The principle that the costs of administration of justice should be met entirely through court fees levied on users is termed as `full cost recovery’. In this chapter it is proposed to examine the practice in some of the commonwealth countries where this principle which was applied long ago, has now been either modified or given up altogether. In fact, a survey of the available literature reveals that the full cost recovery principle has been found to be wholly unsupportable and is not accepted in any country in the Commonwealth or in Europe.
Since the 5G roll-out has not actually happened, though - equally damaging - trials involving the human population have started (which is not the same as doing trials on pigs and/or rats, and/or in an empty Thar Desert, or on the employees of the private defendants) - so that not even one single human life is lost by these trials, the plaintiffs are agreeable if this Court, while waiving the requirement of Section 80(1) of the CPC, grants fair opportunity to the State Defendants to show cause as to why no interim relief be granted which, in any case, is sought against the private defendants, and not against the State defendants.
Court Fees Act, 1870—Section 12—Deficiency in court-fees—It is the matter between the Court and the State—The defendant who may believe even honestly that proper court-fee has not been paid by the plaintiff, he has no right to move the superior court by appeal or revision against the order adjudging the court-fee.
COURT FEES-The plaintiff had sued for a twofold declaration: (i) that the property described in the plaint was a waqf, and (ii) that certain alienations thereof by the mutwali and his brother were null and void and were ineffectual against the waqf property. It was held that the second part of the declaration was tantamount to the setting aside or cancellation of the alienations and therefore the relief claimed could not be treated as a purely declaratory one and inasmuch as it could not be said to follow directly from the declaration sought for in the first part of the relief, the relief claimed in the case could be treated as a declaration with a “consequential relief.
In suits for partition and separate possession of a share of joint family property or of a joint property, or to enforce a right to a share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property or joint property if the plaintiff has been excluded from possession of the property of which he claims to be a co-parcener or co-owner, according to the market value of the share in respect of which the suit is instituted
Plaint or written statement pleading a set off or Counter Claim or Memorandum of Appeal presented to any Court.
Concept of "market value" - a wider concept in other contexts, was deemed to be referrable to one or other modes of determining the value under sub clauses (v), (va) or (vb) of Section 7 (iv-A).
order33 -For calculation of court-fee, there does not exist any distinction between a situation attracting Rule 10 on the one hand and Rule 11 on the other. The court-fee is to be calculated on the amount claimed and not on the amount decreed. For the said purpose, what is relevant is the final decision taken by the court in this behalf. Rule 11 directing the pauper plaintiff to pay the court-fee can be made in the four different situations: (i) When the plaintiff failed in the suit. (ii) Where the plaintiff is dispaupered. (iii) Where the suit is withdrawn. (iv) Where the suit is dismissed under the circumstances specified in clause (a) or clause (b).
Deficit court fee: Section 149 provides that where the whole or any part of court fee prescribed for any document has not been paid, the court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part as the case may be, of such court fee, and upon such payment, the document in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such court fee had been paid in the first instance. Section 4 of the court fees Act bars the court from receiving the plaint if it does not bear the proper court fee. Section 149 acts as an exception to the said bar.
Cancellation of the deed: If ‘A’, the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad-valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If ‘B’, who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of ` 19.50 under Article 17(iii) of Second Schedule of the Act. But if ‘B’, a non- executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem court fee as provided under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act.
Cancellation of document: If the expression ‘value of the subject matter of the suit’ was not followed by the deeming clause, it could possibly be argued that the word ‘value’ means the market value, but by employing the deeming clause, the legislature has made it clear that if the document is sought to be cancelled, the amount of court fee shall be computed on the value of the property for which the document was executed and not the market value of the property.
Indigent person: in terms of explanation I to Rule 1 of Order 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is one who is either not possessed of sufficient means to pay court fee when such fee is prescribed by law, or is not entitled to property worth one thousand rupees when such court fee is not prescribed. In both the cases, the property exempted from the attachment in execution of a decree and the subject-matter of the suit shall not be taken into account to calculate financial worth or ability of such indigent person.