Laws applicable to the Republic of India
Misbehaviour and Incapacity Proceedings for Indian Judges
The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968: Procedure for Removing High Court and Supreme Court Judges
The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 was enacted to regulate the procedure for investigating and proving misbehaviour or incapacity of Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, including the Chief Justice of India and Chief Justices of High Courts, and to provide the method by which Parliament may present an address to the President for their removal. The Act comes into force on a date notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette.
For the purposes of this law, the Chairman means the Chairman of the Council of States, the Speaker means the Speaker of the House of the People, the Committee refers to the three-member inquiry body constituted under section 3, a Judge includes any Judge of the Supreme Court or High Court including their Chief Justices, and “prescribed” refers to rules framed under this Act.
A motion for the removal of a Judge can only begin when notice is given by at least one hundred Lok Sabha members or fifty Rajya Sabha members. The Speaker or Chairman may admit or refuse the motion after considering relevant material. If admitted, a Committee must be constituted to investigate the charges, consisting of one Supreme Court Judge, one Chief Justice of a High Court, and one distinguished jurist. If both Houses give notice on the same day, the Committee is formed jointly only if both admit the motion. If notices are given on different days, the later notice stands rejected.
The Committee frames definite charges and communicates them with supporting grounds to the Judge, who is given a reasonable opportunity to respond in writing. In cases involving alleged physical or mental incapacity, the Committee may order a medical examination by a Medical Board appointed by the Speaker or Chairman (or both, if jointly constituted). The Board reports whether the incapacity renders the Judge unfit for office; refusal by the Judge to undergo examination permits the Committee to presume incapacity. After considering the defence and any medical report, the Committee may amend charges and give the Judge a further opportunity to respond. The Central Government may appoint an advocate to conduct the case against the Judge if requested.
The Committee regulates its own procedure and must give the Judge a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, present evidence, and be heard. After completing its investigation, it submits a report to the Speaker or Chairman (or both), with findings on each charge and relevant observations. The report must be laid before both Houses of Parliament.
For investigation, the Committee has civil-court powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, such as summoning witnesses, examining them on oath, compelling production of documents, receiving evidence on oath, and issuing commissions.
If the Committee finds the Judge not guilty or not suffering from incapacity, the process ends and the motion lapses. If guilt or incapacity is found, the motion is taken up for consideration by the House or Houses in which it is pending. If both Houses adopt the motion in accordance with constitutional requirements under Article 124(4) or Article 124(4) read with Article 218, misbehaviour or incapacity is deemed proved and an address for removal is presented to the President in the same session.
A Joint Committee of fifteen members (ten nominated by the Speaker and five by the Chairman) is constituted to frame rules to implement the Act. It elects its own Chairman and regulates its own procedure. The rules may provide for transmission of motions between Houses, mode of presenting the removal address to the President, allowances for Committee members and witnesses, facilities to be given to the Judge for defence, and any other necessary matters. Rules come into force only after approval by both the Speaker and Chairman and publication in the Official Gazette.
Although the Act appears detailed, its most severe flaw is that it is effectively toothless. The law creates an elaborate mechanism but gives no independent or automatic means to initiate action. It requires an extremely high political threshold—100 Lok Sabha members or 50 Rajya Sabha members—to merely start the process, making initiation practically impossible without political consensus. Further, the Speaker or Chairman may simply refuse to admit the motion, meaning investigation depends entirely on political discretion rather than objective triggers. Even when a Committee finds a Judge guilty, Parliament must still pass a removal motion with a special majority in both Houses, a level of consensus rarely achievable. As a result, even clear cases of misconduct have historically not resulted in removal. The Act also provides no intermediate disciplinary options—no suspension, censure, or administrative action—meaning misconduct is either ignored or escalated to an impossibly high threshold. The judiciary itself controls one member of the inquiry panel, and the process lacks transparency, creating further concerns that colleagues may protect one another. For these reasons, the law functions more like a symbolic framework than an effective accountability mechanism. In practice, it operates almost as if there were no law at all for dealing with judicial misconduct, since the procedural hurdles make its use exceptionally rare and virtually unworkable.
February 22, 2026
