A dying declaration is admissible in evidence under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It alone can also form the basis for conviction if it has been made voluntarily and inspires confidence. If there are contradictions, variations, creating doubts about its truthfulness, affecting its veracity and credibility or if the dying declaration is suspect, or the accused is able to create a doubt not only with regard to the dying declaration but also with regard to the nature and manner of death, the benefit of doubt shall have to be given to the accused. Therefore much shall depend on the facts of a case. There can be no rigid standard or yardstick for acceptance or rejection of a dying declaration.
FIR has been lodged/filed by the brother of the deceased after a period of almost 29 years from the date of incident and after a period of 9 years from the date of decision of this Court in the case of Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (supra) and nothing is on record that in between he had taken any steps to initiate criminal proceedings and/or lodged an FIR, we are of the opinion that at least a case is made out by the appellant for grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438, Cr.P.C. Many a time, delay may not be fatal to the criminal proceedings. However, it always depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, at the same time, a long delay like 29 years as in the present case can certainly be a valid consideration for grant of anticipatory bail.
The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
Whether bias was caused by complainant also being the investigating officer?
Whether alternate version has been established and what is the effect of lack of independent witnesses?
Whether High Court erred in reversing acquittal in appeal?
(A) What is the scope and essence of the High Court’s appellate jurisdiction against a judgment of acquittal?
(B) What is the extent of reliance upon a document with which the other side was not confronted with during cross-examination?
C) Whether non-examination of independent witnesses vitiates the prosecution case?
Under Article 142 of the Constitution this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any ’cause’ or ‘matter’ pending before it. The expression “cause” or “matter” would include any proceeding pending in court and it would cover almost every kind of proceeding in court including civil or criminal.
QUANTUM OF PUNISHMENT-The learned counsel for the accused No. 5 was at pains to persuade us that the said accused is now about 70/75 years of age and at this distance of time, it may not be appropriate to send him back to jail. Taking overall view of the matter, we are not impressed by this submission. Even in case of offence under Section 326, IPC, which commended to the High Court, the same was punishable with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description which may extend to ten years and also liable to fine. Had it been a conviction under Section 326, as aforesaid, the sentence of only about five months in the facts of the present case, by no stretch of imagination, was adequate.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898—Section 288 and Evidence Act, 1872— Section 33—Evidence of a witness given in the committal Court—Cannot be treated as evidence after his death in session trial under Section 288 though it may be considered relevant under Section 33 Evidence Act.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Sections 273 and 284—Recording of evidence by video conferencing—Issuance of commission—Permissibility—When attendance of a witness cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience—Commission can be issued to record evidence by way of video conferencing.
Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act mandates that to make the confession of a coaccused admissible in evidence, there has to be a joint trial. If there is no joint trial, the confession of a co accused is not at all admissible in evidence and, therefore, the same cannot be taken as evidence against the other coaccused.
Proceeding under section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. When the magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence