Philosophy of Law

What Is Philosophy of Law :

Philosophy of law is a branch of philosophy and, more in particular, the branch that deals with philosophical questions about law. Examples of such questions are as follows:

-Origin of Law
– how punishing criminals can be justified,
– what the essence of the rule of law is,
– whether human rights would still exist if they were not included in a statute or treaty,
– why contracts are binding,
– what the nature of law is.

The Normative Question
The Conceptual Question

Study of Leviathan

Foundation of Western Legal Tradition

Ancient
Modern

Contents

Indian Jurisprudence
Natural Law
Utilitarianism
Legal Positivism
Historical Approach
Marxist Approach
Sociological approach
Realist Approach
American Jurisprudence
Feminist Approach to Law
More topics on Legal Philosophy
Like this:

Indian Jurisprudence

Natural Law

Utilitarianism

Legal Positivism

Historical Approach

Marxist Approach

Sociological approach

Realist Approach

American Jurisprudence

Feminist Approach to Law

Hart: Introduction to his System

Law as System

The Concept of Law
Primary and Secondary Rules
A Fallible Theory
A Chain of Rules
Social Practice as Foundation of Law
The Role of “Officials”
A Practical Application: EU Law
Customary Law

Hart as a Legal Positivist

Thomas Hobbes: Normative Legal Positivism

The State

Positive Law and Natural Law

More Topics

Law and ideology
Law and language
Limits of law
Nature of Law
Rule of law and procedural fairness
Laws of nature
Ceteris paribus
Legal obligation and authority
Legal philosophy
Economic analysis of law
Legal positivism
Legal punishment
legal reasoning
Interpretation and coherence of Law
Precedent vs analogy
Legal rights
Political legitimacy

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