Anti Terrorism Act, 2009 Bangladesh

Anti Terrorism Act, 2009

Act No. 16 of 2009

[24 February, 2009 / 12 Falgun, 1415]

An Act to make provisions for the prevention of certain terrorist activities, effective punishment therof and the matters ancillary thereto.

Whereas it is expedient and necessary to make provisions for the prevention of certain terrorist activities, effective punishment thereof and the matters ancillary thereto;

Therefore, it is hereby enacted as follows: –

First Chapter
Preliminary

1. Short title, extent and commencement.– (1) This Act may be called the Anti Terrorism Act, 2009.

(2) It extends to the whole of Bangladesh, and it applies also to persons on ships and Aircraft registered in Bangladesh, where ever they may be.
(3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on 11 June, 2008.

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Anti Terrorism Rules, 2013 Bangladesh

Anti Terrorism Rules, 2013

Part-I

Preliminary

In exercise of the power conferred by section 43 of The Anti Terrorism Act, 2009

(Act No. XVI of 2009) the Government of Bangladesh hereby makes the following

Rules to fulfill the purposes of the Act.

1. Short title, extent and commencement.– (1) These rules may be called the Anti Terrorism Rules, 2013.

(2) It extends to the whole of Bangladesh, and it applies also to persons on ships and aircraft registered in Bangladesh, wherever they may be.

(3) It shall be deemed to have come into force from the date of issuance of the Statutory Regulatory Order (SRO).

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Manifesto of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland

Nothing is more inalienable for a nation, big or small, than her sovereignty. No moment, either, is more challenging for a people than the time when their free existence is challenged The Naga National Council has failed. The sovereign existence of Nagaland is more at peril than ever before. It is high time for the revolutionary patriots to declare their national principles, their views and their aims.

Nagaland and the Naga National Council

We live in a world of constant change. But the forces causing the change are not always the same. They develop and perish according to the different given conditions, stages and times.

To us, the forces that defend the righteous cause of sovereign national existence and further the just cause of the people along the inevitable course are alone patriots and revolutionaries. All forces standing in opposition to this are traitors and reactionaries, in that they try to pull the wheels of history back. All the reactionary traitors lean upon one another; all revolutionary patriots stand as one, supporting one another; there is no via media.

The Naga National Council was the only authentic political organisation of the people of Nagaland. It was this council that boldly took up the historic national trust, that is, the safeguarding of the right of the sovereign existence of Nagaland. With all its resoluteness, the Council faced ups and downs and it was never deterred by setbacks here and setbacks there. It has withstood the bitter period of the past three decades or so, turning neither to the right nor to the left––although there had been marked degeneration in its integrity and vigour. Our country could exist and we owe it to the National Council and to the thousands of patriots who have unsparingly laid down their lives and to the unprecedented endurance of the people, thanks to the leadership Naga National Council had given to the people in their past trials and tribulations till the time of its failure to condemn the treacherous Ministry and the Accord of treason of 1975.

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CHARGE SHEET OF MUMBAI TERROR ATTACK CASES 26TH NOVEMBER 2008

FINAL FORM / REPORT

(Under Section 173 Cr.P.C.)

IN THE COURT OFADDL. CH. M.M., 37TH COURT, ESPLANADE, MUMBAI

The Chief Investigating Officer of the sensational and diabolic attacks by the terrorists at different iconic locations in Mumbai on 26th November 2008, hereby submits a report under Section 173 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 as under.A heinous criminal conspiracy has beenplanned and hatched in Pakistan by the internationally banned Lashkar-e-Taiba to execute a series of attacks at prominent places in Mumbai, the financial capital of the country on 26thNovember 2008. This was with the express intention to destabilize India, wage war against this country, terrorize its citizens, create financial loss and issue a warning to other countries whose citizens were also targetted , humiliated and cold-bloodedly killed. This Fidayeen Mission was part of a larger criminal conspiracy planned in Pakistan for attacking the commercial capital of India with intent to wage war, to weaken India economically and to create terror and dread amongst the citizens of the Mumbai metropolis in particular and India in general and, thereby, through the said unlawful activities its perpetrators committed terrorist acts.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (Lashkar-e Tayyiba; literally means Army of the Good, translated as Army of the Righteous, or Army of the Pure) — also pronounced and spelt as Lashkar-i-Tayyaba, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-i-Taiba, or LeT — is one of the largest, most active and lethal militant organizations in South Asia.Lashkar-e-Taiba – “The Army of the Pure” is a militant offshoot of Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal- Irshad (MDI), an Islamic fundamentalist organization. Markaz-ud-Dawatul-wal- Irshad has since been renamed as Jamaat-ud-Dawa.It was founded by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Zafar Iqbal in the Kunar province of Afghanistan in 1989. It has its headquarter at Muridke near Lahore, Pakistan. It operates numerous training camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir as well as in other parts of Pakistan. Lashkar has forged cooperative and operational ties with religious militant groups throughout the Middle East, South East Asia and also in other parts of the world.The Militant group’s defining objective is to Islamicise South Asia with its main aim being freedom for Muslims in India-administered Kashmir.The Lashkar-e-Taiba is banned as a terrorist organization by India, Pakistan, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Russia, Australia besides a host of other countries. Hafiz Saeed has been listed as the leader of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. The United Nations Security Council has also listed Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Haji Mohammad Ashraf, and Mahmoud Mohammad Ahmed Bahaziq as senior members of the Lashkar-e-Taiba.Zaki-Ur-Rehman Lakhvi is listed as the terror group’s chief of Anti-India operations. Haji Mohammed Ashraf is the group’s chief of finance whereas Mahmoud Mohammed Bahaziq, a Saudi national who served as the leader of Lashkar-e-Taiba in Saudi Arabia, is a senior financier. Jamaat – Ud – Dawa has been recently declared as a terrorist front group by the United Nations (UN) as per its Resolution 1267. UN believes that this organization also supports Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

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Terrorist act

 A terrorist act includes:

(a) an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in one of the following treaties: (i) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970); (ii) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971); (iii) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973); (iv) International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979); (v) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980);

(vi) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1988); (vii) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005); (viii) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf (2005); (ix) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997); and (x) International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (1999).

(b) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act.


[Ref: FATF (2012-2019), International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, FATF, Paris, France]

Terrorist

The term terrorist refers to any natural person who: (i) commits, or attempts to
commit, terrorist acts by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and
wilfully;

(ii) participates as an accomplice in terrorist acts ;

(iii) organises or directs others to commit terrorist acts ; or

(iv) contributes to the commission of terrorist acts by a group of persons acting with a common purpose where the contribution is made intentionally and with the aim of furthering the terrorist act or with the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a terrorist act.


[Ref: FATF (2012-2019), International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, FATF, Paris, France]

CHANDRA PRAKASH Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN – 09/05/2014

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA JUDGMENTS

The basic ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are: (i) an agreement between two or more persons; (ii) the agreement must relate to doing or causing to be done either (a) an illegal act; or (b) an act which is not illegal in itself but is done by illegal means. It is, therefore, plain that meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing or causing to be done an illegal act or an act by illegal means is sine qua non of criminal conspiracy. Yet, as observed by this Court in Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra, a conspiracy is always hatched in secrecy and it is impossible to adduce direct evidence of the common intention of the conspirators. Therefore, the meeting of minds of the conspirators can be inferred from the circumstances proved by the prosecution, if such inference is possible.

(2014) AIR(SCW) 3055 :(2014) CriLJ 2884 : (2014) CriLR 559 : (2014) 3 Crimes 59 : (2014) SCALE 705 : (2014) 8 SCC 340 : (2014) 3 SCC(Cri) 457 : (2014) 5 SCJ 1 : (2014) 2 UC 1249

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

DIVISION BENCH

( Before : K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan, J; Dipak Misra, J )

CHANDRA PRAKASH — Appellant

Vs.

STATE OF RAJASTHAN — Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 1155 of 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) 4419 of 2009)

Decided on : 09-05-2014

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 162, Section 164, Section 215, Section 306, Section 313, Section 464
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 114, Section 133, Section 25, Section 26, Section 27, Section 8
Explosive Substances Act, 1908 – Section 2, Section 3, Section 4, Section 5, Section 6, Section 7
Explosives Act, 1884 – Section 4, Section 9B
Foreigners Act, 1946 – Section 14, Section 3(2)
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 114, Section 118, Section 120B, Section 149, Section 306, Section 307, Section 34, Section 427, Section 435, Section 456
Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 – Section 3, Section 4
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 – Section 18(2)

Cases Referred

  1. Renuka Bai @ Rinku @ Ratan and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2006 SC 3056 : (2006) 8 JT 282 : (2006) 8 SCALE 604 : (2006) 7 SCC 442 : (2006) 5 SCR 643 Supp : (2006) AIRSCW 4385 : (2006) 6 Supreme 679
  2. Bhagwan Dass Vs. State (NCT) of Delhi, AIR 2011 SC 1863 : (2011) CriLJ 2903 : (2011) 2 Crimes 266 : (2011) 6 JT 345 : (2011) 2 RCR(Criminal) 920 : (2011) 5 SCALE 498 : (2011) 6 SCC 396 : (2011) 2 UJ 1770 : (2011) AIRSCW 2867 : (2011) 3 Supreme 729
  3. Anna Reddy Sambasiva Reddy and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 2661 : (2009) CLT 969 : (2009) 5 JT 617 : (2009) 6 SCALE 223 : (2009) 12 SCC 546 : (2009) 6 SCR 755
  4. State of U.P. Vs. Deoman Upadhyaya, AIR 1960 SC 1125 : (1960) CriLJ 1504 : (1961) 1 SCR 14
  5. Ramanand Ramnath Vs. State of M.P., (1996) 3 AD 583 : (1996) 2 Crimes 57 : (1996) 6 JT 3 : (1996) 3 SCALE 429 : (1996) 8 SCC 514
  6. Santosh Kumari Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others, AIR 2011 SC 3402 : (2011) 10 JT 271 : (2011) 4 RCR(Criminal) 360 : (2011) 10 SCALE 379 : (2011) 6 UJ 3606 : (2011) AIRSCW 5313
  7. State of T.N. Vs. Sivarasan alias Raghu alias Sivarasa and Others, (1996) 8 AD 345 : (1997) 1 Crimes 170 : (1996) 10 JT 141 : (1996) 7 SCALE 920 : (1997) 1 SCC 682 : (1996) 8 SCR 243 Supp
  8. State of M.P. Vs. Bhupendra Singh, AIR 2000 SC 679 : (2000) CriLJ 805 : (2000) 1 CTC 554 : (2000) ECR 542 : (2001) 134 ELT 330 : (2000) 1 JT 82 : (2000) 1 SCALE 69 : (2000) 1 SCC 555 : (2000) 1 SCR 104
  9. Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq Vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2011) 3 Crimes 228 : (2011) 9 JT 563 : (2011) 8 SCALE 328 : (2011) 13 SCC 621 : (2011) 10 SCR 56
  10. State of Maharashtra Vs. Suresh, (1999) 9 JT 513 : (1999) 7 SCALE 386 : (2000) 1 SCC 471 : (1999) 5 SCR 215 Supp : (2000) 1 UJ 326
  11. Erram Santosh Reddy and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1672 : (1991) CriLJ 2189 : (1991) 2 Crimes 671 : (1991) 1 SCALE 846 : (1991) 3 SCC 206 : (1991) 2 UJ 522
  12. Yakub Abdul Razak Memon Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 JT 142 : (2013) 4 SCALE 565
  13. Balwant Kaur Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, AIR 1988 SC 139 : (1988) CriLJ 398 : (1987) 4 JT 239 : (1987) 2 SCALE 1019 : (1988) 1 SCC 1 : (1988) 1 SCR 745
  14. Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 1062 : (1981) CriLJ 588 : (1981) 1 SCALE 445 : (1981) 2 SCC 443 : (1981) SCC 17 Supp : (1981) SCC(Cri) 477 : (1981) 3 SCR 68
  15. Mohmed Inayatullah Vs. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1976 SC 483 : (1976) CriLJ 481 : (1976) 1 SCC 828 : (1976) SCC(Cri) 199 : (1976) 1 SCR 715
  16. Prakash Chand Vs. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1979 SC 400 : (1979) CriLJ 329 : (1979) 3 SCC 90 : (1979) SCC(Cri) 656 : (1979) 2 SCR 330 : (1979) 11 UJ 17
  17. Mohd. Husain Umar Kochra etc. Vs. K.S. Dalipsinghji and Another etc., AIR 1970 SC 45 : (1970) CriLJ 9 : (1969) 3 SCC 429 : (1970) 1 SCC(Cri) 99 : (1970) 1 SCR 130
  18. Major E.G. Barsay Vs. The State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 1762 : (1961) CriLJ 828 : (1962) 2 SCR 195
  19. Lennart Schussler and Another Vs. The Director of Enforcement and Another, AIR 1970 SC 549 : (1970) CriLJ 707 : (1970) 1 SCC 152 : (1970) 1 SCC(Cri) 73 : (1970) 2 SCR 760
  20. Anil Kumar Vs. State of U.P., AIR 2003 SC 1596 : (2003) CriLJ 1524 : (2003) 2 JT 175 : (2003) 2 SCALE 74 : (2003) 3 SCC 569 : (2003) 1 SCR 1067 : (2003) AIRSCW 977 : (2003) 2 Supreme 319
  21. Ram Narain Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1973 SC 1188 : (1973) CriLJ 914 : (1973) 3 SCC 805 : (1973) SCC(Cri) 545 : (1973) 3 SCR 463 : (1973) 5 UJ 598
  22. Tribhuvan Nath Vs. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 451 : AIR 1972 SC 2134 : (1972) CriLJ 1277 : (1972) 3 SCC 511 : (1972) SCC(Cri) 604 : (1972) 4 UJ 826
  23. Vikram Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 2010 SC 1007 : (2010) CLT 560 : (2010) 1 JT 568 : (2010) 1 SCALE 633 : (2010) 3 SCC 56 : (2010) 3 SCR 22 : (2010) AIRSCW 5853 : (2010) AIRSCW 5148
  24. Sarwan Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637 : (1957) CriLJ 1014 : (1957) 1 SCR 953
  25. Willie (William) Slaney Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116 : (1956) CriLJ 291 : (1955) 2 SCR 1140
  26. Aftab Ahmad Anasari Vs. State of Uttaranchal, AIR 2010 SC 773 : (2010) CLT 499 : (2010) 1 Crimes 97 : (2010) 1 JT 424 : (2010) 1 SCALE 408 : (2010) 2 SCC 583 : (2010) 1 SCR 1027
  27. Haroon Haji Abdulla Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 832 : (1968) 2 SCR 641
    Chandan and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1988 SC 599 : (1988) CriLJ 842 : (1990) 2 SCALE 733 : (1988) 1 SCC 696 : (1988) 2 SCR 599
  28. Anter Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2004) CriLJ 1380 : (2004) 1 CTC 612 : (2004) 2 JT 332 : (2004) 2 SCALE 271 : (2004) 10 SCC 657 : (2004) 2 SCR 123 : (2004) 2 UJ 769 : (2004) AIRSCW 743 : (2004) AIRSCW 3104 : (2004) 1 Supreme 1005 : (2004) 3 Supreme 131
  29. R.K. Dalmia Vs. Delhi Administration, AIR 1962 SC 1821 : (1962) 32 CompCas 699 : (1963) 1 SCR 253
  30. Himachal Pradesh Administration Vs. Om Prakash, AIR 1972 SC 975 : (1972) CriLJ 606 : (1972) 1 SCC 249 : (1972) SCC(Cri) 88 : (1972) 2 SCR 765
  31. Prabhu Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1113 : (1963) 65 PLR 339 : (1963) 2 SCR 881
    A.N. Venkatesh and Another Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2005 SC 3809 : (2005) 100 CLT 781 : (2005) CriLJ 3732 : (2005) 7 JT 246 : (2005) 7 SCC 714
  32. Bhiva Doulu Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 599 : (1963) 3 SCR 830
    Ravinder Singh Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1975 SC 856 : (1975) 3 SCC 742 : (1975) 3 SCR 453
  33. Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1980 SC 439 : (1980) CriLJ 388 : (1980) 2 SCC 465 : (1980) SCC(Cri) 493
  34. Ramanlal Mohanlal Pandya Vs. The State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 961
  35. Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2010 SC 2352 : (2010) 4 JT 107 : (2010) 4 SCALE 1 : (2010) 6 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCR 103 : (2010) 3 UJ 1650
  36. State of Maharashtra Vs. Damu Shinde and Others, AIR 2000 SC 1691 : (2000) CriLJ 2301 : (2000) 5 JT 575 : (2000) 4 SCALE 8 : (2000) 6 SCC 269 : (2000) AIRSCW 1617
  37. Dalbir Singh Vs. State of U.P., AIR 2004 SC 1990 : (2004) CriLJ 2025 : (2004) 1 DMC 680 : (2004) 4 JT 455 : (2004) 4 SCALE 238 : (2004) 5 SCC 334 : (2004) 3 SCR 941 : (2004) AIRSCW 5377 : (2004) AIRSCW 2119 : (2004) 3 Supreme 506 : (2004) 7 Supreme 200
  38. Ranjeet Singh and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1988 SC 672 : (1988) CriLJ 845 : (1988) 1 JT 473 : (1988) 1 SCALE 171 : (1988) 1 SCC 633
  39. Munna Kumar Upadhyaya @ Munna Upadhyaya Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh Through Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2012 SC 2470 : (2012) CriLJ 3068 : (2012) 2 RCR(Criminal) 962 : (2012) 5 SCALE 501 : (2012) 6 SCC 174 : (2012) AIRSCW 3060
  40. A. Deivendran Vs. State of T.N., AIR 1998 SC 2821 : (1998) CriLJ 814 : (1997) 8 JT 619 : (1997) 6 SCALE 516 : (1997) 11 SCC 720 : (1997) 4 SCR 591 Supp : (1998) AIRSCW 285 : (1997) 9 Supreme 237
  41. Mohd. Aslam Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 JT 104 : (2004) 2 SCALE 242 : (2001) 9 SCC 362
  42. Pratapbhai Hamirbhai Solanki Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, (2013) 3 AD 528 : (2012) 10 JT 286 : (2013) 1 RCR(Criminal) 592 : (2012) 10 SCALE 237 : (2013) 1 SCC 613 : (2012) AIRSCW 5567
  43. K. Prema S. Rao and Another Vs. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and Others, AIR 2003 SC 11 : (2003) CriLJ 69 : (2002) 2 DMC 776 : (2002) 8 JT 502 : (2003) 1 SCC 217 : (2002) 3 SCR 339 Supp : (2003) 1 UJ 101
  44. Mrinal Das and Others Vs. The State of Tripura, AIR 2011 SC 3753 : (2011) 4 JCC 2571 : (2012) 1 RCR(Criminal) 247 : (2011) 10 SCALE 55 : (2011) 5 UJ 3364 : (2011) AIRSCW 5566

