Volume 10 A of the Encyclopedia of American Law.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW
VOLUME 11: THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS – 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH AMENDMENTS
Remaking the Constitution After the Civil War
Introduction to Volume 11
The Civil War did more than preserve the Union. It transformed the Constitution. Three amendments adopted between 1865 and 1870 rewrote the relationship between the federal government and the states, and between the states and the people.
The Thirteenth Amendment (1865) abolished slavery. It also gave Congress power to enforce abolition by “appropriate legislation.” That power turned out to be broader than the eradication of formal servitude. Congress used it to ban racial discrimination in housing, public accommodations, and employment.
The Fourteenth Amendment (1868) did more than any other provision of the Constitution. It made birthright citizenship national. It forbade states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. It forbade states from denying any person the equal protection of the laws. It also penalized states that denied the vote to adult male citizens by reducing their representation in Congress.
The Fifteenth Amendment (1870) forbade the states and the federal government from denying the vote “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”
The amendments were revolutionary. They overturned the pre‑Civil War constitutional order in which the federal government had limited power to protect individual rights against the states. They made the federal government the guarantor of freedom and equality.
But the promise of Reconstruction was betrayed. The Supreme Court read the amendments narrowly. In the Slaughter‑House Cases (1873), the Court gutted the Privileges or Immunities Clause—the provision that was supposed to protect the basic rights of all citizens. In the Civil Rights Cases (1883), the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited only state action, not private discrimination. In Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the Court upheld “separate but equal” segregation.
It took a century and a second Reconstruction—the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s—to restore the amendments’ original meaning. The Court overruled Plessy in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). It enforced voting rights in a series of decisions culminating in South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966). It applied most of the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
This volume tracks the three amendments in order. Part One covers the Thirteenth Amendment: the abolition of slavery, the enforcement power, the Supreme Court’s early restrictive interpretation, and the modern revival of the Thirteenth Amendment as a basis for civil rights. Part Two covers the Fourteenth Amendment: citizenship, privileges or immunities, due process, equal protection, and the enforcement power. Part Three covers the Fifteenth Amendment: the right to vote, the history of disenfranchisement, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the modern Court’s narrowing of the Act.
PART ONE: THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
Chapter 1: The Text and History
“Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”
The amendment did two things. It abolished slavery throughout the United States. The Emancipation Proclamation (1863) had freed only slaves in Confederate territory. The Thirteenth Amendment extended freedom to the border states and any other place still holding slaves.
The exception for criminal punishment has been controversial. The prison system in the South after the Civil War used the exception to re‑enslave Black men. States enacted “Black Codes” that criminalized behavior that was not criminal for whites—vagrancy, loitering, joblessness. The convicted men were leased to plantations and mines. The system was called convict leasing. It did not formally violate the Thirteenth Amendment because the punishment was for a crime. But the crime was defined to catch Black men.
Section 2 gave Congress power to enforce the amendment. That power became the basis for civil rights laws that reach private discrimination. The Fourteenth Amendment, by contrast, applies only to state action. The Thirteenth Amendment applies to private actors as well.
Chapter 2: The Black Codes and the Congressional Response
After the Civil War, Southern states enacted Black Codes. Mississippi’s law required Black workers to sign labor contracts by January 1. If they failed to sign, they could be arrested for vagrancy. They could be fined; if they could not pay the fine, they would be hired out to employers. The law was slavery by another name.
Congress responded with the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Act declared that all persons born in the United States (except Indians) were citizens. It gave them the right to make contracts, sue, give evidence, and buy and sell property. It created federal criminal penalties for individuals who violated those rights.
President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Act. He argued that it was unconstitutional. The federal government had no power to regulate private conduct. Congress overrode the veto. Then, to make sure the Act was constitutional, Congress drafted the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chapter 3: The Enforcement Power
The Supreme Court’s first major Thirteenth Amendment case was The Slaughter‑House Cases (1873). The case was primarily about the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court also addressed the Thirteenth. The plaintiffs argued that a Louisiana law granting a monopoly to a single slaughterhouse violated the Thirteenth Amendment because it amounted to “involuntary servitude.” The Court disagreed. The amendment was aimed at the institution of slavery, not at economic regulation.
In United States v. Harris (1883), the Court struck down a federal law that punished conspiracies to deprive persons of their civil rights. The law was based on the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court held that the amendment reached only the badges and incidents of slavery. The specific conspiracy in Harris—a lynch mob that dragged four prisoners from a jail—was not within the scope of the amendment.
