Reason for lecturing on ‘The Reasons for Judicial Reasoning and Justice.’
Reflection on experience and history suggests that those legal orders are most fortunate in which public authority and justice coexist without fear, and in which the exercise of power does not extinguish dignity. In a well-ordered republic, it is neither perpetual agitation nor idle quiet that sustains justice, but a balance in which public action is restrained by reason and repose is enriched by reflection. It was once assumed that, after long years of public and forensic labour, the space for thoughtful engagement with law and principle would naturally emerge. Yet the conditions of turbulent times have repeatedly unsettled this expectation.
Periods that ought to have secured calm and certainty have instead produced strain, urgency, and conflict. Precisely where institutions promise stability, the pressure to decide swiftly often displaces the obligation to decide rightly. In such moments, justice cannot rest on authority, habit, or expediency alone. It requires articulated reasons—reasons that explain why power is exercised, why conclusions are reached, and why outcomes deserve acceptance. Judicial reasoning thus becomes the medium through which justice makes itself intelligible and legitimate.
When established norms are disrupted and public life is drawn into continuous contest, decision-making stands exposed to error and arbitrariness. Even after formal authority has been exercised, the consequences of judgments return to test their soundness. Reasoned decisions alone can withstand this return. Judicial reasoning disciplines discretion, subjects conclusions to scrutiny, and anchors authority in rational justification rather than mere command.
Accordingly, the value of judicial reasoning does not diminish under pressure; it intensifies. Limited time, competing claims, and hostile circumstances do not excuse the absence of reasons but rather demand greater clarity. Whatever space is available within the demands of governance must be devoted to examining facts, weighing arguments, and justifying outcomes. Judicial reasoning is not an embellishment of justice reserved for tranquil conditions; it is the condition that allows justice to endure turmoil, retain legitimacy, and preserve the moral coherence of the legal order.
Synopsis: Ten-Lecture Series on “The Reasons for Judicial Reasoning and Justice”
Tanmoy Bhattacharyya
23rd January 2026
We are not concerned here with defining judicial reasoning. Reasoning may be legal, ethical, legislative, executive, or purely logical; all of them intersect, overlap, and quietly negotiate with one another in the judicial act of deciding a case, whatever its nature. Nor is there any utility in rehearsing what is meant by “judicial” or by “reasoning,” or in prescribing a model of reasoning that must appear judicious merely to justify a judicial stance. Our inquiry isnarrower and deeper: why are reasons given at all, why is judicial reasoning offered, and why does justice demand it?
A judgment may be just even when it is unreasoned; a decision may remain unjust despite a profusion of reasons. A cryptic order can sometimes heal, whereas an elaborate speaking order only aggravates. Yet the normative judicial discipline expects a recognizable sequence: appraisal of facts, proof through evidence, contest of arguments, their calibration against law, the inward reckoning of judicial conscience, and finally a conclusion. The closer a judge remains to this discipline, without unnecessary embellishment or intrusion, the better it serves both litigants and the state.
If judicial reasoning is the body, justice is the soul. A body without a soul is inert; a soul without a body is ineffable. Justice cannot endure without reasoning, and reasoning cannot disclose itself without justice. Indeed, justice may occasionally emerge without articulated reasoning, and that reasoning, if legally sufficient, may stand on its own. But a civilised legal order cannot afford this separation. Our civility—indeed our civilisation—demands their union.
In the Vedic tradition, Tarka and Nyaya together constituted Dharma in the Dharma Sthanam, the court of justice. A king’s court might rule without explanation; a Dharma Sthanam could not. It was bound to disclose both rational inquiry and principled judgment. We therefore inquire not into techniques of reasoning, but into their necessity: the reasons for judicial reasoning, and the reasons for justice itself.
Lectures are structured to include: (1) core objectives; (2) key themes and concepts; (3) global comparative elements; (4) historical and contemporary case studies; and (5) suggested readings (focusing on seminal texts and recent scholarship). The series assumes familiarity with basic jurisprudence but delves into advanced theoretical debates, empirical research, and speculative futures.
Lecture 1: The Imperative of Reasons in Adjudication – Philosophical and Normative Foundations
Objectives: Explore why articulated reasons underpin judicial legitimacy, distinguishing cases where justice emerges without them.
Key Themes: Reasons as safeguards against arbitrariness; participatory, accountability, and error-correction rationales; justice as soul separable yet intertwined with reasoning-body.
Global Outlook: Vedic Nyaya-Tarka mandating reasoned discourse in Dharma Sthanam vs. royal/kings’ prerogative; Greek equity (epieikeia) allowing deviation from strict rules; African Ubuntu emphasizing communal harmony over exhaustive justification.
Case Studies: Cryptic vs. speaking orders in modern jurisprudence; ancient examples of intuitive justice.
Suggested Readings: Excerpts from Gautama’s Nyaya Sutras; Soulemezis v Dudley Holdings (on reasons’ purposes); Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics; Martha Nussbaum’s Frontiers of Justice (2006).
Lecture 2: Ancient Imperatives – Why Reasoning Was Required in Dharma, Logic, and Early Courts
Objectives: Examine ancient mandates for reasoned adjudication as essential to dharma/justice.
Key Themes: Tarka (hypothetical refutation) and Nyaya (method of justice) as obligatory in courts; inference (anumana) proving cosmic order.