JUDGMENT

Dipak Misra, J.—On 26th January, 1996, a day of celebration and conscientious remembrance of the “Red Letter Day” in the history of India because 26th January is the date in 1950, when our organic, inclusive, humane and compassionate Constitution came into existence being given by the people of this country to themselves and the nation has been obliged to jubilate remembering the said important day in our national history, for it chartered the path of many an emancipation and conferred on the people the highly cherished fundamental rights; about 8.30 a.m., there was a blast of explosive substances between Gate No. 12 and Gate No. 13, towards the southern and eastern side of Sawai Man Singh Stadium Jaipur, where the State level function on Republic Day was going to be celebrated. Soon after the blast, Prahlad Singh, the Station House Officer, Police Station lodged an FIR about 9.30 a.m. which was registered as FIR No. 39/1996. As per the FIR, when the blast took place, the people who had assembled were asked to leave the stadium so that there could be a check. During the check, it was found that due to the blast, a big size crater had come into existence at the scene of explosion. That apart, by the said explosion, the sand hopped upward and fell on the places meant for sitting in the stadium and also on the roof. The glasses of the windows of the pavilion near the explosion had broken into pieces. At the time when the explosion had occurred, only police personnel but no civilians were present in that part of the stadium. The public at large, which was present inside the Stadium, was informed to leave the Stadium so that the check and security could be carried out. Due to the sound caused by the explosion, one Ramgopal Choudhary, an employee of the Public Works Department, who was passing nearby, had met with an injury on his ear for which he was immediately sent to the hospital. On the basis of the FIR, offences u/s 120-B read with Sections 307 and 427 Indian Penal Code, u/s 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 and u/s 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (for short “the 1908 Act”) and also u/s 9B of the Explosive Act, 1884 (for brevity “the 1884 Act”) were registered and the investigation commenced. Later on, the investigation of the case was transferred to C.I.D. (C.B.).

2. During the investigation, an anonymous letter in Urdu language dated 1st June, 1997 was sent to the Superintendent of Police, wherein some information was given which was alleged to have been gathered by the senders who described themselves as well wishers while they were in custody in the Central Jail, Jaipur, in respect of the bomb-blast that took place on 26th January, 1996 at the SMS Stadium, Jaipur. In that letter, the names of some persons, i.e., Raies Beg of Agra, Dr. Abdul Hamid of Firozabad and Pappu Puncturewala were mentioned. It was also mentioned that the ISI of Pakistan was behind the bomb-blast. On the basis of the said information, the investigating officer arrested five persons, namely, Abdul Hamid, Raies Beg, Abdul Mateen, Pappu @ Saleem and Chandra Prakash on various dates.

3. During the investigation, the investigating agency recovered a live time bomb from SMS Stadium and explosive items were recovered from Roopwas, District Bharatpur. In the course of the investigation, accused Pappu @ Saleem filed an application u/s 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for brevity “the Code”) before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 14.8.1997 who, by order dated 30.8.1997, authorized the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 6 to record the statement of the said accused u/s 164 of the Code and thereafter, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, by a reasoned order dated 20.9.1997, allowed the application. After carrying out the detailed investigation, the police laid the charge-sheet against the arrested accused persons, namely, Chandra Prakash, Abdul Mateen, Raies Beg and Abdul Hamid.

4. All the accused persons abjured guilt, pleaded false implication and, accordingly, faced trial.

5. The learned trial Judge framed different charges against the four accused persons and we think that it would be apt to refer to the charges framed against each of them. As far as Chandra Prakash is concerned, the charges that were framed against him were u/s 9B of the 1884 Act and Under Sections 3, 4, 5 read with Section 6 of the 1908 Act. As far as Abdul Mateen is concerned, he was charged with the offences u/s 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, Under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the 1908 Act, u/s 9B of the 1884 Act, u/s 3 of the Prevention of Damages to Public Properties Act and Under Sections 307, 118, 435 and 456 Indian Penal Code. As far as Raies Beg and Abdul Hamid are concerned, they were faced with similar charges, namely, u/s 9B of the 1884 Act, Under Sections 3, 4 and 5 read with Section 6 of the 1908 Act and Under Sections 307/120B, 118/120B and 435/120B Indian Penal Code.

6. To bring home the charges against the accused persons, the prosecution examined as many as 78 witnesses and brought on record exhibits P-1 to P-296. In defence, no witness was examined on behalf of any of the accused persons. However, documentary evidence was produced by them, i.e., exhibits D-1 to D-5. We shall refer to the relevant parts of the testimonies of the vital witnesses and advert to the documents which have been stressed and emphasized upon by the prosecution at a later stage.

7. The accused persons in their statements u/s 313 of the Code took separate plea and hence, it is obligatory on our part to record their pleas individually. Abdul Mateen admitted that he is a Pakistani and he had remained as a Pakistani always; that he had never come to India before his arrest; that he did not know any person in India; that he never visited the places, namely, Jaipur, Farah, Roopwas, Agra Firozabad or any other city; and that he had never given any information to the police and no recovery was made by the police at his instance and he had never identified any place. The plea of Abdul Hamid was that he never gave any information to the police during the investigation of the case and he did not furnish any information about the shop of Mohit Jain, PW-30, situated at Delhi and he had been falsely implicated. Raies Beg took the plea that due to communal riots he had been falsely booked in the crime. Accused Chandra Prakash, apart from false implication, denied any relationship with Pappu @ Saleem, PW-1, and further stated that no key was recovered from him and he did not open any godown and room with his keys. He also took the stand that he had not taken any room on rent in Krishi Upaz Mandi or any shop near the power house on rent and disputed the recovery from any shop. The trial court, appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, by its judgment and order dated 22.04.2000 in Sessions Case No. 8/98, convicted all the accused and sentenced all of them individually in respect of all the specific charges framed against them. The offence for which each of them had faced trial has been already mentioned hereinabove. All the accused had been sentenced separately by the learned trial Judge.

8. Accused Abdul Mateen was sentenced to undergo five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo one year’s simple imprisonment u/s 14 of the Foreigners Act; ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 20,000, in default to further undergo two years’ simple imprisonment u/s 4 of the Prevention of Damages to Public Property Act; three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 3,000/-, in default to further undergo six months’ simple imprisonment u/s 456 Indian Penal Code; to undergo ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default to further undergo two years’ simple imprisonment u/s 307 read with Section 120B Indian Penal Code; seven years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 7,000/-, in default to further undergo one and half years’ simple imprisonment u/s 435 read with Section 120B Indian Penal Code; five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default to further undergo one year’s simple imprisonment u/s 118 read with Section 120B Indian Penal Code; two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default to further undergo three months’ simple imprisonment u/s 9B of the 1884 Act; imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 20,000/- in default to further undergo three years’ simple imprisonment u/s 3 of the 1908 Act; seven years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 7,000/-, in default to further undergo one and half years’ simple imprisonment u/s 4 of the 1908 Act; and five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default to further undergo one year’s simple imprisonment u/s 5 of the 1908 Act.

9. Accused Chandra Prakash was sentenced to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default to further undergo three months’ simple imprisonment u/s 9B of the 1884 Act; ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default to further undergo two years’ simple imprisonment u/s 3 read with Section 6 of the 1908 Act; seven years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 7,000/-, in default to further undergo one and half years’ simple imprisonment u/s 4 read with Section 6 of the 1908 Act; and five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default to further undergo one year’s simple imprisonment u/s 5 read with Section 6 of the 1908 Act.

10. Accused Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg were sentenced to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default to further undergo three months’ simple imprisonment; ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default to further undergo two years simple imprisonment u/s 307 read with Section 120B Indian Penal Code; seven years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 7,000/-, in default to further undergo one and half years’ simple imprisonment u/s 435 read with Section 120B Indian Penal Code; five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default to further undergo one year’s simple imprisonment u/s 118 read with Section 120B Indian Penal Code; ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default to further undergo two years’ simple imprisonment u/s 3 read with Section 6 of the 1908 Act; seven years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 7,000/-, in default to further undergo one and half years’ simple imprisonment u/s 4 read with Section 6 of the 1908 Act; and five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default to further undergo one year’s simple imprisonment u/s 5 read with Section 6 of the 1908 Act.

11. At this juncture, we think it appropriate to state the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge against each of the accused. As far as Abdul Mateen is concerned, the trial court held that it was clear from the evidence of GPS Wirk, PW-69, Assistant Commander, BSF, that Mhd. Ashlam Baba was the financial head of a terrorist organization by the name of “Harkat-ul-Ansar”, and during the course of investigation, the accused Abdul Mateen was arrested from Srinagar and no passport or visa was found in his possession. The offence punishable u/s 14 of the Foreigners Act which had been levelled against him was established beyond reasonable doubt. The live time bomb was duly recovered and accused Abdul Mateen had exclusive knowledge and it was he who planted the time bomb at that place and it was proven from the testimonies of the witnesses. From the evidence of the approver, Pappu, and the information u/s 27 of the Evidence Act, it could be concluded that prior to 26.1.1996, two time bombs were implanted by accused Abdul Mateen. It was clear from the testimonies of Jai Narayan, PW-6, and Gopal Saini, PW-7, that Abdul Mateen had led to the recovery of the bomb and the charge of crime punishable u/s 9B of the Explosive Act levelled against the accused Abdul Mateen has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

12. In respect of Raies Beg and Abdul Hamid, the trial court held that Abdul Hamid had been visiting accused Chandra Prakash at Roopwas quite frequently and both the accused persons had helped accused Abdul Mateen in the commission of the offence. They used to meet at the Madarsa of village Farah and the conspiracy was hatched. The learned trial Judge came to hold that the involvement of the said accused persons in the commission of the crime was reflectible from the evidence of number of witnesses and the prosecution had established their role beyond any shadow of doubt.

13. Pertaining to Chandra Prakash, the Court held that explosive substances including gelatin and dynamite in huge quantity were recovered from his possession on 1.8.1997. Scanning the evidence, it recorded that the dynamite was used in both the bombs. He further opined that Pappu @ Saleem, PW-1, was an associate and colleague of accused Abdul Mateen and prior to the incident, the explosive substance was brought from Chandra Prakash in village Farah, where Pappu @ Saleem used to live with him. That apart, Chandra Prakash was identified by Pappu and the key of the godown was with the accused and he opened the lock of the said godown from which 28 kattas of ammonium nitrate were recovered. It was also clear from the evidence of Chetan Das Rawatani, PW-34, that the goods which were recovered from the accused were utilized for the preparation of the explosive substance.

14. On the basis of the aforesaid findings and conclusions, the learned trial Judge convicted the accused persons and sentenced them as has been stated hereinbefore.

15. Being grieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence, the accused persons preferred separate appeals before the High Court being D.B. Criminal (Jail) Appeal No. 318 of 2000, D.B. Criminal Appeal Nos. 189 of 2000, 258 of 2000 and 369 of 2000. The State filed application for grant of leave (D.B. Criminal Leave to Appeal No. 26 of 2008) with an application for condonation of delay of seven years and nine months which was taken up along with the appeals preferred by the accused persons and the said appeal was dismissed on the ground of delay. However, it may be stated here that the High Court also addressed to the merits of the case of the State which pertained to enhancement of sentence and did not find any substance in the same. As regards the appeals preferred by the accused persons, the appellate court did not perceive any merit and, resultantly, dismissed the same by way of judgment and order dated 3.2.2009. Hence, the assail is to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence by the applications of special leave petitions.

16. Leave granted in all the special leave petitions.

17. As all the appeals relate to defensibility of common judgment passed by the High Court in respect of all the accused-Appellants, they are disposed of by a singular judgment.

18. Mr. Sushil K. Jain, learned senior Counsel for the Appellants, criticizing the judgment of the trial court and that of the High Court, has raised the following contentions:

(a) The learned trial Judge as well as the High Court committed grave error by coming to hold that sanction given u/s 7 of the 1908 Act cannot be found fault with, though the District Magistrate, Jaipur was not examined as a witness to prove the order of sanction.