The restrictive reading continued. In the Civil Rights Cases (1883), the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875. The Act banned racial discrimination in inns, public conveyances, and theaters. The Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment reached only the actual institution of slavery. It did not reach racial discrimination by private businesses.
Justice Harlan dissented. He argued that racial discrimination was itself a badge of slavery. Congress could prohibit it.
Chapter 4: The Modern Revival
The Thirteenth Amendment lay dormant for nearly a century. Congress passed no major civil rights laws based on it after the Civil Rights Cases.
The revival began in the 1960s. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. (1968), the Court held that Congress could prohibit racial discrimination in the sale of housing under the Thirteenth Amendment. The Civil Rights Act of 1866—the same law Congress had passed before the Fourteenth Amendment—forbade racial discrimination in the sale of property. The Court held that the 1866 Act was constitutional. The power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment included the power to prohibit racial discrimination in housing.
Justice Stewart wrote: “When racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.”
Jones opened the door. Congress used the Thirteenth Amendment to pass the Fair Housing Act of 1968. The Court upheld the Act in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1972). Lower courts have upheld laws banning racial discrimination in employment, public accommodations, and credit under the Thirteenth Amendment.
The reach of the amendment is not unlimited. In United States v. Kozminski (1988), the Court held that the amendment prohibits only actual compulsion of labor. A scheme that used psychological coercion to force migrant workers to work was not “involuntary servitude” because the workers were not physically restrained.
In United States v. Cannon (2018), a district court held that sex trafficking is a form of involuntary servitude. The court upheld a federal law criminalizing sex trafficking under the Thirteenth Amendment.
Chapter 5: The Punishment Exception
The exception in Section 1—”except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted”—has been litigated. The exception permits forced labor as a punishment for crime. But the punishment must follow a conviction. The state may not arrest a person, convict him, and then force him to labor. The conviction must be for a crime that is not defined to target a particular race.
In Butler v. Perry (1916), the Court upheld a Florida law requiring able‑bodied men to work on public roads. The law did not punish a crime. The Court held that the duty to work on roads was a “civic duty,” not involuntary servitude.
In United States v. Reynolds (1914), the Court held that a state could require prison labor without violating the Thirteenth Amendment. The prisoners had been convicted of crimes. The exception applied.
The exception does not permit racial discrimination in the enforcement of criminal laws. In McLeskey v. Kemp (1987), the Court held that racial disparities in the death penalty were not a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The disparities were not caused by intentional discrimination.
PART TWO: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Chapter 6: The Text and History
“Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election… is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty‑one years of age, and citizens of the United States… the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty‑one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice‑President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath… as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two‑thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law… shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”
The Fourteenth Amendment is the longest and most complex amendment. Section 1 is the heart. It creates national citizenship, forbids states from abridging privileges or immunities of citizens, forbids states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process, and forbids states from denying any person equal protection.
Sections 2, 3, and 4 were specific to Reconstruction. Section 2 penalized states that denied the vote to male citizens. Section 3 barred former Confederate officials from holding office. Section 4 guaranteed that the Union debt would be paid and that Confederate debts would not.
Section 5 gave Congress power to enforce the amendment.
The framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment to make the Civil Rights Act of 1866 permanent. They intended to overturn Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), which had held that Black persons could not be citizens. They intended to protect the basic rights of all persons against state infringement.
Chapter 7: Citizenship Clause
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”
The clause overruled Dred Scott. It made birthright citizenship the rule. A person born on American soil is a citizen, with narrow exceptions: children of foreign diplomats, children of invading armies, and (originally) children of Native Americans living in tribal relations.
The scope of birthright citizenship has been litigated recently. In United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), the Court held that a child born in the United States to Chinese parents who were not eligible for citizenship was nevertheless a citizen. The parents were permanent residents. The child was born in San Francisco. The Court held that the Citizenship Clause applied.
The clause also covers naturalization. Congress has power to set the rules for naturalization. It may not create a separate class of “non‑citizen nationals” for persons born in American territories unless the territory is unincorporated.
Chapter 8: Privileges or Immunities Clause
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”
The clause was the framers’ primary vehicle for protecting substantive rights against the states. But the Supreme Court killed it in the Slaughter‑House Cases (1873).
The case involved a Louisiana law that chartered a single slaughterhouse in New Orleans and required all butchers to use it. The butchers argued that the law violated their privileges or immunities. The Court rejected the argument. Justice Miller distinguished between state citizenship and national citizenship. The Privileges or Immunities Clause protected only the latter. It protected rights that “owe their existence to the Federal government, its national character, its Constitution, or its laws.” The right to pursue a trade was not among them.
