‘Unable to maintain herself’

 Supreme Court Rulings on Wives’ Maintenance Claims

(a) 1999 SCC 1118 (Rajathi v. C. Ganesan), in paragraph-7, it reads as follows:

7. .. It rather unnecessarily put the burden on the wife to prove that she was unable to maintain herself. The words “unable to maintain herself” would mean that means available to the deserted wife while she was living with her husband and would not take within itself the efforts made by the wife after the desertion to survive somehow. Section 125 is enacted on the premise that it is obligation of the husband to maintain his wife, children and parents. It will, therefore, be for him to show that he has no sufficient means to discharge his obligation and that he did not neglect or refuse to maintain them or any one of them. The High Court also observed that the wife did not plead as to since when she was living separately. This is not quite a relevant consideration. Even though the wife was unable to prove that the husband had remarried, yet the fact remained that the husband was living with another woman. That would entitle the wife to live separately and would amount to neglect or refusal by the husband to maintain her. The statement of the wife that she was unable to maintain herself would be enough and it would be for the husband to prove otherwise.

(b)2005 SCC 1089 (Shantha alias Ushadevi and Anr. v. B.G. Shivananjappa) in paragraph-8, it reads as follows:

8. We are, therefore, of the view that in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the bar u/s 125(3) cannot be applied and the High Court has erred in reversing the order of the Sessions Judge. It must be borne in mind that Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure is a measure of social legislation and it has to be construed liberally for the welfare and benefit of the wife and daughter. It is unreasonable to insist on filing successive applications when the liability to pay the maintenance as per the order passed u/s 125(1) is a continuing liability.

(c) 1978 SCC 508 (Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal and Ors.) in paragraph-9, it reads as follows:

9. This provision is a measure of social justice and specially enacted to protect women and children and falls within the constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39. We have no doubt that sections of statutes calling for construction by Courts are not petrified print but vibrant words with social functions to fulfill. The brooding presence of the constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like women and children must inform interpretation if it has to have social relevance. So viewed, it is possible to be selective in picking out that interpretation out of two alternatives which advance the cause–the cause of the derelicts.