historical Evolution)
Patriotic Religious Associations of China
Three-Self Patriotic Movement
Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association
United Front Work Department and Religion
Religion during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)
Constitutional Freedom of Religious Belief in China
Religion and Ethnic Minorities in China
Marxist Theory of Religion
Xi Jinping Thought on Religious Affairs
History of Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism in China
Religion and National Security in Contemporary China

Cross-Referenced Conceptual Network for Sarvarthapedia

Religious Viewpoint of the Communist Party of China (2026): Conceptual Knowledge Web

Core Civilizational Concept

Religious Viewpoint of the Communist Party of China

Central Theme

The Communist Party of China (CPC) interprets religion as a historical, social, political, and civilizational phenomenon, governed by the principles of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. Rather than treating religion as purely theological, it is understood as a historical institution arising from material conditions and managed through socialist governance.

See also

Marxist Theory of Religion
Historical Materialism
Dialectical Materialism
Communist Party of China
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
State and Religion
Scientific Atheism
Chinese Political Ideology

Historical Foundations Cluster

Document No. 19 (1982)

The 1982 Central Committee Document, The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period, serves as the intellectual foundation of modern Chinese religious policy.

Related Concepts

Religious Policy of China
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
Reform Era
Deng Xiaoping
Ideological Rectification
Party Theory
Constitutional Governance

Cross References

Document No. 19 → Freedom of Religious Belief

Document No. 19 → Cultural Revolution

Document No. 19 → Marxist Theory of Religion

Document No. 19 → Religious Administration

Reform and Opening-up

Beginning after the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee (December 1978), China reassessed previous ideological campaigns concerning religion.

Connected Topics