The Court listed the privileges or immunities of national citizenship: the right to travel to the seat of government, the right to use the navigable waters, the right to protection on the high seas, the right to peaceably assemble, the right to petition for redress of grievances. The list was short and trivial.
The Slaughter‑House decision has never been overruled. The Privileges or Immunities Clause remains a dead letter. The Court has used the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause to protect rights that the clause was designed to protect.
Chapter 9: Due Process Clause
“Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
The Due Process Clause has two faces. Procedural due process requires notice and a hearing before the government deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Substantive due process protects certain rights from government interference even if the government provides notice and a hearing.
The procedural side is covered in Volume 3. The substantive side has generated the most controversy.
The Court used substantive due process to strike down economic regulations in the Lochner era (1897–1937). The doctrine was discredited and abandoned.
The Court revived substantive due process in the 1960s to protect privacy rights. Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) struck down a state ban on contraceptives. Roe v. Wade (1973) struck down state bans on abortion. Lawrence v. Texas (2003) struck down state sodomy laws. Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) required states to recognize same‑sex marriage.
The substantive due process cases are covered in Volume 3.
The Due Process Clause also incorporates the Bill of Rights against the states. The Court has held that most of the first eight amendments apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The incorporation doctrine is covered in Volume 1.
Chapter 10: Equal Protection Clause
“Nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
The Equal Protection Clause is the most litigated provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. It requires the government to treat similarly situated people similarly. But the government classifies people all the time. The Court has developed tiers of scrutiny to evaluate classifications.
Race and national origin classifications receive strict scrutiny. The government must show that the classification is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.
Gender classifications receive intermediate scrutiny. The government must show that the classification is substantially related to an important interest.
Most other classifications receive rational basis review. The government must show that the classification is rationally related to a legitimate interest.
The equal protection cases are covered in Volume 3.
Chapter 11: Section 2 – The Apportionment Penalty
Section 2 penalized states that denied the vote to male citizens. The penalty was a reduction in the state’s representation in Congress. The section was intended to force Southern states to enfranchise Black men. It failed. The states simply accepted the reduced representation.
Section 2 has never been enforced. No state has ever lost representation under it.
Section 2 also contains an exception for “participation in rebellion, or other crime.” That exception has been used to justify felon disenfranchisement laws. States may deny the vote to persons convicted of a crime without losing representation.
Chapter 12: Section 3 – Disqualification from Office
Section 3 barred former Confederate officials from holding state or federal office. The disability could be removed by a two‑thirds vote of each house of Congress.
The section was used extensively after the Civil War. Congress removed the disability for most former Confederates in 1872. By 1898, all but a few had been restored.
Section 3 has been revived recently. After the January 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol, some argued that Section 3 barred former President Donald Trump from holding office. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in Trump v. Anderson (2024). The Court held that Section 3 applies to the presidency. But it held that Congress must pass implementing legislation to enforce the section against a candidate. Without such legislation, the states could not disqualify a presidential candidate.
Chapter 13: Section 4 – The Public Debt
Section 4 guaranteed that the Union debt would be paid. It also declared that Confederate debts were void. The section was designed to reassure bondholders that the Union would not repudiate its debts after the war.
The section has been cited in challenges to the debt ceiling. In Perry v. United States (1935), the Court held that Congress could not repudiate a government bond. But the Court has never held that Section 4 limits Congress’s power to regulate the currency.
Chapter 14: Section 5 – The Enforcement Power
“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”
Section 5 gives Congress power to pass laws to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The power is not unlimited. In City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), the Court held that Congress may not expand the substantive scope of the amendment. Section 5 is remedial, not substantive. Congress may pass laws that prevent or remedy violations of the amendment. But it may not redefine what counts as a violation.
Boerne struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as applied to the states. Congress had passed RFRA to overrule Employment Division v. Smith (1990). The Court held that Congress had exceeded its power. It was not enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment; it was reinterpreting it.
In United States v. Morrison (2000), the Court struck down a provision of the Violence Against Women Act that created a federal civil remedy for gender‑motivated violence. Congress had relied on Section 5. The Court held that there was no pattern of state violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The law was not remedial.
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett (2001), the Court struck down a provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act that allowed state employees to sue their employers for money damages. Congress had not identified a pattern of state violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The law was not congruent and proportional.
The Section 5 power is broad but not unlimited. Congress may pass laws that go beyond what the Court has held to be a violation, as long as the laws are “congruent and proportional” to the constitutional harm.
PART THREE: THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
Chapter 15: The Text and History
“Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”
The Fifteenth Amendment was the last of the Reconstruction Amendments. It was ratified in 1870. It forbade racial discrimination in voting.
Southern states evaded the amendment. They passed literacy tests, poll taxes, grandfather clauses, and white primaries. The devices were facially neutral. They applied to all voters. But they were administered in a racially discriminatory way. White voters were exempted through grandfather clauses—if your grandfather had voted, you did not need to pass a literacy test. Black voters were subject to the test.
The Supreme Court initially upheld these devices. In Giles v. Teasley (1903), the Court declined to strike down Alabama’s voter registration law. In Williams v. Mississippi (1898), the Court upheld Mississippi’s literacy test. The test was on its face race‑neutral.
Chapter 16: The White Primary
The Democratic primary in the South was the only election that mattered. The general election was a formality. The Democratic Party was a private organization. It could exclude Black voters from its primary.
In Grovey v. Townsend (1935), the Court upheld the white primary. The party was private. The state was not involved.
The Court reversed itself in United States v. Classic (1941). The case involved a Louisiana primary. The Court held that the primary was an integral part of the election process. The state had delegated power to the party. The party was acting as a state actor.
In Smith v. Allwright (1944), the Court overruled Grovey. The Texas Democratic Party’s white primary was unconstitutional. The party was acting under state authority. The state could not delegate its power to discriminate.
In Terry v. Adams (1953), the Court struck down a “pre‑primary” held by a private club. The club was created to evade Smith v. Allwright. The Court held that the club was a state actor because the state had closed its eyes to the discrimination.
Chapter 17: The Grandfather Clause
Grandfather clauses exempted voters whose ancestors had voted before the Civil War. The clauses were race‑neutral on their face. But only whites had ancestors who had voted. The clauses were struck down in Guinn v. United States (1915). The Court held that the grandfather clause violated the Fifteenth Amendment.
The decision did not end disenfranchisement. States responded with literacy tests and poll taxes.
Chapter 18: The Voting Rights Act of 1965
The Voting Rights Act was the most effective civil rights law in American history. President Lyndon Johnson signed it into law on August 6, 1965. The Act banned literacy tests and other devices. It also created a preclearance requirement for states with a history of discrimination.
Section 2 of the Act banned any voting qualification that results in discrimination. Section 2 applies nationwide. It is permanent.
Section 4 contained the coverage formula. It applied to states that had used a literacy test and had less than 50% voter turnout in the 1964 presidential election. The formula covered Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and parts of other states.
Section 5 required covered states to obtain preclearance from the Department of Justice or the federal court in Washington, D.C., before changing any voting law. The state had to show that the change did not have a discriminatory purpose or effect.
Section 5 was a powerful tool. The Department of Justice objected to thousands of voting changes. The preclearance requirement forced states to adopt fairer voting procedures.
Chapter 19: The Fifteenth Amendment in the Supreme Court
The Court upheld the Voting Rights Act in South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966). Chief Justice Warren wrote for the Court. The Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Fifteenth Amendment. The coverage formula was rational. The preclearance requirement was not punitive; it was remedial.
In City of Rome v. United States (1980), the Court upheld the Act again. The city had changed its voting system from district to at‑large elections. The change had a discriminatory effect. The Court held that the Act prohibited any change that had a discriminatory effect, even if the change was not intended to discriminate.
Chapter 20: The Demise of Preclearance
In Shelby County v. Holder (2013), the Court struck down Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act. The coverage formula was based on data from 1964 and 1972. The formula was outdated. Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the Act “imposes current burdens on States that were not justified by current needs.”
The Court did not strike down Section 5. It struck down the coverage formula. Without the formula, Section 5 has no effect. Congress has not updated the formula. Preclearance is dead.
In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee (2021), the Court narrowed Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The case involved two Arizona laws: one required voters to vote in their assigned precincts; one prohibited third‑party ballot collection. The Court held that these laws did not violate Section 2. The “totality of the circumstances” test from Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) was not a license to strike down every voting law that had a disparate impact.
The future of the Voting Rights Act is uncertain. Congress has not passed a new coverage formula. The Court has signaled that it will not read the Act broadly.
Chapter 21: Felon Disenfranchisement
States may deny the vote to persons convicted of a crime. The Fifteenth Amendment does not prohibit felon disenfranchisement. The amendment bars discrimination based on race. A facially neutral felon disenfranchisement law may violate the amendment if it was enacted with a discriminatory purpose.
In Hunter v. Underwood (1985), the Court struck down Alabama’s felon disenfranchisement law. The law had been enacted in 1901. The purpose was to disenfranchise Black voters. The law disenfranchised persons convicted of crimes of moral turpitude. The list of crimes was drawn to include crimes that were thought to be committed by Black people. The law violated the Fifteenth Amendment.
Most felon disenfranchisement laws are not challenged successfully. The laws are old. The original purpose is difficult to prove.
APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY
Birthright citizenship – The rule that a person born on American soil is a citizen of the United States. Derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause.
Black Codes – Laws enacted in Southern states after the Civil War to restrict the freedom of Black people. They were the impetus for the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Citizenship Clause – The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment. Establishes birthright citizenship.
Civil Rights Act of 1866 – The first federal civil rights law. Declared that all persons born in the United States (except Indians) were citizens. Gave them the right to contract, sue, and own property. Its constitutionality was secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Civil Rights Cases – The 1883 Supreme Court decision striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875. The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action, not private discrimination. The Thirteenth Amendment does not reach discrimination in public accommodations.
Convict leasing – The system of leasing prisoners to private employers. The practice used the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception for criminal punishment to re‑enslave Black men after the Civil War.
Due Process Clause – The clause in the Fourteenth Amendment that forbids states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Equal Protection Clause – The clause in the Fourteenth Amendment that forbids states from denying any person the equal protection of the laws.
Fifteenth Amendment – The amendment that forbids racial discrimination in voting.
Fourteenth Amendment – The amendment that establishes birthright citizenship and forbids states from violating due process or equal protection.
Grandfather clause – A voting qualification that exempted voters whose ancestors had voted before the Civil War. Struck down in Guinn v. United States (1915).
Incorporation – The doctrine that most of the Bill of Rights applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Privileges or Immunities Clause – The clause in the Fourteenth Amendment that the Supreme Court gutted in the Slaughter‑House Cases (1873).
Reconstruction – The period after the Civil War (1865–1877) during which the former Confederate states were readmitted to the Union and the Reconstruction Amendments were adopted.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act – The provision that bans voting laws that result in discrimination. Applies nationwide.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act – The preclearance provision. Requires covered states to obtain federal approval before changing voting laws. Rendered ineffective by Shelby County v. Holder (2013).
Slaughter‑House Cases – The 1873 Supreme Court decision that eviscerated the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Thirteenth Amendment – The amendment that abolished slavery.
White primary – A primary election limited to white voters. Struck down in Smith v. Allwright (1944).
APPENDIX 2: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Amar, Akhil Reed. The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction. Yale University Press, 1998.
Bond, James E. No Easy Walk to Freedom: Reconstruction and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Praeger, 1997.
Chemerinsky, Erwin. Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies. 7th ed. Wolters Kluwer, 2023 (Chapter 3 – Federalism; Chapter 6 – Due Process; Chapter 7 – Equal Protection; Chapter 11 – Congressional Enforcement Powers).
Foner, Eric. Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877. Harper & Row, 1988.
Foner, Eric. The Second Founding: How the Civil War and Reconstruction Remade the Constitution. W.W. Norton, 2019.
Gillette, William. The Right to Vote: Politics and the Passage of the Fifteenth Amendment. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969.
Kluger, Richard. Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality. Knopf, 1975.
Kousser, J. Morgan. The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One‑Party South, 1880–1910. Yale University Press, 1974.
Lawrence, Charles R., III. “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism.” Stanford Law Review 39 (1987): 317.
Lucas, J. Anthony. The Reconstruction Amendments: The Essential Documents. University of Chicago Press, 2012.
McAward, Jennifer Mason. “The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment Power.” Virginia Law Review 94 (2008): 1479.
Pildes, Richard H. “The Politics of Race and the Constitution: The Voting Rights Act as a Case Study.” University of Chicago Legal Forum 1998 (1998): 1.
Rosen, Jeffrey. The Supreme Court: The Personalities and Rivalries That Defined America. Times Books, 2007.
Rutherglen, George. “The Thirteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.” Virginia Law Review 77 (1991): 1.
Tribe, Laurence H. American Constitutional Law. 3d ed. Foundation Press, 2000.
Woodward, C. Vann. The Strange Career of Jim Crow. Oxford University Press, 1955 (rev. ed. 1974).
Volume 12: Personal Jurisdiction and Venue
