The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
Whether bias was caused by complainant also being the investigating officer?
Whether alternate version has been established and what is the effect of lack of independent witnesses?
Whether High Court erred in reversing acquittal in appeal?
(A) What is the scope and essence of the High Court’s appellate jurisdiction against a judgment of acquittal?
(B) What is the extent of reliance upon a document with which the other side was not confronted with during cross-examination?
C) Whether non-examination of independent witnesses vitiates the prosecution case?
Under Article 142 of the Constitution this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any ’cause’ or ‘matter’ pending before it. The expression “cause” or “matter” would include any proceeding pending in court and it would cover almost every kind of proceeding in court including civil or criminal.
QUANTUM OF PUNISHMENT-The learned counsel for the accused No. 5 was at pains to persuade us that the said accused is now about 70/75 years of age and at this distance of time, it may not be appropriate to send him back to jail. Taking overall view of the matter, we are not impressed by this submission. Even in case of offence under Section 326, IPC, which commended to the High Court, the same was punishable with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description which may extend to ten years and also liable to fine. Had it been a conviction under Section 326, as aforesaid, the sentence of only about five months in the facts of the present case, by no stretch of imagination, was adequate.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898—Section 288 and Evidence Act, 1872— Section 33—Evidence of a witness given in the committal Court—Cannot be treated as evidence after his death in session trial under Section 288 though it may be considered relevant under Section 33 Evidence Act.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Sections 273 and 284—Recording of evidence by video conferencing—Issuance of commission—Permissibility—When attendance of a witness cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience—Commission can be issued to record evidence by way of video conferencing.
Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act mandates that to make the confession of a coaccused admissible in evidence, there has to be a joint trial. If there is no joint trial, the confession of a co accused is not at all admissible in evidence and, therefore, the same cannot be taken as evidence against the other coaccused.
Proceeding under section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. When the magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence
FARE INVESTIGATION-Section 156(3) CrPC is wide enough to include all such powers in a Magistrate which are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation, and it includes the power to order registration of an FIR and of ordering a proper investigation if the Magistrate is satisfied that a proper investigation has not been done, or is not being done by the police.
Civil vs Criminal Proceeding-effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal Courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein.
Penal Code, 1860—Sections 211 and 500—Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Sections 195, 340 and 439—Bail proceedings are judicial proceedings—Any offence punishable under Section 211, IPC could be taken cognizance of only at instance of court in relation to whose proceedings same was committed or who finally dealt with that case—Bar contained in Section 195, Cr.P.C. was clearly attracted to complaint filed by respondent—Impugned orders quashed.
The consistent view taken by this Court that the exercise of power of judicial review of the decision taken by His Excellency the President of India in Mercy Petition is very limited.Keeping in view the above principles, when we considered the grounds raised by the petitioner, we do not find any ground to hold that there was non-application of mind by the President of India. Insofar as the alleged torture of the petitioner in the prison, as we have held in earlier Writ Petition (criminal) Diary No. 3334 of 2020, the alleged torture in the prison cannot be a ground for review of the order of rejection of the Mercy Petition by the President of India.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-It is now well settled principle of law that the Court cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to. Courts should avoid a construction, which would reduce the legislation to futility. It is also well settled that every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its language. It is also trite that when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the court would attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of the provision, having regard to the great consequences of the alternative constructions.
Penal Code, 1860—Sections 499 and 500-Freedom of press vis-a-vis the right to privacy of the citizens of this country-once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others.
Rape Case acquittal -Trial Court and the High Court have convicted the accused merely on conjectures and surmises. The Courts have come to the conclusion based on assumptions and not on legally acceptable evidence, but such assumptions were not well founded, inasmuch as such assumptions are not corroborated by any reliable evidence. Medical evidence does not support the case of the prosecution relating to offence of rape.
Criminal-Whether the appellant-one of the co-accused against whom the charge-sheet is already filed and against whom the trial is in progress, is required to be heard and/or has any locus in the proceedings under Section 173(8) CrPC – further investigation qua one another accused namely Shri Bhaumik against whom no charge-sheet has been filed till date?
To ensure that a “proper investigation” takes place in the sense of a fair and just investigation by the police – which such Magistrate is to supervise – Article 21 of the Constitution of India mandates that all powers necessary, which may also be incidental or implied, are available to the Magistrate to ensure a proper investigation which, without doubt, would include the ordering of further investigation after a report is received by him under Section 173(2); and which power would continue to enure in such Magistrate at all stages of the criminal proceedings until the trial itself commences.
Sections 376 and 450 of the IPC-It cannot be disputed that there can be a conviction solely based on the evidence of the prosecutrix. However, the evidence must be reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, now let us examine the evidence of the prosecutrix and consider whether in the facts and circumstances of the case is it safe to convict the accused solely based on the deposition of the prosecutrix, more particularly when neither the medical report/evidence supports nor other witnesses support and it has come on record that there was an enmity between both the parties.
Nirbhaya’s case-Vinay Sharma – a death-row convict-we do not find any ground for exercise of judicial review of the order of the President of India rejecting the petitioner’s mercy petition and this writ petition is liable to be dismissed.