(b) The recovery made from the Appellant, Chandra Prakash, at the instance of information given by Pappu would not be admissible in evidence because at the time of giving information, Pappu was an accused and had not been treated as an approver which was done later on by virtue of the order of the Court. The testimony of the approver is not creditworthy since he has deposed that he was not aware about the contents of the box that he was asked to carry by the other accused persons.

(c) The alleged recovery of ammonium nitrate from the custody of accused, Chandra Prakash, either at the instance of Pappu @ Saleem, PW-1, or by the accused-Appellant cannot be accepted because Pappu @ Saleem, PW-1 is an accomplice and in absence of any corroboration, his evidence has to be thrown overboard and further the case of prosecution that at the instance of the accused articles were discovered is to be rejected inasmuch as Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 could not have been made applicable to the facts of the present case, for Chandra Prakash had not been arrested by the time the alleged discovery took place.

(d) Assuming the ammonium nitrate was recovered from the custody of Chandra Prakash, the same would not make out any offence punishable under any of the provisions of the 1908 Act or the 1884 Act, for the simple reason that it does not come under the statutory definition. Even if the language of Sections 2 and 3 of the 1908 Act as well as Section 9B of the 1884 Act are stretched, it would not bring in its sweep the simple act of sale by Chandra Prakash without any intention or knowledge about its use.

(e) No independent charges were framed against the accused-Appellant Under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the 1908 Act but along with Section 6 of the 1908 Act and, therefore, conviction under the said provision is absolutely fallacious.

19. Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants, Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg, submitted as under:

(A) The prosecution has failed to prove the nexus of the accused-Appellants with the co-accused Abdul Mateen in the crime and nothing has been brought on record to establish the allegations. The only evidence that has been recorded is that Abdul Hamid used to meet Abdul Mateen frequently at village Farah.

(B) There is no recovery of explosive substance or any incriminating materials from the Appellant’s house and in the absence of any recovery, the Appellant cannot be roped in the crime.

(C) The allegation of the prosecution with regard to the relation of the Appellant with Abdul Mateen does not have any substance and, in any case, there is no proof to establish the same.

(D) The bomb blast at SMS Stadium, Jaipur took place on 26.01.1996 and the accused was arrested on 8.06.1997 and identification parade was conducted on 25.06.1997 about one and half years after the incident. This aspect vitiates the identification parade and creates a dent in the case of the prosecution for which the Appellants should be given the benefit of doubt.

20. Mr. Atul Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant Abdul Mateen, in addition to the contentions raised by Mr. Jain and Mr. Balaji, has contended that no consent has been taken u/s 7 of the 1908 Act from the Central Government and hence, the entire trial is vitiated.

21. Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State of Rajasthan, supporting the judgment of the High Court, has submitted as follows:

(i) The sanction given by the District Magistrate, on a perusal, would show application of mind and, by no stretch of imagination, it can be regarded as invalid in law.

(ii) The recovery at the instance of an accused u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is admissible in evidence and the information given by Pappu, PW-1, which led to the recovery of huge quantity of explosives would per se be admissible in evidence and this evidence is not to be treated as inadmissible merely because the accused at the relevant point of time had subsequently become the approver.

(iii) The recovery of explosives by the accused, Chandra Prakash, by opening the keys of the godown would be a relevant fact and admissible u/s 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of the fact that the conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

(iv) The recovery of the explosive substance has been made by the police vide memo Ex. P-42 during the search and seizure operations. Chetan Das Rawatani, PW-34, Explosive Expert, has stated that the articles recovered in Ex. P-42 were explosive articles and the same has also been proved by the FSL Report, Ex. P-234.

(v) The evidence of the approver Pappu, PW-1, is admissible as substantive evidence u/s 133 of the Evidence Act. In the evidence of the approver, it has been mentioned that the accused, Chandra Prakash, was engaged in the supply of materials for solicitation of money for the commission of offence under the 1908 Act. Possession of huge quantity of ammonium nitrate without any plausible explanation by the accused, Chandra Prakash, corroborates the evidence of the approver.

22. First, we shall deal with the issue of sanction. Section 7 of the 1908 Act reads as follows:

7. Restriction on trial of offences.-No Court shall proceed to the trial of any person for an offence against this Act except with the consent of the District Magistrate.

23. The learned Counsel for Abdul Mateen has submitted that no consent has been granted by the Central Government. In this context, we may refer to the decision in State of M.P. Vs. Bhupendra Singh, . In the said case, the consent for the prosecution was granted by the Additional District Magistrate by notification dated 24.4.1995 issued by the State Government. The High Court has quashed the proceeding as there was no sanction. This Court concurred with the said view on the ground that it was within the domain of the Central Government to delegate the authority and, in fact, the Central Government vide notification dated 2.12.1978 has entrusted to the District Magistrates in the State of Madhya Pradesh its consent u/s 7 of the 1908 Act. Thus, there could be delegation by the Central Government to the District Magistrates.

24. It is relevant to note here that the consent was given by the concerned District Magistrate as Ext. P-277/278. His authority was not questioned. What was urged before the Court was that there had been no application of mind inasmuch as the relevant materials were not placed before him while according sanction. When such a point was not raised, the consequences have to be different. In this regard, reference to a two-Judge Bench decision in Erram Santosh Reddy and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, would be appropriate. In the said case, the Court has observed as follows:

7. The last submission is that no sanction was obtained from the Central Government as laid down u/s 7 of the Explosive Substances Act for prosecuting the Appellants for the offences under the Explosive Substances Act. From the judgment we do not find that any such objection was taken. In any event from the record we find that the Collector granted permission and this must be pursuant to the delegation of powers as contemplated u/s 18(2) of the ‘TADA’.

25. From the aforesaid, we come to the conclusion that the District Magistrate had the authority to give consent for the prosecution.

26. The next facet of the challenge pertaining to sanction is that the sanctioning authority had not perused the relevant materials. The learned trial Judge, upon scrutiny of Ext. P-277/278, has expressed the opinion that the approval had been granted after perusal of the materials on record. The High Court has observed that the consent/sanction order is a self-speaking and detailed one. It has also been held that all the facts have been taken into consideration by the District Magistrate and the entire police diary was made available to him at the time of grant of sanction/approval. With regard to the authority of consent as postulated in the 1908 Act, reference to certain authorities would be fruitful. In State of T.N. Vs. Sivarasan alias Raghu alias Sivarasa and Others, , the Court, while dealing with the effect of Section 7 of the 1908 Act, has observed as follows:

Section 7 does not require a sanction but only consent for prosecuting a person for an offence under the Explosive Substances Act. The object of using the word “consent” instead of “sanction” in Section 7 is to have a purely subjective appreciation of the matter before giving the necessary consent.

27. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state as follows:

We do not think that for obtaining consent of the Collector for prosecuting the accused for the offence punishable under the Explosive Substances Act it was necessary for the investigating officer to submit the statements of witnesses also, who had deposed about the movements of the accused and their activity of manufacturing bombs and grenades. We, therefore, hold that the consent given by the Collector was quite legal and valid.

28. In view of the aforesaid, the approval/consent granted by the District Magistrate in the obtaining factual matrix cannot be treated as vitiated.

29. The third aspect of challenge to the sanction is that the District Magistrate has not been examined as a witness to prove the order of sanction. On a perusal of the document, we find that the same has been proven by the competent person and the document has been marked as Ext. P-277/278. We are of the considered opinion that the examination of the District Magistrate to prove his consent is really not necessary.

30. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the submission relating to the invalidity of the consent, as stipulated in Section 7 of the 1908 Act, does not commend us and, accordingly, the same stands rejected.

31. The next issue, to which we should advert to, pertains to the delay in holding the test identification parade. The submission of Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, learned Counsel appearing for accused Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg, is that there has been enormous delay in conducting the test identification parade in respect of accused Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg. There is no dispute that both of them were arrested on 8.6.1997 and the test identification parade was held on 25.6.1997. Thus, it is evident that they were arrested long after the occurrence but the test identification parade was held within a period of three weeks from the date of arrest. As the analysis of the trial court shows, they could not have been arrested as the materials could not be collected against them and things got changed at a later stage. In this regard, we may refer with profit to the decision in Ramanand Ramnath Vs. State of M.P., , wherein identification parade was held within a period of one month from the date of arrest. This Court observed that there was no unusual delay in holding the test identification parade.

32. That apart, the witnesses, namely Prem Prakash Gupta, PW-78, and Mohit Jain, PW-30, have identified them in the Court. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Suresh, , it has been held as follows:

We remind ourselves that identification parades are not primarily meant for the court. They are meant for investigation purposes. The object of conducting a test identification parade is twofold. First is to enable the witnesses to satisfy themselves that the prisoner whom they suspect is really the one who was seen by them in connection with the commission of the crime. Second is to satisfy the investigating authorities that the suspect is the real person whom the witnesses had seen in connection with the said occurrence.

33. The said legal position has been reiterated in Anil Kumar Vs. State of U.P., Recently, in Munna Kumar Upadhyaya @ Munna Upadhyaya Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh Through Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, , a two-Judge Bench has observed thus:

66. There was some delay in holding the identification parade. But the delay per se cannot be fatal to the validity of holding an identification parade, in all cases, without exception. The purpose of the identification parade is to provide corroborative evidence and is more confirmatory in its nature. No other infirmity has been pointed out by the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant, in the holding of the identification parade. The identification parade was held in accordance with law and the witnesses had identified the accused from amongst a number of persons who had joined the identification parade.

34. In view of the aforesaid, the submission that there has been delay in holding the test identification parade does not really affect the case of the prosecution. It is also noteworthy that the witnesses had identified the accused persons in court and nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination even to create a doubt. Thus, we repel the submission advanced by the learned Counsel for accused Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg.

35. The next facet to be addressed is whether the evidentiary value of the testimony of approver Pappu, PW-1, is required to be considered. Learned Counsel for the State has drawn our attention to Section 133 and illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. They read as under:

133. Accomplice.-An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

Illustration (b) to Section 114

(b) The Court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars.

36. The aforesaid two provisions came to be considered in Bhiva Doulu Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra, wherein the Court held as follows:

The combined effect of Sections 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114, may be stated as follows:

According to the former, which is a Rule of law, an accomplice is competent to give evidence and according to the latter, which is a Rule of practice it is almost always unsafe to convict upon his testimony alone. Therefore, though the conviction of an accused on the testimony of an accomplice cannot be said to be illegal yet the courts will, as a matter of practice, not accept the evidence of such a witness without corroboration in material particulars.

37. In Mohd. Husain Umar Kochra etc. Vs. K.S. Dalipsinghji and Another etc., , the Court observed thus:

…The combined effect of Sections 133 and 114, Illustration (b) is that though a conviction based upon accomplice evidence is legal, the Court will not accept such evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars. The corroboration must connect the accused with the crime. It may be direct or circumstantial. It is not necessary that the corroboration should confirm all the circumstances of the crime. It is sufficient if the corroboration is in material particulars. The corroboration must be from an independent source. One accomplice cannot corroborate another.

38. Having stated the legal position with regard to the statutory provisions, presently we shall proceed to consider the requisite tests to be applied to accept the credibility of the testimony of the approver. At this juncture, we may sit in a time machine and quote a passage from Sarwan Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, wherein it has been held as follows:

…An accomplice is undoubtedly a competent witness under the Indian Evidence Act. There can be, however, no doubt that the very fact that he has participated in the commission of the offence introduces a serious stain in his evidence and Courts are naturally reluctant to act on such tainted evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. It would not be right to expect that such independent corroboration should cover the whole of the prosecution story or even all the material particulars. If such a view is adopted it would render the evidence of the accomplice wholly superfluous. On the other hand, it would not be safe to act upon such evidence merely because it is corroborated in minor particulars or incidental details because, in such a case, corroboration does not afford the necessary assurance that the main story disclosed by the approver can be reasonably and safely accepted as true. But it must never be forgotten that before the court reaches the stage of considering the question of corroboration and its adequacy or otherwise, the first initial and essential question to consider is whether even as an accomplice the approver is a reliable witness. If the answer to this question is against the approver then there is an end of the matter, and no question as to whether his evidence is corroborated or not falls to be considered. In other words, the appreciation of an approver’s evidence has to satisfy a double test. His evidence must show that he is a reliable witness and that is a test which is common to all witnesses. If this test is satisfied the second test which still remains to be applied is that the approver’s evidence must receive sufficient corroboration. This test is special to the cases of weak or tainted evidence like that of the approver.

8….Every person who is a competent witness is not a reliable witness and the test of reliability has to be satisfied by an approver all the more before the question of corroboration of his evidence is considered by criminal courts.

39. In Ravinder Singh Vs. State of Haryana, , this Court has observed that:

An approver is a most unworthy friend, if at all, and he, having bargained for his immunity, must prove his worthiness for credibility in court. This test is fulfilled, firstly, if the story he relates involves him in the crime and appears intrinsically to be a natural and probable catalogue of events that had taken place. … Secondly, once that hurdle is crossed, the story given by an approver so far as the accused on trial is concerned, must implicate him in such a manner as to give rise to a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

40. Similar principles have been reiterated in Mrinal Das and Others Vs. The State of Tripura, .

41. In A. Deivendran Vs. State of T.N., , the Court has registered the view that there cannot be any dispute with regard to the proposition that ordinarily an approver’s statement has to be corroborated in material particulars. Certain clinching features of involvement disclosed directly to an accused by an approver must be tested qua each accused from independent credible evidence and on being satisfied, the evidence of an approver can be accepted. The Court further observed that the extent of corroboration that is required before the acceptance of the evidence of the approver would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case, however, the corroboration required must be in material particulars connecting each of the accused with the offence, or in other words, the evidence of the approver implicating several accused persons in the commission of the offence must not only be corroborated generally but also qua each accused but that does not mean that there should be independent corroboration of every particular circumstance from an independent source. The court proceeded to state that all that is required is that there must be some additional evidence rendering it probable that the story of the accomplice is true and the corroboration could be both by direct or circumstantial evidence. Be it noted, the said principle was stated on the basis of pronouncements in Ramanlal Mohanlal Pandya Vs. The State of Bombay, , Tribhuvan Nath Vs. The State of Maharashtra, , Ram Narain Vs. State of Rajasthan, and Balwant Kaur Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, .

42. In Chandan and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan, , the Court held that so far as the question about the conviction based on the testimony of the accomplice is concerned, the law is settled and it is established as a rule of prudence that the conviction could only be based on the testimony of the accomplice if it is thought reliable as a whole and if it is corroborated by independent evidence either direct or circumstantial, connecting the accused with the crime.

43. In Haroon Haji Abdulla Vs. State of Maharashtra, , the view in this regard was expressed in the following terms:

An accomplice is a competent witness and his evidence could be accepted and a conviction based on it if there is nothing significant to reject it as false. But the rule of prudence, ingrained in the consideration of accomplice evidence, requires independent corroborative evidence first of the offence and next connecting the accused, against whom the accomplice evidence is used, with the crime.

44. In Major E.G. Barsay Vs. The State of Bombay, , it has been observed that this Court had never intended to lay down that the evidence of an approver and the corroborating pieces of evidence should be treated in two different compartments, that is to say, the court shall first have to consider the evidence of the approver dehors the corroborated pieces of evidence and reject it if it comes to the conclusion that his evidence is unreliable; but if it comes to the conclusion that it is reliable, then it will have to consider whether that evidence is corroborated by any other evidence.

45. In Renuka Bai @ Rinku @ Ratan and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra, , the Court held that the evidence of the approver is always to be viewed with suspicion especially when it is seriously suspected that he is suppressing some material facts.

46. In Ranjeet Singh and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan, , the Court observed that while looking for corroboration, one must first look at the broad spectrum of the approver’s version and then find out whether there is other evidence to lend assurance to that version. The nature and extent of the corroboration may depend upon the facts of each case and the corroboration need not be of any direct evidence that the accused committed the crime. The corroboration even by circumstantial evidence may be sufficient.

47. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles which relate to the acceptance of the evidence of an approver, we have bestowed our anxious consideration and carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and that of the High Court. Learned Counsel for the parties have taken us through the evidence of Pappu @ Saleem, PW-1. He has clearly deposed that Abdul Mateen who is also known as Iqbal, used to visit the Madarsa at village Farah. Abdul Hameed and Abdul Mateen were seen at village Farah many times without any reason before the incident. As far as Abdul Hameed and Raies Beg are concerned, he has deposed that both the accused used to go to the house of Chandra Prakash in Roopwas to collect the “masala” in a cover box. Both of them used to meet Abdul Mateen in the Madarsa at village Farah on a number of occasions. He used to contact Abdul Mateen from Firozabad many times and the watches fixed with bombs as timers were given at Farah by Abdul Hameed to make the bomb. It has also come out in his evidence that Pappu along with Accused Raies Beg @ Raies Ahmad and other accused persons used to visit the Madarsa at village Farah. His evidence also shows that Raies Beg and Pappu used to bring explosive from Roopwas to village Farah and he has mentioned that Raies Beg had brought five boxes of “masala” for Rs. 10,000/- from the house of Chandra Prakash and those boxes were unloaded at the Madarsa in Farah. Pappu was asked to carry the boxes along with Raies Beg and Abdul Hameed. He has clearly deposed about the conspiracy that was told to him by accused Abdul Mateen. As far as Chandra Prakash is concerned, it had come in the evidence that though Pappu used to visit his house at Roopwas along with other accused persons, yet he used to stay outside the house of Chandra Prakash and the others used to go to bring “masala” from the house of Chandra Prakash. The alleged “masala” used to be brought in boxes from time to time to the associates of Raies Beg and Abdul Hameed who used to come to Madarsa at Farah.

48. From the analysis of the aforesaid evidence, it is clear that Pappu as approver has implicated himself in the crime. He has not made any effort to give any statement which is exculpatory. He has spoken quite graphically about the involvement of all the accused persons. Mr. Jain, learned senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant, would contend that he has used the word “masala” but not ammonium nitrate, but Pappu has clarified that though he was not aware what was contained in the boxes, yet he was told by the other accused persons later on that it contained certain explosive substances. The said aspect has been corroborated from other ocular evidence as well as the seizure.

49. Presently, we shall advert to the various facets of corroboration in evidence against the accused persons. As far as Chandra Prakash is concerned, on the basis of the approver Chandra Prakash was arrested on 1.8.1997 vide Ext. P-37. On the basis of the information of the accused, Chandra Prakash, the Investigating Officer searched his house and godown and recovered 28 boxes of ammonium nitrate. It has come out in the evidence that Chandra Prakash opened the lock of the godown the key of which was in his possession. Bhup Singh, PW-32, eye witness to the seizure of articles from the godown of Chandra Prakash, has categorically stated that the accused Chandra Prakash led to the recovery of red and blue coloured bundles from the godown of the building. The office of PW-32 was also in the said building. From the godown, fuse wires and five kilograms of grey coloured material was also recovered. The Investigating Officer, M.M. Atray, PW-71, has also proven the factum of recovery. Shivnath Kuriya, PW-22, who had accompanied the investigating team, has deposed that the explosive which was used in the live bomb had ammonium nitrate/gelatin. Chetan Das Rawatani, PW-34, who is an expert witness in respect of explosives, approved his report Ext. P-49 and has deposed that the ammonium nitrate that was seized from the godown of Chandra Prakash was in such a condition that it could be used to prepare a bomb.

50. Mr. Jain, as has been stated earlier, has seriously criticized about the recovery from Chandra Prakash on the ground that when he led to the discovery of the articles seized, he was not arrested. In this context, we refer with profit to the decision in Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq Vs. State of NCT of Delhi, wherein the Court opined thus:

The essence of the proof of a discovery u/s 27 of the Evidence Act is only that it should be credibly proved that the discovery made was a relevant and material discovery which proceeded in pursuance of the information supplied by the accused in the custody. How the prosecution proved it, is to be judged by the court but if the court finds the fact of such information having been given by the accused in custody is credible and acceptable even in the absence of the recorded statement and in pursuance of that information some material discovery has been effected then the aspect of discovery will not suffer from any vice and can be acted upon.

51. In this context, we may refer to the authority in Vikram Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab, , wherein while interpreting Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the Court opined that a bare reading of the provision would reveal that a “person must be accused of any offence” and that he must be “in the custody of a police officer” and it is not essential that such an accused must be under formal arrest.

52. In this regard, a passage from the Constitution Bench decision in State of U.P. Vs. Deoman Upadhyaya, is reproduced below:

The expression, “accused of any offence” in Section 27, as in Section 25, is also descriptive of the person concerned, i.e., against a person who is accused of an offence, Section 27 renders provable certain statements made by him while he was in the custody of a police officer. Section 27 is founded on the principle that even though the evidence relating to confessional or other statements made by a person, whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, is tainted and therefore inadmissible, if the truth of the information given by him is assured by the discovery of a fact, it may be presumed to be untainted and is therefore declared provable in so far as it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered. Even though Section 27 is in the form of a proviso to Section 26, the two sections do not necessarily deal with the evidence of the same character. The ban imposed by Section 26 is against the proof of confessional statements. Section 27 is concerned with the proof of information whether it amounts to a confession or not, which leads to discovery of facts. By Section 27, even if a fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received, only that much of the information is admissible as distinctly relates to the fact discovered.

53. In Anter Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, , after referring to the decisions in AIR 1978 1511 (SC) , Mohd. Aslam Vs. State of Maharashtra, , AIR 1947 67 (Privy Council) , Prabhu Vs. State of U.P., and Mohmed Inayatullah Vs. The State of Maharashtra, , this Court summed up the following principles:

16. The various requirements of the section can be summed up as follows:

(1) The fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue. It must be borne in mind that the provision has nothing to do with the question of relevancy. The relevancy of the fact discovered must be established according to the prescriptions relating to relevancy of other evidence connecting it with the crime in order to make the fact discovered admissible.

(2) The fact must have been discovered.

(3) The discovery must have been in consequence of some information received from the accused and not by the accused’s own act.

(4) The person giving the information must be accused of any offence.

(5) He must be in the custody of a police officer.

(6) The discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused in custody must be deposed to.

(7) Thereupon only that portion of the information which relates distinctly or strictly to the fact discovered can be proved. The rest is inadmissible.

54. In this context, it would be fruitful to refer to the ruling in State of Maharashtra Vs. Damu Shinde and Others, wherein it has been observed that:

35. The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered in a search made on the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature, but if it results in discovery of a fact it becomes a reliable information. Hence the legislature permitted such information to be used as evidence by restricting the admissible portion to the minimum.

55. In Aftab Ahmad Anasari Vs. State of Uttaranchal, , after referring to earlier decisions, a two-Judge Bench, appreciating the material brought on record, came to hold that when the accused was ready to show the place where he had concealed the clothes of the deceased, the same was clearly admissible u/s 27 of the Evidence Act because the same related distinctly to the discovery of the clothes of the deceased from that very place.

56. In Bhagwan Dass Vs. State (NCT) of Delhi, , relying on the decisions in A Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), , the Court opined that when the accused had given a statement that related to the discovery of an electric wire by which the crime was committed, the said disclosure statement was admissible as evidence.

57. As the material brought on record would show, the accused was in the custody of the investigating agency and the fact whether he was formally arrested or not will not vitiate the factum of leading to discovery. However, it may be stated that the accused was also arrested on that day. We have dealt with the issue that formal arrest is not necessary as Mr. Jain has seriously contended that the arrest was done after the recovery. As we have clarified the position in law, the same would not make any difference.

58. As regards recovery from accused Abdul Mateen is concerned, it is borne out from the record that after his arrest on 28.6.1997, he gave information at 6.00 a.m. as contained in Ext. P-255, about another bomb and on the basis of the said information the Investigating Officer, PW-71, visited the spot along with the accused and at his instance a live bomb was recovered which was underneath the earth. In the said information the accused had stated that the two bombs were inside the SMS Stadium and he could verify the places by going inside the stadium. In the evidence of Jai Narain, PW-6, Gopal Singh, PW-7 and Shivnath, PW-22, it has come on record that the bombs were recovered at the instance of accused Abdul Mateen on 28.6.1998. This fact has been corroborated by Vinod Sharma, PW-16 and Gordhan, PW-10 who also accompanied the investigating team. Shivnath, PW-22, had clearly stated that the bomb recovered was high explosive time bomb and the battery was inside the timer and the same was switched on and he further confirmed that electric detonator was used in the bomb. Vinod Kumar, PW-16, also stated that the electric detonator was found in the bomb and the same was neutralized. Suresh Kumar Saini, PW-67, in his deposition, gave description of loss caused due to the explosion of the time bomb. He had further deposed that lid of stainless steel of casio watch had been recovered from the scene of crime.

59. On appreciating the aforesaid material, it is clear as crystal that the said accused has stated about the fact of planting of bomb at a particular site in the stadium and led to the said place from which the bomb was recovered. The submission of Mr. Jain is that such material cannot be put against the accused being inadmissible in evidence. In this context, we may refer to a two-Judge Bench decision in Prakash Chand Vs. State (Delhi Administration), wherein the Court, after referring to the decision in Himachal Pradesh Administration Vs. Om Prakash, , opined thus:

There is a clear distinction between the conduct of a person against whom an offence is alleged, which is admissible u/s 8 of the Evidence Act, if such conduct is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact and the statement made to a Police Officer in the course of an investigation which is hit by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. What is excluded by Section 162, Code of Criminal Procedure is the statement made to a Police Officer in the course of investigation and not the evidence, relating to the conduct of an accused person (not amounting to a statement) when confronted or questioned by a Police Officer during the course of an investigation. For example, the evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that an accused person led a Police Officer and pointed out the place where stolen articles or weapons which might have been used in the commission of the offence were found hidden, would be admissible as conduct, u/s 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any statement by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

60. The said principle has been reiterated in A.N. Venkatesh and Another Vs. State of Karnataka, .

61. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid enunciation of law, the submission of Mr. Jain leaves us unimpressed and we are inclined to hold that the said fact is a relevant fact which is admissible in evidence.

62. The next aspect that is to be adverted to is that ammonium nitrate not being an explosive substance, mere possession cannot bring the accused Chandra Prakash within the ambit of any offence. In this regard, we may refer to Section 4(d) of the 1884 Act. It reads as follows:

(d) “explosive” means gunpowder, nitroglycerine, nitroglycol, guncotton, di-nitro-toluene, tri-nitro-toluene, picric acid, di-nitro-phenol, tri-nitro-resorcinol (styphnic acid), cyclo-trimethylene-tri-nitramine, penta-erythritol-tetranitrate, tetryl, nitro-guanidine, lead azide, lead styphynate, fulminate of mercury or any other metal, diazo-di-nitro-phenol, coloured fires or any other substance whether a single chemical compound or a mixture of substances, whether solid or liquid or gaseous used or manufactured with a view to produce a practical effect by explosion or pyrotechnic effect; and includes fog-signals, fireworks, fuses, rockets, percussion-caps, detonators, cartridges, ammunition of all descriptions and every adaptation or preparation of an explosive as defined in this clause;

63. Section 2 of the 1908 Act, which deals with definitions, reads as follows:

2. Definitions.- In this Act-

(a) the expression “explosive substance” shall be deemed to include any materials for making any explosive substance; also any apparatus, machine, implement or material used, or intended to be used, or adapted for causing, or aiding in causing, any explosion in or with any explosive substance; also any part of any such apparatus, machine or implement;

(b) the expression “special category explosive substance” shall be deemed to include research development explosive (RDX), penta erythritol tetra nitrate (PETN), high melting explosive (HMX), tri nitro toluene (TNT), low temperature plastic explosive (LTPE), composition exploding (CE) (2, 4, 6 phenyl methyl nitramine or tetryl), OCTOL (mixture of high melting explosive and tri nitro toluene), plastic explosive kirkee-1 (PEK-1) and RDX/TNT compounds and other similar type of explosives and a combination thereof and remote control devices causing explosion and any other substance and a combination thereof which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for the purposes of this Act.

64. Keeping in view the broad definitions of both the Acts, we are required to see what has been seized from the accused Chandra Prakash. What is evincible from the seizure report, Ext. P-42, apart from ammonium nitrate, fuse wire and empty boxes were also seized. That apart, 17 packs containing blue coloured fuse wire kept in plastic (polythene) bags and four boxes containing blue coloured fuse wire, “Sun brand safety fuse” numbered as 40208, 40158, 39937, 40203 respectively, one carton of explosives detonating fuse measuring 1500 meters in length and 38 kg in weight, containing four wooden logs of red colour, 375 meter wire in each Gattha and black coloured cap fitted on the tip of the wire, three cartons of explosive Belgelative 90 (Gulla Dynamite) net weight of each being 25 Kg. with “Division I Class II safety distance category ZZ Bharat Explosive Ltd. 9 KM Lalitpur (U.P.) Date of manufacturing 4.6.97 batch No. 2” written on each box, four packets of O.D. Detonator containing 1600 detonators, a substance of light yellow colour kept inside a carton of paper in a plastic bag weighing nearly 5 kg and 16 empty cartons, one of gulla and 15 of fuse wire, were seized.

65. Section 2 of the 1908 Act has a deeming provision which states that explosive substance would include any materials for making any explosive substance. Similarly, Section 4(d) of the 1884 Act has a broader spectrum which includes coloured fires or any other substances, whether single chemical compound or a mixture of substances. That apart, as we find, apart from ammonium nitrate other articles had been seized. The combination of the same, as per the evidence of the expert witness, was sufficient to prepare a bomb for the purpose of explosion. In addition to the same, huge quantity of ammonium nitrate was seized and it was seized along with other items. The cumulative effect is that the possession of these articles in such a large quantity by the accused gives credence to the prosecution version that the possession was conscious and it was intended to be used for the purpose of the blast.

66. The next aspect which needs to be adverted to is non-framing of specific charge. On a perusal of the record, we find that the learned trial Judge has framed the charges specifically by putting the charges to the accused. The purpose of framing of charges is that the accused should be informed with certainty and accuracy of the charge brought against him. There should not be vagueness. The accused must know the scope and particulars in detail. In this context, we may refer to decision in Santosh Kumari Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others, , wherein it has been held as follows:

17. Like all procedural laws, the Code of Criminal Procedure is devised to subserve the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by mere technicalities. It regards some of its provisions as vital but others not, and a breach of the latter is a curable irregularity unless the accused is prejudiced thereby. It places errors in the charge, or even a total absence of a charge in the curable class. That is why we have provisions like Sections 215 and 464 in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

18. The object of the charge is to give the accused notice of the matter he is charged with and does not touch jurisdiction. If, therefore, the necessary information is conveyed to him in other ways and there is no prejudice, the framing of the charge is not invalidated. The essential part of this part of law is not any technical formula of words but the reality, whether the matter was explained to the accused and whether he understood what he was being tried for. Sections 34, 114 and 149 Indian Penal Code provide for criminal liability viewed from different angles as regards actual participants, accessories and men actuated by a common object or a common intention; and as explained by a five-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in Willie (William) Slaney Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, , the charge is a rolled-up one involving the direct liability and the constructive liability without specifying who are directly liable and who are sought to be made constructively liable.

67. In K. Prema S. Rao and Another Vs. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and Others, , the Court opined that though the charge specifically u/s 306 Indian Penal Code was not framed, yet all the ingredients constituting the offence were mentioned in the statement of charges. In that context, a three-Judge Bench of this Court ruled that mere omission or defect in framing of charge does not disable the criminal court from convicting the accused for the offence which is found to have been proved on the evidence on record. The said principle has been reiterated in Dalbir Singh Vs. State of U.P., , State of U.P. Vs. Paras Nath Singh, and Anna Reddy Sambasiva Reddy and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, .

68. In the case at hand, as has been stated earlier, the charges have been framed and we do not find any vagueness. That apart, neither any prejudice has been caused nor has there been any failure of justice. Thus, the submission of Mr. Jain in this regard leaves us unimpressed.

69. The next facet which deserves to be addressed pertains to the criminal conspiracy. The submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellants is that the learned trial Judge has inappositely drawn certain inferences to show that there was a criminal conspiracy and the High Court has, without delving deep into the matter, concurred with the same. As per the evidence brought on record, it is clear as crystal that accused Abdul Mateen, Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg used to meet quite frequently at the Madarsa at village Farah. It is also evident from the deposition of Kanchan Singh, PW-11, Shri Chand, PW-12, Murari Lal Sharma, PW-13, and Ashok Kumar, PW-17, that the accused Abdul Mateen, Raies Beg and Abdul Hamid used to meet at the Madarsa at village Farah. That apart, Pappu had also deposed implicating himself that when there used to be discussion at Madarsa in the village Farah about the suitable place for planting the bomb, the timer of the bomb was supplied by Dr. Abdul Hamid. The chain of events and the participation of the accused persons which had the genesis in the discussion and the meetings, the purchase of ammonium nitrate and other items, carrying of the boxes to the Madarsa and all other factors cumulatively show that there was conspiracy.

70. While dealing with the facet of criminal conspiracy, it has to be kept in mind that in case of a conspiracy, there cannot be any direct evidence. Express agreement between the parties cannot be proved. Circumstances proved before, during and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. Such a conspiracy is never hatched in open and, therefore, evaluation of proved circumstances play a vital role in establishing the criminal conspiracy. In this context, we may refer with profit to a passage from Yogesh @ Sachin Jagdish Joshi Vs. State of Maharashtra, :

20. The basic ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are: (i) an agreement between two or more persons; (ii) the agreement must relate to doing or causing to be done either (a) an illegal act; or (b) an act which is not illegal in itself but is done by illegal means. It is, therefore, plain that meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing or causing to be done an illegal act or an act by illegal means is sine qua non of criminal conspiracy. Yet, as observed by this Court in Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra, a conspiracy is always hatched in secrecy and it is impossible to adduce direct evidence of the common intention of the conspirators. Therefore, the meeting of minds of the conspirators can be inferred from the circumstances proved by the prosecution, if such inference is possible.

71. The same principles have been stated in Pratapbhai Hamirbhai Solanki Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, .

72. In Yakub Abdul Razak Memon Vs. State of Maharashtra, , analyzing various pronouncements, this Court opined thus:

68. For an offence u/s 120B Indian Penal Code, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the conspirators expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act, the agreement may be proved by necessary implication. It is not necessary that each member of the conspiracy must know all the details of the conspiracy. The offence can be proved largely from the inferences drawn from the acts or illegal omission committed by the conspirators in pursuance of a common design. Being a continuing offence, if any acts or omissions which constitute an offence are done in India or outside its territory, the conspirators continuing to be the parties to the conspiracy and since part of the acts were done in India, they would obviate the need to obtain the sanction of the Central Government. All of them need not be present in India nor continue to remain in India. The entire agreement must be viewed as a whole and it has to be ascertained as to what in fact the conspirators intended to do or the object they wanted to achieve. (Vide: R.K. Dalmia Vs. Delhi Administration, , Lennart Schussler and Another Vs. The Director of Enforcement and Another, , Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra, ).

73. Testing the present factual matrix on the anvil of the aforesaid enunciation of law, we are of the considered view that the opinion expressed by the learned trial Judge as well as by the High Court that there has been conspiracy between the parties to commit the blast on a particular day cannot be found fault with.

74. Presently, we shall engage ourselves to deal with the conviction of accused Abdul Mateen for the offence u/s 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. The said provision reads as under:

14. Penalty for contravention of provisions of the Act, etc.-whoever-

(a) Remains in any area in India for a period exceeding the period for which the visa was issued to him;

(b) does any act in violation of the conditions of the valid visa issued to him from his entry and stay in India or any part thereunder;

(c) contravenes the provisions of this Act or of any order made thereunder or any direction given in pursuance of this Act or such order for which no specific punishment is provided under this Act, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine; and if he has entered into a bond in pursuance of Clause (f) of Sub-section (2) of Section 3, his bond shall be forfeited, and any person bound thereby shall pay the penalty thereof or show cause to the satisfaction of the convicting court why such penalty should not be paid by him.

Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, the expression “visa” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it under the Passport (Entry into India) Rules, 1950 made under the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 (34 of 1920).

75. The learned trial Judge, analyzing the material on record, has come to hold that the said Abdul Mateen is a resident of Pakistan and he had no valid document to be in India. In his statement u/s 313 of the Code, he had not disputed that he was not having passport or visa and he is of Pakistan nationality. Thus, the offence under the said Act has been held to be proved. The High Court has concurred with the said view. In our considered opinion, the offence under the said Act has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

76. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we conclude and hold that the grounds assailing the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence have no legal substantiality and, accordingly, they are rejected.

77. The factual scenario of the instant case compels us to state that these kinds of activities by anyone breeds lawlessness, fear and affects the fundamental unity of our great country. A nation with a desire to prosper is required to maintain high degree of law and order situation apart from respecting “imperatives of internationalism”. Certain individuals harbouring unacceptable notions and inexcusable philosophy and, on certain occasions, because of enormous avarice, try to jeopardize the cohesive and collegial fabric of the State. This leads to national decay and gives rise to incomprehensible anarchy. It reflects non-reverence for humanity. Be it categorically stated, every citizen of this country is required to remember that national patriotism is founded on the philosophy of public good. Love for one’s country and humanity at large are eternally cherished values. The infamous acts of the Appellants are really condemnable not only because of the dent they intended to create in the social peace and sovereignty of the nation, but also from the humane point of view as they are founded on greed, envy, baseless anger, pride, prejudice and perverse feelings towards mankind.

78. We have, in agony and anguish, have expressed thus because when a devastating activity like the present one occurs on the Republic Day of our country Bharat, it injures the nationality, disturbs the equilibrium of each individual citizen, creates a concavity in the equanimity of the peace of the State, generates a stir in the sanctity and divinity of law and order situation which is paramount in any civilized State, attempts to endanger the economic growth of a country and, in the ultimate eventuate, destroys the conceptual normalcy of any habitat. Law cannot remain silent to this because it is the duty of law to resist such attacks on peace. It is manifest that the accused-Appellants had conspired to send a savage stir among the citizenry of this country on the Republic Day. The great country like ours cannot succumb to this kind of terrorist activity as it is nationally as well as internationally obnoxious. Such tolerance would tantamount to acceptance of defeat. The iron hands of law has to fall and in the obtaining facts and circumstances, as the charges have been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the law has rightly visited the Appellants and, accordingly, we concur with the same.

79. Consequently, all the appeals, being bereft of merit, stand dismissed.

Boko Haram Salafist jihadist group

Also known as

Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (People of the Tradition of the Prophet for Preaching and Striving / Group Committed to Propagating the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad)

Boko Haram (BH) is a Salafist jihadist group operating in northern Nigeria whose ultimate objective is to overthrow the Nigerian government and implement Sharia Law. The group desires a political system in Nigeria modeled after how the Taliban ruled in Afghanistan. Its tactics include small arms attacks, the use of improvised explosive devices, suicide bombings, and kidnappings. BH conducted a suicide bomb attack against the United Nations compound in Abuja, Nigeria in August 2011, killing 23 people. In April 2014, BH kidnapped a Canadian nun and two Italian priests in Cameroon. A few days later, in Nigeria, the group kidnapped 276 schoolgirls. In 2015, BH leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and BH renamed itself the “Islamic States in West Africa Province” (ISWAP). However, the Islamic State appointed Abu Musab al-Barnawi as leader of ISWAP, resulting in the formation of two rival factions; one loyal to Shekau operating under the BH banner, and the other (ISWAP) led by Barnawi. During the first nine months of 2016, BH was responsible for nearly 400 deaths in Nigeria, and approximately 850 deaths in 2017. In many of its attacks BH used children, particularly young girls, as suicide bombers.

Listed Terrorist Entities by Canada under The Anti-Terrorism Act

The Anti-Terrorism Act provides measures for the Government of Canada to create a list of entities.

Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Al-Murabitoun
Al-Muwaqi’un Bil Dima
Al Qaida
Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Al Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Al Shabaab
Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade (AAMB)
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (AGAI)
Ansar al-Islam (AI)
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Asbat Al-Ansar (AAA) (The League of Partisans)
Aum Shinrikyo
Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)
Boko Haram
Caucasus Emirate
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Faction of the Hezb-e Islami, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)
Hamas (Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya) (Islamic Resistance Movement)
Haqqani Network
Harakat ul-Mudjahidin (HuM)
HASAM (Harakat Sawa’d Misr)
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
Hizballah
Indian Mujahideen (IM)
International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy – Canada (IRFAN – CANADA)
International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Qods Force
Islamic State
Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP)
Islamic State – Sinai Province (ISSP)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)
Jaysh Al-Muhajirin Wal-Ansar (JMA)
Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI)
Kahane Chai (Kach)
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ)
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA)
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Sendero Luminoso (SL)
Taliban
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
World Tamil Movement (WTM)

2018 Public Report on the Terrorism Threat to Canada

Table of contents

Ministerial Foreword

Executive Summary

Part 1: The Current Terrorist Threat Environment

The Current Terrorist Threat to Canada
Sunni Islamist Extremism
Right-Wing Extremism
Extremists who Support Violent Means to Establish an Independent State Within India
Shia Extremism
Canadian Extremist Travellers
The International Threat Environment
Europe
The Middle East and South/South-East Asia
Africa

Part 2: Threat Methods and Capabilities Observed Globally in 2018

Low-Sophistication Tactics, High Impacts
Threats to Transportation Infrastructure
Chemical and Biological Weapons
Terrorist Financing
Terrorist Use of the Internet and Cyber Capabilities

Part 3: Canada’s Approach to Countering Terrorism

Managing Canadian Extremist Travellers
Arrests and Prosecutions in Canada for Committing Terrorism Offences
Bill C-59 – An Act Respecting National Security matters & Bill C-21 – An Act to Amend the Customs Act
Enhanced Passenger Protection Program
Immigration Security Screening
The Listing of Terrorist Entities
Countering Radicalization to Violence
Addressing Online Threats
Canada’s International Partnerships and Cooperation

Conclusion


Ministerial Foreword

I am pleased to provide the annual update on the threat to Canada from terrorism and violent extremism – part of our commitment to being open and transparent through a balanced and frank assessment of the current threat environment.

In many ways, this year’s threat update is similar to those of the recent past. The threat posed by those espousing violent interpretations of religious, ideological or political views persists, but has remained stable. The National Terrorism Threat Level – a broad indicator of the terrorist threat to Canada – remains at Medium, unchanged since 2014.

Canada is known internationally as a welcoming and peaceful nation. But we are also resolute in our determination to reject and combat violent extremism in all forms. Put simply, violence and threat of violence have no place in Canadian society. Stopping and eradicating this is a top priority of the Government.

Conflicts and the evolving global security environment continue to shape the nature of the terrorist threat to Canada. Those in Canada who are inspired by conflicts abroad may seek to carry out an attack here. Despite the ongoing erosion of Daesh, we have not seen an increase in the number of Canadian Extremist Travellers (CETs) attempting to return. Our top priority in managing CETs also remains the same – to bring them to justice using all resources at our disposal.

Canadians expect their Government to keep them safe and to keep pace with evolving threats, tactics and global trends. Our security, intelligence, law enforcement, border and armed forces – to name a few – work around the clock in this regard. They consistently monitor all threats and review their approaches for how best to deal with them. This includes working closely with our friends and allies.

The global nature of terrorist and extremist threats necessitates close cooperation with international partners. Our partnerships are stronger than ever, including with NATO, the Five Eyes community, G7, the European Union, INTERPOL and others. We remain committed to being a collaborative force of good in the world and recognize that this can only be achieved by working together and leveraging our strengths.

Domestically, we also continue to build on our multi-layered approach to security. Bill C-59 (An Act Respecting National Security Matters) shaped by public views and concerns on how we as a country approach national security issues, is now closer to final Parliamentary approval and implementation. It brings with it an unprecedented era of transparency and openness and a clear signal of the importance that our departments and agencies have the most up to date mandates, tools and resources at their disposal.

Despite everyone’s best efforts, there will be times when our collective security is challenged. There will be competing public views on what we as a nation should do. We will continue to take a measured but firm approach – a collaborative approach that unites our strengths – both as a government and as a nation.

Executive Summary

Canada’s terrorist threat environment remains stable. The principal terrorist threat to Canada continues to stem from individuals or groups who are inspired by violent Sunni Islamist ideology and terrorist groups, such as Daesh or al-Qaida (AQ). Canada also remains concerned about threats posed by those who harbour right-wing extremist views. The April 2018 van attack in Toronto is a reminder that violent acts driven by extremists’ views are not exclusively-linked to any particular religious, political or cultural ideology. Furthermore, Shia extremism and extremists who support violent means to establish an independent state within India also remain of concern because while their attacks in Canada have been extremely limited, some Canadians continue to support these extremist groups, including through financing. At the time of publication, Canada’s National Terrorism Threat Level remains at medium, as set in early October 2014 – meaning a violent act of terrorism could occur.

Though Daesh territorial holdings in the Syria-Iraq conflict zone continue to decline, Canada has not seen a related influx in the number of Canadian Extremist Travellers (CETs) who have returned to Canada, nor does it expect to. Owing to several factors (such as a lack of valid travel documents, denying boarding to aircraft destined for Canada, potential fear of arrest upon return, their continued commitment to Daesh or other groups, having been captured while in Syria and Iraq, or because they have died), CET numbers abroad remain stable at approximately 190 individuals with a nexus to Canada, and close to 60 who have returned.

In an effort to project strength and influence to counter its decreasing support and size, Daesh is resorting more frequently to false claims of responsibility for acts of violence, including in Canada. In June 2018, after Faisal Hussain fired on the busy Toronto neighbourhood of Danforth, Daesh quickly claimed responsibility, despite the total absence of any link between the attack and that group or any other terrorist group.

While globally, terrorist attacks have seen a decline, particularly in the West, ungoverned and permissive environments continue to allow terrorist groups to regroup or develop capabilities. Al-Qaida, Daesh and their affiliates continue to conduct attacks in the Middle East, South-East Asia, South Asia (Afghanistan) and North and West Africa. The Taliban continues to challenge the authority of the Afghanistan government through terrorist acts, while other groups, such as Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM), Ansurul Islam, and al-Shabaab remain active in Africa.

In Canada, and more generally, in the West individuals who claim allegiance or who are inspired by terrorist groups use low-sophistication, low-resource tactics (such as vehicle ramming) to commit violent acts which achieve mass casualties and garner significant publicity and reaction. These individuals or groups are often inspired online, which is also a venue for recruitment, facilitation, guidance on weapons and/or financing.

The Government of Canada’s approach to countering the threat posed by terrorism also continues to evolve, in line with the nature of the threat. Regardless, its primary objectives remain the same – to disrupt potential acts from occurring and bringing all perpetrators to justice. Since 2001, 55 individuals have been charged with terrorism offences under the Criminal Code. In each case, measures and tools available to the government are employed in a flexible and versatile whole-of-government approach, which are tailored for each specific individual and situation.

Looking forward, Bill C-59, An Act Respecting National Security MattersNote 1, would further enhance this approach by improving information sharing among security and intelligence partners; amending the Secure Air Travel Act to make it more effective at preventing travel by those intent on engaging in terrorism (while facilitating legitimate travel) and by amending parts of the Criminal Code to, among other things, make terrorism provisions more clear.

Finally, the National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence will outline priority areas aimed at preventing radicalization to violence in Canada, which are shaped by the evolving threat environment.

Part 1: The Current Terrorist Threat Environment
The Current Terrorist Threat to Canada
Sunni Islamist Extremism
According to the Criminal Code a Terrorist Activity is generally defined as an act or omission, inside or outside of Canada, committed for a political, religious, or ideological purpose that is intended to intimidate the public, or a subset of the public, with respect to its security, including its economic security, or to compel a person, government or organization (whether inside or outside Canada) from doing or refraining from doing any act, and that intentionally causes one of a number of specified forms of serious harm, such as causing death or serious bodily harm. This can also include conspiracy, attempt or threat to commit, or being an accessory after the fact or counselling in relation to any such act.

National Terrorism Threat Level (NTTL) – As of November 2018, the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) assesses the terrorism threat in Canada to be MEDIUM. This means extremist groups and individuals located in Canada and abroad, have both the intent AND capability to carry out an act of terrorism in Canada. Such an attack could occur in Canada. Uniformed personnel face a specific on-going threat. They have been singled out as a particularly desirable target. The NTTL was formalized in early October 2014 when the threat level was first raised in Canada, anticipating incidents like the two terrorists attacks that occurred later in October of that year. The NTTL has remained the same since that time.

The principal terrorist threat to Canada and Canadian interests continues to be that posed by individuals or groups who are inspired by violent Sunni Islamist ideology and terrorist groups, such as Daesh or al-Qaida (AQ).

At the same time, Canada also continues to face threats from individuals inspired to commit violence based on other forms of extremism, including from right-wing extremists, Shia Islamist extremists and extremists who support violent means to establish an independent state within India. The risk of violence emanating from individuals inspired by these forms of extremism currently poses a lower threat to Canada than that of Daesh or AQ inspired individuals or groups.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the right to protest, as well as the rights of freedom of conscience and religion, expression, association and peaceful assembly. It is the evolution from hate to serious acts of politically-motivated violence with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, in regard to its sense of security, that could be considered a terrorism offence.

In 2018, no terrorist attacks have been committed by terrorist groups or their followers in Canada. In fact, the rate of terrorist attacks in the West has decreased overall; statistics show a decline in the rate of terror attacks since early 2016, after having peaked in late 2014 / early 2015. Canada’s National Terrorism Threat Level (NTTL) remains at Medium. However, individuals in Canada continue to express both the intent and capability to carry out violent acts of terrorism in Canada and against Canadian interests.

In the past year, attacks that were carried out by individuals who are not formally connected to any terrorist group continued to occur. These individuals, often inspired by other attacks, adopt terrorist methods when carrying out a violent act. Further, over the course of the last year, terrorist groups and their followers falsely claimed responsibility for attacks, when in fact they had no involvement or foreknowledge of these acts. Canada is not immune to this phenomenon. For example, in July 2018, 29-year-old Faisal Hussain opened fire in the busy Danforth neighbourhood in Toronto, Ontario. While law enforcement officials confirmed that there was no terrorism nexus, Daesh falsely claimed responsibility for the attack soon after it occurred.

Fewer Canadians are seeking to travel abroad to support groups like Daesh or AQ. A small number of individuals maintain intentions to travel and some have made attempts. When travel plans are prevented, some individuals may turn their extreme intentions to the domestic environment. Canada continues to be used for recruitment, fundraising and other activities that facilitate violent extremist activity abroad. Social media also remains a key tool for individuals in Canada and abroad who wish to communicate with other terrorists and violent extremist actors.

In July 2014, Daesh leaders incited followers to participate in conflicts abroad and called on supporters to conduct attacks against the West. At the time, a number of Canadians amplified the group’s call for violence within Canada, which also resulted in some travelling abroad to join Daesh. Separately, two terrorist attacks occurred in Canada in October 2014. These incidents were praised by Daesh supporters online at the time.

In August 2018, Daesh’s leader released a speech urging Daesh supporters in the West to remain defiant and follow examples of their “brothers” in Canada and elsewhere, and carry out attacks. Unlike in 2014, Canada has not yet seen a response to these calls for attacks, however, Canada remains vigilant.

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Right-Wing Extremism
The Face of Right-Wing Extremism in Canada

In June 2014, Justin Bourque shot and killed three RCMP officers and injured two others in Moncton, New Brunswick. He was motivated by his extreme anti-law enforcement and anti-government beliefs. Bourque was charged with three counts of first-degree murder, and two counts of attempted murder. He plead guilty to all charges, and is currently serving two concurrent life sentences, without the possibility of parole for 75 years.

In January 2017, Alexandre Bissonette, shot and killed six individuals and injured 19 more, at the Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec City in Ste-Foy, Quebec. Bissonette was motivated, at least in part, by his self-admitted fear of Muslims. Bissonette was charged with six counts of first-degree murder and six counts of attempted murder. Bissonette plead guilty to all charges. Sentencing in this case is still on-going.

Although the majority of recent global terrorist attacks can be attributed to individuals inspired by terrorist groups such as Daesh and AQ, other recent events around the world are bringing attention to the threat of violence from individuals who harbour right-wing extremist views.

Right-wing extremism (RWE) is traditionally driven by hatred and fear, and includes a range of individuals, groups, often in online communities, that back a wide range of issues and grievances, including, but not limited to: anti-government and anti-law enforcement sentiment, advocacy of white nationalism and racial separation, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, anti-immigration, male supremacy (misogyny) and homophobia. The threat of violence from any individuals, including those holding extreme right-wing views, may manifest in terrorist activity or other forms of criminal violence. However, while racism, bigotry, and misogyny may undermine the fabric of Canadian society, ultimately they do not usually result in criminal behavior or threats to national security.

In Canada, individuals who hold extreme right-wing views are active online, leveraging chat forums and online networks to exchange ideas, as opposed to openly promoting violence. These individuals leverage online chats and forums in attempt to create an online culture of fear, hatred and mistrust by exploiting real or imagined concerns.

Traditionally, in Canada, violence linked to the far-right has been sporadic and opportunistic. However, attacks perpetrated by individuals who hold extreme right-wing views and other lesser-known forms of ideological extremism can occur. A recent example is the April 2018 van attack in Toronto, Ontario, which resulted in the deaths of 10 people and alerted Canada to the dangers of the online Incel movement. It may be difficult to assess, in the short term, to what extent a specific act was ideologically-driven, or comment while investigations are ongoing or cases are before the court.

Right-wing extremism is not unique to Canada. In fact, some European RWE groups have established chapters in Canada. Likewise, some Canadian RWE groups have far-right connections in Europe.

Extremists who Support Violent Means to Establish an Independent State Within India
Some individuals in Canada continue to support violent means to establish an independent state within India. These violent activities have fallen since their height during the 1982-1993 period when individuals and groups conducted numerous terrorist attacks. The 1985 Air India bombing, which killed 331 people, remains the deadliest terrorist plot ever launched in Canada. While attacks around the world in support of this movement have declined, support for the extreme ideologies of such groups remains. For example, in Canada, two organizations, Babbar Khalsa International and the International Sikh Youth Federation, have been identified as being associated with terrorism and remain listed terrorist entities under the Criminal Code.

Shia Extremism
Hizballah – Established in 1982, in the wake of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, this Iran-backed group has developed into a socio-political-military organization. Hizballah continues to carry out and facilitate terrorist activities and provide support to several terrorist organizations, including with the covert provision of weapons, training, funding and guidance. In recent years it has participated in parliamentary elections and has formed part of the government. While some countries differentiate between the organization’s militant and political wings under their listing regimes, Canada has listed Hizballah in its entirety under the Criminal Code.

Shia violent extremist groups remain active in various parts of the world. With many supporters worldwide, Iran-backed Hizballah, based in Lebanon, continues to be the primary Shia terrorist group. Since the early 1980s, Hizballah has been responsible for, or linked to, multiple large-scale terrorist attacks worldwide; however, none of these attacks have occurred in Canada.

Hizballah operates within a global and highly diversified logistical and support structure, receiving considerable material and financial support from individuals and businesses in many countries, including Canada. Often, the individuals that support the group are not directly tied to Hizballah structures, but may sympathize with the organization for political reasons. Additionally, Hizballah operates an international network of charities that may divert funds to the organization or benefit from Hizballah funding. As a result, Hizballah has been a listed terrorist entity under the Criminal Code since 2002. Since that time, banks and financial institutions in Canada have had to freeze the entity’s assets. Also, the Criminal Code mandates severe penalties for people or organizations that deal with the property of a listed entity.

Canadian Extremist Travellers
Difference between a Canadian Extremist Traveller and a Foreign Terrorist Fighter

A Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF) is the globally-used term for an individual, regardless of country of origin, who has travelled abroad to conflict zones, such as Syria and Iraq, to directly engage in terrorist activities. The term FTF is linked to international efforts to address this threat, including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2396.

A Canadian Extremist Traveller (CET) refers to an individual with a Canadian nexus who has travelled abroad to participate in extremist activity. Extremist activity is defined as any activity undertaken on behalf of, or in support of, a terrorist entity. It can include, but is not limited to: participation in armed combat, financing, radicalizing, recruiting, media production, and other activity.

The Government continues to monitor and respond to the threat of Canadian Extremist Travellers (CETs) who are individuals suspected of travelling abroad to engage in extremist activity. This year, as with the last, approximately 190 extremist travellers with a nexus to Canada are currently abroad, including Syria and Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan and North and East Africa. Approximately half of the CETs who are abroad are located in Turkey, Syria or Iraq. These individuals have travelled to support and facilitate extremist activities, and, in some cases, to directly participate in terrorist acts. Approximately sixty (60) additional individuals with a nexus to Canada who are suspected of engaging in extremist activities abroad have returned to Canada. Of these 60, only a relatively small number of those who have returned are from Turkey, Iraq or Syria. These numbers have remained stable over the last three years.

Over the past year, Daesh has lost significant territory in Syria and Iraq. This has raised international concerns about the potential threat posed by extremist travellers returning to their home countries as they escape the conflict zone. Canada has not experienced, and does not expect to experience, a significant influx of returning Daesh-affiliated extremist travellers. Many of these individuals have been killed or captured in Syria and Iraq, and many will remain abroad due to their ongoing commitment to the cause. Of the CETs remaining there, only a few have openly expressed a desire to return to Canada.

With respect to those considering returning, measures are in place to ensure that the Government can monitor and respond to a return and to the threat posed by that individual CET. The government’s response is tailored in each specific case based on the threat the individual may pose to Canada and can include a variety of mitigation measures, which will be discussed in part 3 of this report. Some of these same measures may also serve to deter individuals from trying to leave Canada to travel abroad.

Should Canadian extremist travellers return home, their experiences abroad and network of like-minded individuals could pose a security threat to Canada. As such, it is conceivable that all returnees possess the capability to conduct unsophisticated attacks, such as with knives or vehicles. They may also possess the ability to influence and encourage others to participate in such activities. There is also a threat posed by individuals who, for a variety of reasons, may have been stopped by the Canadian authorities from travelling abroad. Due to the travel restrictions placed on them, there is a possibility that these individuals may re-direct their efforts towards planning attacks here in Canada. Some may also choose to facilitate international terrorism activities abroad. For example, in 2009, Momin Khawaja was the first Canadian charged and subsequently sentenced under provisions of the Criminal Code which were introduced by the 2001 Anti-terrorism Act for his role in helping individuals aligned with AQ in the failed plot to use fertilizer bombs to attack targets in and around London, England.

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The International Threat Environment
Europe
The three European countries most recently affected by AQ or Daesh inspired terrorism are France, Belgium, and Germany. The United Kingdom has also experienced a number of successful attacks over the last couple of years; while a number of others have been disrupted.

Europe has experienced attacks that have changed by way of complexity and sophistication. The change is likely linked to operational security concerns, rather than to a general lack of know-how.

Firearms and improvised weapons, such as knives and vehicles, continue to be the weapons of choice, as seen in recent attacks. These weapons do not require much preparation, special skills, or financing, and facilitate spontaneous attacks.

European countries remain concerned about the volume of European extremist travellers who are still unaccounted for following the decline of Daesh. Adding to this, a significant number of imprisoned terrorists and other inmates who have been radicalized in prison are also scheduled to be released from European prisons in the coming years, which may impact the terrorist threat in their respective countries.

The Middle East and South/South-East Asia
While Daesh’s physical “caliphate” in the Middle East has continued to decrease over the past year, the group retains an ability to inspire attacks, and is particularly capable in Iraq and several other Middle East countries. Despite setbacks, since 2017, Daesh has recognized several new provinces, including in Somalia and the Philippines.

Meanwhile, AQ’s global network remains resilient, with a strong operational presence in the Middle East and in East and West Africa. AQ continues to demonstrate both intent and capability to launch attacks in various parts of the world. Notably, in early 2018, AQ-aligned groups in Syria coalesced into Hurras al-Din (HAD) to combat both the Syrian regime and Western and Allied interests in the Middle East.

In the past year, the Taliban has continued to conduct operations across Afghanistan designed to challenge the authority of the Afghan Government. These included attacks in Kabul, Farah and Ghazni provinces. Another element of this conflict is Islamic State Khorasan Province which has also conducted many high-profile attacks. In Southeast Asia, the region has continued to grapple with the threat of Daesh in the Philippines following the five month-long siege of Marawi City in 2017. In May 2018, Indonesia suffered a series of terrorist attacks linked to the Daesh-aligned Jemaah Anshor Daulah which used women and children as suicide bombers.

Ungoverned or permissive environments in these regions will continue to allow the expansion and development of capability for both AQ- and Daesh-aligned groups. While the physical territory held by these groups has generally decreased, the groups remain capable of conducting terrorist attacks and inspiring individuals, including in Canada.

