Madhu Limaye Vs State of Maharashtra-31/10/1977

By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-s. (2) of S. 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Art. 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of S. 397 (2). It is neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub-sec. (2) of S. 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course.

Municipal Corporation of Delhi  Vs Ram Kishan Rohtagi and ors-01/12/1982


Section 482 of the present Code is the ad verbatim copy of Section 561 A of the old Code. This provision confers a separate and independent power on the High Court alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in cases where grave and substantial injustice has been done or where the process of the Court has been seriously abused. It is not merely a revisional power meant to be exercised against the orders passed by subordinate Courts.