Global Outlook: Indian Nyaya-Vaisesika epistemology requiring pramanas (valid knowledge) vs. Mesopotamian/Hammurabi codes with implied rationales; Confucian rectification of names through reasoned harmony.
Case Studies: Dharma Sthanam proceedings vs. king’s discretionary edicts; early Athenian rationale in trials.
Suggested Readings: Cicero’s De Oratore; Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire (1986) for modern echoes; global survey in H. Patrick Glenn’s Legal Traditions of the World (2014).
Lecture 3: Medieval and Religious Traditions – Divine Justice and the Duty to Reason
Objectives: Probe why religious systems demanded (or excused) reasons in judgments.
Key Themes: Scholastic reasoning in canon law; Sharia’s qiyas (analogical reasoning) as obligatory justification.
Global Outlook: Aquinas’ synthesis of faith-reason vs. Islamic fiqh’s evidentiary chains; Jewish Halakha’s detailed responsa; Buddhist karmic reasoning in Vinaya.
Case Studies: Inquisitorial vs. accusatorial shifts; millet systems balancing reasons with communal equity.
Suggested Readings: Aquinas’ Summa Theologica; Al-Ghazali on legal reasoning.
Lecture 4: Enlightenment and Positivist Shifts – Reasons as Democratic Legitimacy
Objectives: Analyze why modern rationalism elevated reasoned judgments for accountability.
Key Themes: Social contract demanding transparent justification; positivism separating law but requiring reasons for application.
Global Outlook: Kantian autonomy vs. Qing/Meiji reforms; colonial impositions critiqued for unreasoned authority.
Case Studies: French Declaration’s rights justification vs. Haitian claims; early common law insistence on reasons.
Suggested Readings: Kant’s moral philosophy; Bentham on utility in judgments.
Lecture 5: Comparative Mandates – Why Systems Demand Reasons (or Permit Cryptic Orders)
Objectives: Compare why common, civil, and hybrid systems vary in reason-giving duties.
Key Themes: Stare decisis requiring precedential reasoning; codification allowing concise application.
Global Outlook: Anglo-American speaking orders vs. French succinct judgments; Islamic/ customary blends.
Case Studies: U.S. detailed opinions vs. European Court brevity; South African hybrid restorative approaches.
Suggested Readings: René David’s legal systems survey; Mathias Siems’ comparative law.
Lecture 6: Decolonial and Transitional Justice – Reasons Amid Power Imbalances
Objectives: Question why colonized/post-colonial systems demanded reasons for reparative legitimacy.
Key Themes: Structural injustice requiring explicit rationales; truth commissions prioritizing narrative over formal reasons.
Global Outlook: Fanonian critiques vs. Gacaca’s community-based minimalism; Indigenous resistance to unreasoned colonial edicts.
Case Studies: Nuremberg reasoned accountability vs. Rwanda’s efficiency; Indian affirmative action justifications.
Suggested Readings: Frantz Fanon; transitional justice literature.
Lecture 7: Contemporary Crises – Reasons in Human Rights and Environmental Adjudication
Objectives: Examine why global challenges compel elaborate reasons despite urgency.
Key Themes: Cultural relativism vs. universalism in justification; eco-justice requiring evidence-based reasoning.
Global Outlook: UN rights instruments demanding reasons vs. Asian values debates; Rights of Nature cases.
Case Studies: ICC reasoned verdicts vs. climate litigation transparency.
Suggested Readings: Sen’s capabilities approach; Stone on standing.
Lecture 8: Critical Perspectives – Reasons, Bias, and Inclusive Justice
Objectives: Critique why dominant reasoning paradigms exclude marginalized voices.
Key Themes: Intersectional demands for reasons exposing bias; feminist/CRT views on whose reasons count.
Global Outlook: Western feminist jurisprudence vs. African womanism; Islamic feminism’s reasoned reinterpretation.
Case Studies: Gender/race disparity cases requiring explicit rationales.
Suggested Readings: MacKinnon; Crenshaw on intersectionality.
Lecture 9: Digital and Algorithmic Adjudication – Reasons in an Automated Era
Objectives: Investigate why AI-assisted decisions heighten demands for explainable reasons.
Key Themes: Black-box risks vs. transparency imperatives; bias detection through mandatory rationales.
Global Outlook: EU GDPR explainability vs. Chinese social credit opacity; Indian biometric debates.
Case Studies: Predictive tools (e.g., COMPAS) requiring human-reasoned override.
Suggested Readings: Pasquale’s Black Box Society; Eubanks on automation.
Lecture 10: AI Futures – Reasons, Justice, and Post-Human Adjudication
Objectives: Speculate why human-AI hybrid systems must preserve reasons for justice’s soul.
Key Themes: Explainable AI as modern tarka-nyaya; risks of justice without human reflexive conscience.
Global Outlook: Western AI ethics vs. Eastern harmonious integration; African data sovereignty.
Case Studies: Hypothetical AI judges; global governance of reasoned AI decisions.
Suggested Readings: Bostrom on superintelligence; emerging AI jurisprudence.
This lecture series centers on the reasons why judicial reasoning is pursued and why justice requires (or occasionally forgoes) it, fostering deep reflection on civilization’s demand for both—intertwined yet distinct—in delivering just outcomes. Participants conclude with a synthesis exploring reasoned justice in the AI age.