Africa
Based on the number of successful recent attacks, the three countries in North and West Africa most affected by terrorism and/or violence inspired by AQ or Daesh are Mali, Libya, and Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso in particular is experiencing an increase in the number and sophistication of attacks. In northern Mali, the violent Daesh-inspired insurgency is fuelled by Tuareg grievances including, but not limited to its autonomy, nationality and migration. In central Mali and Northern Burkina Faso, Fulani grievances, which are caused by a mix of historical, political, economic, and ethnic rivals, are driving the conflict. In many cases, the violence in these regions is linked to existing tensions and underlying grievances, and some groups are forming or claiming allegiances with Daesh and AQ to heighten their profiles and in some cases boost their capabilities.

In West Africa, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM) continues to expand its operational reach amid conflicts with the United Nations Multi-Dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. The three main groups responsible for attacks in West Africa are JNIM, Ansurul Islam, and Daesh in the Greater Sahara. These three groups place a priority on targeting local law enforcement and military forces, as well as French presence and interests in the region.

Libyan instability and its insecure borders are allowing for the transfer of weapons, explosives and people throughout the region, creating insecurity and a more dangerous and unstable climate. Weak governance and ineffective law enforcement further contribute to long-term instability in the region. Libya is currently experiencing a civil war along ethnic, religious, and regional lines, which is fuelling the growth of violent extremist groups linked to either AQ or Daesh.

Boko Haram is known to be one of the most brutal terrorist groups in the world. Its activities continue to impact Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.

Al-Shabaab (Somalia) has also been very active in carrying out attacks in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and elsewhere. Through these activities, the group is seeking retribution for the perceived injustice of involvement in Somalia from neighbouring countries.

Part 2: Threat Methods and Capabilities Observed Globally in 2018

This section of the report provides an overview of some of the global trends witnessed throughout 2018 when it comes to terrorist methods and capabilities.

Low-Sophistication Tactics, High Impacts

Terrorists continue to adopt low-sophistication, low-resource methods of committing high-impact violent attacks, especially in the West. This has been evident in the continued use of vehicles and knives in terrorist attacks, particularly in Europe. Not only has the use of vehicular attacks in crowded spaces become a tactic of choice, it has also inspired individuals with unclear motives but who are radicalized to violence, to use a similar approach. Such tactics require minimal skills and resources, but can achieve high-impact results, through mass injury or death and garner significant publicity and reaction. More sophisticated tactics, such as the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been used in conflict zones, but are less common in Western attacks, including Canada. Nonetheless, some extremists have showed an interest in advancing or gaining new capabilities and skills that could be used to support terrorism and extremist violence. Some individuals have sought or acquired certain skills or training that could be used for nefarious purposes such as weapons training or the construction of basic IEDs. In addition, some have been experimenting with the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs, drones). In Canada, however, the main threat remains the potential for unsophisticated attacks on soft targets and unsecured public spaces.

As some individuals seek to acquire more sophisticated capabilities, it is possible that they may aspire to target more hardened targets, such as highly-secure special events, government buildings such as Houses of Parliament, or critical infrastructure, as these are highly symbolic targets. However, these types of venues often have an obvious physical security presence and may be well protected by law enforcement. This limits the opportunity for attacks. Further, the coordination required to be successful against these types of targets has limited the intent of some groups. Lastly, enhanced intelligence and law enforcement capabilities have proven to be a deterrent for some attackers and plots against these types of targets.

Targets with lower levels of physical security have become more attractive alternatives. These targets can include hotels, commercial venues, restaurants, and underground metro stations where people gather in larger numbers. Attackers will often look to target open spaces and large venues with mass gatherings using unsophisticated methods. While these types of public events continue to present physical security challenges as compared to well established, limited-access targets, unsophisticated attack plans against them are becoming more difficult due to the enhanced security measures and law enforcement put in place to protect them.

Threats to Transportation Infrastructure

Terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida and Daesh or those inspired by them, continue to use propaganda to communicate and influence individuals to attempt to attack transportation infrastructure. In particular, terrorists have sought to persistently target civil aviation.

Terrorist groups believe that such an attack would instill fear, inflict maximum casualties and cause economic damage to the West. Terrorist groups would then use a successful attack, especially if against a western aircraft, as further propaganda in an attempt to demonstrate weakness in our advanced security measures.

Globally, traditional hard targets, such as airports and aircraft, are still considered as the benchmark for terrorist attacks. However, some terrorist groups continue to show interest in soft targets within the transportation system, such as ticketing areas, baggage claim areas, security checkpoint line-ups, and other areas that are vulnerable to attack due to their public accessibility, and/or crowds.

As seen in the 2016 attacks in Istanbul, Turkey and Brussels, Belgium, as well as the 2017 attacks in Flint, Michigan and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, the public areas of airports remain attractive terrorist targets due to their symbolic value, media coverage, and the opportunity to inflict mass casualties.

Attacks against transportation systems abroad have typically been coordinated attacks involving multiple operatives, while most attacks in North America have traditionally involved a single operative in an unsecured area, using easily acquired weapons such as knives or guns. Target selection often depends on the resources available to the attacker(s). While some individuals inspired by terrorist groups may choose a target of opportunity, individuals directly associated with a terrorist group may develop more complex plots with direction from abroad.

Individuals also remain interested in concealing weapons or explosives to circumvent security measures. Successful concealment would permit prohibited items to be brought into secure areas of a facility such as an airport, or onto an aircraft. However, constructing IEDs capable of avoiding detection at screening checkpoints requires sophisticated resources and knowledge. While employing IEDs remains the preferred attack method for terrorists, the construction and successful detonation of IEDs often remains a significant technical challenge outside of conflict zones. The July 2017 attempt to conceal IED components in a meat grinder, which was aimed at targeting Australian civil aviation, is an example of this trend. Fortunately, in this case, the IED never made it past the ticketing area.

Terrorists also remain interested in targeting trains and rail infrastructure. For example, detailed guides on how to do so were the subject of AQ in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) propaganda, Inspire 17, in 2017. Train and metro stations in Europe have been the target of IEDs, shootings, and knife attacks due to the ease with which terrorists can reach dense crowds. Within Canada, the disrupted rail plot of 2013 indicates that there are some domestic actors who have the intent to launch attacks against rail infrastructure. In this case, the perpetrators of the plot had planned to attack the daily Toronto to New York City train, jointly operated by Via Rail and Amtrak. A Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)-led investigation that involved numerous security and intelligence partners from both countries stopped the plot and arrested Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

The past decade has seen a slow but steady rise in the use of chemical agents to carry out attacks abroad. In Iraq and Syria, Daesh has carried out chemical weapons attacks using chlorine and sulphur mustard, while the regime of Bashar Al-Assad was found responsible for several attacks on its own people using Sarin and chlorine. None of these incidents have a direct Canadian link. The use of chemical agents accounts for a smaller proportion of deaths compared to those caused by conventional means, and its use has mostly been limited to conflict zones.

Other agents could be used as chemical or biological weapons due to their availability or rapidly advancing technology. For example, toxic industrial chemicals could become weapons of opportunity given their widespread availability and previous historical use. From a biological perspective, recent and newly emerging technologies have increased concerns that a biological weapon could be produced using techniques such as synthetic biology.

Terrorist Financing

Terrorist financing is the collection and provision of funds from legitimate or illegitimate sources to support, directly or indirectly, terrorist activity. It supports and sustains the activities of domestic and international terrorists that can result in terrorist attacks in Canada or abroad, causing loss of life and destruction.

The Criminal Code includes various offences related to terrorist financing, such as it being an offence to:

Provide or collect property intending it to be used to carry out terrorist activity;
Provide or make available property or financial services for terrorist purposes; or,
Use or possess property for terrorist purposes.

Internationally, Canada continues to face exposure to terrorist financing risks, in particular in the Middle East and South Asia. Specific countries include Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, Qatar, United Arab Emirates as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Terrorist groups and their supporters use a wide variety of means to finance their activities and further their goals. They can raise funds from legitimate sources, such as self-financing through regular income, or by diverting donations collected through charitable organizations. They can also raise funds from illegitimate sources of financing such as state-sponsors or undertaking criminal activities like hostage-taking for ransom or credit card fraud. Terrorists are increasingly using hard to track tools like prepaid cards, virtual currencies and crowdfunding operations to raise, collect, and transfer funds anywhere in the world.

Both Canadian and international sanctions have helped obstruct direct financial connections between Canada and designated groups and individuals active in certain conflict zones, such as Syria and Iraq. However, indirect financial connections to these jurisdictions still exist and continue to present a high risk for the Canadian financial system’s exposure to terrorist financing activity.

Daesh, AQ and Hizballah continue to be the main concern. Their financial capacity allows them to carry out attacks, recruit and pay members, provide weapons and training, and maintain communications networks to disseminate propaganda. Even though Daesh in Syria and Iraq has been weakened, the group continues to have significant financial resources that allows it to fund and direct attacks in unstable regions such as Afghanistan and sub-Saharan Africa. For its part, Hizballah has a diversified funding structure and global reach that allows it to obtain funds from sympathetic individuals, businesses and charities, including via domestic support from Canada.

Canadian extremist travellers may also use the Canadian financial system to raise or move funds to either facilitate their return to Canada or their overseas travel.

Terrorist Use of the Internet and Cyber Capabilities

The Criminal Code includes various offences related to the terrorist use of the internet, such as its being an offence to:

Counsel any person to commit a crime, whether it is committed or not; and
Knowingly participate in or contribute to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purposes of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist act.
There is also a provision that allows judges to order the deletion of terrorist propaganda made publicly available on a computer system in Canada.

There are also offences that address cyber-attacks, including those committed by terrorists.

Terrorists and violent extremist groups continue to exploit the internet. Further, encrypted messaging applications also provide a secure means of communication which allow users to share information and ideological content, recruit individuals, coordinate and carry out operations, or offer material support with relative anonymity and security.

Social media in particular has allowed terrorists to target specific subsets of the population with tailored messages in an attempt to indoctrinate individuals and recruit them to their cause. While online activity on its own does not cause radicalization to violence, it can help facilitate the process. Online platforms can also be used by those who are involved in, or have completed, the process of radicalizing to violence, by providing a space where individuals can potentially reinforce prior beliefs, seek justification for future actions, spread propaganda, provide material support, recruit others, or communicate about planned actions and claims.

Terrorists use a combination of online platforms, each of which is exploited in a manner specific to its capabilities and the intent of the threat actor. This usually includes a network of social media, websites, file sharing services and encrypted messenger applications among others. For instance, Daesh has manipulated the online space, influencing its supporters to carry out violence with well executed and timely propaganda and a relatively sophisticated and coordinated communications strategy. Its strategy has included the use of an assortment of platforms hosting audio, picture and video content. However, the use of the internet and online platforms is not exclusive to Daesh.

Online facilitation is also leveraged by right-wing extremists and other extremist groups. Social media and the internet can also serve to amplify this threat. For example, certain algorithms may guide someone towards increasingly extreme content, help recruiters identify vulnerable individuals, and feed escalating anger among groups. The way information about violent incidents and the activities of terrorist groups is circulated can also create harm by worsening the impact on victims, as well as generating fear and polarization.

While some terrorist groups continue to express interest in developing more sophisticated cyber capabilities, their actual capability remains limited. This means that their offensive cyber activities have generally been limited in scope and duration, such as denying service or defacing public websites.

Part 3: Canada’s Approach to Countering Terrorism

Addressing the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in Canada and to Canadian interests is a major priority for the Government. This section of the report provides an overview of the many steps that the Government has taken and will continue to take to address such threats.

Managing Canadian Extremist Travellers

The threat posed by extremist travellers is significant and presents difficult challenges to both Canada and our allies. However, the Government of Canada has taken many steps to ensure we are ready to address and mitigate this threat and protect Canadians.

The first objective in dealing with returning extremist travellers is to investigate and mitigate the threat they may pose to Canada and to Canadians and to ensure public safety. If there is sufficient evidence, the Government of Canada will pursue charges, and prosecute them to the full extent of the law. Criminal prosecution is the top priority and the preferred course of action. If there is insufficient evidence for a charge, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and its law enforcement, security and intelligence partners will continue their investigation, while other tools are leveraged to manage and contain the threat. These tools include: using a terrorism peace bond to seek to have the court place conditions on the individual (including electronic monitoring); active physical surveillance; using the Secure Air Travel Act to prevent further travel; additional border screening; and/or cancelling, refusing or revoking passports. In certain circumstances, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) may also employ threat reduction measures to reduce the threat posed by a returnee.

Canada’s law enforcement, security and intelligence, and defence departments and agencies continue to monitor and respond to the threat of Canadian extremist travellers through a coordinated, whole-of-government approach. When the Government learns that a CET may be seeking to return, federal departments and agencies come together to tailor an approach to address the threat he/she may pose. Key departments and agencies, including Public Safety Canada, Global Affairs Canada (GAC), the RCMP, CSIS, the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC), the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), Transport Canada (TC) and the Privy Council Office (PCO) work together to assess risks, develop options and manage the return of CETs. The whole-of-government approach enables the collective identification of measures needed to deal with the threat.

The Government can be informed of a potential return through a variety of means, including through information collected by Canada’s security and intelligence departments and agencies as well as through key international allies such as the Five Eyes, the G7, INTERPOL and EUROPOL.

The RCMP also leads a National Security Joint Operations Centre (NSJOC), which includes several federal departments and agencies to enhance the Government’s operational response to individuals seeking to travel abroad for terrorism purposes. This collaborative approach allows the Government of Canada to respond more effectively to the threat of Canadian extremist travellers, with all available tools and capabilities. The NSJOC facilitates timely information sharing and provides direct support to national security criminal investigations by the RCMP-led Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs).

In addition to the contribution to the NSJOC, CSIS investigates threat activities of CETs and their potential for return to Canada. CSIS uses all available resources under its mandate, working with partner agencies, to ensure public safety. This includes disclosing information to law enforcement organizations in their investigations or prosecutions of CETs and using measures to reduce the threat, when reasonable and proportionate to the nature of the threat.

Another mechanism to address and mitigate the threat of CETs is to prevent individuals from radicalization to violence in the first place. To that end, Public Safety Canada has established the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and the Prevention of Violence (the Canada Centre), which is mandated to lead, support, and coordinate Canada’s prevention efforts. These efforts include local-level programming aimed at countering radicalization to violence. The Canada Centre also funds innovative research, such as the project led by the University of Waterloo to better understand why Canadians travelled to Syria and Iraq to join terrorist groups.

Some returning CETs may also be suitable for programs which are designed to help them to disengage from violent extremism. These programs do not replace or prevent our security and law enforcement agencies from doing their work: namely monitoring, investigating, and potentially building a case for prosecution. Rather, these programs complement the work of these agencies by helping to reduce the threat posed by returning extremists travellers, while also addressing the health and social problems of associated travellers, including family members and children, returning from a conflict zone. These programs are not limited to returning extremist travellers but are also available to individuals in Canada who are radicalizing to violence, including right-wing extremists.

Arrests and Prosecutions in Canada for Committing Terrorism Offences
An effective response to terrorist threats and acts requires strong investigative and prosecutorial abilities. National security criminal investigations, including those related to terrorism offences, are conducted by INSETs, operating in major cities across the country. The INSETs are specialized, multi-agency investigative units which are co-located at the field level to enhance the RCMP’s ability to investigate suspected terrorist activity and to respond to terrorism activities or incidents.

There have been a number of terrorism investigations, prosecutions and convictions in Canada since 2001. Some terrorism prosecutions are still ongoing, but there were no new proceedings in 2018. This is reflective of the fact that there were no terrorist attacks in Canada in 2018, that fewer individuals are attempting to travel abroad for terrorism purposes, and that the number of returning extremist travellers has remained stable since last year.

Overall, since 2001 a total of 55 individuals have been charged with terrorism offences under the Criminal Code. The RCMP has also charged five (5) additional individuals for a terrorist hoax using terrorism provisions available under the Criminal Code. These five (5) charges are counted separately as they did not require the Attorney General’s consent.

In 2013, offences specifically related to leaving or attempting to leave Canada for the purposes of committing certain terrorism offences were enacted in the Criminal Code. Since then, a total of 12 individuals have been charged with specific terrorism travel offences:

Three (3) have been convicted;
Two (2) have had terrorism peace bonds imposed;
Four (4) have outstanding warrants;
Two (2) are awaiting trial; and
One (1) has had the charges withdrawn.
The 12 individuals identified above are specific to those who have attempted to or have travelled, and does not include other terrorism charges brought against other Canadians that were not travel-related in that period.

In Canada, the ultimate decision on what charges should be used in response to a criminal act is taken by the police service and the independent prosecution service. The decision is taken by looking at the law, available evidence, the likelihood of conviction and the public interest. In addition, no proceedings in respect of a terrorism offence can commence without the consent of the Attorney General.

The Criminal Code sets out various specific terrorism offences and their punishments. Many of them were created to prevent terrorist activity from happening. The possible offences include different types of criminality, including participation, contributing, financing, and instructing.

One of the terrorism offences in the Criminal Code is committing an indictable offence that constitutes a terrorist act. An example of this could be first degree murder. If the situation surrounding the murder falls within the general definition of “terrorist activity” in the Criminal Code, a prosecutor can decide to charge and prosecute the individual for the murder and for the terrorism offence of committing an indictable offence (first degree murder) that constitutes a terrorist act. If the prosecutor decides to prosecute the terrorism offence, he or she will have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed for a political, religious, or ideological cause. While an offence may appear to be ideologically driven and motivated, concrete evidence is required to prove this. It is sometimes difficult to collect the necessary evidence, especially when evidence is collected outside of Canada. In fact, the complexity, disclosure issues and delays inherent to terrorism charges sometimes risks jeopardizing otherwise viable prosecutions given the need to try an accused within a reasonable time as dictated by the R. vs. Jordan decision. In addition, there are often challenges associated with the use of intelligence and sensitive information as courtroom evidence, especially when the alleged criminal offences took place abroad. Depending on these and various other factors, a prosecutor may choose to prosecute for first degree murder.

The Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC) and the RCMP work together to determine which charges have the best chance of successful prosecution, in order to most effectively address the threat.

Bill C-59 – An Act Respecting National Security MattersNote 2 & Bill C-21 – An Act to Amend the Customs ActNote 3
Bill C-59, An Act Respecting National Security Matters, proposes to modernize Canada’s national security and intelligence framework. Overall, three core themes are embedded in Bill C-59:

Enhancing accountability and transparency;
Amending certain elements of existing legislation; and
Ensuring that our national security and intelligence agencies can keep pace with the evolving nature of security threats.
Bill C-59 would enhance accountability and transparency of Canada’s national security and intelligence activities through the establishment of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and an Intelligence Commissioner. These two bodies would ensure national security and intelligence activities are reasonable, necessary and comply with Canadian laws and values.

The Bill would also enact the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act. This would create a mechanism for the Governor in Council to issue direction to security and intelligence-mandated departments and agencies prohibiting the disclosure or request of information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment by a foreign entity, as well as certain uses of information that was likely obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity.

Other legislative changes to Canada’s existing legal framework would include:

Amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act would seek to affirm the importance of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; clarify CSIS’ threat reduction mandate, and would introduce additional safeguards and accountability requirements.
Amendments to the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act would, for instance,clarify the scope and strengthen the threshold of information that can be disclosed between Canadian government institutions with national security responsibilities.
Amendments to the Secure Air Travel Act (SATA) would include improvements to the recourse process, reduce uncertainty on the issue of whether young children are on the SATA list and introduce measures to enable centralized screening of air passengers against the SATA list.
Amendments to the Criminal Code would, for example, replace the offence of advocacy or promotion of terrorism offences in general with a new counselling offence; clarify the definition of terrorist propaganda; raise the threshold for obtaining a recognizance with conditions; and enhance the procedural protections under the Youth Criminal Justice Act for youth involved in the criminal justice system due to terrorism-related conduct.
Bill C-59 would also ensure that Canadian security and intelligence agencies can keep pace with the evolving nature of security threats. For example, the modernization of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act would enable CSIS under strict conditions and safeguards to collect, retain and use datasets that contain personal information. Changes would also establish in law an authorization regime for acts or omissions undertaken during intelligence activities that would otherwise constitute offences.

The Bill would also allow for the enactment of the new Communications Security Establishment Act. The proposed Communications Security Establishment (CSE) Act would broaden the range of capabilities CSE could use to acquire foreign intelligence from foreign targets outside of Canada. This new authority would allow CSE to interact with foreign targets operating on computer networks and systems that could be used, for example, to uncover foreign extremists’ efforts to radicalize individuals to conduct attacks in Canada and abroad. The Act would also give CSE the authority to conduct active cyber operations, and allow CSE to use online capabilities to interfere with the ability of foreign terrorists groups to recruit Canadians or plans attacks against Canada and its allies.

Bill C-21, An Act to Amend the Customs Act, if passed, would be a key piece of legislation to assist the Government’s ability to respond to the threat of Canadian extremist travelers, among others. The Bill would provide the legal authority to collect and make use of information on potential extremist travellers seeking to leave Canada.

Enhanced Passenger Protection Program

The Passenger Protect Program (PPP) is a national security tool aimed at preventing the travel by air of individuals suspected of posing a threat to transportation security or seeking to travel to commit certain terrorism offences. The PPP works with air carriers to screen commercial passenger flights to, from, and within Canada, and uses specific, reasonable and necessary measures to address security threats. This program is administered by Public Safety Canada and Transport Canada, in cooperation with several other federal departments and agencies.

The PPP allows the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to list an individual under the SATA, and direct an air carrier to deny transportation to the individual or require them to undergo additional screening. The 2018 Federal Budget announced funding to enhance the PPP so that the screening of flights would be brought under government control through a centralized screening system that would build on advance passenger screening already in place under the Canada Border Services Agency. Centralized screening would improve the security and integrity of the program and would allow the implementation of a redress process. The redress process would allow the government to distinguish between individuals who are false-positive matches and those who are listed under the SATA.

Security Screening
An important means of preventing individuals connected to terrorist activities from entering or gaining status in Canada are the Government of Canada’s immigration security screening processes. Foreign nationals seeking status in Canada must meet national security-related requirements, as set out in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. These include grounds for refusal based on engaging in terrorism. Individuals who are found to be inadmissible would not be permitted to enter or remain in Canada. Similarly, Section 22 of the Citizenship Act sets out various situations which prevent a person from becoming a Canadian citizen, the majority of which are related to criminality or security.

The Listing of Terrorist Entities
The listing of an individual or group as a “terrorist entity” continues to be one of the public instruments the Government uses to identify a person or group’s involvement with terrorism. It also sends a strong message that Canada will not tolerate such acts of violence.

The Criminal Code is Canada’s primary domestic listing tool and carries with it significant consequences. The regime helps block those in Canada and Canadians abroad from supporting listed entities. Listing under the Criminal Code provides the legal and institutional framework to implement measures to freeze terrorist funds, to help prohibit the financing of individual terrorist organizations, and to help criminalize certain support activities to the listed entity.

Since the release of the 2017 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, the government listed Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) as a terrorist entity pursuant to the Criminal CodeNote 4. Formed in 2015, the group is an officially recognized affiliate of Daesh and is based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. ISIS-K’s objective is to establish the “wilayat” (province) of Khorasan as part of the global Islamic State Caliphate. Since its establishment, the group has carried out bombings, small arms attacks, and kidnappings against civilians, aid organizations, and security forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The group also possesses the capacity to target Western interests.

In 2018, the government also updated the name of listed terrorist entity Jabhat-al Nusra (JN) to Hay’at Tharir al Sham (HTS), including their aliases. The name change occurred in January 2017, when JN (which had changed its name from Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) merged with four smaller groups. HTS’ objective is the overthrow of President Bashir al-Assad’s regime and the establishment of an Islamic state under Sharia Law. Updating the group’s name will support the effective application of counter-terrorism measures.

Countering Radicalization to Violence

Canada’s collaborative approach to countering radicalization to violence involves many partners and organizations, including the RCMP.

In its ongoing efforts to keep Canadians safe, the Canada Centre provides national leadership and supports local level efforts aimed at preventing radicalization to violence in Canada. Early priority activities of the Canada Centre include building, sharing and using knowledge, addressing radicalization to violence in the online space, and supporting interventions. These priorities are shaped by the evolving threat environment and articulated in the Canada Centre’s National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence.

In addition, Public Safety Canada’s Community Resilience Fund provides targeted investments to support innovative research and local level programming to counter radicalization to violence. This includes support for projects that help understand and address the role of social media in processes of recruitment and escalation towards violence, improve digital literacy, and provide educators and other frontline practitioners with the knowledge and materials to constructively and safely discuss online terrorist activity with students, parents, and community members.

Furthermore, the RCMP’s long standing efforts to counter radicalization to violence encompass all forms of violent ideologies. The First Responder Terrorism Awareness Program team develops and manages training for first responders and key partners to provide awareness about a range of criminal threats. The training helps partners identify the early signs of radicalization to violence and outlines possible responses.

While criminal prosecution is the Government’s top priority, the RCMP’s Federal Policing Intervention Program provides support to national investigators so they may better understand what drives individuals to commit acts of violence and how the RCMP and law enforcement partners can disrupt and/or disengage an individual from the process of radicalizing to violence. This counterterrorism program seeks to address the ideology and risk factors behind the radicalization to violence.

Addressing Online Threats

In an effort to address online threats, the Government of Canada has applied a multi-stakeholder approach to preventing and countering the terrorist use of the internet. This includes ongoing engagement with international allies and other international and domestic partners and is structured around three lines of effort:

Supporting research to understand how terrorist groups operate online and how best to counter their activities;
Working with technology companies and international partners to reduce the impact of terrorist content; and,
Supporting civil society groups to develop digital literacy guidelines and alternative narratives.
Canada’s efforts focus on protecting the general public from terrorist narratives, preventing and countering terrorist material and activity online and helping ensure that alternative narratives provide points of view that counter those promoted by terrorists. Government support for research is focused on making these efforts more effective, while ensuring the protection of personally identifiable information.

The Government of Canada also engages with technology companies through the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). GIFCT was established in 2017 by Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube and structures how those companies and other members work together to address terrorist activity on their platforms. Engagement with GIFCT occurs bilaterally and through both the G7 and Five Country Ministerial. Within the G7 and Five Country Ministerial contexts, the Government of Canada has asked GIFCT and its members to increase transparency around their efforts to counter terrorist activity, support collaboration with researchers, develop and implement new technological solutions, and help improve the capacity of smaller companies.

Canada’s International Partnerships and Cooperation

Given the global nature of the threat posed by terrorism, a collaborative international response is required for meaningful progress in countering the threat both in Canada and abroad. Canada works closely with its partners in exchanging timely intelligence and sharing information to counter the terrorist threat effectively.

One of Canada’s most important multilateral forums for intelligence and information sharing remains the “Five Eyes” community. Canada regularly attends the Five Country Ministerial, an annual meeting between the security and immigration ministers of the Five Eyes countries to discuss national security challenges and proactive areas for collaboration. The 2018 Five Country Ministerial was hosted by Australia in August, and focused on improving cooperation on a range of national security issues, including foreign terrorist fighters, terrorist use of the internet, and the challenges posed by encryption for lawful investigators.

Canada is actively engaged in international counterterrorism efforts with partners both bilaterally and in a number of international fora including: the United Nations (UN), the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), the Global Coalition to Counter Daesh, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the G7.

In 2018, Canada held the G7 presidency. Canada was responsible for hosting and organizing the G7 Leaders’ Summit that took place in Charlevoix, Quebec, in June. At the summit, G7 leaders committed to continuing to work together to address terrorist threats.

In addition to the Leaders’ Summit, Canada’s G7 presidency offered an opportunity to host a number of G7 Ministers’ meetings leading up to the Leaders’ Summit. This included a meeting of G7 Foreign Affairs and Security Ministers, who met on the theme of building a more peaceful and secure world. During these meetings, Ministers agreed that G7 partners would work together by providing advice to their respective leaders for the Summit in Charlevoix. This included, addressing transnational threats to security, including managing extremist travellers and their families, efforts to counter violent extremism, and terrorist use of the internet.

Canada’s response to the threat of terrorism also contains a robust military response capability both at home and abroad, which is articulated in Canada’s Defence Policy, Strong, Secure, and Engaged. Under this Policy, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces is charged with actively addressing threats abroad for stability at home, developing awareness of its operating environment to better predict and respond to crises, and addressing the threat stemming from terrorism and the actions of extremists and terrorist groups.

To fulfill its mandate, DND/CAF maintains specialized forces and capabilities on very short notice to support Canadian national security interests both at home and abroad. Since 2014 DND/CAF continues to contribute to the Global Counter Daesh Coalition with significant CAF presence in Iraq. Additionally, CAF continues to conduct numerous security cooperation and capacity building activities that enhance the abilities of partner nations to counter the threats posed by violent extremist and terrorist groups within their own borders.

In addition, as a way to combat the financing of terrorism, Canada is a member of the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The FATF, which brings together 37 member jurisdictions or regional organizations, sets standard and promotes effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. As a member of the FATF, Canada has committed to implementing international standards to combat the financing of terrorism.

As Canada’s financial intelligence unit, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) is also an active member of the Egmont Group, an international network of financial intelligence units that collaborates and exchanges information about terrorist activity financing.

Canada’s international counter-terrorism efforts are also delivered through Global Affairs Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP) and allows Canada to support security and intelligence agencies in partner countries around the world with training and equipment. In 2018, among of the many projects to which Canada contributed, two particularly interesting projects should be highlighted: (1) Enhancing the Jordanian capacity to respond to security incidents; and (2) supporting a counter-terrorism capacity-building project for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

Conclusion

Individuals inspired by terrorist or violent ideologies continue to pose a significant threat to Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests. While Canada’s terrorist threat environment remains stable, we are not immune to the threat of ideologically-inspired violence.

In 2018, the threat environment was characterized by individuals who continue to use the internet to support their activities, and how inspired individuals continue to show interest in low sophistication type of attacks with easy access targets. However, as terrorism evolves, so too does the Government of Canada’s approach. Canada continues to respond to the evolving threat environment and is taking the necessary steps to better the tools and resources available to the Government, including through Bill C-59 An Act Respecting National Security Matters.

Canada continues to invest in capacity building abroad and cooperates closely with international partners and allies. The Government also continues to list new terrorist entities under the Criminal Code, work to counter online threats, undertake efforts to counter radicalization to violence, and take a range of other measured steps to protect Canadians.

Above all, the Government of Canada continues to counter terrorism in a manner consistent with the expectations of Canadians – to protect its people and its allies in a manner that reflects our shared values, rights and freedoms.