Woman’s Position According to the Bible Annie Besant 1885



One of the favorite claims put forward on behalf of the Bible by believers in its inspiration is that the position of woman in society has been greatly improved by its acceptance. “See women among the heathen, how degraded, how hard-worked, how enslaved!” say Christians. “Contrast her treatment among them with the liberty and respect enjoyed by women in happy Christian lands.” Putting on one side the question whether an Indian squaw has, on the whole, a much harder life than a married factory “hand”, who toils all day at the factory, and returns home at night to clean the house, wash, mend and make the children’s clothes, cook the supper, etc, it should be remarked that in the suggested comparison the question of civilisation is entirely omitted. If the position of women in the higher ranks of society in England be compared with the position of women among the Australian savages, there is no doubt that the former enjoy an enormous superiority, but this superiority is the result of civilisation not of religion, of culture not of creed. It is noteworthy that the comparison is always made between the women in highly civilised Christian communities, and in savage heathen ones. All allusion to women in comparatively civilised heathen States is omitted, and we hear nothing of the venerated priestesses of the older civilisations, nothing of the women of Greece and of Rome. Subordinate as was the position of the latter in relation to their husbands and fathers, they stood far higher than women among the Hebrews. Yet the Hebrews possessed the Old Testament, which was unknown to the great Pagan States. The assertion that the improvement in woman’s social position in modern times is due to civilisation and not to religion may be proved by examining the position assigned to women in the Bible, and by tracing the results of Biblical teaching on the community. We shall find that the position assigned to her by the earlier portions of the Bible is degraded in the extreme; that in the later portions it is still the position of a slave, though the slavery is somewhat softened—the New Testament being written in times less uncivilised than the old; that the laws which enslaved the married woman were the direct outcome of Bible teaching, and that the gradual and still incomplete enfranchisement of women has been the result of a struggle of justice against Christianity. In fact the position of women in any community may be taken as the gauge of its civilisation; as justice takes the place of physical might, women is more and more recognised as possessing equal rights with man.

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Content and Significance of the Convention


Discrimination (Article 1)
Policy Measures (Article 2)
Guarantee of Basic Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 3)
Special Measures (Article 4)
Sex Role Stereotyping and Prejudice (Article 5)
Prostitution (Article 6)


Political and Public Life (Article 7)
Representation (Article 8)
Nationality (Article 9)

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Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women: UN General Assembly resolution 1993

Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women

The term “violence against women” means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.

Proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 48/104 of 20 December 1993

The General Assembly ,

Recognizing the urgent need for the universal application to women of the rights and principles with regard to equality, security, liberty, integrity and dignity of all human beings,

Noting that those rights and principles are enshrined in international instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

Recognizing that effective implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women would contribute to the elimination of violence against women and that the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, set forth in the present resolution, will strengthen and complement that process,

Concerned that violence against women is an obstacle to the achievement of equality, development and peace, as recognized in the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, in which a set of measures to combat violence against women was recommended, and to the full implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,

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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women New York, 18 December 1979

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women New York, 18 December 1979

For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “discrimination against women” shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.



The States Parties to the present Convention,

Noting that the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women,

Noting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the principle of the inadmissibility of discrimination and proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, including distinction based on sex,

Noting that the States Parties to the International Covenants on Human Rights have the obligation to ensure the equal rights of men and women to enjoy all economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights,

Considering the international conventions concluded under the auspices of the United Nations and the specialized agencies promoting equality of rights of men and women,

Noting also the resolutions, declarations and recommendations adopted by the United Nations and the specialized agencies promoting equality of rights of men and women,

Concerned, however, that despite these various instruments extensive discrimination against women continues to exist,

Recalling that discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to the participation of women, on equal terms with men, in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their countries, hampers the growth of the prosperity of society and the family and makes more difficult the full development of the potentialities of women in the service of their countries and of humanity,

Concerned that in situations of poverty women have the least access to food, health, education, training and opportunities for employment and other needs,

Convinced that the establishment of the new international economic order based on equity and justice will contribute significantly towards the promotion of equality between men and women,

Emphasizing that the eradication of apartheid, all forms of racism, racial discrimination, colonialism, neo-colonialism, aggression, foreign occupation and domination and interference in the internal affairs of States is essential to the full enjoyment of the rights of men and women,

Affirming that the strengthening of international peace and security, the relaxation of international tension, mutual co-operation among all States irrespective of their social and economic systems, general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control, the affirmation of the principles of justice, equality and mutual benefit in relations among countries and the realization of the right of peoples under alien and colonial domination and foreign occupation to self-determination and independence, as well as respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, will promote social progress and development and as a consequence will contribute to the attainment of full equality between men and women,

Convinced that the full and complete development of a country, the welfare of the world and the cause of peace require the maximum participation of women on equal terms with men in all fields,

Bearing in mind the great contribution of women to the welfare of the family and to the development of society, so far not fully recognized, the social significance of maternity and the role of both parents in the family and in the upbringing of children, and aware that the role of women in procreation should not be a basis for discrimination but that the upbringing of children requires a sharing of responsibility between men and women and society as a whole,

Aware that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between men and women,

Determined to implement the principles set forth in the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and, for that purpose, to adopt the measures required for the elimination of such discrimination in all its forms and manifestations,

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Measures taken by Government to prevent Crime against Women -10/12/2019

The Government and Security

Press Information Bureau

Government of India

Measures taken by Government to prevent Crime against Women

New Delhi

December 10, 2019

Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Shri G. Kishan Reddy, in a written reply to a question regarding crime against women, in Lok Sabha today, said that women safety is a high priority for the Government and several initiatives have been taken for safety of women across the country, which are given below:

The Criminal Law (Amendment), Act 2013 was enacted for effective deterrence against sexual offences. Further, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 was enacted to prescribe even more stringent penal provisions including death penalty for rape of a girl below the age of 12 years. The Act also inter-alia mandates completion of investigation and trials within 2 months each.

Emergency Response Support System provides a pan-India, single, internationally recognized number (112) based system for all emergencies, with computer aided dispatch of field resources to the location of distress.

Using technology to aid smart policing and safety management, Safe City Projects have been sanctioned in first Phase in 8 cities (Ahmedabad, Bengaluru, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Lucknow and Mumbai).

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has launched a cyber-crime portal on 20th September 2018 for citizens to report obscene content.

MHA has launched the ‘National Database on Sexual Offenders’ (NDSO) on 20th September 2018 to facilitate investigation and tracking of sexual offenders across the country by law enforcement agencies.

In order to facilitate States/UTs, MHA on 19th February 2019 launched an online analytic tool for police called ‘Investigation Tracking System for Sexual Offences’ to monitor and track time-bound investigation in sexual assault cases in accordance with the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2018.

One Stop Centre (OSC) scheme is being implemented across the country since 1st April 2015 which is exclusively designed to provide integrated services such as medical aid, police assistance, legal counselling/ court case management, psycho-social counselling and temporary shelter to women affected by violence under one roof. As per available information, 728 OSCs have been approved by Government of India, 595 OSCs are operational in the country.

In addition to the above-mentioned measures, MHA has issued advisories from time to time with a view to help the States/UTs to deal with crimes against women, which are available at http://www.mha.gov.in.


স্ত্রীলোকের বাহিরে গমন – প্যারীচাঁদ মিত্র

 ঋগ্বেদে প্রকাশ হইতেছে যে, স্ত্রীলোকেরা সালঙ্কৃত হইয়া উৎসব ও বিদ্যানুরঞ্জন সভাতে গমন করিতেন। মহাবীর চরিতে লিখিত আছে যে, ঋষি কন্যা ও পত্নী সকল, পিতা ও স্বামীর সহিত ভোজে ও যজ্ঞে গমন করিতেন। মনুসংহিতা পাঠে স্পষ্ট বোধ হয় যে, স্ত্রীলোকেরা নাট্যশালায় ও উৎসবে গমন করিতেন। প্রকাশ্য স্থানে মঞ্চোপরি স্ত্রীলোক বসিয়া মল্লযুদ্ধ ও বাণ শিক্ষা ইত্যাদি দেখিতেন। কি মৃগয়ায়, কি যুদ্ধস্থানে, কি শব-সৎকারে, কি যজ্ঞস্থানে, স্ত্রীলোক সঙ্গে থাকিতেন। কুরুক্ষেত্রের যুদ্ধকালীন দ্রৌপদী, সুভদ্রা ও উত্তরা পাণ্ডবদিগের শিবিরে ছিলেন। দ্রৌপদীর বিবাহ বিবেচনার্থে, দ্রুপদের সভায় কুন্তী উপস্থিত থাকিয়া, আপন অভিপ্রায় প্রকাশ করেন। রাজসূয়ে, অশ্বমেধ যজ্ঞে ও রাজা যুধিষ্ঠিরের অভিষেকের সময়ে নারীরা উপস্থিত ছিলেন। অশ্বমেধ যজ্ঞে নারীদিগের জন্য স্বতন্ত্র স্থান ছিল ও যুবতীর সভার মধ্যে ইতস্ততঃ বেড়াইয়া ছিলেন।

Source:এতদ্দেশীয় স্ত্রীলোকদিগের পূর্ব্বাবস্থা : প্যারীচাঁদ মিত্র

Etad Desiya Strilok Diger Purvabasta -শকাব্দা ১৮০০

Gayatri Devi Pansari Versus State of Orissa and others – 11/04/2000


The Policy of the State Government, indisputably being to provide 30% of the 24 hours Medical Stores within a District in favour of ladies by virtue of specific orders passed, therefore, that would itself provide sufficient and valid as well as legal basis for extending preference in favour of a lady applicant as long as the ceiling limit is not violated.

AIR 2000 SC 1531 : (2000) 4 SCC 221 : JT 2000 (4) SC 600 : (2000) 3 SCALE 210


Gayatri Devi Pansari  Versus  State of Orissa and others

(Before: S. Saghir Ahmad And Doraiswamy Raju, JJ.)

Civil Appeal No. 2580 of 2000 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 9367 of 1998),

Decided on: 11-04-2000.

Pharmacy Act, 1948—Sections 32 and 2(i).

Counsel for the Parties:

M. N. Krishnamani, Sr. Advocate, Rajiv S. Roy, J. Mohapatra, P. K. Mullick, Jana Kalyan Das, Shiva Pujan Singh, Advocates, with him, for Appearing Parties.


Raju, J—Special leave granted.

2. The appellant herein was selected to open a 24 hours Medical Store in the Campus of Sub-Divisional Hospital, Patnagarh, District Bolangir, Orissa, pursuant to the advertisement made by the Government of Orissa published on 12-10-96 inviting applications from the unemployed registered Pharmacists (Gents and Ladies) or persons having medical shops, who have engaged registered Pharmacist/person who undertakes to engage a registered Pharmacist. It appears, apart from the appellant and the fifth respondent herein who was the writ petitioner before the High Court, three others also submitted their applications. The first respondent by the orders dated 12-5-97 selected the appellant taking into account the guidelines governing such selection, the revised and latest of which were said to have been issued on 26-5-97. The selection of the appellant, apart from the fact that she was found eligible, was on account of preference shown to her as a lady applicant in furtherance of and giving effect to the Policy-decision of the Government to provide self-employment opportunities to ladies. Pursuant to such selection and in compliance with the terms of the orders as communicated by the Chief District Medical Officer, the appellant appears to have not only deposited the required fee of ` 50,000/-, but executed the necessary Agreement on 22-5-97 and commenced operating the day and night Medical Store.

3. Aggrieved, the fifth respondent herein, the unsuccessful applicant, filed a Writ Petition OJC No. 7778/97 before the High Court challenging the selection of the appellant mainly contending that she was not eligible or qualified for the same and that extraneous considerations weighed with the selection by the authorities. Respondents 1 to 4, the authorities of the State, have filed a common Counter Affidavit opposing the Writ Petition and justifying the selection of the appellant. The appellant, who was arrayed as fifth respondent before the High Court, also filed a separate Counter Affidavit denying the allegations made against the appellant and the contentions raised by way of challenge to her selection. The sum and substance of the stand taken for the respondents in the High Court was that not only the appellant was fully qualified and eligible for being awarded the right to run the Medical Store in question, but that she being a lady and the Policy of the Government also being to accord preference to lady candidates even by providing for a reservation of 30% of the day and night medical shops in the District to lady candidates, no exception could be taken to the selection of the appellant. Reliance in this regard, to justify the preference, was placed on the Government Order dated 9-11-93, which was said to have issued on 27-11-93, and the relevant portion of which reads as follows:-

“30% of the 24 hours medical stores within a district shall be reserved for ladies. The C.D.M.O. concerned should identify the medical stores which would be reserved exclusively for ladies and issue advertisement accordingly. Similarly 30% of the 24 hours medical stores of all Medical College Hospitals taken together shall be reserved for ladies. The D.M.E.T. shall identify the medical stores to be exclusively reserved for ladies. If no lady candidate is willing to run any such store a fresh advertisement shall be issued inviting applications from general public irrespective of sex for allotment of medical store.”

4. The Division Bench of the Orissa High Court by its Order under challenge in this appeal purported to not only doubt the claim made that the appellant was a registered Pharmacist under the Orissa Pharmacy Council, but also observed that the controversy about the claim of the appellant being a qualified Pharmacist need not be gone into and that the same was not relevant too, in the opinion of the High Court, so far as the present Writ Petition was concerned. Such a view seems to have been taken for the reason that her case was not considered solely on the ground of being a qualified Pharmacist, but also on account of the preference given to her, as a lady candidate. Thereupon, the High Court proceeded to consider the claim based on such preference in terms of the Order of the Government, noticed supra, and ultimately, the High Court arrived at the conclusion that the question of reservation envisaged under the Government Orders referred to above, would arise only after the Medical Store for the purpose of reservation as contemplated in the Government Order is identified and specified. Since the Department has not undertook any such exercise in this case and the Medical Store in question was not one of the identified or specified stores for purposes of reservation in favour of a lady, the selection of the appellant, in the opinion of the High Court, stood vitiated. While quashing the selection of the appellant, the High Court directed the authorities to consider the matter afresh taking into account the respective merits, acceptability of the application and all other relevant factors, if need be and advised to do so, by calling for fresh applications, too.

5. Aggrieved, the above appeal has been filed. While issuing notice, status quo was ordered to be maintained and the appellant, indisputedly, running the Medical Store in question. The respondents in the appeal have filed their respective replies. The appellant has also filed her rejoinder.

6. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the appellant, a Pharmacist duly registered under the Pharmacy Act in another State, in this case the State of Madhya Pradesh, whose Registration Certificate is valid till 2000 and who is entitled to conduct the business in Pharmacy even in a different State, satisfy the norms and the eligibility criteria for being selected and awarded her the right to run the Medical Store in question, particularly when she was entitled under Section 32 of the Pharmacy Act, 1948 to get her name registered as Pharmacist by virtue of her having been registered as such in a different State for which she was said to have applied even as early as in 1988 in the State of Orissa by paying the necessary fee it was also contended that the High Court committed an error in adjudging the issues on the out dated guidelines contained in the Government Order dated 13-5-93 ignoring the revised and latest Orders, which rendered eligible for being considered not only a registered Pharmacist, “but a person who can engage a Pharmacist irrespective of whether he himself is a Pharmacist or not”. Adverting to the reason assigned that in the absence of proper identification and specification of the Medical Store in question, the appellant could not have been selected as against the reserved quota of 30% envisaged for ladies, the learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that it proceeded on a wrong understanding of the purport of the orders and that even in the absence of actual identification of any particular Store for reservation, showing of preference to a lady candidate cannot be said to be per se a vitiating factor having regard to the above Policy of the Government, which has been duly declared in the Government Order itself and that, therefore, the order of the High Court is liable to be set aside. Equities have also been urged by pleading investment of substantial amount running to few lakhs and the running of the Store all along. The learned counsel appearing for the authorities of the State of Orissa also joined hands with the learned senior counsel for the appellant in defending the action of the Government.

7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the fifth respondent herein, who succeeded before the High Court, reiterated the reasons urged and assigned in the Order of the High Court and contended that the order of the High Court does not suffer any infirmity in law to warrant interference in this appeal. Argued the learned counsel further, that the appellant could not claim herself to be a registered Pharmacist within the State of Orissa, which, according to the fifth respondent, is a must to render her eligible for being selected for the assignment in question. Our attention has been invited to the provisions contained in the Pharmacy Act, 1948. Even, at this stage, we may indicate that neither such a claim has no basis or support in the advertisement calling for applications or criteria governing such selection as was in force, in terms of the Government Order dated 26-5-97, which held that the field of selection.

8. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. In our view, the challenge to the order of the High Court is well merited. Even from the gist of the criteria for selection as found noticed in paragraph 2 of the order of the High Court, it could be seen that a person could be considered eligible for the purpose whether he is a registered Pharmacist himself or even if he can engage a Pharmacist irrespective of whether he himself is a Pharmacist or not. An unemployed person, who had previous experience of running a Medical Store, could be given preference. If that be the position, dehors the controversy as to whether the appellant was a registered Pharmist within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Pharmacy Act within the Council at Orissa, she cannot be rendered ineligible, particularly having regard to the factual position disclosed in this case that the appellant was a registered Pharmacist in the State of Madhya Pradesh and a Certificate of such registration valid up to 2000 A.D. has been placed on record and that she can also engage any body else. Even in the writ petition filed before the High Court, the petitioner therein (the fifth respondent herein) seems to have stated in paragraphs 10, 12 and 13 of his petition that the appellant was owning a shop, but sold the same since she could not manage it to some other person. In addition to this, the Certificate of the Drug Inspector, Balangir Range, placed on record also disclosed that the appellant was being engaged as a Pharmacist at M/s. Mukesh Medicals since 6-4-1994. In the light of such factual details disclosed, the appellant could not be considered to be ineligible either for applying or her claims being considered for selection for the purpose on hand.

9. The High Court also did not purport to negate her claims once and for all on such a ground.

10. Coming to the question of the alleged illegality or impropriety, if any, involved in the selection of the appellant by showing preference to her as a lady candidate, we are of the view that the High Court was too technical and pedantic in construing the Government Orders dated 9-11-93 issued on 27-11-93 and relying upon the rhetoric of the same to invalidate the selection of the appellant. The High Court should have construed the orders of the Government by keeping in view the purpose and substance as well as the object underlying the same, more with a view to promote the same rather than stifle it. In our view, the High Court has completely overlooked and also failed to keep into consideration the substantial difference involved between a case of reservation on the one hand and an instance of showing a preference on the other. As the relevant portion of the orders extracted by the High Court itself disclosed if only the Medical Store for the purpose of 30% of reservation is identified and specified, the question of inviting applications from members of both sexes for the purpose did not at all arise and such identified and specified Medical Stores could be allotted for being run only from out of the lady applicants and that even the advertisement to be issued has to be only for inviting applications from ladies, for such identified and reserved shops. So far as the case in question is concerned, it could be seen that the applications were invited from both gents and ladies. It is only because the store was not actually exclusively reserved for being run by the ladies that applications were invited from members of both sexes and finding that among the applicants there was a lady, duly eligible, preference came to be shown in the matter of selection. It is not the case of the fifth respondent that the ladies otherwise have been already selected and allotted shops against the 30% reserved quota in the District or that if any further preference is shown to the appellant for being a lady candidate, it will exceed and offend the 30% quota of reservation. The Policy of the State Government, indisputably being to provide 30% of the 24 hours Medical Stores within a District in favour of ladies by virtue of specific orders passed, therefore, that would itself provide sufficient and valid as well as legal basis for extending preference in favour of a lady applicant as long as the ceiling limit is not violated. Otherwise, by the mere fact of any lapse or omission on the part of the ministerial officers to identify a shop, the legitimate claims of a lady applicant could not be allowed to suffer defeating the very purpose and object of reservation itself. The view taken by the High Court has the consequence of overriding and defeating the laudable object and aim of the State Government in formulating and providing welfare measures for the rehabilitation of women by making them self-reliant by extending to them employment opportunities. Consequently, we are of the view that the High Court below ought not to have interfered with the selection of the appellant for running of 24 hours Medical Store in question.

11. For all the reasons stated above, the order of the High Court is hereby set aside, the Writ Petition filed in the High Court shall stand dismissed and the appeal shall stand allowed. No costs.


Competency of a woman as Panda or Pujari in a temple

Whether the office of the Pujari and Panda in a temple involves such duties as could not be discharged by a female in person and if so, whether she is also incompetent to get the same discharged by a deputy.

Now for this purpose it is desirable to have a clear idea of the duties of a Pujari in an ordinary Hindu temple. A Pujari has to perform the prescribed daily worship of the image as well as the special worship of a periodical nature on particular occasions and for prescribed festivals during the year. In Ramabrahma Chatterjee v. Kedar Nath Banerjee AIR 1923 Cal 60 Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjee indicated the daily routine of worship in the following passage :

“The normal type of continued worship of a consecrated image consists of the sweeping of a temple, the process of smearing, the removal of the previous day’s offerings of flowers, the presentation of fresh flowers and water, and other like practices. It is sufficient to state that the deity is, in short, conceived as a living being and is treated in the same way as the master of the house would be treated by his humble servant. The daily routine of life is gone through with minute accuracy; the vivified image is regaled with the necessaries and luxuries of life in due succession, even to the changing of clothes, the offering of cooked and uncooked food, and the retirement to rest.”

In Saraswati’s Hindu Law of Endowments (The Hindu Law of Endowments by Pandit Prannath Saraswati, T.L.L., 1892 (1897 Edn.) the nature of the daily worship of a consecrated idol in a temple is set out at pages 134 and 135 in detail. It must be recognised that the daily worship differs according to the tenets and usages of the religious sect for which the temple is intended and the idol is consecrated. But whatever may be the details of the worship and the variations therein, there can be no doubt that the ministration of various services involving personal touch of the idol, and, often enough, the recitation of religious hymns inclusive of Vedic hymns are amongst the normal and essential features of a Pujari’s duties, at any rate in temples where the worship is conducted according to the Shastras. It is also undisputed that according to Hindu Shastras the functions of a Pujari can be performed only by certain limited classes and involves special qualifications and that these classes may vary with the nature of the institution. Now, whatever may have been the position in early times, of which there is no clear historical evidence, it appears to have been well established in later times that a female, even of the recognised limited classes, cannot by herself perform the duties of a Pujari. Even at a time when the institution of temple worship had probably not come into general vogue, the incapacity of a woman to recite Vedic texts, to offer sacrificial fire, or to perform sacramental rites, is indicated in certain texts of Manu. (See Sacred Books of the East, Manu, Vol. 25, pages 330 and 437, Chapter 9, section 18 and Chapter 11, section 36). Whether it is on the basis of these texts or for some other reason, her incapacity to discharge, in person, the duties of the Pujari appears to have been well settled in later times as appears from the following text from Brihan-Naradiya Purana quoted in Saraswati’s Hindu Law of Endowments at page 136.

“Women, those uninvested with the sacred thread, (i.e. the members of the Dvija class before the initiation ceremony has been performed for them), and Sudras are not competent to touch images of Vishnu or Siva. A Sudra, one uninvested with the sacred thread, a woman or an outcaste, having touched Vishnu or Siva, goes to hell.”

This passage, in terms, refers to the images of Vishnu and Siva but it may reasonably be assumed, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that in practice the incapacity of a female to discharge the duties of a Pujari by herself extended, at any rate, to all public temples where an image of whatever form had been consecrated and installed according to the Shastras. Indeed, all the cases on the subject have assumed this incapacity of the female. The point of controversy has been whether she is also incompetent to get the duties discharged by employing a qualified substitute. If her competence in this behalf is recognised and can be accepted there is no reason why she should not be held entitled to succeed to the office. Thus the really important question for consideration in this case is whether the duties of the Pujari’s office can be got done by a substitute and if so is there any particular reason or clearly established usage, against a female employing such a substitute and thus becoming entitled to the office.

In early Hindu society a priestly office could have relation only to the performance of various kinds of Vedic rituals and sacrifices either of a daily and routine nature or of a periodical and special nature. In theory a Brahmin is to perform such functions for himself by himself, while persons of other classes should get them done through qualified Brahmins. On principle a priest in the Hindu concept is chosen as such with reference to his personal qualities and competence. The system of hereditary priesthood, however, with the possibility of persons not fully competent, succeeding to or occupying such an office, appears to have come into vogue from fairly early times. It appears, however, that from the very nature of the situation, the temporary discharge of the priestly function by a substitute in the place of the hereditary priest was a matter of inevitable necessity since the Hindu Shastras recognised temporary and casual disqualifications like that of birth and death pollution. But there does not appear to be any indication in the early books of any general practice about the functions of priestly office being discharged by proxies. In comparatively later days, however, there is clear indication of such a practice. In Saraswati’s Hindu Law of Endowments at page 56, it is stated that in the Padma Purana and other treatises incapacitated persons are directed to have the worship performed through Brahmins. This statement is with reference to the performance of service of an idol and has presumably reference to the incapacity of persons occupying a priestly office. In Colebrooke’s translation of the Digest of Hindu Law on Contracts and Successions with a commentary by Jagannath Tercapanchanana (4th Edition, published by Higginbotham & Co., Madras, 1874), Vol. I, Book II, Chapter III, Section II, pages 360 to 381 deal with the topic of partnership among priests jointly officiating at holy rites. A perusal thereof and particularly of placita 28 to 44 containing citations from various Smrutis with Jagannatha’s commentary thereon, clearly indicate that the institution of hereditary priestship, became established by that date and that the performance of such priestly functions by substitutes had definitely come into vogue. Various rules are propounded as to the sharing of remuneration between the substitute priest and the hereditary priest when the former happens to perform the functions in the place of the latter. It is to be noticed that these passages from Jagannatha’s Digest refer in terms only to priestly office by way of officiating at holy rites, i.e., sacrifice and other Vedic or Shastric functions but do not in terms refer to the discharge of a priest’s duties in relation to the worship of an idol in a temple. This is all the more remarkable because by the date of Jagannatha’s Digest the institution of worship of consecrated idols in temples had become long since fairly established. The probable explanation is that Jagannatha’s Digest is a commentary on selected texts mostly of the various Smrutis from which he quotes and that in the days of the Smrutis the temple worship does not appear to have come sufficiently into vogue. The historical origin and growth of temple worship has been fully dealt with in Saraswati’s Hindu Law of Endowments and has been also noticed in the referring judgment in Annaya Tantri v. Ammaka Hengsu AIR 1919 Mad 598. It is pointed out therein that according to Hindu sentiment the performance of the duties of an Archaka or Pujari for an idol has been considered sinful and it required inducements by way of liberal grants of land and promise of substantial perquisites to attract competent persons for the office of Pujari of Archaka. This, in course of time and with the change in social conditions and economic values, rendered the offices of Panda and Pujari in almost all the famous shrines in India, a lucrative affair, and has enabled the hereditary priests to get the functions discharged by paid substitutes and themselves enjoy a substantial margin of income. Here just in the same way as the patronage of the kings or the society may have been a great incentive to the development of the system of discharge of hereditary priestly functions by substitutes in relation to sacrificial and Vedic religious rites, the phenomenal development and worship of idols in temples and the substantial emoluments which in course of time rendered the discharge of priestly office lucrative must have brought into vogue the employment of substitutes for performance of the duties of the priests not only for sacrificial or other religious rites but also for temple worship. Whether and how far this practice is permitted by the Shastras is not the question before us. But it cannot be denied and is indeed a matter of common knowledge, that at the present day, hereditary priestly offices are, as often as not, performed by proxies, the choice of proxy being, of course, limited to a small circle permitted by usage. The question for consideration of the courts is, whether, in this state of things, a female is to be excluded from succession to the hereditary office of Pujari on account of her well recognised personal disqualification to officiate as such Pujari for the Shastrically installed and consecrated idols in the temples and whether she is to be denied the capacity to retain the property by getting the priestly duties efficiently discharged through a competent substitute. The only basis for the alleged denial is a passage from Jagannatha’s Digest which is as follows : (Vide Vol. I, page 379, commentary under placitum 43).

“Wives and others, disqualified by sex for the performance of holy rites, cannot appoint a substitute; as defiled person cannot perform a solemn act ordained by the Vedas, therefore wives have no property in the office of priest.”

Now apart from the question whether this passage can be taken to be sufficiently authoritative, there has been some difference of opinion as to the correct import thereof. In Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavanagurukkal (A.I.R. 1915 Mad. 561) this passage has been relied upon by Justice Sadasiva Aiyar as showing that women are incompetent to discharge the functions of a priest even through a substitute and that, therefore, they have no right of succession to the office. The learned Judges of the High Court in the present case have also relied on it. In Annaya Tantri v. Ammaka Hengsu AIR 1919 Mad. 598, Justice Seshagiri Aiyar in his referring Judgment has referred to this passage and was of the opinion that it does not express a specific view. In Ganapathi Iyer on Hindu and Mahomedan Endowments (2nd Edn.) the learned author while commenting on this very passage says as follows at page 453 of his book :

“Jagannatha there considers the question whether wives and others have a title to the succession to this priestly office. As usual with the discussions of Jagannatha it is difficult to say what his final opinion is. But we should certainly think that Jagannatha’s opinion is that women can inherit doing the duties through a substitute, but enjoying the emoluments attached to that office.”

It appears on a careful consideration of the disputed passage with reference to its context, that this view of the learned author is correct. In any case the passage cannot be definitely relied upon as an authority for the contrary view. The discussion in connection with which this passage occurs in the commentary is under placitum No. 43 in Section II of Chapter III, Book II, which is a text from Narada relating to hereditary priests. The statement relied on occurs at a place where there is an attempt to reconcile the disqualification of the female to discharge the functions of a hereditary priest, and the recognition of her right to succeed to all property including a hereditary office. The relevant portions of the discussion are herein below set out :

“It is doubted whether wives and others have a title to this succession, although the partition, founded on the admission of a right vesting in Agraharicas and other officiating priests, ought to be similar to the partition of inheritance in general. As the wife’s title to succession, on failure of heirs in the male line as far as the great-grandson, will be declared under the head of Inheritance, what should reverse her title in this instance? It should not be argued, that the wife can have no right to the village, because as a woman, she is disqualified for the performance of holy rites, and because the wives of agraharicas and others are totally incapable of receiving tila delivered as a gift to priests. The tila may be received, and the rites be performed, through the intervention of a substitute. Let it not be argued, that, were it so, a property in the sacrificial fee and regular dues would vest in the substitute. The wife may have the benefit of property acquired by the substitute, as a sacrificer has the benefit of rites performed by an officiating priest. However, there is this difference : the sacrificer acquires merit from rites performed by an officiating priest, and none is ever acquired by the intermediate performer of the rites; but if the duty of the officiating priest be performed by a substitute, property in the sacrificial fee is at first vested in the substitute, and through him, in the widow entitled thereto. It is alleged, that there is no authority for this construction.

* * * *

The text which ordains that “a person unable to act shall appoint another to act for him,” is the foundation of this construction : but the property of an outcaste, or other person disqualified for solemn rites, is absolutely lost, in the same manner with his right to the paternal gold, silver, and the like. This will be explained in the fifth book on Inheritance. Wives and others, disqualified by sex for the performance of holy rites, cannot appoint a substitute : as a defiled person cannot perform a solemn act ordained by the Vedas : therefore wives have no property in the office of priest.”

At the end of the discussion there is the following significant passage :

“Therefore the difficulty is thus reconciled; women are entitled to that only for which they are qualified. In regard to the assertion, that women, being disqualified, cannot appoint a substitute, this must be understood : being disqualified for solemn acts ordained by the Vedas, they cannot appoint a substitute for such acts; but, qualified for worldly acts, nothing prevents their appointment of a substitute for temporal affairs : and the right should devolve on the next in succession, under the text quoted in another place (Book 5, v. 477) and because women are dependent on men. Grain and similar property may be consumed by a woman entitled to the succession; but gold, silver, and the like, should be preserved : if she cannot guard it, let it be entrusted to her husband’s heir, as will be mentioned under the title of inheritance. Here, since a woman cannot preserve the office, it should be executed by her husband’s daughter’s son, or other heir : but the produce should be enjoyed by the woman. However, should the daughter’s son be at variance with his maternal grandmother, it may be executed by another person : he is not entitled to his maternal grandfather’s property, if that grandfather leave a wife : and should the maternal grandmother litigate, it must be amicably adjusted.”

 The concluding portion seems rather to indicate that the more categorical passage underlined above and relied upon is in the nature of an objection which is being answered and that the final conclusion is the recognition of a right to succeed by getting the duties of the office performed by the next male in succession. The learned Judges of the High Court have in fact noticed this concluding passage but have missed its correct import.

It is desirable now to consider how this question stands with reference to the decided cases in the various High Courts. A fairly substantial number of cases appear in the reports of the Madras High Court. One of the earliest decisions is that of the Madras Sadar Diwani Adalat in Seshu Ammal v. Soundaraja Aiyar [1853] M.S.D.A. 261 wherein it was held, following the opinion of the Sadar Court Pandits, that a woman was disqualified by reason of her sex from inheriting the office of Acharuapurusha but the same Pandit’s opinion distinctly recognizes that religious offices like those of an Archaka or Pujari can be held by a female, by her getting the duties thereof performed through a competent male substitute. In Tangirala Chiranjivi v. Rama Manikya Rao Rajaya Lakshmamma AIR 1915 Mad 505 it was stated that there was no basis for the assumption that a minor, a female, or a person unlearned in the Vedas, will lose the right to service in the temple and that the onus will be one the person who alleges the disqualification to prove it. The learned Judges categorically asserted (apparently as being a matter within general knowledge and experience) that “service in temples is being performed by proxies.” In Ramasundaram Pillai v. Savundaratha Ammal AIR 1915 Madras 725 the learned Judges say as follows :

“It is undeniable that this and other High Courts have in numerous cases acted on the assumption (which was not questioned) that women could hold religious offices and get the duties performed by proxy.”

They further say

“It may be that the parties concerned are so accustomed to the idea of female office-holders with proxies that it has usually not occurred to them to question the legality of such a state of affairs and that in the absence of contest, the Courts have some what too readily assumed it to be legal without requiring proof of a valid custom in support of it.”

In Rajeswari Ammal v. Subramania Archaka AIR 1917 Mad 963 the learned Judges state as follows :

“We are of the opinion that a female is not, under Hindu law or custom, disqualified from succeeding to a hereditary religious office and getting such duties as she may be disqualified by reason of her sex from performing, performed by proxy.”

The only dissentient view against this current of authority in the Madras High Court was that of Justice Sadasiva Aiyar in Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavanagurukkal AIR 1915 Mad 561. He expressed a strong opinion that the practice of allowing the priestly office to be performed by a substitute excepting for merely temporary occasions or casual purposes, is wholly opposed to public policy and that it should not be recognised. In a later judgment in Annaya Tantri v. Ammaka Hengsu AIR 1919 Mad 598 relating to the same topic he (Justice Sadasiva Aiyar) stated as follows :

“It is notorious that the deputy is usually chosen on the principle of a Dutch auction. The man who agrees to allow the widow to retain the largest portion of the emoluments of the office and to receive the least as his own remuneration is given the place of the deputy.”

The learned Judge pointed out that

“such a practice was mischievous and that even if it was sanctioned by usage it ought not to be recognised by courts.”

There is certainly force in this comment. But in a matter of this kind where there is no express prohibition in the texts for the performance of the duties of the Pujari’s office by the appointment of substitutes and where such an office has developed into a hereditary right of property, the consideration of public policy cannot be insisted on to the extent of negativing the right itself. In such a situation what has to be equally emphasised is the duty-aspect of the office and to insist, on the superior authorities in charge of the temple exercising vigilantly their responsibility by controlling the then incumbent of the priestly office in the exercise of his rights (or by other persons having interest taking appropriate steps through court), when it is found that the services are not being properly or efficiently performed. In view of the peculiar nature of such offices as combining in them both the element of property and the element of duty, it cannot be doubted that superior authorities in charge of the institutions or other persons interested have this right which may be enforced by appropriate legal means. In Raja Peary Mohan Mukherji v. Manohar Mukherji [1921] L.R. 48 I.A. 258 the Privy Council has recognised that notwithstanding the personal interest of a Shebait in respect of his office, the performance of the duties thereof has got to be safeguarded and that he can be removed where he has put himself in a position in which the obligation of his office can no longer be faithfully discharged.

So far as the Madras High Court area is concerned, the controversy has been settled by the Full Bench case in Annaya Tantri v. Ammaka Hengsu AIR 1919 Mad 598 where the view taken by Justice Sadasiva Aiyar was specifically overruled on the ground that “there were numerous decisions of the Madras High Court in conformity with the decisions of the other High Courts by which the widow and the daughter and the daughter of the last male Archaka are held entitled in accordance with the established user to succeed to the office of Archaka discharging his duties by deputy and to transmit it to their heirs, who as male heirs are preferred to female, and will generally be competent to perform the duties in person.” These decisions of the Madras High Court seem to recognise both the factum and validity of the usage as one that has been accepted by the courts not only within its own Jurisdiction but also within the Jurisdiction of the other High Courts. It is urged, however, that there is no such usage that can be definitely said to be established with reference to the decisions of the other High Courts.

As regards the other High Courts doubtless the actual cases appearing in the reports about this point are not many. In the Bombay High Court one of the earliest decisions is the case in 1866 of Keshavbhat bin Ganeshbhat v. Bhagirhibai Kom Narayanbhat 3 B.H.C.R., A.C.J. 75 where the learned Judges say as follows :

“With respect to the objection, that a Hindu female cannot perform the duties which attach to the office for the maintenance of which the allowance was granted, it may be observed that the defendant had not proved the existence of any usage in conformity with his allegation.”

The claim in question in that case was to an annual allowance paid from the Government Treasury to the members of a family for the maintenance of certain religious services at the temple of Mahadev at Baneshvar near Poona. In Sitarambhat et al v. Sitaram Ganesh 6 B.H.C.R. A.C.J. 250 the head-note shows as follows :

“Semble, that an hereditary priestly office descends in default of males through females.”

This is apparently the assumption on which that judgment appears to have proceeded though the matter does not appear to have been specifically so decided. In Calcutta one of the early cases is Poorun Narain Dutt v. Kasheessuree Dosee [1865] 3 W.R. 179. There it was recognised that a woman can succeed to a priestly office and the contention to the contrary was overruled on the ground that the lower appellate court found the same as a fact on the evidence and that no one but the defendant had raised the contention. In Joy Deb Surma v. Huroputty Surma [1871] 16 W.R. 282 the same question was raised, viz., whether according to Hindu law a woman can succeed to the priestly office and reliance appears to have been placed for that contention on the passage from Colebrooke’s Digest already above referred to. In view of this contention the learned Judges remitted the case to the lower court for determination of the question whether with reference to any particular custom or rule of Hindu law a woman is entitled to succeed to the priestly office. In that case it was the office of the Dolloi of the temple. It does not appear what the finding received was and how this matter was finally decided. In Radha Mohan Mundul v. Jadoomonee Dosee 23 W.R. 369 their Lordships of the Judicial Committee quoted with apparent approval the following passage from the judgment of the trial Court :

“They (the members of the family) merely say that as the said properties are of a doubter character, they are not susceptible of division among the share-holders; and that since the plaintiff is a childless widow, she is not competent to carry on the service of the gods. That the properties in question do not admit of any partition among the co-shares is a fact which must be admitted by me; but I do not see any reason why a widow of the family should be incapacitated from superintending the service of the gods. It is not urged by the defendants that any such rule has been laid down in the family, and that under it the widows have been excluded from the above superintendence. On the other hand, among the Hindus, persons belonging to no other caste except that of Brahmins can perform the service of a god with his own hands, that is, worship the idol by touching its person. Men of other castes simply superintend the service of the gods and goddesses established by themselves, while they cause their actual worship to be performed by Brahmins. Thus, when persons of the above description can conduct the service of idols in the above-mentioned manner, why should not the widows of their family be able to carry on worship in a similar way ?……………… Consequently, there is nothing to prevent the Court from finding that the plaintiff has a right to hold possession of the debtor properties enumerated by the defendants in the 12th paragraph of their written statement, and to superintend the service of the gods conjointly with the other co-sharers.”

 In Mahamaya Debi v. Haridas Haldar ((2)) it has been recognised that according to custom the pala AIR 1915 Cal 161s of Kaligahat shrine in Calcutta are heritable and that it was immaterial whether the heir is a male or a female. This must necessarily have involved the recognition of the capacity of the female to get the worship performed by a male substitute who is to be taken from a limited class. As has been already noticed, the reported cases dealing with this matter outside the Madras High Court do not appear to be many. At any rate, no others have been brought to our notice dealing with this question directly, though there are many cases relating to the question of succession to the office of Shebait and the performance of duties thereof by proxy, which is a matter distinguishable from a case relating to the office of Pujari or Archaka simpliciter. The paucity of decided cases in the reports of the other High Courts may very well be due to what has been pointed out in one of the Madras cases, viz., that the practice of females succeeding to this office and getting the duties thereof performed by a substitute was so common and well recognised that it has not been seriously contested and brought up to the Courts. Further the institution of private family temples and the endowments of large and substantial properties for the Deb-seva in such temples though somewhat uncommon in South India is fairly common in Bengal and some other States. In view of the Dayabhaga system of law of succession prevalent in Bengal and the very much larger number of occasions for wives and daughters succeeding to a sonless coparcener in Dayabhaga joint families, the practice of females succeeding to the priestly office and of getting to duties performed by other members of the family as proxies in their places must, by the very situation, have been common in these areas. The case reported in Jalandhar Thakur v. Jharula Das AIR 1914 P.C. 72 is a case relating to Shebait’s (priest’s) office in the Singheswar temple of Bhagalpur and the facts therein show that there was unquestioned female succession to the office. It is a clear indication of the prevalence of the usage of female succession to priestly office in the State of Bihar from which the present case arises.

 A careful review, therefore, of the reported cases on this matter shows that the usage of a female succeeding to a priestly office and getting the same performed through a competent deputy is one that has been fairly well recognised. There is nothing in the textual Hindu law to the contrary. Nor can it be said that the recognition of such a usage is opposed to public policy, in the Hindu law sense. As already pointed out the consideration of public policy can only be given effect in the present state of the law, to the extent required for enforcing adequate discharge of the duties appurtenant to the office. Subject to the proper and efficient discharge of the duties of the office, there can be no reason either on principle or on authority to refuse to accord to a female the right to succeed to the hereditary office held by her husband and to get the duties of the office performed by a substitute excepting in cases where usage to the contrary is pleaded and established. In the present case such a usage was pleaded by the defendant in his written statement but no evidence of it was given. Indeed as pointed out by the first appellate Court, the plea that there has been a partition of the offices of the two temples and the implied recognition of the plaintiff’s right to the office of the other temple at Gangupal appears to indicate the contrary usage. We are accordingly of the opinion that the claim of the plaintiff-appellant is made out and that she is entitled to succeed.

The discussion above is more germane to the case of a public temple wherein the idol has been Shastrically installed and consecrated and the worship is in accordance with the Shastras.

Hindu Woman’s Property Right in Context

 Under The Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937

Offerings from relations:- This is a acknowledged form of the stridhan. Gifts given to woman, throughout maidenhood, coverture or widowhood, by her parents and their relatives, or by the husband and his relatives. The Dayabagha School does not identify gifts of permanent property by spouse as stridhan.

Offerings from strangers:- Property given by gifts to a woman during her life time by strangers also acknowledged her stridhan. But these were for the period of her husband’s life time in the husband’s power. On his death these became her absolute stridhan.

Property achieved by self-exertion and mechanical arts:- A woman may achieve property at any phase of her existence by her personal self-exertion such as by physical labour, by service, by playing, dancing etc. or by any involuntary art. The property thus achieved during her life time by personal effort is her stridhan.

Property earned with stridhan:- It is an established law that the properties earned with stridhan or with the investments of stridhan, as well as accumulations and investments of the profits of stridhan, also acknowlged stridhan.

Property achieved by cooperation:- When a person achieves property under a cooperation, where under she gives up her privileges to her stridhan will be stridhan.

Property acquired by unfavorable control:- It is a well known law that any property that a woman achieves at any phase of her existence by unfavourable environment is her stridhan.

Property achieved for protection:- The expenses given to a Hindu female in total or occasionally for her protection, and all the fields of such protection recognize her stridhan. Likewise, all impermanent and permanent properties given to her by way of a fixed gift in pursuance of protection represent her stridhan.

Property acquired by inheritance:- A Hindu female can inherit property  from her parents as well as from her husband. Thus properties obtain from parents or from husband also constitute her stridhan.

Share acquired on division:- The share obtained on division of property is also her total property or stridhan.

  • The essence of a coparcenary under the Mitakshra Law is unity of ownership.
  • Hindu Mitakshara [Vijaneshwar] law determines estates in terms of tradition.
  • Mitakshara is a straightforward  Law. In the Mitakshara School, the allocation of inherited property was based on the law of possession by birth  The joint family property went to the group known as coparceners. The property is inherited in the Dayabhaga School[Jeenutavahan] after the death of the person who was in possession of it. Benaras School of Hindu Law is little different.
  • The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, bases its rule of succession on the basic Mitakshara principle of propinquity, i.e., preference of heirs on the basis of proximity of relationship.
  • The rules relating to making of a will is considered in the law of testamentary succession .
  • The law of inheritance is different from the law of succession
  • Hindu Statutory Interpretation :-The textual prohibition was only directory and not mandatory by applying a rule of interpretation expounded by Jamini, the author of ‘Purva Mimansa’ that all texts, supported by the assigning of a reason were to be deemed not as vidhi but as arthavada or recommendatory.
  • According to Mitakshra Law as administered in West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, no co-parcener can alienate even for value his undivided interest without the consent of the other co-parceners, unless the alienation be for legal necessity or for payment of antecedent debt by father. This is not all, even in case of alienation of such property in favour of a coparcener, the consent of the other co-parceners is also necessary, (see Para 260, Chapter XII of Mulla Principles of Hindu Law-15th Edition at page 347).
  • In Punjab and Haryana, the Hindus are governed by Mitakshra School of Hindu Law. According to paragragh 269 of the Hindu Law by Mulla which is a book of unquestioned authority since more than half a century, where a member of joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshra law sells or mortgages the joint Hindu family property or any part thereof without the consent of the coparcener, the alienation is liable to be set aside wholly unless it was for legal necessity and it does not pass the share even of the alienating coparcenor.
  • Supreme Court in Balmukand Vs. Kamla Wati and Others, :

    No doubt Pindi Dass himself was bound by the contract which he has entered into and the Plaintiff would have been entitled to the benefit of Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act which runs thus.

    On the basis of the same observations, the decision in Jawala Singh’s case (supra) was confirmed by the Letters Patent Bench in L. P. A. No 692 of 1973. In Balmukand’s case (supra) no question that where Mitakshra law prevailed, alienation of joint Hindu family property made by Manager or any coparcenor without any legal necessity and consent by the other coparceners did not bind the share of the alienor, was raised before the Supreme Court and as such the observations referred to above which were made in the context of Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act would be operative in that limited sphere. By no stretch of reasoning while making the said observations, the Supreme Court can be said to have laid down the law that in the States where Mitakshra law applies, alienation would be binding qua the share of the vendor even though it was made without the consent of other coparceners and legal necessity nor for the benefit of the estate.


Connected  statutes :-

  1. The Hindu Succession Act of 1956,
  2. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955,
  3. The Jammu and Kashmir Hindu Marriage Act, 1980,
  4. The Dowry Restraint Act, 1960
  5.  The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
  6. The Hindu Widow’s Remarriage and Property Act, 1989
  7. Article 370 of the Constitution – applicable in Jammu and Kashmir
  8. the Jammu and Kashmir Hindu Succession Act, 1956,

Hindu Digests :

Vrihad Manu [Commentary on Manu Samhita]

Yajnavalkya Smriti [The Text]

  1. Smriti Chandrika
  2. Vyavahara Mayukha
  3. Vivada Chintamani of  Vachaspati Misra
  4. Mitakshara -Vijnanesvara
  5. Dayabhaga – Jimutavahana


The Composition and physiological purpose of menstruation

Menstruation evolved to rid the uterus of bacteria. Due to the mixed nature of menstrual blood, it is difficult to know if the biological processes common to blood and menstrual blood, and vaginal fluid and menstrual blood. The menstrual cycle is a complex, finely orchestrated series of cellular, physiological, and biochemical changes under precise endocrine control that routinely builds a rich endometrial lining in constant anticipation of blastocyst implantation. A study shows that the woman lower genital tract is constantly exposed to various microorganisms, which could infect the upper genital tract
through direct migration. It is found that as normal microbial flora in the vagina, some gram-negative bacteria infect the uterine wall after ascending migration from the vagina to contaminate menstrual blood, consequently resulting in accumulation of endotoxin in the menstrual/peritoneal fluid and initiation of pelvic inflammation.

Menstrual blood is composed of three distinct body fluids: blood, vaginal fluid, and the cells and fluid of the late secretory phase of the uterine endometrial lining which is shed during menstruation.

Proteins are shared between venous and menstrual blood, while 513 proteins (48%) are unique to menstrual blood. A comparison of menstrual blood to vaginal fluid shows 388 shared proteins, while 673 (63%) are unique to menstrual blood. When all three body fluids are compared menstrual blood contained a total of 385 proteins (36% of total) not found in vaginal fluid or venous blood.

Blood and menstrual blood share two processes: death and establishment of localization, while vaginal fluid and menstrual blood also share two common processes: biological adhesion and developmental process. It should be noted that neither metabolic nor cellular processes, which involve the greatest percentage of proteins in blood, were identified in menstrual blood, and that locomotion is the sole biological process identified only in menstrual blood. The menstrual blood is highly contaminated with Escherichea coli and the endometrial samples[blood] are colonized with other microbes.

NB:- Purpose of this article is legal only and we accepted the premise that Holiness is different from Hygiene.